Glantz's conclusions on Kursk

[redhead]

I just finished Glantz's Battle of Kursk, and the lengthly Kursk thread from a few months back, and there seem to be a few contradictions/surprises.

I had previously read Panzer Battles, which had claimed that the lack of a mobile defense had hastened Germany's downfall. Glantz contends that a mobile defense wouldn't have had nearly as great an impact.

"What von Manstein did not know then or after the war, however, was that strong Soviet strategic reserves in the Stalingrad region would have thwarted the breakout effort." ( Battle of Kursk (BoK) p. 263). So even if Hitler had allowed the attempt, it wouldn't have mattered.

Also, "Mobile defense seemed prudent and wise to postwar military analysts, but the generals of 1943 knew that it could not produce victory in a war that most thought could still be won." (BoK, p. 263)

He claims that the German pessimism about the later date for Citadel didn't exist at the time of the operation, but only arose in hindsight. German forces easily smashed Soviet tactical and operational defenses in 41 and 42. So "even the most pessimistic German general presumed German forces could easily penetrate Soviet tactical and operational defenses." (BoK, p.262) He claims that the main German concern was to make sure that they didn't over extend once they broke through which had been their problem in the past. (Or perhaps their problem in the past was that they couldn't over extend far enough?)

This, of course, doesn't seem to gel with other quotes I remember reading about the German trepidation prior to Citadel.

He concludes that even launching Citadel when originally planned wouldn't have helped, since then the Germans were just as weak as the Soviets. He even goes so far as to say maybe they should have waited longer to get the kinks out of the new tanks.

Finally, although this was mentioned on the other Kursk thread, he also concludes that the Soviets really did have a large strategic plan to absorb the German offensive, and then respond in kind.

So, since I have multiple conflicting sources (Panzer Battles, BoK, previous threads), I was wondering if there are any other good sources to turn to here to clarify this. Or what the more informed members of this board thought.

thanks

[Grisha]

Glantz also concludes that Prokhorovka was not the battle it was purported to be in Soviet sources. While the battle can now be seen as possibly the final straw, it was by no means the smashing victory the Soviets claimed it to be. What defeated Zitadelle was the manner in which Soviet forces kept the Germans off-balance operationally throughout the offensive. Though paying deeply in losses at the tactical level, the Soviets insured that German forces were unable to consolidate their operational maneuvers, resulting in a snail's pace advance. This was mainly accomplished by incessant counterattacks upon the flanks of advancing German forces, spoiling timetables and insuring German attacks were fragmented. Also, with the north pincer soundly repulsed, the south pincer couldn't hope to accomplish any sort of encirclement of Soviet forces.

And, yes, Soviet plans for summer 1943 were twofold: to repulse the German offensive, then assume a broadfront offensive within weeks of the cessation of Zitadelle.

[ March 06, 2003, 03:51 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Redmow]

I think alot of that was written from the perspective of the Generals of divisions and corps and army. A good book to see what happened down on the field of battle itself is Panzer Aces by Franz Kurowski. Not that I disagree with you gentlemen but for info purposes, to hear eyewitness accounts is astounding. There is also Infantry Aces by the same author. Just started reading it so I don't know if any mention of Kursk is there. Right now I am reading about France 1940.

[cbb]

Originally posted by Redmow:

There is also Infantry Aces by the same author. Just started reading it so I don't know if any mention of Kursk is there. Right now I am reading about France 1940.

I don't recall there being anything in Infanterie Aces about Kursk. But it's still a very good book. So much has been written about the panzertruppen, it's refreshing to see a book focus on the foot soldiers.

[SgtMuhammed]

Glantz does a good job of clearing up some of the myths of the battle. It is easy to declare that one particular action was THE action of a campaign when you think about it for 50 years. The mistake people often make is assuming that the participants at the time also felt the same way.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

For those who are interested, there is a new book, Kursk: the German View, by Steven Newton, due this month. It is a large collation of German accounts of the battle and post Kursk battles from German officers, plus some other stuff. The conclusion is that, no, Kursk was never winnable. Steven Newton comes out of the US army education establishment as does Glantz, and both reach the same conclusion.

This has always been my view, too. One only has to look at the massive Soviet offensives that followed on from Kursk, without a break, to see that any idea of the Germans having “thrown away” a potential victory is fanciful, in my view.

What is true about Kursk, but not all of the post-Kursk battles, particularly from the autumn of 43 onwards, is that the Soviets suffered far heavier casualties at Kursk than did the Germans. Although strategically the Soviets were on the defensive, tactically, and operational within the western definition of operations, the Soviets often attacked at Kursk. This was a huge mistake. Post Kursk and even pre-Kursk but not “at” Kursk, the Soviets had learnt that you do not attack Uber armour. The Standard Operating Procedure when T34/76s came up against StugIIIs, and in 44 when any armour attacked Panthers, was to go over to the defensive immediately. They would out-flank the Uber armour but this does mean moving the attack some kms to the flanks. In CMBB terms, moving off the given CMBB map. At Kursk they seem to have thrown away the manual and attacked Uber armour again and again. This cost them massive casualties in armour. Contrary to some popular belief, the best form of defence is to do just that, defend. As the Soviets often found, the T34 when defending against Uber armour can be very effective. German Uber armour was really only Uber in defence. StugIIIs and Panthers both have thin side armour which is a huge problem in attack. Neither is particularly threatening in attack for the above reason. Remember, even the lowly Soviet 76.2mm gun will penetrate the side of a Panther, at a 45 degree strike angle, at 1,000m.

At the tactical level the Soviets were not on their best game at Kursk. But they certainly learnt the tactical lessons. The autumn of 43 is when you see the real step change in the combat effectiveness of the Soviets.

I always think of Kursk as the last of the old style Eastern Front battles.

All good fun,

All the best,

Kip.

[ichadwick]

I'm also reading Glantz's book on Kursk (and his book on the entire campaign as well). It's an interesting read: full of detail and data from previously restricted sources. I haven't reached the conclusions yet... too bad it's such a dry, academic book.

[Keke]

There have been some heavy discussions about Glantz's use of various sources...

Anyhow, I agree with his conclusions. Maybe this would be the right time to discuss why Soviets had planned so perfect countermeasures?...

And please, no praises of UberSoviet operational art of war...

[Aragorn2002]

Other good reading on Kursk; Decision in the Ukraine, by George M. Nipe Jr.

[Grisha]

Kip,

I think I must disagree with your statement:

Although strategically the Soviets were on the defensive, tactically, and operational within the western definition of operations, the Soviets often attacked at Kursk. This was a huge mistake.

Rather than see it as a huge mistake, I see it as the main reason for Soviet victory at Kursk. First, one must acknowledge the planning put into adequate reserves for the defensive action. The Soviets ended up with units to spare as it turned out, with three rifle armies and two tank/mech corps uncommitted when Zitadelle was called off.

Having sufficient reserves deployed for their defensive operation, the next question for the Soviets was how to make the best use of them. Of course, the primary function was to plug the gaps, but would that be enough to guarantee success? By this point in the war the Germans had the clear advantage in armor, and combining this with their tactical abilities for rapid redeployment and battle, a passive defense would've given the Germans the time to consolidate forces to shift the schwerpunkt as they saw fit. Had the Soviets allowed for this, their southern defenses might very well have been penetrated, because Vatutin was unsure of the Germans' main attack sector, and Voronezh Front's defensive preparations reflected that. As it was, the Germans still 'sidestepped' eastwards when they ran into stiff resistance in the south pincer, and it was this shift that caused significant problems for Vatutin. Had the Germans been given the luxury of regrouping without hinderance, the combined assault power of von Manstein's force could’ve been beyond Voronezh Front’s capacity to contain. By conducting continuous counterattacks upon the flanks of the German divisions, German attack plans were kept in disarray, forcing the Germans to make do with whatever they had at hand. At times, German attacks were even called off when it became necessary to respond to a particularly effective Soviet counterattack. That Soviet losses would be high was a given in this instance, and a necessary evil, since the Soviets needed to engage and attack German panzer divisions with equipment that was now inferior.

[ March 05, 2003, 11:28 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by ichadwick:

... too bad it's such a dry, academic book.

I admire anybody who can read a Glantz book front to back without taking major breaks with other books.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Keke:

There have been some heavy discussions about Glantz's use of various sources...

Anyhow, I agree with his conclusions. Maybe this would be the right time to discuss why Soviets had planned so perfect countermeasures?...

And please, no praises of UberSoviet operational art of war...

UberSoviet operational art. I kinda like it, Keke

I guess you're referring to the intelligence aspect of Kursk. Namely, Ultra, Lucy, and ... yup, UberSoviet operational art in its dynamic razvedka guise! Well, in a discussion with Chris Lawrence over at the TDI forum, we came - from opposing directions - to the same conclusions: that all those really exciting 007-spies and their networks blew the whistle on Zitadelle. Of course, that still left a lot of work to be done before anything productive could be made of it. Which is where UberSoviet operational art: razvedka, comes in. Through the organs of the GRU and the NKVD, most of the pieces of the puzzle were put in place, so that meaningful details could be determined and acted upon. So, yes, Lucy and Ultra first let out word of this offensive, but it was the methodical, centralized collection and processing of thousands of bits of information from troop patrols, aerial recon sorties, partisan reports, special dept. operations, and agent reports that took this vague indicator and gave it form and definition.

[cbb]

Originally posted by redwolf:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by ichadwick:

... too bad it's such a dry, academic book.

I admire anybody who can read a Glantz book front to back without taking major breaks with other books. </font>

[Andreas]

I would argue that depends on your definition of 'entertainment'. Personally, I find e.g. the 'Panzer Aces' style of writing boring, while many others seem to find it entertaining.

[Keith]

I would just like to second the comment that it was precisely because the Soviets executed constant counter attacks on the flanks that Kursk failed. Most importantly, Army deteachment Kempf was unable to keep abreast of the SS panzer corps, thereby forcing the SS panzer corps to allocate one of its three divisions for flank protection rather than driving forward. This of course led to the check at Prokhorovka due to inadequate force strength.

Regarding the Stalingrad comment in the original posting, based on my readings I strongly believe that after the 64 hours of encirclement the Germans had no chance of breaking out as an intact force. Most of the German infantry were not motorized, the supply dumps were outside of the pocket, the Germans had really no force to facilitate the breakout from outside the pocket, and the Russians had plenty of reserves. The infantry would have been slaughterd on the open steppes in the snow. Regarding Manstein's relief attempt, by that point it was doomed from the start. The encircled 6th Army was in no shape physically or supply-wise to break out, Manstiens force was inadequate, and the Russians had plenty of reserves on hand. The only thing it succeeded in doing is drawing away Russian forces that were slated to drive on Rostov to seal off the whole German Southern wing. I would argue that after the initial week or so, 6th Army's continued resistance did more to help the Germans by tying down vast Russian forces that could have cut off the whole German Southern wing.

[kipanderson]

Grisha, hi,

As usual with you and I, if we look at the detail, there may not be that much difference between us, but still some difference no doubt.

I fully agree that the Soviets showed greater operational agility than the Germans at Kursk. Given that there is unlikely to be a Soviet Uber operational gene , the consistent Soviet operational superiority during the second half of the war must be down to better training of senior officers. Anyway… at the tactical level I remain unimpressed with the Soviet use of armour at Kursk.

Counter attacks against the flanks of the southern penetration were in deed the way to ago, but “meeting engagements”, for want of the better phrase, against Uber German armoured units were unwise and proved to be massively wasteful. They played into German hands. I appreciate fully the importance of operations. However, there is a very important qualification that must always be given. Tactical failure, and tactical success, can both be on such a scale as to have operational consequences. As in peace time cost/price matters, so in war price also matters. Resources matter. As in economics when there is always a highest valued alternative for gone, so in war. Attacking Uber armour with T34/76s and suffering 7 or more:1 casualty ratios was not a sensible use of resources. In my view.

A twenty odd strong battalion of T34/76s could find its strength halved by just one platoon of Tiger1s, Panthers or StugIIIs without destroying a single German AFV. However, in defence the T34/76 could come close a 1:1 casualty ratio against Panthers. The same battalion of T34s that was used to attack Uber tanks, could be used to defend against them on a different access. A far more sensible use of resources.

At Kursk the Soviets abandoned their usual SOP of not attacking Uber armour. Uber armour being German AFVs that could not be penetrated over the forward arc by the 76.2mm gun. The use of operational agility to attack the flanks of the penetration was fine, but the attacks should have been against infantry units, including mechanised infantry, but not against locations where Tiger1s and Panthers were expected. My view is that one reason they did ignore their own rule book and attack such units is that it may only be in retrospect that Soviet commanders understood quite how great the concentration of Tiger1s and Panthers was. When ordering attacks the Soviet commanders may have had in mind German armoured battalions of MarkIIIs and MarkIVs, supported by Marders. The standard German armoured units of the first half of 43. I have no idea.

If the Soviets had been more careful and disciplined in their use of armour, they could have greatly reduced their own casualties, while increasing German casualties.

The golden rule is, you do not attack Uber armour, you allow Uber armour to attack you. In 44 the Soviets were far more disciplined in applying this rule. Greatly to their own benefit. But strangely, this rule was developed to deal with StugIIIs well before Kursk. But it was not applied at Kursk.

Andreas, hi,

I tend to agree with you. Clear academic analysis is best and the high quality of the analysis and opinions adds its own excitement. However, the “very best” narrative accounts, such as Rick Atkinson’s An Army at Dawn also make stunningly fine reads. In my view.

All good fun ,

All the best,

Kip.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by cbb:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by redwolf:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by ichadwick:

... too bad it's such a dry, academic book.

I admire anybody who can read a Glantz book front to back without taking major breaks with other books. </font>

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by redwolf:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by cbb:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by redwolf:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by ichadwick:

... too bad it's such a dry, academic book.

I admire anybody who can read a Glantz book front to back without taking major breaks with other books. </font>

[Trommelfeuer]

Very interesting discussion, gentleman!

My grandfather was a "Panzermann" in the Waffen-SS "Totenkopfdivison", and he told me some wartime stories...must have been a awful mess at Kursk!

He told me that there were many tank colliding with each other in the mess, and that the battle at Prokharovka was like a close combat without any clear direction...

What do you think of the following Kursk-homepages? They differ very much from each other, which one is closer to the truth?

The Iron Fist

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/battles/battle2.html

The Kursk battle began early morning, on July 5, 1943.Many German tanks were gone in the first 700 metres, because of mines. Russian guns stepped in... The first day 586 German tanks were destroyed or damaged beyond repair.

On the July 8 Germans were close to making it through the anti-tank defense system. They pushed hard, but Russians fought back as hard. Germans threw everything they had - but Russians held.

The battles countinues from 11 to 14 July. Total German's casualties were over 300 tanks. The 5th Guard Tank Army also had heavy losses.

And now the other one:

Clash at Kharkov and Kursk

http://www.geocities.com/wolfram55/russia43.html

The Leibstandarte marched to the SS Korps troop concentration areas on 29 June, and the attack started on 5 july. It would assault right in the center, being in fact the point of the entire IV. Panzerarmee. Right from the start, Model's Armee was hampered with severe difficulties in the northren part of the assault, the number of Panthers dropped from 200 to some 40 because of mechanical breakdown, and the Elefants fell victim to Russian troops who climbed on it and aimed their flame-throwers right into the ventilation shafts.

The Panzer assault of Das Reich was delayed, as the Grenadiere were tangled up in defusing a vast web of mines.

On July 9,...Stavka threw in 1st Tank Army, which attacked from three sides, and badly hit Das Reich. Das Reich however, managed to hold its position and drove off the badly mauled Russian army. The German attack was picked up again.

By now the following Russian formations had been wiped out by SS-Pz.Kps., Stavka withdrew the remains:

- 6th Guards Tank Army

- 1st Tank Army

- detachments from 5th Guards Army

When the Russians decided the cross the Waffen-SS, a clash erupted that was more that of a total annihilation battle without much direction. The 13.s.Kp/SS-Pz.Reg. 1 engaged the Russian 181st Tank Regiment, and destroyed the whole unit without suffering a single loss. The main body of 5th Gds. Tank Corps assaulted in a series of uncoordinated strikes with the intention to separate and destroy the divisions separatly.

By the end of 12 July, 5th Guards Tank Army had lost 313 tanks versus 49 lost German Panzer. LAH tank losses were only 19.

A popular myth seems to be that the Waffen-SS Korps was almost destroyed in the fighting, but it is clear from their operations (none were in fact pulled out of the line, LAH moved to another theatre) after Zitadelle that they not at all badly mauled.

So which one is true? :confused:

With friendly greetings, Trommelfeuer

The Battle of Kursk(David M. Glantz, Jonathan M. House, Maps by Darin Grauberger)

http://www.angelfire.com/wi2/foto/ww2/proh/

[ March 05, 2003, 05:47 PM: Message edited by: Trommelfeuer ]

[Andreas]

Neither, although the second one is a bit closer on the mark.

There was no 6th Guards Tank Army at Kursk. 1st Tank Army was clobbered, but not destroyed, AFAIK. It participated in the follow-on Soviet offensive two weeks later.

[Becket]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

Glantz's introductory chapters and the book's conclusions are actually the most interesting and readable parts. There's clearly a lot of important research, but when he has to construct a narrative description of a battle, he has no clue on how to sustain the reader's interest.

Let's not forget, however, that these are scholarly endeavors, not creative writing. Now, that doesn't mean they have to be dry and boring (see "Portrait of the Titan," a bio of Henry VIII, for an example of engaging history) but it is typical of the field. I read Glantz, Erikson, et. al. for the scholarly information.

Not disagreeing with your conclusion that's it "dull" but rather with your conclusion that it's poor writing. Let's also remember that Glantz is endeavoring to provide analysis, which I find fascinating, unlike other authors, say, Hampton Sides or Stephen Ambrose, who are trying to provide gripping recreations.

[ March 05, 2003, 08:03 PM: Message edited by: Becket ]

[SgtMuhammed]

As a historian in training I am cursed to read even less entertaining authors than Glantz. Try G.R. Elton or Kitchen. It is a major failing in the field that some historians are taught that in order to be taken seriously they have to write seriously. There is no reason good history can't be good writing as well.

[Grisha]

Hey Kip

I understand what you're saying, but still believe that it was paramount that Soviet forces take the battle to the Germans as much as possible during Kursk. Granted, it could've been done better, but that may be attributed to insufficient experience combined with steppe terrain.

The situation at Kursk was basically a full-blown German offensive. Something the Germans had done the previous two summers with devastating effect. As such, initiative was squarely in the hands of German forces. Unlike 1941-42 the Germans also had unquestioned technological superiority in armor. Combine this with their already superb tactical expertise, and you have a very dire situation for the Soviets. The reason is that combined arms warfare had finally reached the point where any given defensive position was capable of being defeated, given sufficient focus and resources. At Kursk, the Germans possessed this capability. Soviet defenses were very formidible, but as long as the Germans had the initiative, it was just a matter of time before the Germans found the weakpoint and exploited it - something they were very good at. The key is as long as the Germans held the initiative. Take or dispute the initiative and German capabilities degrade, because now regrouping timetables cannot be met, attack plans are changed at the last minute or aborted, and commanders must work overtime to maintain the initiative. And this is what the Soviets did, everything possible at Kursk to cut into German initiative by committing to continuous tactical counterattacks. To be convincing, to basically keep the Germans 'honest,' these counterattacks had to be true threats to German plans, and the only way this was possible was by taking the fight to the Germans, getting into their kitchen and kicking a few pots and pans. The sad part is that doing that to panzertruppen (ss panzertruppen even) in the wide open steppes with inferior weaponry was largely suicidal - but it had to be done. To mitigate that, the Soviets did try to find chinks in the German line as well, but it was only a matter of time before the panzers restored the tactical situation. Which is where sufficient reserves was absolutely vital, and the Soviets just fulfilled this requirement. It might seem that Soviet generals were throwing their troops away in hopeless counterattacks, but the truth to the matter was that each counterattack, each retaken position put a hold on German attempts to consolidate their forces and move on.

One helpful analogy is to use computer gaming for purposes of understanding Zitadelle. The Germans intented to play a turn-based game, but the Soviets flatly rejected this, and instead went RTS What was intended to be a methodical reduction of Soviet defenses ended up being a "wrist-twitch fest" as seemingly endless Soviet forces kept appearing on the German flanks. German units were far superior in this wide open terrain, but it was exceedingly difficult to do much more than try to keep some semblance of an advance while defending the next Soviet attack on some unexpected flank.

[ March 06, 2003, 12:34 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

I guess you're referring to the intelligence aspect of Kursk. Namely, Ultra, Lucy, and ... yup, UberSoviet operational art in its dynamic razvedka guise! Well, in a discussion with Chris Lawrence over at the TDI forum, we came - from opposing directions - to the same conclusions: that all those really exciting 007-spies and their networks blew the whistle on Zitadelle. Of course, that still left a lot of work to be done before anything productive could be made of it. Which is where UberSoviet operational art: razvedka, comes in. Through the organs of the GRU and the NKVD, most of the pieces of the puzzle were put in place, so that meaningful details could be determined and acted upon. So, yes, Lucy and Ultra first let out word of this offensive, but it was the methodical, centralized collection and processing of thousands of bits of information from troop patrols, aerial recon sorties, partisan reports, special dept. operations, and agent reports that took this vague indicator and gave it form and definition.

So how was German intelligence gathering inferior to Soviets? (Or was it?...)

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Becket:

Not disagreeing with your conclusion that's it "dull" but rather with your conclusion that it's poor writing.

Well, see my comments about the engineers above. That is not scholary or dull, it is poor writing. It is out of place information which is detracting, and it is repeated every few pages for the small part of the book I read yet.

There is great info in the book but man it is hard to get through, especially now that I finally got "Deep Battle".