Montgomery as Battlefield Commander

[Michael Dorosh]

This subject came up at another messageboard; since we recently revisited Rommel as Battlefield Commander (again) I thought I'd pose the question here. Discussion at the other board really led nowhere. I know one of the Four Horsemen discussed it with me briefly off-forum, and taught me one or two things.

Basically, the original poster asked the simple question "why does Monty get negative comments" from North Americans and Europeans outside the UK, especially in popular media presentations (Ted Danson in SPR, for example).

In his defence, it was suggested that Monty was famous for his ability to "think outside the box", and the Market Garden example was given.

I've disagreed with that statement, though some other examples of thinking outside the box do appear - his views on VD in France in 1940, for example, got him nicknamed "Our General of Love" in a bit of soldier's doggerel (according to Whiting in PBI, anyway) due to his laxity concerning soldiers being prevented from fraternizing and a generous issue of prophylactics. This was apparently shocking at the time, but of course, Lord Gort had some rather ancient commanders at the time, did he not?

Also, Monty became famous for having everyone including brigadiers in his brigades doing PT every morning! He turfed out the old and the fat as best he could and send shock waves through 8th Army on assuming command.

He also renamed his SE Command as SE Army without getting permission, between Dunkirk and Alamein when he was in the UK.

I would categorize Monty as

a) overall, a good general, whose strengths lay in the setpiece battle (ie Rhine crossing), but who possessed no real overwhelming imagination on the order of say, Simonds (who invented the APC in Normandy) - Arnhem excepted (or can we argue that Market-Garden was not really exceptional?)

in his element as a trainer of troops. He mentored Crerar of the Canadians, and Simonds, most certainly and could pick good RSMs, COs, company commanders and brigadiers from any battalion after the briefest of visits. He did indeed do this with most units of I Canadian Corps in 1942; his notes seem pretty accurate when stacked up against battlefield performance of individuals he commented on. Would love to see info regarding his judgement of British troops and units at that time

I also contended that the situation in Normandy probably wasn't one that would have been handled any better than anyone else, but would be interested in other assessments. (Funny how the desert commanders, Rommel and Montgomery, get ultimately judged by their conduct in Normandy).

My own impression - and please comment on this as it is only a gut feeling - is that Monty wasn't necessarily one to interfere with the tactical operations of his subordinates. Don't know if that's right or not, but given the situation around Caen in June and July, it's hard to see that any criticism of him is really warranted - as what else could he really have done that he didn't do? Regardless of whether you believe his real intention all along was to draw German armour from the US front, the fact is - that's what happened.

[Siege]

I'm not the biggest study of Monty, though I do have my opinions on him. To me, he seemed to over-plan a lot and focus too much on a single course of action without alternatives. Too many grand schemes,

Take for instance Goodwood, the crossing of the Rhine. The basic methodology was to stop, mass troops and equipment, and launch a massive assault. It was led with a 1,000 bomber raid on the defending areas followed by a large area artillery barrage and the actual assault was a massed crossing with just about everything that could be assembled. To me, this is about as brilliant as the massed assaults on the Hindenberg line in the first war. While successful, such an attack is always a costly matter. It also left little flexibility should the assault fail.

This was the problem with Market Garden, a lack of flexibility. From the moment the British Airborne landed, there was absolutely no other course of action than to just hammer foreward. in the worst case scenario, which did happen, the unavoidable delay by XXX Corps meant a horrible toll on the Red Devils at and around Arnhem. Without the incredible stand by Frost's battalion, and the miracle at Eindhoven bridge, it probably would have meant the total loss of the division and the Polish brigade. While it was a brilliant idea at the core, there were a lot of "What if's" that never seemed to have been asked or just plain ignored.

His usage of intelligence sources is hit and miss. In North Africa, he seemed to have an amazing grasp of how important the Ultra intercepts were. The manner he directed the attacks on shipping showed that he recognized the value of the targets, but also knew how important it was to protect the information sources. In every case it was made to appear a random scout aircraft located the convoys, and in some cases they were deliberatly allowed to proceed, all keep the Germans from knowing why the convoys were being discovered and attacked.

However in Market Garden there was no excuse for not knowing about the SS Panzers so close to the drop zones. I also wonder why British and Free French were unaware of the bocage in Normandy. For the French, it was their country, and you would think they would know the landscape of their own nation. The BEF had been in France only 4 years earlier. At least the US Army had the excuse of not being in France for 26 years, and even then were never really in the Normandy area.

I dunno, but thats my Monty opinion. Let the flaming begin!

-Hans

[ October 28, 2003, 10:01 PM: Message edited by: Siege ]

[Seanachai]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...though some other examples of thinking outside the box do appear - his views on VD in France in 1940, for example, got him nicknamed "Our General of Love" in a bit of soldier's doggerel (according to Whiting in PBI, anyway) due to his laxity concerning soldiers being prevented from fraternizing and a generous issue of prophylactics.

Typical Pestilence 'aside' in an otherwise straight-forward bid to ignite heated debate.

Michael, you don't always have to have a hook on which to hang the 'disease' thing.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Siege:

I'm not the biggest study of Monty, though I do have my opinions on him. To me, he seemed to over-plan a lot and focus too much on a single course of action without alternatives. Too many grand schemes,

Take for instance Goodwood, the crossing of the Rhine.

Yes, it is interesting to note that Patton and Hodges both crossed the Rhine with no fanfare at all.

This was the problem with Market Garden, a lack of flexibility.

That's an excellent point, also, that I failed to consider in my original thinking on Market Garden.

However in Market Garden there was no excuse for not knowing about the SS Panzers so close to the drop zones. I also wonder why British and Free French were unaware of the bocage in Normandy. For the French, it was their country, and you would think they would know the landscape of their own nation. The BEF had been in France only 4 years earlier. At least the US Army had the excuse of not being in France for 26 years, and even then were never really in the Normandy area.

[/qb]

As for the bocage - what could they had done differently even if they knew about it?

Not sure why you suggest they didn't, though.

As for Market Garden - that was Browning more than it was Montgomery, wasn't it? There was a Major Urquhart (no relation to General Urquhart) who was watching the German tank situation near Arnhem - did he not report to Browning rather than Monty?

[ October 28, 2003, 10:05 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Siege]

Yes, it is interesting to note that Patton and Hodges both crossed the Rhine with no fanfare at all.

Hodges crossed mostly by luck, the original planning had been to expect no bridges to be standing. However they were ready to move to exploit the situation if one was managed to be captured.

Patton's was more due to the speed of his advance, the Germans didn't have the time to fortify or even move in front of him to block a crossing. By the time they could react, the bridgehead had been established. IIRC, Patton crossed at a shallows and not even over a bridge.

As for the bocage - what could they had done differently even if they knew about it?

Not sure why you suggest they didn't, though.

From everything I have seen, the US commanders were totally shocked at what the Bocage was. They had been told to expect little stone walls like in the Northeast US, not major earthen berms.

The ad-hoc solutions such as Rhino's and such shows more of a reaction than prior planning.

The solutions would have probably been the same, but would have come ashore with the troops rather than a costly advance until equipment and techniques were devised.

As for Market Garden - that was Browning more than it was Montgomery, wasn't it? There was a Major Urquhart (no relation to General Urquhart) who was watching the German tank situation near Arnhem - did he not report to Browning rather than Monty?

Good point, I don't know how far up the chain the information went. I know it was 1st Army that ordered the recon flights due to reports of enemy activity, but I don't know if Monty himself knew about it.

-Hans

[ozi_digger]

Criticism aside, Monty also 'gelled' his troops together. I've seen pictures of him in Nth Africa with the badges of all Commonwealth troops (Brit, Aussie, NZ, Polish, Canadian, Indian etc) involved, stuck to his hat. He realised that to make a coalition work you had to get them reading from the same sheet of music. Some trivia for what its worth....

[Aacooper]

Monty is a complicated character, so I'll just list his positive and negative attributes:

Positive:

Instilled confidence in subordinates

Raised the standard of training in the British Army

Popular with troops

Helped improve OVERLORD plan

Led a good retreat to Dunkirk

Negative:

Needed set-piece battles, which meant opportunities were lost (i.e. post-Alamein, pre-Rhine crossing (didn't want US 9th Army to jump river), cautious handling of US 1st Army in Ardennes, couldn't close the Falaise Gap)

Failed to trap German 15th Army, which delayed opening up Antwerp and made Market-Garden less successful

Unclear if he ever pushed the lead armored forces in Market-Garden to hurry up and save the 1st Airborne

Post-war, his legacy was dimmed by his vanity and self-serving memory

All-in-all, I'd say he was a fine World War One general fighting World War Two.

[Siege]

All-in-all, I'd say he was a fine World War One general fighting World War Two.

You have put my opinion into better words than I ever have. 100% agreement.

Positive:

Instilled confidence in subordinates

Raised the standard of training in the British Army

Popular with troops

The training quality I will also agree with, as well as the popularity with the troops.

For all these reasons is probably why I find him to be so similar to General McClellan from the US Civil War. (what do they call that in other countries anyways?)

-Hans

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

As for the bocage - what could they had done differently even if they knew about it?

Had they known (and they should have. This was a huge intel failure), they could have developed the combined arms methods for bocage fighting that eventually did come to pass in July much earlier.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Marlow:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

As for the bocage - what could they had done differently even if they knew about it?

Had they known (and they should have. This was a huge intel failure), they could have developed the combined arms methods for bocage fighting that eventually did come to pass in July much earlier. </font>

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Was there a lot of specialized tactics developed outside the ken of normal infantry training, as a response to the bocage?

Quite a bit according to Doubler. "Closing with the Enemy" details not only the development of the hedge cutters, but more importantly the tank/infantry team tactics that were developed in late June/July to attack in hedgerow country. A number of units conducted training in these tactics right behind the front lines.

[SgtMuhammed]

I think Monty pretty much rides the middle line of what the popular image of him has been. He wasn't as bad as many Americans thought but he wasn't as good as he thought.

His forte was the set-piece battle and his contributions to the planning for Sicily and Normandy were invaluable. Unfortunately he tended to be both overly cautions and overly optomistic during the actual execution. Setting Caen as a day one objective was bad enough but then not pushing hard enough for it ensured that it wouldn't be taken. The same thing happened at Market-Garden. An overly optomistic objective with not enough force in any case.

As to the Allied problems with the Boccage; the main problem was that so much time was spent on thinking and training for the invasion that little was done to prepare for what was to happen once troops were ashore. One of the main reasons that there was no big push inland immediatly after the invasion, D-day and D+1, was that there was a sense that the work was done. The invasion was what they had prepared for and now it was over.

Had there been better preparation for followup operations then the Allies would have been better prepared for what lay ahead. Massive recons, including operatives to gather soil samples, were conducted of the beaches themselves but nothing further in. The interesting part is that southern England has hedgrows that closely resemble the Boccage and would have allowed the invading forces to prepare for what turned out to resemble more city fighting than anything else.

The main thing, tactics wise, to come out of the Boccage was the developement of a more all arms approach to fighting. There really weren't a lot of new methodes other than the Rhinos but rather a better implimentation of what the troops were supposed to be doing in the first place. Rather than trying to flood the enemy with infantry or hammer them with armor, Allied commanders had to get used to using the strengths of each to accomplish the mission. Thus the close integration of infantry, armor, engineers, and artillery and air was necessary to fight through the boccage.

All of this could have been worked out in training but instead had to be learned under fire.

[Firefly]

The British knew about the bocage in Normandy, at least Alanbrooke certainly did, he fought there in 1940, before evacuating his troops and, from the little I've read on the subject, the Germans suffered the same problems as the Americans later did. Alanbrooke was opposed to Normandy as a landing site for that reason, but was overruled by Churchill under pressure from the Americans who didn't take Alanbrooke's warnings seriously and considered them to be British prevarication. (See Carlo D'Este Decision in Normandy which is also a good contribution to the 'Montgomery Debate')

Siege in the rest of the world we refer to the American Civil War as 'The American Civil War' .

[Monty]

Psssst... i have to admit something guys.

My forum name Monty is NOT related to the English general but to my first cat who's name was MONTY

Why i name my cat Monty i hear you thinking.

Well, i liked the name and i was not into wargaming at all at that time (1986).

My CM name is Moose or Mossie btw.

Monty

[...................................]

Anyone who considers Montgomery inflexible would perhaps care to read up on his manoeuvering of the 3rd Infantry Division before Dunkirk. He kept them together and skillfully withdrew them to safety despite the chaos of the German breakthrough and Allied collapse, and received a lot of very high praise which did his subsequent career prospects no harm at all. He also refined his Alamein plan mid stride with the Supercharge offensive, there are probably others I can't recall at the moment, so I really don't see how that charge can be levelled.

For critics of the Rhine operation a it could be worth remembering that Britain and the Commonwealth had been in a long war by that time, and they were short of men. He had to be sure he wasn't wasting lives where possible, politically it would not have been acceptable, hence the big effort in an attempt to elimintate unnecessary risk.

I think as a General he was very good, but his ascerbic personality has coloured his reputation, particularly with the Americans. What was it they said, 'As quick as a ferret, and about as likeable'.

Just MHO anyway

[MrSpkr]

I think Monty was not a capable as a commander at that level should be. While I will grant he was a very good division commander (and did splendidly in his Dunkirk actions), he exemplifies the Peter Principle -- members of a bureaucracy will rise to the level of their incompetence.

I think Monty was bright enough to realize when he was in over his head, and he compensated for that by being extremely methodical (to the point of dragging his feet), and by building overwhelming force before going over to the attack (which allowed victory, but also allowed the enemy more time to either escape or build fortifications that would cost more Allied lives).

I think Market-Garden was his attempt to grab some of the headlines and accolades then being showered upon Patton for his breakout campaign across France. This insistence on recapturing the headlines may explain why some of the intelligence warning of the SS Panzer division were ignored. Monty simply did not want to be accused of dragging his feet again.

Steve

[Firefly]

Originally posted by Pheasant Plucker:

I think as a General he was very good, but his ascerbic personality has coloured his reputation, particularly with the Americans. What was it they said, 'As quick as a ferret, and about as likeable'.

I think a lot of the dislike of Monty was due to his post-war rewriting of history. In Normandy he was faced with a situation where he had to think on his feet and did a pretty good job of it. However thinking on his feet was total anathema to his philosophy of generalship and after the war he insisted that Normandy had gone to plan and it was always his intention for the British to soak off the German armour and give the Americans the chance for Cobra. There is ample evidence to suggest that this was not his original plan prior to D-Day.

[ October 29, 2003, 09:34 AM: Message edited by: Firefly ]

[Sirocco]

A good general understand the strengths and weaknesses of the forces at his disposal, and uses them in a suitable fashion. You cannot therefore judge the performance of a commander without such an appreciation.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Firefly:

The British knew about the bocage in Normandy, at least Alanbrooke certainly did, he fought there in 1940, before evacuating his troops and, from the little I've read on the subject, the Germans suffered the same problems as the Americans later did. Alanbrooke was opposed to Normandy as a landing site for that reason, but was overruled by Churchill under pressure from the Americans who didn't take Alanbrooke's warnings seriously and considered them to be British prevarication. (See Carlo D'Este Decision in Normandy which is also a good contribution to the 'Montgomery Debate')

Having read both Doubler and D'Este's earlier cited books, I'll take note of D'Este first.

I don't recall where in "Decision in Normandy" that Alanbrooke (AB) expresses opposition to landing in Normandy due to the bocage terrain, or of being shouted down due to US pressure, but for the moment I will allow AB's objections to be plausible. (I think that AB's greater pre-Normandy effort was trying to guide who would command the Second Front & SHAEF.)

However, what I do recall from D'Este in regards to pre-invasion unit training would actually implicate AB for negligence as much as any other major Allied commander in that period. How so? D'Este doesn't finger any one commander in specific over tactics training shortfalls (especially for operating in "broken" terrain), but he nonetheless notes that many Allied units, even the British veteran divisions from the Med, just did not apply tactics training in earnest when they should have.

And if AB anticipated that the bocage would be a big enough issue (as it did turn out to be), then it must be fairly asked: why didn't he, going down the chain, put the hammer down to get the message to the combat unit commanders to prepare for this?

I don't think it a singular sin of omission from AB's part, however. The lower echelon CO's like Monty, Dempsey, Bucknall et al could have done more to anticipate on this too; the same, of course, for many US commanders like Bradley too. Part of it was due to a seeming "hands-off" attitude about training requirements, especially for the veteran British units. It was expected that the British 7th Armoured and 50th/51st Infantry, having "done their bit," would know what to do well enough without having to be put through the "chicken****" drills again.

That proved to be a mistake for both the British 7th Armoured and the 51st Infantry. In spite of the expectations put upon the veteran British units, they rather significantly underperformed in Normandy (except for the 50th). For one thing, the Normandy terrain wasn't anything like North Africa or Sicily as to draw prior experience from. And for another, coordination and initiative often proved wanting in the divisions' command chains.

It wasn't due to the fictional Stephen Ambrose assertion that the UK soldiers were "unmotivated" in the veteran divisions. Some were, but for others, it was a matter where leadership and training simply fell short from what was earlier assumed. It apparently changed significantly for British 51st Division when the capable Gen. Rennie took over later on.

The other major sin of omission on the part of the Allied commanders was the assumption that the German ground troops, now "used up" and unwilling, would crack soon under battle. Some did, especially the pressed foreign "volunteers", but just as often the German combat troops proved resilient and determined enough, matched with an average maintained edge in small unit tactics at that time. And some Allied troops learned from all this; at least those who weren't killed or evacuated. But the German troops at Normandy, in sum, did not make it easy for the Allies to engage in close quarters.

Another issue that D'Este points out very compellingly is that the pre-invasion estimations for UK infantry casualties and replacement rates were WAY off the mark for what resulted in Normandy. Again, D'Este doesn't seem to put the onus for this on any one UK commander or planner in specific, but IMO this is another thing for which Alanbrooke (and Churchill) must share some given bit of responsibility over also, proportioned on down to the operational commanders and planners.

There is one error I regard in D'Este's book, however. He contends that the US Army forces in Normandy, as compared to the Commonwealth, were better adapted to apply combined-arms tactics. Concerning unit organizations, this might have been true, but experience-wise, the new US divisions also fell short at first in applying combined arms. Nominally, each US infantry division had one tank and one TD battalion assigned to it on a consistent if not permanent basis. However, in the pre-invasion training, Doubler points out that there was no real concerted effort to get the US tank battalions to fight with the infantry in coordinated small-unit actions. This had to be learned the hard way in the Normandy bocage, although the US divisions did adapt readily enough after their initial bloody noses. The US Armored divisions seemed to apply combined arms better at the get-go, but their more even proportioning of tank & infantry units probably helped drive this.

What is also noteworthy is that the pre-invasion veteran US divisions generally performed fairly well in Normandy. The US 1st Division, bloodied from Omaha, still reached Caumont in six days. The US 9th Division shredded the German 77th Division while cutting off the Contenin Peninsula and later repulsed Panzer Lehr the following month. And the US 2nd Armored of course performed remarkably well in the days following the "Cobra" breakthrough.

Not much of this addresses Monty in specific, but helps lay out some of the premise in Normandy for which Monty and other commanders had to deal with.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Siege:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Positive:

Instilled confidence in subordinates

Raised the standard of training in the British Army

Popular with troops

The training quality I will also agree with, as well as the popularity with the troops.

For all these reasons is probably why I find him to be so similar to General McClellan from the US Civil War.

-Hans </font>

[Determinant]

Ahh, Monty. Points to note:

1. He was a horrid self-important little prig of a man. Compare and contrast Ike who was an utter gentleman. But ****s have their uses too.

2. He was an effective battlefield commander. He had 'grip' and his men believed in him; that he wouldn't squander their lives. Can the same be said for Patton?

3. He commanded the land forces in OVERLORD. He therefore defeated the German Army in France. But he lied afterwards about how he did it: see 1 above. If anyone thinks that there was a better spot on the map for 'entering the continent of Europe' I'd be pleased to learn where.

4.

[MrSpkr]

Originally posted by Determinant:

2. He was an effective battlefield commander. He had 'grip' and his men believed in him; that he wouldn't squander their lives.

I think some survivors of the Sicilian campaign and more importantly, Market-Garden might disagree with you.

Steve

[Spook]

CombinedArms does have a point. Much (though not all) of the negative aura surrounding Monty to this day stems from his recognized personality shortfalls and typical lack of sufficient tact, along with his less-than-honest postwar recountings. He had gotten even Churchill all ruffled a couple of times during Normandy alone. As Churchill is reputed to say once of Monty: "In defeat, unthinkable; in victory, insufferable."

One thing I do want to nip in the bud for now is another mundane "Patton vs. Monty" comparison. For one, Patton didn't move up the command chain as far as Monty did. And second, Patton, while often denigrating of Monty, was not Monty's most ardent rival in the full course of the NW Europe campaign. That instead would be Bradley after he had gotten out from under Monty's wing.

Anyway, my own follow-up on Sir Bernard Law Montgomery is going to stay focal to the Normandy campaign in this post, much of which links to my earlier reading this year of D'Este's "Decision in Normandy." How Monty conducted himself at the Scheldt, Market-Garden, and the Ardennes can be taken up in later posts.

Recognizably, even in the planning of the Normandy operation, Montgomery often strove for the meticulous and the methodical. This paid off in a way as that Monty (as did Ike & Bedell Smith) recognized that Gen. Morgan's original COSSAC plan of assaulting with just three divisions risked too narrow a beachhead, and argued emphatically to revise to a five-division assault front.

However, the notion of Monty also being "overly cautious" is something as that can be used to the point of outright misrepresentation.

Monty, whatever his methodical and precautionary natures for "set-piece" battles, still had one enduring quality throughout the war: he sought to fight the Germans, to take the ground war to them wherever he could. This quality truly came to the fore when the final "go" decision was needed on D-Day. The weather premise was bad enough as that others like Tedder or Leigh-Mallory were more discouraged to press forward on 6th June. When Ike turned to Monty, Monty's reply: "I would say....Go." Monty was resolute enough to see the matter pressed through even though the weather conditions, while "tolerable", were certainly not optimal.

Whatever all else is assessed of Monty in being risk-evasive, he wasn't being evasive at that moment. It certainly must have played on his mind that there were still some real chances for the invasion to founder.

D'Este also related in detail that Monty's plan for the Commonwealth invasion forces was actually quite ambitious in a few ways. While the stock history often holds that Monty only wanted to "pin the German armor" in the Caen zone, it is certain that Monty did NOT want his British troops to be contained in a shallow beachhead. Thus why he wanted Caen as a D-Day objective; not for Caen in itself, but to allow the British 2nd Army to then quickly drive on to the higher country between Caen and Falaise as the later "hinge" of the Allied beachhead.

A shallow beachhead, if entertained in pre-invasion planning, ran too much the risk of another Anzio premise, something as that Monty and Churchill wanted to AVOID if at all possible. A shallow beachhead also challenged the deployment of reinforcing echelons, and prior to Goodwood, this indeed did become an issue for activating Creare's Canadian Army under 21st Army Group in July.

What Monty proposed to help prevent an Anzio situation was to keep the Germans "unhinged" from forming a congealed and continuous front. To aid in this, he further proposed that independent British armoured/tank brigades would land quickly and "race ahead" to form strongpoint pockets within German lines. In proposing this, Monty acknowledged that such a move might instead hazarded the armoured brigade to be ultimately lost, but if the higher operational goal of keeping the Germans "unhinged" was achieved, he felt it was worth it.

But it didn't work out that way. The armoured brigades were unloaded more slowly than planned, for one. For another, it did not take much in a German ambush as to force even a British armored brigade advance to stall.

The last chance to prevent a congealed German line came with Villers-Bocage on 13th June. Monty's input to this planned operation was to use British 1st Airborne in a drop just behind the German lines in the region between Caen and Villers, to link with the planned 7th Armoured's drive east from Villers. Such a plan on face value did have its risks, but also some good potential. However, Leigh-Mallory inferred that the air transport for the job would not be fully on hand, and was overall pretty averse to risking 1st Airborne. L-M may have ultimately been right about this risk (especially given how quickly the battle in Villers had turned), but Monty's later regard of L-M is a bit ironic: "He (L-M) could just fly over in a Mosquito to check out the form for himself. But he doesn't, the gutless bugger."

Anyway, as is known, the Villers op was abortive, due in part to the storied Wittman ambush, and Villers itself was given up back to the Germans. Worst of all, the Germans had by now brought up enough troops to "congeal" the line and constrain British 2nd Army to the shallow beachhead that Monty wanted to avoid. He wanted to keep up the initiative over Rommel, but now was losing it and had to play to Rommel's tune at times.

The failure of Villers can't be held on Monty's head in the main. More of the blame for the lack of initiative belongs to the 7th Armoured's Erskine and 30th Corps CO Bucknall. However, in the critical time period to keep operational inertia from setting in, both Monty and the 2nd Army CO Dempsey were curiously inactive in their own turn.

And this wasn't the only time that Monty seemed to misstep in the grand-tactical realm. Another time was in Goodwood (which actually was Dempsey's concept) when Monty, by giving 8th Corps CO O'Connor an added tactical directive before the battle, brought on the premise that those tanks which broke through were short-handed on infantry support and thus more vulnerable.

Even less easy to explain is that during the later formation of the Falaise Pocket, Monty could have easily shifted 30th Corps over from being "stalled" at the Vire sector and used it to reinforce the hard-pressed and bloodied Canadians pushing to Falaise itself. Yet he didn't.

Overall, in Normandy, there isn't very much to show Monty to have inspired tactical or grand-tactical thinking. In this lower realm of warfighting, Rommel's own performance in Normandy seemed to outpace.

But in the higher-level operational thinking, it is here where Monty had Rommel's measure and then some. For one thing, Monty may have asserted that "I never had to alter my master plan", which is since proven untrue. Monty DID revise his plan, and did so several times. But adaptation to unplanned events and circumstances is not a weakness, but a strength, to an operational commander. Recognized that sometimes he had no other choice, of course.

Monty was also thinking ahead of Rommel in the game of coordinating air operations with the ground battle. Rommel felt that the Luftwaffe had to be more subordinated to army control, but Monty argued less for direct control and more for direct coordination, arguing that the tac AF and army HQ should neighbor each other to enhance this coordination. In general, it worked out quite well, either with Broadhurst's 83rd Group (2nd TAF) to Dempsey or Quesada's IXth TAC to Bradley. The coordination between Broadhurst and Quesada was also well applied.

This is hardly reflective of the "World War I General" mindset as asserted earlier for Monty, IMO.

And in Normandy, while Monty had his share of higher-level detractors that would've been quite happy to see Monty replaced (Tedder & Coningham as a couple such), it is to his credit that he didn't lambast his Normandy subordinates in a comparable way. After Bradley's botched "distributed" attacks in early July, Monty could've harangued and shredded Bradley over the matter, but instead (per Dempsey) subtlely hinted, "I would concentrate my thrusts more." It would be much for Monty to claim that COBRA was part of his plan too, when it was really Bradley who formulated it in the main. But Monty held the reins loose and give a hint, all the while as he was dealing with higher-level sniping above him, sometimes even from Eisenhower.

(And to fairly note, it is also to Ike's credit that he stuck with Monty through the Normandy operation when he was given opportunities, even from Churchill, to make a change if he saw fit to do so.)

One other thing to remind is that the resultant breakout and forming of the Falaise Pocket was not --- repeat, NOT --- originally envisaged in Monty's grand plan. Originally, Monty planned for the balance of Patton's 3rd Army to drive into the Britanny Peninsula to seize Brest as an added offloading port, affirmed as late as 28th July. But when Patton, Bradley, & Ike proposed instead for most of 3rd Army to instead turn east to Le Mans by 3rd August, Monty was astute to see the new opportunities and quickly approved.

Whatever his sum shortfalls and virtues, and his recognized missteps in Normandy, the Normandy campaign was still one of Montgomery's finest moments as an operational commander. As the overall ground forces commander in this one campaign, he was most likely the right man for the job at the right time, a job for which I'm unconvinced as that Bradley or Alexander could have done as well at just then.

[ October 29, 2003, 02:12 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by MrSpkr:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Determinant:

2. He was an effective battlefield commander. He had 'grip' and his men believed in him; that he wouldn't squander their lives.

I think some survivors of the Sicilian campaign and more importantly, Market-Garden might disagree with you.

Steve </font>

[MrSpkr]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by MrSpkr:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Determinant:

2. He was an effective battlefield commander. He had 'grip' and his men believed in him; that he wouldn't squander their lives.

I think some survivors of the Sicilian campaign and more importantly, Market-Garden might disagree with you.

Steve </font>