Montgomery as Battlefield Commander

[Determinant]

Some very interesting and informative posts here. The debate over the 'pursuit' (if that term can be used after El Alamein) raises a general point of principle: Is it not faster to withdraw than it is to advance?

Some deception in whether you will stand or not - force the attacker to deploy and plan; cleverly fought and determined rear-guards; an evil and ingenious obstacle plan. Lots of factors to aid a withdrawal.

Which takes us to a more particular point: did the British Army in the 20thC ever overtake and destroy in pursuit a withdrawing German formation of any size? For some reason I keep thinking of the successful and almost untroubled German withdrawal to the Hindenburg line in WWI. Was that setting a pattern? And come to that even killing the Italian Fox in the open at Beda Fomm was a damn close run thing...

Perhaps Monty, if he failed after El Alamein, should be judged like for like against his British comparators who did pin down and destroy the Hun time after time in aggressively fought pursuit battles. Errr. Can anyone think of any names?

[Spook]

Loose notes:

Originally posted by Andreas:

Some other things to consider. To 'simply' clear up the west bank of the Rhine was a massive operation that took the Western Allies months to undertake. New allied divisions fed in during autumn 1944 sometimes woefully underperformed (7th Armored got its rear handed to it at Overloon in October by a German offensive). So did some of the generals - unless someone can tell me a good reason for the Huertgen bloodletting).

A "good reason" will probably always elude, and IMO forever be one such stain on Bradley and Hodges and other various US lower-level commanders involved. Though I rarely see posters ever wanting to kick off a "Bradley as Battlefield Commander" topic.

The Germans had just come through a terrific beating in the east, losing upwards of 800,000 men as irrecoverable casualties. Probably another 200,000 or so in France.

Well, checking both Glantz and D'Este, I think that the above numbers have a bit of "tilt" to them if one constrains to the same period of fighting. The standard sum of casualties to the Germans for Normandy and the later fall of France come in at 400,000, half of these as POW's. The German losses on the East Front in turn were about 550,000 in the same timeframe.

It was not Montgomery's fault alone to get this wrong. He was in very good company on it. But if one wants to assess his generalship, it needs to be considered.

Yes, this is true.

BTW - what do those who have seen it think of the Monty shrine at the IWM?

I haven't, but your own views all the same?

[Spook]

Originally posted by Determinant:

Perhaps Monty, if he failed after El Alamein, should be judged like for like against his British comparators who did pin down and destroy the Hun time after time in aggressively fought pursuit battles. Errr. Can anyone think of any names?

I could think of a few, but they're all Soviet instead.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Spook:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />

The Germans had just come through a terrific beating in the east, losing upwards of 800,000 men as irrecoverable casualties. Probably another 200,000 or so in France.

Well, checking both Glantz and D'Este, I think that the above numbers have a bit of "tilt" to them if one constrains to the same period of fighting. The standard sum of casualties to the Germans for Normandy and the later fall of France come in at 400,000, half of these as POW's. The German losses on the East Front in turn were about 550,000 in the same timeframe. </font>

[CombinedArms]

The western Allies collectively were not frequently successful at encircling and bagging retreating Axis armies. This was true even after the US entered the war with a force designed for more rapid movement and exploitation than the British forces--which were never really built for pursuit. I think one reason the WA had trouble bagging German armies was because in many cases one pincer was American, one pincer British, and it was difficult to achieve the kind of coordination and cooperation and sheer gritty determined singleness of purpose needed for encirclement when you've got two national armies trying to close the circle from different sides. Thus, we see the Axis escape from Sicily, the Monte Cassino line, Normandy/Mortain-Falaise, etc.

But the WA did get better at this, achieving one of the larger encirclements of the war (325,000 men) in the Ruhr pocket. It may have help that in this case both pincers were from the single nationality, the American 1st and 9th Armies. (Tunis was a succesful and big early encirclement involving both nations, but it doesn't really count because the Axis was cut off by sea.)

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

The western Allies collectively were not frequently successful at encircling and bagging retreating Axis armies. This was true even after the US entered the war with a force designed for more rapid movement and exploitation than the British forces--which were never really built for pursuit. I think one reason the WA had trouble bagging German armies was because in many cases one pincer was American, one pincer British, and it was difficult to achieve the kind of coordination and cooperation and sheer gritty determined singleness of purpose needed for encirclement when you've got two national armies trying to close the circle from different sides. Thus, we see the Axis escape from Sicily, the Monte Cassino line, Normandy/Mortain-Falaise, etc.

I think this might be a trifle unfair. I've been thinking a lot about Sicily lately and it's hard for me to imagine any way the Alllies could had prevented the evacuation to the mainland once the Axis decides to go, given the resources available on each side.

As for bagging the Germans in Italy, once again, unless Hitler gives a truly suicidal order to stand and fight, I can't see much chance of the Allies pulling it off, given the balance of forces and the terrain. My own opinion is that the only way to have bagged the Germans in Italy would have been to make a really large scale landing at about the height of Genoa and strike vigorously across the penninsula. And to do that you would probably have to give up D-Day, and that just wasn't in the cards.

Normandy is a somewhat different story. There the Allies did have a real chance to complete the encirclement and the failure to do so may in part be attributed to confusion of the lines of command and lack of a sure hand at the top.

But in general, and responding to a couple of earlier posts, bagging a retreating enemy is not all that easy to do and it isn't just in the 20th. century where we see a failure to achieve that. An army that retains cohesion and has determined leadership is very hard to bag unless it is already surrounded before it begins to withdraw. And sometimes even a surrounded enemy escapes.

Michael

[ November 05, 2003, 08:56 PM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[Siege]

I had never really thought to compare Monty and MacArthur before, but the more I think about it is the more I would say Monty was the better choice between them.

MacArthur was caught totally unprepared in the Phillipines in 1941. I can understand not having a CAP at Pearl Harbor, but for almost the entire USAAF in the theatre to be caught on the ground on Luzon after being issued an immediate war warning? P-35's and P-36's and P-40's may not be an even match for an A6M, but they could at least have been in the air! Everybody predicted the Phillipines would be the primary target for Japan, so why was he caught totally indecisive and unprepared? Had they struck the japanese airfields in Formosa, like had been planned for months in case of hostilities, it would have caught hundreds of japanese aircraft on the ground due to poor weather.

He launched a number of un-needed invasions that could have been isolated and ignored, in order to stage his assault "Back to Bataan". Pelilu(sp?) was among the worst cases of this, and was needlessly invaded. He allowed his family hertiage in Manilla to control his thinking. This IMHO was worse than Market Garden, which at least would have made a major contribution had it succeeded.

Inchon may have been an amazing success, but his decision to fight all the way up to the Yalu River turned a finished war into a 3 year bloody stalemate that should have never happened.

While I may consider Monty to be an OK general who doesn't quite match up to his image, MacArthur was a pure and simple idiot most of the time, with only occasional spats of brilliance. He is definitely far below Monty in ability, as far as I am concerned.

-Hans

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by CombinedArms:

The western Allies collectively were not frequently successful at encircling and bagging retreating Axis armies.

[snip]

But in general, and responding to a couple of earlier posts, bagging a retreating enemy is not all that easy to do and it isn't just in the 20th. century where we see a failure to achieve that. An army that retains cohesion and has determined leadership is very hard to bag unless it is already surrounded before it begins to withdraw. And sometimes even a surrounded enemy escapes.

Michael </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

I think this might be a trifle unfair. I've been thinking a lot about Sicily lately and it's hard for me to imagine any way the Alllies could had prevented the evacuation to the mainland once the Axis decides to go, given the resources available on each side.

Landing near Messina, not splitting their forces, or even not letting Patton tear-arse completely the wrong direction to Palermo instead of leaning hard on the Germans falling back across the centre of the island would have been a start.

A naval blockade of the straits of Messian, perhaps even landings at Reggio di Calabria would have put paid to any kind of shipping from Sicily to the mainland.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

The Russians eventually learned how to do it, and so did the WA, in the Ruhr.

But at least part of the reason it worked in the Ruhr was that Hitler had given the forces there one of his stand fast orders.

It's also worth noting that even Rommel, who has to be one of history's greatest advocates of aggressive pursuit, failed to catch and destroy Eighth Army as it fell back into Egypt in the summer of '42. Like I said, it ain't easy.

Michael

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

It's also worth noting that even Rommel, who has to be one of history's greatest advocates of aggressive pursuit, failed to catch and destroy Eighth Army as it fell back into Egypt in the summer of '42 ...

... or at any other time for that matter. He did manage to nibble off bits and pieces from time to time though.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

I think this might be a trifle unfair. I've been thinking a lot about Sicily lately and it's hard for me to imagine any way the Alllies could had prevented the evacuation to the mainland once the Axis decides to go, given the resources available on each side.

Landing near Messina...</font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Landing near Messina...

How?

Same way Patton landed at Brolo, and all his other "catclaws" on the north coast. A landing in Sardinia to get airbases for this first would have been in order. Or simply to have done this in force after a lodgement was made in the south and airbases there were secured?

What's that mean interms of what happened on Sicily?

Not landing the British and American armies on opposite ends of the island, mostly.

What did it mean to you?

Mostly, though, some submarine action in the Straits of Messina - or even surface vessels - to prevent the withdrawal of the garrison, and the same result would have been gained - ie the destruction of the German forcethere - no matter where they landed.

What transpired was just comical.

[ November 06, 2003, 01:38 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Spook:

The Germans had just come through a terrific beating in the east, losing upwards of 800,000 men as irrecoverable casualties. Probably another 200,000 or so in France.

Well, checking both Glantz and D'Este, I think that the above numbers have a bit of "tilt" to them if one constrains to the same period of fighting. The standard sum of casualties to the Germans for Normandy and the later fall of France come in at 400,000, half of these as POW's. The German losses on the East Front in turn were about 550,000 in the same timeframe.[/QB]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

I've been thinking a lot about Sicily lately and it's hard for me to imagine any way the Alllies could had prevented the evacuation to the mainland once the Axis decides to go, given the resources available on each side.

Shurely the all-powerful air farce could have intervened? Or were the pilots too busy sipping Kool-Aid?

[Spook]

Originally posted by Siege:

He launched a number of un-needed invasions that could have been isolated and ignored, in order to stage his assault "Back to Bataan". Pelilu(sp?) was among the worst cases of this, and was needlessly invaded. He allowed his family hertiage in Manilla to control his thinking. This IMHO was worse than Market Garden, which at least would have made a major contribution had it succeeded.

M-G might have had a significant impact if it succeeded. Or it might have instead meant a good bit less. The possibilities will always be speculated on, but regardless the concept to "flank" the Rhine seemed worthy to try IF Monty & co. had also seen to isolating the 15th Army and getting Antwerp opened up pronto.

Recognizably, "Mac" did have an overt bias on a "Philippines first" strategy as that can be linked to restoring his prestige with the Filipinos at the time. The Luzon vs. Formosa debate also goes on to this day as where the US forces should've next reached for after Leyte.

And as note above, Mac didn't control the Peleliu invasion, that was instead Nimitz's. So was another botch job known as Tarawa in 1943, although the latter did drive home some important later lessons learned to amphibious landings.

[ November 06, 2003, 08:10 AM: Message edited by: Spook ]

[CombinedArms]

I think the contretemps over Highway 124 in Sicily supports my point about coalition armies and their problems with achieving encirclements. Later uncertainties about the boundary-line in Mortain-Falaise, and who, if anyone, should be trying to choke off the German retreat, had a similar impact.

Moreover, it's clear that neither over-all commander, Alexander in Sicily or Ike in France, was attempting to exercise much overall control of the battle. My point would be that successful encirclements require a high degree of command and control, difficult to achieve under any circumstances and even harder in a coalition war.

BTW, in the Ruhr, the US 9th Army (Simpson), to the north, was under Monty's overall command--in his 21st Army Group-- while the US 1st Army (Hodges), to the south, was under Bradley's command--in Bradley's Army Group. But it no doubt helped that both armies were actually of a single nationality and that Simpson and Hodges were good friends with a history of mutual cooperation. And Hitler's stand-fast order did help but he'd given one of those in Normandy, too, and even insisted on the ill-advised counterattack in Mortain.

I credit the Ruhr success to:

1. More practice on the part of the commanders--these were far more experienced generals at this stage.

2. More unified command...the generals working cooperatively rather than competitively. Hodges and Simpson had together worked out a successful mobile defense in the Battle of the Bulge. Many of the US divisions that blocked the German advance in the Ardennes were quickly pulled out of the line by Simpson in the norht and rapidly funneled to the embattled Hodges in the south.

3. Hitler's inimitable standfast order--which also promoted the encirclement of armies in Russia on several occasions. One of the keys to the escape from Sicily was that the Germans were not required to stand fast by Hitler and were working on an escape plan from early in the campaign. Most of Hitler's standfast orders made little sense but one can almost justify the one in the Ruhr. If the Germans lost their industrial heartland, the war was as good as over.

Anyway, the Ruhr is one of the great encirclement battles but remains comparatively unsung.

[ November 06, 2003, 12:14 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Landing near Messina...

How?

Same way Patton landed at Brolo, and all his other "catclaws" on the north coast. A landing in Sardinia to get airbases for this first would have been in order. Or simply to have done this in force after a lodgement was made in the south and airbases there were secured?</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

Moreover, it's clear that neither over-all commander, Alexander in Sicily or Ike in France, was attempting to exercise much overall control of the battle. My point would be that successful encirclements require a high degree of command and control, difficult to achieve under any circumstances and even harder in a coalition war.

I would strongly agree with that. The situation in Normandy was especially confused as SHAEF had just recently moved into France and wasn't really set up to take over control of the ground forces. Therefore, until the end of the pocket battle, Montgomery was still in nominal control of both army groups in addition to running his own, but his authority was less well-defined. Add onto that his previous reluctance to tell Bradley how to run his battle, and you get a vague situation. Although Montgomery was kept informed of the progress of Third Army south of the gap, I am not sure how fresh that information was or how closely Montgomery was following it. The army group boundary was in fact shifted northwards twice, but always tardily.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

Falaise may have been further confused as First Canadian Army headquarters was activated in August, no? Therefore Monty had control of British 2nd Army and Canadian 1st Army. How much of the responsibility for the Falaise Gap goes to Crerar, and how much to Montgomery?

[Michael Emrys]

Well, from what I've read, the Canadians were doing about all that flesh and blood could do, the Germans were just putting up one almighty resistance. The thing is that the back door was less well defended and Third Army was making good progress but they kept bumping up against the Army Group boundary and having to call a halt. Montgomery is often blamed for not moving it northward earlier and more drastically, but I have also read that Bradley refused to ask for a more drastic altering of the boundary because he was afraid to have the troops of Patton's Army fighting at close quarters with the Germans who could be expected to put up a particularly desperate fight. His preference was to destroy the Germans in the pocket using artillery and airpower. This is usually viewed nowadays as excessively cautious, but I suspect that the difference in destruction of German forces was small. And he was right that the Americans would be needed later.

But then there were all the troops he threw away in the Huertgen...

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Well, from what I've read, the Canadians were doing about all that flesh and blood could do,

Michael

You should read the Canadian Army version - CP Stacey, the official historian, talked a lot about inexperience - 2nd Division was ashore on 6 July and didn't see any real fighting for a couple of days; 4th Armoured didn't land until August - ie just before the Gap battles. Don't remember the specifics. Not to downplay the courage of the men fighting there; Currie won the VC at St.Lambert sur Dives with his tank squadron and an infantry company fighting off swarms of fleeing Germans.

[CombinedArms]

My theory is that Bradley was jumpy about friendly fire casualties because of his significant losses to them (including Lt. Gen. Leslie McNair) when the Allied heavy bombers hit American positions before the Cobra breakout. Still, the fear does seem exaggerated--maybe a couple of guys would get hit as the two armies began to link up, but after that, people would stop shooting each other pretty fast. I believe the friendly fire casualties when the Russian and American armies met were minimal. The Germans would have fought hard, but Bradley hadn't backed off from hard fights in the bocage. If he did in this case, it seems short-sighted. In any case, there was nobody around to order him to close the gap.

Again, the problems of coordination grow out of the fact that nobody was really in charge of making the link between the two armies happen. The fact that Bradley hated and resented Monty didn't make matters easier. This is one situation where Monty being a pain-in-the-ass may have had real life consequence--that and Bradley being someone with a tendency to nurse resentments. Bradley also didn't completely trust Patton--was reluctant to really give him free rein. And, as we've seen, Ike was just getting his HQ set up and hadn't really yet taken charge of ground operations. All of which seems to be a formula for failing to complete an encirclement. Patton was the only American commander who seemed to really thirst to encircle Germans and he had limited authority.

Still, the Allied victory in Normandy was a tremendous victory and only a smallish portion of the encircled troops actually got out. Also the German army in northern France around Calais (was that the 15th Army?) was never actually encircled and most of them got out, as was to be expected. Sometimes those troops are unfairly included in the count of "Germans who got away." As Micheal says, "the difference in destruction of German forces was small." With all its problems, the coalition army in France in generally worked remarkably well.

And on the "grand strategy" level the big three of Britan, US and USSR actually achieved a wonderful level of coordination--as compared to the dismal coordination Germany, Italy and Japan. I've often wondered what might have happened if Italy and Japan had lent Germany their navies in 1940 to support Sealion. That's the sort of thing the Allies almost certainly would have done in the same situation--the Normandy invasion across the same channel was a truly coordinated effort-- but it's hard to imagine the Axis powers with real navies putting their own agendas on hold long enough to help Germany defeat the UK, which in the long run would have benefitted them all.

[Michael Dorosh]

The Russians and Americans met in a quiet sector though, not one in which the remnants of an entire army was trying to flee through a narrow gap!

[Michael Emrys]

Yeah, that counts too. One other thing is that the friendly fire that Bradley and Montgomery were concerned about was not small arms fire, but artillery, which is harder to control under these circumstances. First of all, somebody who has a line to the firing batteries has to notice that the shells are falling on friendly forces, which is a neat trick in itself. Then he has to call in a cease fire/retarget order, which may also take a little time. Meanwhile, death and mayhem are falling on the good guys. And a lot of arty was being used at Falaise. It had basically been turned into a free fire zone for arty and aircraft. Anything venturing into it was liable to be clobbered. Of course, adjustments to this sort of thing could be—and were—made, but it took time to issue the orders and make sure that everybody had gotten and understood them.

Michael

[ November 07, 2003, 02:34 PM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]