"The High Water Mark" for the Germans?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by kenm:

The US went on a war time economy after Pearl Harbor. No way would the lend lease program have contributed to the war effort in the same quantity without the shift to a total war economy. In 1941 the US was the only country with any significant surplus manufacturing capacity available to immediately make a major contribution to the war effort. That capacity was moderately in use during the 1940-41 years, but went all out after Pearl Harbor.

That's true, but you need to remember also that for several months after PH LL was severely reduced. A lot of war materiel which had been earmarked for LL was sequestered to bolster the build-up of US forces after PH, especially aircraft. LL to the USSR had not been of much volume yet to that point, and PH further delayed it reaching its ultimate volume.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by kenm:

From Gaylord Falker on why the Japenese attacked America--

"The USA embargo on Japan for it's agression was hindering the empire's ability to wage war since it was the U.S who was hooking them up with all that nice scrap metal, oil, and rubber.

Japan was looking at it as more of a now or never situation, wich never was never considered as since they wanted to make their empire larger, a war with the U.S was inevitable."

This might be true for scrap metal and rubber but I thought the Dutch oil from Indonesia, which Japan conquered, was more than sufficiant to provide the demand of Japan. The US strategy during the war centered on cutting this oil supply off.

Your reply is kind of confusing. In the first place, Japan did not counquer the Netherlands East Indies (as it was then called) until after the war began. Before that, both Britain and the NEI had joined in the embargo, though in the case of the NEI I understand their compliance was less than 100%.

In the second place, I think it is somewhat of an oversimplification to say that "The US strategy during the war centered on cutting this oil supply off."

I think the Allied (not just US) strategy was to roll back the Japanese forces wherever Allied forces could be brought into action. It was US Navy strategy to split the Empire by driving across the Central Pacific towards Formosa. But it was MacArthur's strategy to roll it up from the south and the British strategy to roll it up from the west in collaboration with the US drive from the east.

So you had several strategies going at once, loosely coördinated by the Combined Chiefs.

If there had been a single strategy focussed on denying the Japanese oil from the Indies, you might have seen something like a drive from Darwin, Australia, through Timor to, say, the Celebes, with strategic bombing of the oil refineries from there. But this was not done for various reasons that I have not fathomed in their entirety yet, but probably had something to do with the urgent need to stop Japanese expansion in the Solomons and New Guinea on the one hand, and the logistical difficulty of getting forces committed along the axis I describe on the other.

Michael

[ June 08, 2003, 03:18 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by manchildstein II:

i think though that - everything else such as weather and luftwaffe ineffectiveness being the same - that the royal navy would have showed up and shelled the panzers into oblivion. i get this sense from what the allied naval guns did to german counterattacks at normandy 4 years later...

What do you think of when I say 'Prince of Wales' and 'Repulse'?

Regarding Luftwaffe ineffectiveness, the RN lost 6 destroyers sunk, and 19 heavily damaged off Dunkirk, out of a force of 41 (61% loss rate in a situation where air superiority was as contested as it could have been). Additionally 26 smaller warships, for total losses of 222 ships. The French Navy another seven, all figures found with a bit of Googling.

If the RN had sent the big ships in, the Luftwaffe would have left the evacuation vessels alone and concentrated on them. Since big ships are far less nimble than destroyers, and bigger targets, losses would presumably have been very heavy.

[ June 08, 2003, 05:25 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Since big ships are far less nimble than destroyers, and bigger targets, losses would presumably have been very heavy.

Not that I agree with the argument that the big ships should have been sent in, or that there was even the ghost of a chance that they might, but I feel obliged to point out here that they are also much more able to absorb damage and remain afloat. More armor (in fact, the destroyers had none at all), more compartmentalisation, better damage control, etc. Furthermore, I'm not sure how important the greater nimbleness of the destroyers was in the event, since I think most of the ones hit were either dead in the water at the time they came under attack (picking up soldiers) or threading their way through the other boats and ships adjacent to the beaches at slow speeds and limited maneuver options.

That said, much too much depended on the continued survival of the battleships to risk them at all for such dubious probable gain.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Not that I agree with the argument that the big ships should have been sent in, or that there was even the ghost of a chance that they might, but I feel obliged to point out here that they are also much more able to absorb damage and remain afloat.

Italian cruiser Trento - hit by an unexploding bomb at Taranto which ruptured the oil tanks, out of commission for months.

HMS Illustrious hit or near missed 9-10 times 10th Jan 41 and on the following days, out of commission for 18 months.

Warspite hit by a bomb near Crete 24 May 1941, damage repairs completed 28 Dec 1941 (over half a year).

USS Savannah hit by a 600lb explosive guided missile near Anzio (see pictures here.

A list of hits of these (which were of course not available in 1940) is here

I think it is quite clear that even single bomb hits are devastating enough on a complex weapon system such as a battleship that it will not be operable for quite some time, even though it may be able to continue to stay afloat and move. Having lots of afloat battleships and cruisers with semi- or very serious damage in Scapa would not really do much to fight off a German invasion fleet.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Having lots of afloat battleships and cruisers with semi- or very serious damage in Scapa would not really do much to fight off a German invasion fleet.

Which was my point.

But also keep in mind that a destroyer hit by those same bombs would be on the bottom of the ocean and out of the war for good.

Michael