Montgomery as Battlefield Commander

[Firefly]

Originally posted by MrSpkr:

By ignoring intel about the Panzers, he committed airborne troops to a battle in which they would be slaughtered, and for no good purpose.

The intelligence came from a flawed source, the Dutch Resistance, which was not only thoroughly infilitrated by German intelligence, but was known to be so by Allied intelligence. It was rightly suspect and not really surprising that that the Allies decided to ignore it without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Firefly:

The intelligence came from a flawed source, the Dutch Resistance, which was not only thoroughly infilitrated by German intelligence, but was known to be so by Allied intelligence. It was rightly suspect and not really surprising that that the Allies decided to ignore it without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.

Though that doesn't also address the added photo-recon which showed German armored vehicles on one such occasion, as I might anticipate to come up as a later counter.

Even to that end, a measure of perspective is needed. One or two photos of armored vehicles alone do not confirm the existence of a (rebuilding) panzer corps. Many German infantry divisions also could have some limited integral (SP/TD) armor support.

However, I consider your assertion of the Dutch Underground being a "flawed" source as being too vague. Yes, that the Dutch (PAN?) had been infiltrated on one such occasion is often cited, and an understandable backdrop to the British command's reservations to use same.

But do you throw the baby out with the bathwater? That does seem implied as justified above, and historically, it is not. The Dutch PAN practiced some strict intel standards per the accounting of C. Ryan in "A Bridge Too Far," and for that matter, that the Nijmegen highway bridge didn't blow up when it was supposed to might have been the work of a PAN agent who earlier sabotaged some fuse lines, but didn't survive the Market-Garden op.

That the British chose not make more use of the PAN was ultimately to Market-Garden's detriment; as it also was to ignore the advice of some Dutch liasion officers about an alternate advance route to Arnhem. Again, this can be more fairly appreciated in hindsight than foresight, but I've yet seen it demonstrated as that the PAN was so "thoroughly infiltrated" to be ignored as it was as an intel asset.

[ October 29, 2003, 03:59 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

[Andreas]

I think what Firefly is alluding to is the famous case of all agents landed by SOE in Holland being captured and either shot, or worse turned. There was a BBC docu about it a while back. The Germans, when they knew the game was up, said goodbye in the clear, just to add insult to injury.

Not sure about times etc. This is all off memory. Been a while I have seen that programme, never read anything on it. So take it for what it is worth.

[Firefly]

Originally posted by Spook:

That the British chose not make more use of the PAN was ultimately to Market-Garden's detriment; as it also was to ignore the advice of some Dutch liasion officers about an alternate advance route to Arnhem. Again, this can be more fairly appreciated in hindsight than foresight, but I've yet seen it demonstrated as that the PAN was so "thoroughly infiltrated" to be ignored as it was as an intel asset.

I'm not arguing that they were correct to ignore the intelligence, subsequent events proved that they were wrong, but, as you know, intelligence is a tricky thing and it's understandable that they treated it as suspect. To lay the entire blame at Montgomery's door when he was probably following the advice of his intelligence chiefs is a little unfair on him (I know you personally didn't).

[Spook]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I think what Firefly is alluding to is the famous case of all agents landed by SOE in Holland being captured and either shot, or worse turned. There was a BBC docu about it a while back. The Germans, when they knew the game was up, said goodbye in the clear, just to add insult to injury.

If true, that would lend a fair charge to a "thoroughly infiltrated" Dutch resistance, although I don't know if this played into the reservations of Monty and 21st AG in specific for the MG planning. I don't recall it mentioned in Ryan's book.

[Firefly]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I think what Firefly is alluding to is the famous case of all agents landed by SOE in Holland being captured and either shot, or worse turned. There was a BBC docu about it a while back. The Germans, when they knew the game was up, said goodbye in the clear, just to add insult to injury.

Not sure about times etc. This is all off memory. Been a while I have seen that programme, never read anything on it. So take it for what it is worth.

Actually some survived being captured, including happily the father of an very nice Dutch girl I knew a long time ago . She loaned me an English version of his book about his experiences, but it's so long ago I'm afraid I don't remember the details apart from him having a hell of job convincing his own side that he wasn't a traitor after his liberation. In the end he was cleared and awarded a medal.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Firefly:

To lay the entire blame at Montgomery's door when he was probably following the advice of his intelligence chiefs is a little unfair on him (I know you personally didn't).

Well, yes, this point is true.

Actually, the sins of Monty (and Ike & several others) regarding the Scheldt and Market-Garden are more onerous than over the extent on how much the Dutch underground was used. But I'll have to get into that later on.

[SFJaykey]

I think criticisms of Monty as being overly cautious may be unfair. After Pearl Harbor, as an astute calculator of military power he might have realized, as many did, that Germany's defeat was inevitable. Under such circumstances a methodical approach was appropriate. To rush forward would only add to the casualty figures.

Market-Garden was a bad plan: too long a chain with too many questionable links. But it may have been an expression of Monty's patriotism as much as his vanity. At the time of its planning German forces were in headlong retreat and victory seemed imminent: British troops leading the way to Berlin would have benefitted the UK's postwar position as much as Monty's reputation.

Alot of speculation in both of these suggestions, admittedly....

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Spook:

If true, that would lend a fair charge to a "thoroughly infiltrated" Dutch resistance, although I don't know if this played into the reservations of Monty and 21st AG in specific for the MG planning. I don't recall it mentioned in Ryan's book.

I doubt it was de-classified when Ryan wrote it. Could be the same situation as with Chester Willmot wrote 'The struggle for Europe' before ULTRA was declassified, there are some references to decoy stuff in there, as true history, IIRC.

Firefly, good to hear that.

[flamingknives]

ISTR that the Germans used the underground infiltration to capture a radio operator, complete with codes, who they used to arrange future drops.

SOE finally tumbled the ruse when one of their radio ops. in England twigged that the messages he was getting were too good for the people that they sent out.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Spook:

If true, that would lend a fair charge to a "thoroughly infiltrated" Dutch resistance, although I don't know if this played into the reservations of Monty and 21st AG in specific for the MG planning. I don't recall it mentioned in Ryan's book.

I doubt it was de-classified when Ryan wrote it. Could be the same situation as with Chester Willmot wrote 'The struggle for Europe' before ULTRA was declassified, there are some references to decoy stuff in there, as true history, IIRC. </font>

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

ISTR that the Germans used the underground infiltration to capture a radio operator, complete with codes, who they used to arrange future drops.

SOE finally tumbled the ruse when one of their radio ops. in England twigged that the messages he was getting were too good for the people that they sent out.

Very close. What actually happened during "Das England Spiel" was that the radio operator was captured and forced to continue signaling. However he was assigned an intentional code mistake sequence wich he was to skip if captured. He thus sent his message perfectly when captured. SOE was sleeping on the job and didn't catch on to the absence of their forced coding error. So every drop by SOE from then on was by Gestapo invitation. The fault IMO is entirely SOE. The operatives was initially branded as a traitor before being cleared.

[Aacooper]

There are a few comments effectively saying that Monty wasn't too cautious because the Commonwealth armies had a manpower problem. The Commonwealth armies certainly had a manpower problem, but consider Monty's approach when he had temporary command of the US 1st Army in Dec-Jan '44:

- Wanted to pull back from Elsenborn Ridge

- Wanted to pull back from Manhay crossroads, Hodges ordered crossroads retaken

- Possibly wanted to wait three months before erasing German gains (all cribbed from "A Time For Trumpets")

The US Army didn't effectively have a manpower crisis, so I believe it's safe to say he was too cautious.

The other sentiment commonly expressed is that Monty's go-slow approach is okay because "it saves lives". That's true and untrue. A hasty attack into a prepared defense unnecessarily costs lives. However, giving the enemy time to regroup costs lives as well. How would the German conquest of France gone if Rommel's panzer division and the others had played it safe to save lives? History might have been quite a bit different! What if Monty had caught up with and destroyed Rommel post-El Alamein but pre-Tunisia? In the short term it might have cost lives, but in the long-run it would have saved many Allied lives.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Aacooper:

There are a few comments effectively saying that Monty wasn't too cautious because the Commonwealth armies had a manpower problem. The Commonwealth armies certainly had a manpower problem, but consider Monty's approach when he had temporary command of the US 1st Army in Dec-Jan '44:

- Wanted to pull back from Elsenborn Ridge

- Wanted to pull back from Manhay crossroads, Hodges ordered crossroads retaken

- Possibly wanted to wait three months before erasing German gains (all cribbed from "A Time For Trumpets")

The US Army didn't effectively have a manpower crisis, so I believe it's safe to say he was too cautious.

You are probably right, but to be fair it might be considered that he was seeking to avoid the criticism that while he was cautious with Commonwealth lives, he was spendthrift with American lives. I don't claim that that was what was on his mind—frankly I don't know what he was thinking—but it's a consideration.

On another point, I think Montgomery's lapses might have been seen in a kinder light if he himself had not always looked down on his American colleagues as if from the height of perfection. Such an attitude begs severe criticism in return.

Michael

[Matthias]

well u can't blame market graden on failule on him to much, as he couldn't control the weather and the intell he got couldn't be trusted. market graden was the only way the allies could have got to berlin before the red army. something that was only just realized that once the red army got to berlin it wasn't going back to russia. monty was one of the only allied genrals who wanted to attack from italy into easten europe which would have stoped the red army and rusia gaining east europe, which was alot better then what the usa wanted to do and attack southen france...which was pretty pointless statically. u can not really complane that he he was to slow to move, bnecuase he didn't want to put hes men into battles he might not win and would cost many lives. "less speed and more haste". he was the only genral to get hes divsion out of dunrik with not only hes men in order...but with their weapons...he was the only one. i don't think u could find a better allied commaner in the second world war! yes he might have been a pain in the ass. but he was a bigger pain in the ass to the germans.

[Andreas]

I think Anthony on the previous page was the only one so far to mention Antwerp. That was probably the biggest mistake Montgomery made, and IIRC it needed a very straight and direct order from Eisenhower to make him deal with it. It is interesting that in this case he completely ignored logistics, while previously he had shown himself to be a master in that area. When Eisenhower's order made Montgomery deal with the Antwerp conundrum, a month had been lost. Even after Market Garden, another thrust to the Ruhr was planned for a short time before the importance of the Antwerp problem was realised.

Market Garden tends to obscure that fairly significant oversight.

[MrSpkr]

Originally posted by Matthias:

market graden was the only way the allies could have got to berlin before the red army.

I disagree with that analysis. Had Bradley's forces, including Pattons, been given the fuel and other supplies diverted to Monty, the Allies very well could have occupied the Ruhr in October 1944, rather than March 1945. From there, Berlin is a short hop.

Also keep in mind that the Western Allies in 1945 opted against even trying to get to Berlin for fear of the horrific casualties they would suffer in taking the city. Had the Western Allies made a concerted drive towards Berlin, the biggest obstacle would have been getting past the throngs of civilians and German units fleeing the Soviet advance. I doubt they would have encountered much in the way of military resistance until they hit the outskirts of the city.

Steve

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I think Anthony on the previous page was the only one so far to mention Antwerp.

[Voice of James Earl Jones]Your searching skills are weak, old man...you should not have come back...[/voice]

[ November 02, 2003, 10:43 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Sailor Malan]

Originally posted by MrSpkr:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Matthias:

market graden was the only way the allies could have got to berlin before the red army.

I disagree with that analysis. Had Bradley's forces, including Pattons, been given the fuel and other supplies diverted to Monty, the Allies very well could have occupied the Ruhr in October 1944, rather than March 1945. From there, Berlin is a short hop.

Also keep in mind that the Western Allies in 1945 opted against even trying to get to Berlin for fear of the horrific casualties they would suffer in taking the city. Had the Western Allies made a concerted drive towards Berlin, the biggest obstacle would have been getting past the throngs of civilians and German units fleeing the Soviet advance. I doubt they would have encountered much in the way of military resistance until they hit the outskirts of the city.

Steve </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Sailor Malan:

This is a straight question not a troll: if MG was Monty's biggest mistake - actually I think Antwerp was, but following from the conversation above, lets go with it. What have we got? A 50 mile advance, crossing multiple river lines, panicking Model (not difficult by all accounts), and liberating a lot of southern Holland. The cost - 1 reinforced British AB div trashed, and reasonable losses elsewhere. How does this compare with some others: Rommels worst mistake? Bradley (Bulge, or Hurtengen, or Kasserine take your pick), Patton?, etc.

Views please...

Patton's worst mistake may have been Hammelburg - which cost only a small task force.

Interesting view on the MG debacle, though.

[Broken]

Originally posted by Determinant:

Ahh, Monty. Points to note:

1. He was a horrid self-important little prig of a man. Compare and contrast Ike who was an utter gentleman. But ****s have their uses too.

Patton wasn't exactly the smoothest personality in the world either. Good generalship and quirky personalities often go hand-in-hand.

2. He was an effective battlefield commander. He had 'grip' and his men believed in him; that he wouldn't squander their lives. Can the same be said for Patton?

You are right, Patton wasn't tremendously concerned with casualties. That was the 'yin' to the 'yang' of his aggressive attacking style. It is hard to say which approach saves more lives in the end: a cautious casualty avoiding but slow Montgomery or a hell-for-leather, 'Blood 'n Guts' Patton.

3. He commanded the land forces in OVERLORD. He therefore defeated the German Army in France.

He did a good job organizing the invasion and the following attrition phase, despite the criticism. He was only nominally in charge by the time of the breakout.

[Michael Dorosh]

I wonder how often Monty visited hospitals, though? We know Patton did at least twice ( ) alarming results aside. Of course, Patton made some revolting comments about getting more officers killed because it was good for the morale of the men...

[Mr Furious]

Originally posted by MrSpkr:

I disagree with that analysis. Had Bradley's forces, including Pattons, been given the fuel and other supplies diverted to Monty, the Allies very well could have occupied the Ruhr in October 1944, rather than March 1945. From there, Berlin is a short hop.

Also keep in mind that the Western Allies in 1945 opted against even trying to get to Berlin for fear of the horrific casualties they would suffer in taking the city. Had the Western Allies made a concerted drive towards Berlin, the biggest obstacle would have been getting past the throngs of civilians and German units fleeing the Soviet advance. I doubt they would have encountered much in the way of military resistance until they hit the outskirts of the city.

Steve

Well from the looks of things that may well have been the case, but i contest that the attrition rate under Patton would of been horific, probably far more then Market Garden produced. The refitting 2nd SS panzer division in Holland would also have had more time to refit and plan attack upon Pattons army. Imagine the 2nd SS drivng into Pattons 4th army flank, his forces would of been annhilated.

While i don't neccesarily think that the MG operation was a good idea, nether-the-less it was executed with due consideration - except for the whole Intel issue-which would of been out of Monty's hands. Having a grandfather who fought with the Red Devils across WW2 he knew what might face them if they didn't link up with Horrocks, they weren't inexperinced soldiers they were a fighting airbourne unit. My granddad has no regrets about it because he still believes that if they had linked up with XXX corps they could of driven the Werhmacht into germany very quickly and enforced a very quick surrender, well he does regret the deaths of his mates.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I think Anthony on the previous page was the only one so far to mention Antwerp. That was probably the biggest mistake Montgomery made, and IIRC it needed a very straight and direct order from Eisenhower to make him deal with it. It is interesting that in this case he completely ignored logistics, while previously he had shown himself to be a master in that area. When Eisenhower's order made Montgomery deal with the Antwerp conundrum, a month had been lost. Even after Market Garden, another thrust to the Ruhr was planned for a short time before the importance of the Antwerp problem was realised.

Market Garden tends to obscure that fairly significant oversight.

Along with Andreas's summation above, and echoed by Anthony and now Sailor Malan, I similarly concur that the Antwerp/Scheldt affair was Montgomery's most significant error. Along with the errors to be discussed below of Monty's errors with Market Garden, he had gone from what was his best period of summed generalship (Normandy) to his worst.

However, any critique of Monty in the Antwerp/MG operations has to maintain a larger perspective in that there were a host of other Allied leaders in that same timeframe that didn't perform their best either, sometimes in such ways to either chainlink or to magnify Monty's errors.

Sometimes one just has to look at a map so to start. For nearly two months, the French battlefield had been constrained to Normandy, basically a postage-stamp of the overall area of France. Then, in but a few weeks, the Allies had burst out and had seemingly ripped the German west-front army into irrecoverable shreds. At its peak strength, the German mechanized units had about 1500 tanks or so. By the end of August, German tank strength was measured at a few hundred, and it seemed as if any Panzer Division had no more than but a handful of tanks and other armored vehicles. Luftwaffe strength in sorties over France was in similar straits. Frequent airborne drops planned in late August were cancelled due to ground forces overruning the planned dropped zones. And so on & so forth.

Little surprise that "victory fever" took hold of several high-ranking Allied leaders from what they could see of German strength, and how fast their troops were now driving through France.

Whatever victory fever had also taken hold of Monty also, the added premise was of his "demotion/promotion" in the first week of September. With Eisenhower taking over directly as overall ground forces commander on the West Front and with Bradley's US forces now independent of Monty, Monty's overall command responsibility was gutted down to the Commonwealth forces. Certainly not insignificant, but in terms of raw manpower, the US forces were mushrooming beyond the CW much faster. Sure, Churchill mollified a little by bumping up Montgomery to field marshal rank, one rank over Ike and two over Bradley, but in practical terms, Bradley now had the greater offensive power. Further, both Ike & Brad were concurrent with the "broad front" strategy for which Monty was opposed to, who instead advocated the "single thrust" strategy for driving to the Ruhr and then on to Berlin.

(NOTE: I rarely see earnest discussion on which strategy was ultimately better, which would make a good topic in itself. But IMO, the answer was "neither" in strictest terms, if one compares with what an high-ranking Soviet commander experienced in "deep operations" would instead probably do. )

So Monty, the overall ground commander of the Normandy campaign, watched as the fruits of victory seemed to slip through. He didn't control the West Front anymore, the Germans seemed at the end of their rope, and the strategy for which he was ardent about wasn't being adopted.

All of which had probably turned some screws in Monty's mind, as for him to not be in the peak train of thought right then.

The downside of the victory fever however, not overly obvious to all, was that the sudden liberation of most of France also came part & parcel with exponentially increased logistics friction. Supply depots had to move up from Normandy (again, just a postage stamp of France overall), supply lines had lengthened immensely without a working rail net to also support, only Cherbourg was coming along in operating as a deep-water port on the northern coasts, and the overall frontage was now greatly stretched.

I'd hate to think on what the West Front logistical bind would've been in late 1944 ,if Ike didn't stand up to Churchill and didn't follow through with the DRAGOON invasion that had taken the valuable southern French Riviera ports intact.

Another harbinger for the results of September was that the tactical air units of US 9th AF and RAF 2nd TAF also needed to relocate and move up.

And to be honest, the transfer of overall ground command to Eisenhower was not done in the most inspired fashion. SHAEF HQ was first set up in the coastal town of Granville, not the best place in location or in available communications net resources to keep abreast of developments with the separate army groups during September.

It was an environment for which one or several SNAFU's boded to happen, and inevitably did.

This doesn't directly address or explain Monty's actions in September/October on what he did right or wrong, it just sets the stage. (To be continued)

[Spook]

Originally posted by Mr Furious:

Well from the looks of things that may well have been the case, but i contest that the attrition rate under Patton would of been horific, probably far more then Market Garden produced. The refitting 2nd SS panzer division in Holland would also have had more time to refit and plan attack upon Pattons army. Imagine the 2nd SS drivng into Pattons 4th army flank, his forces would of been annhilated.

Where to start....

Mr Furious, first of all, it wasn't "2nd SS Panzer Division" refitting in Holland, it was 2nd SS Panzer Corps of 9th & 10th SS Panzer Divisions.

Second, Patton's army was the US 3rd, not 4th.

Third, that any German panzer force could've "annhilated" Patton's army in September is rather bogus to presume. In fact, during the Lorraine operations of that month, Patton's 3rd WAS counterattacked by three of the four "panzer brigades" formed ad-hoc for the West Front (the fourth went to Holland), with all three instead being resoundingly thrashed in separate actions by Patton's divisions (including French 2nd Armored). The results of these battles convinced even Hitler that the future Ardennes attack against the "crappy" American troops would have to be better concentrated in armor and other forces.

As compared to Market-Garden happening at the same time, I regard the Arracourt battles by Patton's 3rd as being one of the few bright spots of September, along with the Westwall breakthrough near Aachen. The attrition for the 3rd at Arracourt also was much better than that for Market-Garden on average, although the later Lorraine operations would be worse.