Montgomery as Battlefield Commander

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Sailor Malan:

as my signature points out, MG was somewhat out of character for him to even attempt

The plan does have an antecedant. I think D'Este illuminates the plan to envelop Caen by dropping paratroops to the south and linking up with two armoured pincers from either side of the city.

[flamingknives]

As I see it, from post Alamein and post Normandy, Monty seems to get cocky after a victory or poor performance by his opponents and then become almost sloppy in the next series of battles.

[ErrantRecce1]

I completely agree with you knives, although I would go one further. Montgomery, was never a good leader in my opinion, sure he would put on a good show when in front of the men ( which i suppose was worth something) but strategically, he only ever had one mode; slow. I think that you can go back to Montgomeries first kick at the can and see him for the rest of the war. At El Alamein, he took a well reasoned plan set up by Auchinleck, and distorted it all out of shape, bulked it up, til it look like Roseanne, and then expected it to perform. He had the opportunity to significantly shorten the desert war by snipping off large hunks of the DAK, but he and the forces under his command moved like sludge in the Thames instead. His "Corp de Chasseurs" who were supposed to tear off once the initial lines had pierced, didn't get off the line til a day later. His command and the performance of his foreces was atrocious, but they were all great friends. The original Plan for El Alamein, called for a month or two to get everyone in order and then the attack, with the supplies so short, they would have handed teh DAK it's head ( like had happened a couple times before, whenever the supply lines got too long) but this time Auchinleck had planned for a finishing stroke ( think of removing Rommel from the West Wall preparation). Instead we got Montgomery and the most miserable drudge since Haig. That is totally aside from him being a whiny prig. That's another story for another day.

[CombinedArms]

I'm not exactly Monty's biggest fan--but I point out again that he did win almost all of his battles. He might have won them bigger, better or faster, but winning sure beats losing. And he kept his job till war's end, something no British field general had managed previously through the war.

I think Spook had an excellent point regarding Market Garden. The months between Oct and Dec. '44 were a low point for the western Allied generalship overall. They had indeed picked up victory fever and kept looking for that one big breakthrough when the logistics really we're there yet to support it. The Allies ended up holding essentially the same line from Oct '44 to Feb or March '45, after which they broke through and overran everything. Those five months were essential to build up both the supplies and the troops (many, many new divisions) to allow the big breakout. Probably a lot of lives could have been saved if the Allies hadn't pushed so hard during the consolidation period. But Monty wasn't alone in pushing.

BTW, my theory of why Monty went for the aggressive, risky and therefore uncharacteristic plan of MG was simply that it offered his only plausible chance for a priority claim on Ike's resources. Hence, he advocated a risk that was really out of character for him.

[Sailor Malan]

Originally posted by ErrantRecce1:

I completely agree with you knives, although I would go one further. Montgomery, was never a good leader in my opinion, sure he would put on a good show when in front of the men ( which i suppose was worth something) but strategically, he only ever had one mode; slow. I think that you can go back to Montgomeries first kick at the can and see him for the rest of the war. At El Alamein, he took a well reasoned plan set up by Auchinleck, and distorted it all out of shape, bulked it up, til it look like Roseanne, and then expected it to perform. He had the opportunity to significantly shorten the desert war by snipping off large hunks of the DAK, but he and the forces under his command moved like sludge in the Thames instead. His "Corp de Chasseurs" who were supposed to tear off once the initial lines had pierced, didn't get off the line til a day later. His command and the performance of his foreces was atrocious, but they were all great friends. The original Plan for El Alamein, called for a month or two to get everyone in order and then the attack, with the supplies so short, they would have handed teh DAK it's head ( like had happened a couple times before, whenever the supply lines got too long) but this time Auchinleck had planned for a finishing stroke ( think of removing Rommel from the West Wall preparation). Instead we got Montgomery and the most miserable drudge since Haig. That is totally aside from him being a whiny prig. That's another story for another day.

Sorry, but the old 'Montgomery only picked up the Auks plan' debate has been had, and debunked before. I suggest you read some more accounts! There is a thread somewhere were this was discussed earlier - I can't find it at present, but will post a link later.

What makes you think that Rommel would be any less likely to escape from a surrounded position than he was from Tunisia?

Methinks that emotion doth not make a good basis for historical analysis...

[Determinant]

Originally posted by Sailor Malan:

[i suggest you read some more accounts! There is a thread somewhere were this was discussed earlier - I can't find it at present, but will post a link later.

Methinks that emotion doth not make a good basis for historical analysis...

Amen to that. Read some books fellahs - they're great! Some of the stuff here is what I would expect Homer Simpson to trot out if asked. But at least we'd be knocking back some beers in Moe's.

I have no liking for Montgomery. He was not a likeable man. He was a vain, prickly, self-conceited, prig. War is not a popularity competition but many of the criticisms that are levelled at him are motivated by nothing more than personal dislike.

Some observations:

1. He had an enormous experience of, and appetite for war. Alan Brooke, no mean strategist and soldier, thought highly of Montgomery.

2. He trained his soldiers well, and he fought his battles as he wanted to fight them. More often than not his battles went the way that he wanted them to. He had grip.

3. The men that served under him are still very proud of the fact. Sydney Jary and his contemporaries still get angry, after all these years, at unthinking criticism of their much-maligned army group commander. That is a deeper and longer loyalty than many men have for their wives. Oh the fuss when that barman from Cheers slagged him off in SPR...

[dieseltaylor]

And thanks to Monty for "having" the right brother-in-law!

hence 79th Armoured and the funnies

[ErrantRecce1]

Thanks for the suggestion, but i have 'read some books', that is where I got my opinion from to start with. I know they may not have been picture books with the big words that you like, but I am fairly versed on the subject. I do agree with Determinant that MG, was Montie's great last hope to be remembered for anything more than retreating successfully out of Dunkirk. After all I read, it really seems to be ( and I promise not to wilt too much, under the collected genius that I may have to face for this ) that Montgomery was a charade in the desert. He talked a good game and got everyone on board, and then proceeded to trudge along at a fairly ( or totally) inspectacular pace. But I promise to send you a Christmas card all the same Sailor Melon

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by Aacooper:

All-in-all, I'd say he was a fine World War One general fighting World War Two.

Interesting that you'd say that, since just about every CinC in the British Army had had their formative experiences in the Great War. The difference with Monty was, having spent most of WW1 as a staff officer, his experience of WW1 wasn't as stark as most.

For instance: By the second day of el Alamein (Op Lightfoot), with most of his infantry and all of his tanks still stuck in the minefields --- and a day short of their first day objectives --- the division commanders of X (Armored) Corps concluded that it was hopeless, and sent word up the chain of command that they thought the attack should be called off. Generals Lumsden (X Corps) and Leese (XXX Corps, infantry support for X), went up to 8th Army HQ in the middle of the night to put it to Monty that they should fall back to the original start lines.

Monty heard what his corp commanders had to say, and then told them that if his armored commanders were not prepared to fight their way out to the objectives, he'd replace them with leaders who would. Previous 8th Army CinC would have flinched from giving such an order out of fear of repeating the unreasoning obstinancy of World War 1 commanders. Not Monty. When Monty told his commanders to screw their courage to the sticking place and drive on, it was the psychological turning point for 8th Army.

As for Monty cribing Auchinleck's battle plan, that's something of a myth. "Lightfoot" was all Monty. Just look at it: Where any other desert commander would have done the conventional thing, and swung around the minefields to the south, 8th Army drilled straight through the heaviest defenses up north. The initial objectives were way more optimistic than they should have been --- and that was Monty all the way, too.

Everybody wants to compare Monty to Patton --- easy to do, them being so opposite. Personally, I think the American general Monty should be compared to is MacArthur. Both came up through staff positions, both "political" (in the sense that they were very status conscious), both had a flair for the dramatic, both liked the sound of their own voice, both loved and reviled at the same time.

[Mr Furious]

Originally posted by Spook:

[QBWhere to start....

Mr Furious, first of all, it wasn't "2nd SS Panzer Division" refitting in Holland, it was 2nd SS Panzer Corps of 9th & 10th SS Panzer Divisions.

Second, Patton's army was the US 3rd, not 4th.

Third, that any German panzer force could've "annhilated" Patton's army in September is rather bogus to presume. In fact, during the Lorraine operations of that month, Patton's 3rd WAS counterattacked by three of the four "panzer brigades" formed ad-hoc for the West Front (the fourth went to Holland), with all three instead being resoundingly thrashed in separate actions by Patton's divisions (including French 2nd Armored). The results of these battles convinced even Hitler that the future Ardennes attack against the "crappy" American troops would have to be better concentrated in armor and other forces.

As compared to Market-Garden happening at the same time, I regard the Arracourt battles by Patton's 3rd as being one of the few bright spots of September, along with the Westwall breakthrough near Aachen. The attrition for the 3rd at Arracourt also was much better than that for Market-Garden on average, although the later Lorraine operations would be worse. [/QB]

Coloured me embarassed, probably more so that i've just finished reading a few books on the 2nd SS panzer division in Normandy (Steel Inferno - Michael Reynolds) and just last month i finished reading Cornelius' Ryan - A Bridge Too Far. AS for the disposition of American armies, well I profess to not really know much about them except in what i read from a few books (those mostly on the 101 airborne in europe). I still contest that an thrust into germany by Patton with an unknown refitting panzer corp at his flank could of been very catastrophic. Perhaps annhilation was too strong a word, perhaps not.

I think i might read up on the Arracourt battle, don't know anything about it, sounds interesting.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by MrSpkr:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Matthias:

market graden was the only way the allies could have got to berlin before the red army.

I disagree with that analysis. Had Bradley's forces, including Pattons, been given the fuel and other supplies diverted to Monty, the Allies very well could have occupied the Ruhr in October 1944, rather than March 1945. From there, Berlin is a short hop. </font>

[ErrantRecce1]

All things said and done about Montgomery, my opinion of his exploits are still that he was overrated. He was no where near combat for World War round 1. He was inordinately successful as a BEF division commander. El Alamein was no where near the break out that it was supposed to be, mostly because his main goal was to engage and hold the DAK, instead of trying to outmanourve them, which another 'to remain unnamed ' famous general would have done in his sleep. ROMMEL. On the continent, he showed grip ( read willingness to bull through things that ordinary, 'mundane' military commanders might have gone around. Was this a blessing or a curse? I would tend toward not a blessing, simply because the real goal a CinC is to bring about victory through shock, manouvre and the application of force. He showed none of the first two. I really have never thought much of him, but when cast beside MacArthur, he does make more sense to me at least.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

As for Monty cribing Auchinleck's battle plan, that's something of a myth. "Lightfoot" was all Monty.

I think there may have been some confusion over this creep into this thread. As I have read it before, it isn't "Lightfoot" that Montgomery gets accused of cribing from Auchinleck, but the plan for the battle of Alam Halfa. For that, he took the existing plan and worked it up a bit and ran with it. Can't blame him for that, it was a good plan anyway and he really didn't have time to come up with a completely new one even if something else had been better, which under the circumstances probably there wasn't. What rankled a lot of people at the time and since is his claim that he created the plan all on his own out of whole cloth.

Just look at it: Where any other desert commander would have done the conventional thing, and swung around the minefields to the south...

Yes, by all means let's look at it. The southern flank of the front rested on the Qatara Depression, a large salt marsh surrounded by steep, high cliffs that was all but completely impassable to modern armies. I don't think anybody seriously thought the way to attack that position was to send a major part of your army south of the Depression where it would be cut off from the rest of your army. That would invite defeat in detail.

The only possibility with the forces available was to punch straight through the front. Both sides knew that. The only uncertainty was which part of the front, and Montgomery tried to capitalize on that uncertainty by faking a thrust through the southern part so as to draw the Panzers in that direction and make them use up their fuel. But he was only partly successful in that.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by ErrantRecce1:

All things said and done about Montgomery, my opinion of his exploits are still that he was overrated. He was no where near combat for World War round 1.

Maybe you need to get some books after all? Alternatively Google may help.

World War I (August, 1914-November, 1918)

Served on Western Front (1914); wounded at Meteren during First Battle of Ypres; later awarded DSO for role in attack (October 13, 1914); treated in field hospital and in French hospital at St. Omer (October 1914); patient at Herbert Hospital, Woolwich (October-December, 1914); declared fit for home service (February, 1915)

He first saw action as an infantry officer in the opening months of the First World War until badly wounded in October 1914, serving on the staff for the rest of that conflict.

Bernard Law Montgomery was born in November 1887 in London. In 1907, he entered the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and was commissioned a lieutenant of infantry. During World War I he served with distinction and earned the D.S.O. for conspicuous gallantry after being wounded twice in the chest and knee in October 1914.

How far away can you keep from combat if you get shot in the chest?

[Sailor Malan]

Originally posted by ErrantRecce1:

Thanks for the suggestion, but i have 'read some books', that is where I got my opinion from to start with. I know they may not have been picture books with the big words that you like, but I am fairly versed on the subject. I do agree with Determinant that MG, was Montie's great last hope to be remembered for anything more than retreating successfully out of Dunkirk. After all I read, it really seems to be ( and I promise not to wilt too much, under the collected genius that I may have to face for this ) that Montgomery was a charade in the desert. He talked a good game and got everyone on board, and then proceeded to trudge along at a fairly ( or totally) inspectacular pace. But I promise to send you a Christmas card all the same Sailor Melon

If you are going to throw gratuitous insults about my choice of reading matter, you needn't bother

I'll have you know that I never read books with big words, they are too difficult!

However, you would make your points better if you were to pay a little respect to me, and my chosen handle.

As to Monty's performance in the desert...sources please. The initial persuit after Alamein has been critised as slow, but this tends to disregard several factors, not least of which the intensity of the battle, and the weather. (I know, the usual counter is that the defeated axis managed to move in just the same conditions, but they have little to lose, and moving 'too fast' is good for them. The Allies had less of an incentive to take risks). Read up on the Mareth line if you like. Also, don't compare Monty against perfection, compare him against his peers. Who else would you suggest should have had his role?

Other threads on this same subject (or at least covering it):

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=13;t=010589;p=1

I am sure there are more, including a specific discussion of the Auk/Monty plan for 1st and 2nd Alamein, but I cant find them

[Michael Emrys]

Another of Montgomery's moves (or lack of move) that has been held up to criticism as typical of his shortcomings as a general is the performance of Eighth Army after entering Calabria. It gets said that he took his own sweet time advancing while Fifth Army was having a desperate fight at Salerno, only arriving on the scene after the crisis had passed. Further, it gets said that he was content merely to follow the German army as it withdrew up the penninsula without putting any real pressure on it, thus allowing it to retreat in good order and send forces against the Salerno salient.

I have not myself studied this part of the campaign closely enough to form an opinion of how justified these criticisms may or may not be. So my question to the gallery is, does anyone know enough about this issue to render an informed opinion? I am frankly curious and I don't know where to look for a reasonably unbiased view.

Michael

[JonS]

The terrain, and thus the roads, through Calabria weren't the best. Also, by this time the Germans had plenty of practice at delaying a persuing army for maximal time with minimal effort. Finally, the 8th Army didn't have enough engineering support or equipment to repair the damage done by the Germans.

Could 8th Army have done better? Sure, I suppose, since nobody and nothing is perfect.

Should they have had more bailey bridges, etc? Sure - but they didn't realise how much would be required, and until that time didn't have much to base their planning on. It's worth noting that the US Army fell into exactly the same trap after they broke out onto the plain north of Salerno. Also, it's worth noting that the 8th Army did execute a number of nifty outflanking moves while moving through Calabria to try and speed things up, so it's not like they were just sitting around having brews while they waited for the sappers to finish the next bridge

Regards

JonS

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Just look at it: Where any other desert commander would have done the conventional thing, and swung around the minefields to the south...

Yes, by all means let's look at it. The southern flank of the front rested on the Qatara Depression, a large salt marsh surrounded by steep, high cliffs that was all but completely impassable to modern armies. I don't think anybody seriously thought the way to attack that position was to send a major part of your army south of the Depression where it would be cut off from the rest of your army. That would invite defeat in detail.</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

Never the less, Rommel did sweep south, skirting the northern edge of the Qattara Depression and avoiding much of the Brit defenses, when he attacked Alam Halfa.

Heh, and ran right into deep soft sand in a trap the British had prepared and laid for him that bogged down his advance. The story of how that came about is a prime example of one of the things the British did best. They had a map prepared that showed good going on that part of the front and planted it on an officer who "got lost", blundered into Axis troops, and allowed himself to be captured. Rommel swallowed it hook, line, and sinker and took the route straight into the pits. Which incidentally was also where the Brits had placed the strongest part of their defense.

Michael

[Wisbech_lad]

According to the fantastic 9th Aus Div info posted, it was a staff car deliberately blown up on a jerry mine (where they knew it would be recovered by the Axis), with map stuffed into abandoned back pack. Don't think any officer had to volunteer to surrender.

As for Monty - no, he wasn't a military genius, and was obviously a prickly character. But the men believed in him. Like Slim in Burma, he went out of his way to look after them, and sideline the "colonel blimps" of the interwar period who were fish out of water in the peoples' army of WW2 and bad for morale - ISTR recall accounts of him forcing out of shape senior officers to do PT.

The British Army (as opposed to RAF, or RN) had to do a lot of indocrination that the war was worth dying for - this was a generation that believed that their fathers had died pointlessly in WW1, had been through the depression, and (to generalise) was hostile to the traditional imperial army ethos and class structure. Monty, through his actions, did persuade dockers from the Wirral that they were not just cannon fodder to ensure the continuation of pink gins in India for a favoured few, but were fighting for themselves, and that all in his armies were in it together. So, yes, Monty was a "political" general, but he had to be to gain the respect of a socialist (and independent thinking) army rank and file. I wouldn't go so far to say the British Army '43-45 was mutinous, but from what I have read, the feeling on the ground was that the war was won, and buggered if they were going to take any undue risks to end it quicker. Monty (and Slim) seemed to have the ability to persuade them to still fight hard.

What was Spike's view of Monty?

[Aacooper]

MacArthur is an interesting general to compare Monty to, I like that. The comparison is mostly in personality, the battles against Germans and Japanese were of a completely different nature.

Blood and Guts Patton actually was more careful with his men's lives than most other US Generals. Even though he always pushed speed, and would talk bloody while trying to get speed, I think he believed speed saved lives. I can think of cases where he might have been careless about casualties, but all-in-all I think he was pretty good about it. Consider that Gen Hodges had the Hurtgen Forest, Clark had Monte Cassino/Anzio, Patch & Anderson did pretty well, and the Pacific generals had any number of battles to choose from. Patton's bloodiest campaigns were Metz, where the 3rd Army decided to starve the forts out after a couple of tries, and the Ardennes counter-counter-offensive. In both cases Patton's men had to deal with terrible weather (rainiest November in many years, and much snow & ice in Dec/Jan) which hurt mobility and tactical flexibility.

[Chek]

After viewing 8th Armies dispositions Montgomery took command prematurely,much to "The Auch's" chagrin.

One of the first things he did was to reinforce the Alam Halfa position(then occupied by not much more than a company of Infantry)and sack a whole lot of "Auch's" chronies.The next thing he did was to abandon the Brigade boxes and Jock columns and concentrate into divisional formations,sticking one onto Alam Halfa(if memory serves it was the then newly arrived 50th),along with what little armour he had.He extended the minefields and shifted 8th army HQ to the coast,right next to the Desert Air Force HQ.

When the inevitable attack came "The Auch's"(a WW1 General if ever there was one) plan was to fall back and break up into battle groups attempting to engage the enemy in a mobile cavalry like battle.Orders regarding what the various units were to do were vague to say the least.There were no definite objectives layed out and the impression is given of not really knowing what was to be done.

In contrast Montgomery issued very definite orders as to what was required of those now under his command and that is they were to stand firm.No matter what the cost there would be no retreat.To emphasise this he had all transport removed far to the rear.

Montgomery realised two very important points which had eluded "The Auk".

1)The British were crap at conducting mobile armoured warfare and to attempt to do so against probably the finest the world has ever seen was suicide.

2)The importance of Alam Halfa as it overlooked the only road in the desert.

When the battle began Rommel dove into what he thought was empty desert only to find it thoroughly mined(a couple of weeks before it hadn't been,or not as thoroughly).Whilst struggling through the minefields the Desert Air force turned up and thoroughly pounded the Axis virtually without let up for the entirety of the battle.

Finally Rommel's depleted forces made it through the mines.Realising he now lacked the strength to cut deep behind Allied lines he focused his attention on the perfectly prepared Alam Halfa.Naturally he expected the British armour to do what it had always done and come charging at them.However the British "cavalry" was under strict instructions to stay put and use there guns,the tanks of course being the remainder from the first batch of Grants.Staying put irked "the chaps" somewhat and at one point a group attempted to move off,only to come under fire from what were thought to be 88's.

Rommel was unable to get onto the Alam Halfa position and constantly pounded by dug in armoured and AT guns,artillery and from the air and seeing his forces vanish before him he wisely decided to retreat.

This to me is Montgomery's finest moment.A largely unknown General,takes a worn down demorilised force,realises it's few strengths and then sets about creating an enviroment where the enemy are put into a position that enables him to utilise those strengths.Its major strength not actually being the army itself but the Desert Air Force.He was a protaginist of air support,having seen it expertly utilised in France a few years earlier where he expertly handled the Iron Division,this running a very close second as his finest moment.

It could be argued that defence was his forte,as this is basically how he attacked.

[...................................]

Lots of interesting stuff to read here Can I add a couple of further points from my reading on the pursuit after Alamein which some posters have criticised.

The weather has already been mentioned, but the Axis forces had the great advantage of the use of the one good quality roadway in the theater - ie. the coast road. While the desert was turned ito a quagmire slowing the pursuit, and the air force was grounded, they could freely use the tarmac road and easily deny it to the Allies with small rearguards.

Also I did read years ago of the actual numbers of Axis troops who made it back to Halfaya from the Alamein positions, and it was suprisingly few, the large majority surrendered. I wish I could recall the source, but if anyone has any information or ideas I'd be grateful.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Wisbech_lad:

According to the fantastic 9th Aus Div info posted, it was a staff car deliberately blown up on a jerry mine (where they knew it would be recovered by the Axis), with map stuffed into abandoned back pack. Don't think any officer had to volunteer to surrender.

Now that you've jogged my memory, I believe I've come across that version too, which sounds more plausible to me. The "officer surrendered" version does sound more like a UL, possibly arising out of confusion with "the Man Who Never Was".

Thanks for the prompt.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Chek:

It could be argued that defence was his forte,as this is basically how he attacked.

I would add to your list his defensive battle at Medenine where he slaughtered the Axis forces, especially the German armor, with almost no losses of his own.

Michael