"The High Water Mark" for the Germans?

[Kevin Kinscherf]

After the American Civil War the Confederate’s most advanced position into Cemetery Ridge at Gettysburg was labeled "The High Water Mark".

What was the "The High Water Mark" for the German Army in WWII. Was it Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk? Or perhaps it was outside the Eastern area of operations. The term has both physical and physiological aspects.

Kevin

[Michael Emrys]

When they reached the Caucusus Mountains. About September, 1942, I think.

BTW, in what way "physiological"? Are you concerned with the soldiers health?

Michael

[Holman]

What about Prokhorovka, the major tank engagement on the south side of the battle of Kursk in July '43? While not decisive in itself, the battle stopped the Germans' (already slowing) momentum. The Germans never recovered from their losses in the Kursk operation, and initiative passed to the USSR for the rest of the war.

[ May 29, 2003, 10:28 PM: Message edited by: Martyr ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Martyr:

What about Prokhorovka, the major tank engagement on the south side of the battle of Kursk in July '43? While not decisive in itself, the battle stopped the Germans' (already slowing) momentum. The Germans never recovered from their losses in the Kursk operation, and initiative passed to the USSR for the rest of the war.

Really? GD launched a sizeable and successful counterattack into Lithuania in the autumn of 1944.

You could pick any moment between 31 January 1943 and 7 May 1945 and make a case that it was the straw that broke the camel's back, really.

I should think the devastating loss at Stalingrad, coupled with "Tunisgrad" a couple months later, marked the first time the Germans ever seriously thought about losing. Add to that the firestorms in Hamburg (was that about the same time?), the turning of the North Atlantic battles...the Eastern Front was just one front, as incredibly important as it was, it was not the only one.

Don't forget that as Stalingrad was falling Manstein was doing big things at Kharkov, so taken on its own, it wasn't necessarily the big turning point it is often attributed to be. Add in North Africa, Hamburg, Tunisia, and you have a devastating set of circumstances.

As for Kursk - at the same time as that was going on, German soldiers were performing a brilliant retrograde battle in Sicily, which got positive press, and by September, Germany got rid of their biggest liability - Italy - and managed to trap many Allied divisions in that theatre until the end of the war.

[ May 29, 2003, 10:57 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

... Italy - and managed to trap many Allied divisions in that theatre until the end of the war.

So you subscribe to that theory too huh? Oh well. Its probably worth ponting out that in the end the Germans had more men and divisions in Italy than the Allies did, raising the question of just who got sucked in to a secondary theatre.

Regards

JonS

[Michael Dorosh]

I never said sucked!

I did, but I deleted it. Okay, maybe I spoke too hastily - but you have to admit, had those divisions been employed elsewhere, they could have been used a wee bit more decisively?

Or not...

The Normandy bridgehead was damned crowded, so "extra" divs there would have been of little consequence (they were still landing fresh divisions in August!) - but had they landed simultaneously at Pas de Calais...with German divisions still tied down in Italy on garrison duty (presupposing Italian capitulation and the need to garrison the country in any event)...

But I digress. The "physiological" that Kevin was referring to, I think, would have been the multiple disasters at Stalingrad, Tunisia, and the home front (firebombings) between February and early May 1943, and the newly found idea that Germany could in fact suffer losses in the field that were irreversible. The losses of 1941-42 were "reversed" in that new conquests were gained the next year. North Africa was gone for good, as was Sixth Army.

[ May 29, 2003, 11:23 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Cogust]

I seriously doubt that the Allies had enough lending capacity to perform simultaneuos landing in Normandy and Pas de Calais. IIRC they had to withdraw most of the landing crafts deployed in the Mediterranean just to be able to land what they did in Normandy.

The high tide, geographically, would be the situation in November 1942 where the Germans had secured most of Stalingrad, had forces deep into the Caucasus and were sitting right outside el-Alamein.

[tabpub]

So, that would be the "High Tide... for Hitler... and Germanyyyy"?

[Hans]

High water mark...December 1941, they were stopped at the gates of Moscow and the US entered the war. At that point, unless the allies morale had suffered a grevious blow - the game was up. The production capacity and manpower capabilities of the USSR and USA could not be overcome.

[Hans]

Another point, perhaps the point at which the Axis lost the war was when Hitler decided to invade the USSR. If he and Italy had concentrated on the 'med' strategy. Our world would have become a four power one. Japan in Asia, the USSR, Europe under Germany and the UK and North America combined for mutual defense - although I would expect a war between the Axis and Russia would have been hard to avoid.

[Slappy]

tabpub,

I can't support that sort of punning, but I want you to know that someone got it.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Hans:

High water mark...December 1941, they were stopped at the gates of Moscow and the US entered the war. At that point, unless the allies morale had suffered a grevious blow - the game was up. The production capacity and manpower capabilities of the USSR and USA could not be overcome.

Psychologically - as Kevin mentions - this was not a foregone conclusion for Germany or Germans at the time. While I agree with you (well, with the guy that said the decision to invade spelled their doom), I don't think a German in December of 1941 would have agreed with you. And for that matter, most Russians and Americans would have had their doubts, too. (I wonder if Churchill's primary concern at the time wasn't the North Atlantic run, and getting food and supplies to Britain.)

By May 1943, the handwriting was on the wall for everyone to see, even the Germans (those that wanted to see it).

[Hans]

hindsight is marvolous isn't it. My Father said he was VERY uncomfortable about the possible outcome of the war until November 1942 and the Invasion of NA and Guadacanal. After that he was confident the Allies would win.

[Hensworth]

I agree with Hans. The outer busstops of Moscow.

Nothing in the South of the Eastern front could serve as a high tide mark for me because I subscribe to the view that Hitler's decision to switch the main focus of the war in the East away from Moscow was a mistake.

I don't necessarily believe that the Soviet Union would have crumbled if Moscow had fallen, but if it had the Germans would certainly have been as close to winning the war as they were ever going to get.

[kipanderson]

Michael Dorosh, hi,

Thought I would just quickly mention that I popped over to view the links to the sites as the bottom of your post.

Very fine sites indeed. The Med one is very informative as I must admit to knowing very little about the Med, the later war in Italy.

All the best,

Kip.

[ScotMc3]

FWIW I agree with Hans.

Germany's chances of defeating the Soviet Union were slim in 1941 but nil in 1942. The Germans grossly underestimated the size of the Soviet armies in 1941. In spite of that underestimate, 1941 was the only year in which the chaos and gains generated by the German invasion might have caused a Soviet collapse or forced them to come to terms. If I recall correctly it is also the only time when the Soviets felt desperate enough to send peace feelers to the Germans; there were later peace feelers but they were initiated by the Germans.

However in terms of territory conquered the high water mark is probably 1942 during the German move into the Caucasus, even when factoring in the territory the Germans lost in their retreat in front Moscow.

As a side note, I have always considered it to be one of the underwritten subjects of World War II about how concerned the Anglo-American leadership was worried about the possibility of the Germans and Soviets coming to a separate peace. That is of course what happened in World War I. I think that fear colors many of the strategic decisions made by the Western Allies.

[Kevin Kinscherf]

Opps ...

I meant psychological not physiological aspects.

That’s what happen when I type fast at night.

Carry on.

- Kevin

[SgtMuhammed]

18 January 1871, the last time the Germans won a war.

Seriously, in my opinion it was 1942. Germany and the world still thought they could win, by the end of the year anyone willing to see could tell they could not.

[Sergei]

I would speak for early Barbarossa. At that point, Germany had had a row of successful Blitzkriegs (Poland, Denmark, Norway, Benelux, France, Yugoslavia, Greece all look terrific on your curriculum vitae), the only place in mainland Europe where Brits still had a presence was the Rock, and it was obvious for any sane military analyst that Soviet Union would fall before the leaves. Psychologically that was the high water mark that could not be reached in 1942, because the failure of Typhoon and the continued resistance of Leningrad showed that Wehrmacht could be stopped.

Physics-wise, continuing the attack deeper into USSR exhausted Wehrmacht, though not like in 1943 or '44 it was engaged in a huge war with problematic supply situation. And while Red Army took heavy losses, it recovered despite of what OKW believed (in some sense having all that T-26 **** destroyed from the arsenal probably helped the Soviets) and next year was much better prepared to face the offensive, and certainly Stalin wouldn't refuse to believe that the Nazis are trying something.

[Andreas]

I'd agree with Hans. High-water mark on the outskirts of Moscow. Lost the war when Adolf decided that Stalin was not a nice man and needed taking out.

[MikeyD]

I'd place the high water mark as the day before the first winter snow at the end of '41. When the Russian winter took its first bite the (professional) High Command started to realize that they had placed themselves in an impossible position. Battles may have been won and lost after that but it's nearly impossible to imagine the Germans marching on to Victory after the horrors of that first winter.

[Michael Emrys]

I stick by my earlier statement. Autumn of 1942 marked the greatest expanse of territory under German control, and is therefore the high water mark.

The rest of you (mostly) are talking about momentum, which is a different albeit legitimate subject. I'd offer that point was reached about August or September of 1941.

A few more observations:

Someone—I think it was a German general, but I can't recall which one—said that after Stalingrad there was no chance that Germany could win the war and after Kursk no chance that it could avoid losing it.

I agree with Dorosh that if we want to talk about the turning point of the war that the month of May, 1943 is about as good a nominee as there is, particularly from the point of view of the West. The U-boat menace had finally been defeated (though that wouldn't be known for sure for a while yet), North Africa had been cleared of the Axis, Germany was on the verge of a stunning defeat in the East, Sicily was soon to be taken by the West, the strategic bombing campaign against Germany was finally beginning to bear fruit and promised to inflict some major hurt, as signified by the burning of Hamburg.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

I agree with Dorosh that if we want to talk about the turning point of the war that the month of May, 1943 is about as good a nominee as there is, particularly from the point of view of the West. The U-boat menace had finally been defeated (though that wouldn't be known for sure for a while yet), North Africa had been cleared of the Axis, Germany was on the verge of a stunning defeat in the East, Sicily was soon to be taken by the West, the strategic bombing campaign against Germany was finally beginning to bear fruit and promised to inflict some major hurt, as signified by the burning of Hamburg.

Michael

That was also the month they instituted seatbelt laws for autobahn...oh wait, wrong thread....

[OZ77]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

I'd place the high water mark as the day before the first winter snow at the end of '41. When the Russian winter took its first bite the (professional) High Command started to realize that they had placed themselves in an impossible position. Battles may have been won and lost after that but it's nearly impossible to imagine the Germans marching on to Victory after the horrors of that first winter.

If you went to desert and didnt take water, whom should you blame for? desert? If Germans were freezing to death in Russia, should they blame the accident on Russia?

Correct me If I am wrong but I think OKW and Hitler have the responsibility to this. Befor invade Russia they had to think about winter supplies.As you said they "placed themselves in an impossible position".

In this case it would be better for German generals continue to fight against counties such as Poland, Denmark, Greece and etc. , but not agaist Soviet Union.

My opinion is that German's "The High Water Mark" was at 22 June 1941, after that no one could save Hitler from suicide.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by OZ77:

In this case it would be better for German generals continue to fight against counties such as Poland, Denmark, Greece and etc. , but not agaist Soviet Union.

No, surely if we consider the SWOT method, that is Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats, Soviet Union would have remained a threat even if Germany didn't attack. On the other hand, Germany did have the opportunity to change that, and the strengths of a powerful army, having closed Britain off the continent, and the strategic initiative and element of surprise. During the early Barbarossa, the threat possessed by Red Army had been negated, and there was the opportunity to end the war shortly. Germany also still had most of those strengths. But when we get into the winter, weaknesses start to rise - the hardships of winter, long supply distances for a primarily horse-drawn army. The threat of Soviets not crumbling but regaining the initiative with reinforcements materialised at the gates of Moscow. The declaration of war against USA was a bad, bad miscalculation (as Hitler seemed to devalue them as a bunch of degenerate, jazz-playing negroes and rich jews), especially as the Japanese weren't interested in fighting the Soviets again.

So my argument is that things never seemed as good for Germans nor they ever would again, as they did during the early stages of Operation Barbarossa.

Michael Emrys, I don't think I have ever really appreciated the advances made in the south in 1942. Wasn't the idea that from there they could eventually turn towards Moscow? In 1941 they at least reached Moscow, in 1942 all they got was a scorched section of the west bank of Volga and the foot of Caucasus. Trying to head right to the mountains was IMO another screwup, there you just give all the defensive benefits to your opponent. Not to mention that Stalingrad affair...

In addition, I'd point out that Germany wasn't truly prepared for a long-lasting war in the east. All the wars before had been quick jobs, but after December 1941 this was impossible. In 1941 Germany, while not actually capable to defeat the Soviets, was closer to reaching that than at any later stage. The effects of 1941 enabled Germans to continue the drive in 1942, but the effect of 1942 was the surrender of the 6th Army.

[ May 31, 2003, 05:47 AM: Message edited by: Sergei ]