The Dupuy formula (so as not to get inundated by the IS-3 debate)

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

"Bad" commanders are typically weeded out rapidly by natural selection. Sure some slip through the cracks and many good ones "buy the farm". But in the Case of the German Army in Normandy, a fair number of their formations had seen several years of this weeding out process on the Eastern Front. Most Allied formations going into Normandy had seen no prior action. German tactical level leaders had a strong feel for terrain and how to best weave the weapons at their disposal into the terrain advantages offered to a defending army in Normandy. This can't be reflected in a tactical level game by artificially enhancing a squad's firepower.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree with this, of course, and pretty much think that CM gets it right. A "typical" June '44 battle in CMBO should have mostly Green US troops (with a smattering of Regulars, maybe), vs. mostly Regular German troops with a smattering of Vets, maybe. US on the attack in mostly defensible terrain.

The German troops will be much more "effective" in this battle if you look at the casualties from AAR. Even if the US wins the scenario, the Germans will probably end up being more effective, in terms of actual casualties taken vs. inflicted. This is historically accurate, and pretty much so for the correct reasons.

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>gunnergoz: Combat effectiveness is as much a spiritual matter as it is mathematical, I would argue.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don’t disagree. Napoleon said something to the effect of: “Morale is to the physical as 10 is to 1” (a bastardization of the quote I’m sure). In other words Morale is ten times more important than numbers and firepower. But than Napoleon also said “God is on the side with the biggest artillery (or maybe it was the most artillery)”.

Depuy simply offers another way of looking at combat effectiveness. Nothing more, nothing less. “Quantified Judgment Method of Analysis of Historical Combat Data”. Within the boundary conditions he establishes in his model the “factors” he employs are quite “knowable”.

I personally don’t discount his work simply because someone thinks it was done purely to define weather a German Corps strength in AH’s Stalingrad should be 3-6-4 or a 4-6-4. Although that is certainly an offshoot of what Depuy’s work was employed for. But that assessment is a broad over simplification of the model, and to a large degree missing the point of why the model was developed in the first place.

Certainly Depuy was not upset by the fact that a lot of young kids playing Afrika Korps, D-Day, Blitzkrieg, etc. were snatching up his work and employing it for their own design work. Book sales are important to authors, just like game sales are important to game designers. But these are Kids that would eventually grow up and become Norm Koger, Sid Meier, or Eric Young. And contrary to Jason’s comments, Depuy’s CEV calc’s and QJM model are still being employed by present day Historians. Not for wargame design, but for research purposes. Niklas Zetterling is one example.

Depuy’s original intent in coming up with QJM and CEV and the like was to develop a standardized tool for analysis of combat operations. It was developed to remove all of the quibbling that occurs in operational research over who’s morale was better and who had the biggest artillery (sort of like some of the discussions that occur on this forum). Everyone works from the same sheet of notes so to speak. It’s analogous to developing mix designs for concrete. If I add X% of sand, X% of cement, X% gravel, X% water I will end up with a concrete that develops 3,000 psi compressive strength after 28 days of curing. No need to philosophize about the color of the gravel employed in the mix, the end result is 3,000 psi.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>gunnergoz said: At some point in time, I would argue, we must all take a step back and concede that we're doing nothing less than arguing about "how many fairies can dance upon the head of a pin" as the Victorians would say.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

yup…but that is what we do a lot here on this forum, and look how many folks continue to post here

[ 06-16-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[gunnergoz]

To Jeff Duquette -

A very interesting reply. I'd respond except I'm too busy playing with Magua's Normandy modded terrain!

How many fairies was that...?

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

But than Napoleon also said “God is on the side with the biggest artillery (or maybe it was the most artillery)”.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I believe it was "biggest battalions."

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I believe it was "biggest battalions."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

My friend from the North is correct. It was written in his memoirs and widely read, then made famous by U.S. Grant and several other Generals with rather pragmatic turns of mind.

As for Dupuy, it was really designed to prove that the U.S. and British aimed fire systems were not as effective as small arms used by the Germans. He proved it, as can be seen by the weapons carried today by all modern forces. He was never trying to prove national superiority, especially in a simulation that looks closely at variables involved in victory or loss at the tactical level.

It is sort of like the tank study done for "Lorraine Battles". in several dozen actions, Germans lost nearly 3 tanks confirmed killed (someone had the wreck in front of them, not claims) for every U.S 3rd Army tank loss (not including half tracks, but including light tanks and tank destroyers). Thus we could surmise that U.S. units have 3 times the fighting power tank for tank as the Germans.

But when we look at the numbers, we find out that direct support airpower accounted for a third of German tank losses, while another third were creditied to just 8 battalions, all equipped with either M36, or with the M18 (these units had a real kill to loss ratio of closer to 5 - 1 but they also did not provide close support like the M10 units).

Of the 1-1 ratio left us, it is for all units, not just tank units, and means an awful lot of US tanks could have been killed by Infantry, the same with Germans. At this point the stats are not available. But using Dupuy to argue a mystical as opposed to real difference between nationalities is misusing the research. The game already takes into account the larger number of automatic weapons in German formations, which was Dupuy's point (echoed by other researchers such as Dunnigan).

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by kipanderson:

If Krivosheev’s data is accurate when dealing with the first half of the war why should it suddenly become unreliable when dealing with the second half of the war? If Krivosheev’s data had resulted in a German combat effectiveness of, say, only 2 for the first half of the war, I also would have thought “ hmm.. maybe this guy simply understates Soviet losses”,

[ 06-15-2001: Message edited by: kipanderson <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Kip, I'm confused on the above, but i also realise their are 2 difrent converstaions going on here & I may be misreading this. It's not that the Krivosheev’s group data is 'wrong' it's that while many are touting Grif as the defacto work on Soviet losses, since Erickson & Glantz have endorsed it.

What's less known in the West is that other Russian historian's Ie, Sokolov etc have challenged the Krivosheev’s groups data in certian areas of which I gave a few examples of in my posts.

I'd also add that IMHO Grif though a giant step, in the feild is not, nor is any work to date, the defacto work on Soviet losses in WW2 & I doubt their will be one in the near future.

Regards, John Waters

[Degrees of Frost]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

As for Dupuy, it was really designed to prove that the U.S. and British aimed fire systems were not as effective as small arms used by the Germans. He proved it, as can be seen by the weapons carried today by all modern forces. He was never trying to prove national superiority, especially in a simulation that looks closely at variables involved in victory or loss at the tactical level ....

.... But using Dupuy to argue a mystical as opposed to real difference between nationalities is misusing the research. The game already takes into account the larger number of automatic weapons in German formations, which was Dupuy's point (echoed by other researchers such as Dunnigan).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks for that Slapdragon !!

I was hoping someone would step up and say that succinctly. I was dreading have to try and write the same thing in a way that wouldn't in some way be misinterpreted.

[PJungnitsch]

Hmmm, interesting. I was under the assumption that Dupuy's figures were not there to prove WHY there were differences, but rather that differences existed.

There were plenty of other factors that contributed to the Germans effectiveness, ie greater encouragement of individual initiative by the lower command levels 'every man a leader', a replacement and organizational system that was very effective at keeping unit cohesiveness under stress 'men fight best for their buddies', the policy of keeping commanders close to the front so they were better abreast of changing conditions.....

I'm sure there are others, but all have been looked at very closely by most modern armies.

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Michael Dorosh: I believe it was "biggest battalions."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks Michael. Shame on me for not double checking the words of The Emperor I guess it was my muddled amalgamation of Napoleon and Maugham.

“In this world of sin and sorrow if virtue triumphs over vice it is not because it is virtuous, but because it has better and bigger guns; if honesty prevails over double dealing, it is not because it is honest, but because it has a stronger army more ably led; and if good overcomes evil it is not because it is good, but because it has a well-lined purse. It is well to have right on our side, but it is madness to forget that unless we have might as well it will avail us nothing. We must believe that God loves men of good will, but there is no evidence to show that he will save fools from the results of their folly.

Somerset Maugham”

==================

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Snap Dragoon Said: He was never trying to prove national superiority, especially in a simulation that looks closely at variables involved in victory or loss at the tactical level.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed. I don’t think anyone is arguing that the Germans as a race are superior fighters. Depuy simply crunches numbers and presents the results. He even boldly provides some conclusions. How people choose to interpret his numbers is certainly not his affair. Although Depuy does elude to “inherent national characteristics” as a means of explaining German combat effectiveness…whatever that means.

The whole superiority of German squad level automatic weapons is throwing me for a bit of a loop. Is this a conclusion of Dunnigan or Depuy?

Depuy's work in "Numbers Predictions and War" is primarily focused on combat effectiveness at the operational level and above. So yes I agree that a preponderance of readily available squad automatic weapons certainly represents a major chunk of a squads “combat power”.

However the implications and impact of a squad level MG42 becomes exceedingly diluted as one moves up the food chain…so to speak. Moreover, if we are considering a divisional engagement in which a US Infantry Division may have had 10 or 12 non-organic artillery battalions at its disposal, the combat power afforded a Defending German Infantry Division as a result of squads equipped with organic MG42’s becomes successively less the focal point of the engagements outcome.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> From: Depuy “Numbers Prediction and War” (pg 62-63)

EVALUATION OF GERMAN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS SUPERIORITY

The QJMA analyses of the engagements of the Validating Sample showed that the same 20 percent German ground effectiveness superiority was also evident from the results of 19 engagements in northern France in July-December 1944. At the same time it became evident from the Kursk example that German combat effectiveness superiority over the Russians in 1943 must have been more than 100 percent. (These findings have been confirmed and reaffirmed by other research described below.) An interesting fact emerged from a preliminary effort to investigate the reason for the consistent German ground combat superiority. A rough comparison of fighting strength versus overhead for German and American infantry divisions was made, based on tables of organization of 1943-44.

In an American infantry division 50.26 percent of its personnel strength was directly connected with manning or serving weapons in normal combat situations; in a German infantry division, using the same basis of calculations, the percentage was 59.83 percent. This suggests that part of the overall German superiority probably resulted from better utilization of manpower. The remainder could possibly be the result of such factors as more experience, greater mobility, better doctrine, more effective battle drill, superior leadership, or inherent national characteristics.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Snap Dragon Said: It is sort of like the tank study done for "Lorraine Battles". in several dozen actions, Germans lost nearly 3 tanks confirmed killed (someone had the wreck in front of them, not claims) for every U.S 3rd Army tank loss (not including half tracks, but including light tanks and tank destroyers). Thus we could surmise that U.S. units have 3 times the fighting power tank for tank as the Germans.

But when we look at the numbers, we find out that direct support airpower accounted for a third of German tank losses, while another third were creditied to just 8 battalions, all equipped with either M36, or with the M18 (these units had a real kill to loss ratio of closer to 5 - 1 but they also did not provide close support like the M10 units).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is very interesting indeed. Where are you deriving these stats?

[argie]

Sorry, Jeff, you are saying Depuy for Dupuy for some reason that escape from me or just confusing the analist with the general?

[Jeff Duquette]

ooophs

[Jeff Duquette]

Well the thread has been on Dupuy’s Formula…so no I wasn’t intending on switching gears or referring to Depuy the General. My inadvertent added "e" and delted "u" make the context of Snap Dragons post more understandable now. Or are you “snap dragon” as well as “argie”.

[argie]

Well, I'm a bit schizoid, but only a bit... The good people in white shirts keeps me on track

The point is as I'm not an English speaker, then some subtles jokes or between lines readings tends to escape from my understanding, so I want to check

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Argie Said: Well, I'm a bit schizoid, but only a bit... The good people in white shirts keeps me on track

The point is as I'm not an English speaker, then some subtles jokes or between lines readings tends to escape from my understanding, so I want to check <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ok I understand. Thanks for the proof read, and yes you are correct…it should be Dupuy not Depuy.

Depuy the General commanded a battalion of infantry in the 90th ID in ETO 1944 to 1945. In “Changing An Army, An Oral History of William E Depuy”, General W.E. Depuy makes numerous comments on the effectiveness of German Squad level tactics, and squad level automatic weapons.

Relative to snapdragon’s post:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As for Dupuy, it was really designed to prove that the U.S. and British aimed fire systems were not as effective as small arms used by the Germans.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

He appears to be talking about T.N Dupuy the Colonel and Analyst, although I think he means W.E. Depuy the General.

Now how many fairies can dance upon the head of a pin?

[Slapdragon]

Statistic quoted come from 3rd Army G-1 Section Daily Caulaty reports no. 31 (October 31st, 1944) to No. 126, (December 4, 1944) and are based on action break out provided by John Nelson Rickard. For example, from September 5 to 25 (called phase one of the Lorrain battle by Rickard and enumerated in appendix D of his book) the U.S. lost 41 light tanks and 113 medium tanks, versus an AFV (not including half tracks) loss of 410 tanks for all German units and counted physically by US G-1 and G-2 section intelligence groups. Numbers for the kill percentages are taken from those assigned to Air kills, and those individually claimed from wrecks by the 607th, 654th, 691st, 818th, 814th, 638th, 773rd Tank Destroyer Battalions and the 1st French Tank Destroyer Regiment. Be careful though, because I was pointed out the absurdity of using casualty ratios to prove points. US TD battalions (at least when equipped with M18 and M36 tank destroyer) consitently out fought German units, but they were seen as a failure and were a failure in the bigger picture. The reason why kill to loss ration in tanks would be even higher for the TD units is because they suffered a little less than half their losses to other factors than tanks.

As for Dupuy, his data was used for Dunnigan to: prove that firepower was directly responsible for casualty rates, discussed replacement systems (vis a vis US system: both Dupuy and Dunnigan thought it was broken and not as effective in forming cohesive units as German in World War Two), and Dupuy used his own data to try and find out why casualties on the US side were lower than expected in some cases (reason: massive use of artillery) and higher in others (reason: US infantry could not generate enough violence at the squad level to attack dug in troops).

All of the attempts to assign mystical variable, racial or not, can usually be explained by coding in the game. You see this all over: German tanks should get a bonus in camoflage cause they were so skilled at it (all armies used camoflage. The problem is the engine not taking camoflage, hard or soft dug in tanks into account, not a mystical German advantage of camoflage.) In almost all cases so far presented on any list, using Dupuy data out of contect or not, the advantages discussed are conditional, included in the game engine currently, and equally applicable to both sides.

As to Depuy the General and Dupuy the statistical military historian, to make matters worse in confusing them the publishers of Dupu's son's book "Flashpoint" misspelled his name Depuy on the book's cover.

[PzKpfw 1]

Also keep in mind that Air units tended to exagerate or understate claims. Claims often could not be ground verified due to German recovery efforts as well.

Fighter/bomber effectiveness has also come into question as it appears Allied TAC was much less effective vs tanks then 1st thought.

Ie, the 2nd TAF 124th wing consisting of Typhoons of 181, 182, & 247 Squadrons from June 6 - July 6 1944 claimed:

Tanks Destroyed - 12

Tanks Damaged - 4

AFV's destroyed - 1 (armored car).

124 Wing expended no less then 3,700 rockets, which equates to 308 rockets fired per tank destroyed.

Regards, John Waters

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

As to Depuy the General and Dupuy the statistical military historian, to make matters worse in confusing them the publishers of Dupu's son's book "Flashpoint" misspelled his name Depuy on the book's cover.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Now in addition to "Depuy" the General and "Dupuy" the analyist we have "Dupu" the son. Cute name, and I'd bet he hates it.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

Also keep in mind that Air units tended to exagerate or understate claims. Claims often could not be ground verified due to German recovery efforts as well.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

True, in general, but does not seem applicable to Slapdragon's specific example as the numbers were based upon physical counts, not claims (according to what was posted here).

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Slapdragon Said: Statistic quoted come from 3rd Army G-1 Section Daily Caulaty reports no. 31 (October 31st, 1944) to No. 126, (December 4, 1944) and are based on action break out provided by John Nelson Rickard. For example, from September 5 to 25 (called phase one of the Lorrain battle by Rickard and enumerated in appendix D of his book).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Interesting. From the reviews, it sounds like Rickard’s work is rather controversial. But than how could anyone take an author who questions the martial skills of George S. P. seriously.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Slapdragon Said: All of the attempts to assign mystical variable, racial or not, can usually be explained by coding in the game. You see this all over: German tanks should get a bonus in camoflage cause they were so skilled at it (all armies used camoflage.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed. Again the relative operational advantages or disadvantages – or better yet stereotypes -- one often associates with Army “X” or Army “Y” become rather pointless to try and model at a tactical level. Although as you say game designers have been doing it from as far back as I can remember.

This was the intent behind my comments about not directly employing Dupuy’s (spelling correct ) 1.4 CEV as a means of justifying arbitrarily multiplying a squads firepower level factors by 1.4.

Again, a bad player will always be a bad player and will go from game to game wondering why his digital Germans are not consistently beating the Americans, or British or Russians. “This has to be a function of the game engine.”

A bad combat leader typically is dead or wounded in fairly short order. He doesn’t have time to lament about weather a games engine requires tweaking in order artificially force more historically consistent battle results.

What is J. Dunnigan doing these days?

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

True, in general, but does not seem applicable to Slapdragon's specific example as the numbers were based upon physical counts, not claims (according to what was posted here).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I believe it does apply somewhat Vanir as the post states " Numbers for the kill percentages are taken from those assigned to Air kills" while the TD claims are from the TD Bn's claims on wrecks. But then again I may be reading it wrong.

Their was a great discussion on this subject on Soc Hist.WW2 nwsgrp a couple of years ago & 1/3 destroyed by air seems a bit steep IMHO from what i have read on actual TAC effectiveness vs claims, which makes me skeptical on any Air claims with Mortain provideing an prime example of exagerated air claims & a good representaion with the problems on verification practices.

Regards, John Waters

[ 06-17-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Slapdragon]

Both John and Vanir are write here, from my reading of it. Reading past Rickard and into the actually number claims, it appears that when G-1 or G2 had a wreck to explain, they would try and assign a reason for it being there when they kicked it with there toes. When a TD or tank or infantry killed it, they generally already knew about it, becuase AARs were what led them to do the toes kick, and the G2 person involved was from Battaliion. (Of course this only works in actions were no ground is lost and ground is gained, I take all US kill numbers with a grain of salt during Bulge unless the unit took the ground instead of retreated).

So it was likely that a battalion G2 (called an S2 in the dossiers I took notes from) knew what killed a tank their own unit killed, but when they counted a wreck that was killed by somone else, they had to classifiy. So they looked at it, looked at AARs, and then made an educated guess. Or maybe they did not dig to deep and just gave it to the fly boys. Front line stats should always be taken with a grain of salt.

I should also point that the number of German tanks killed versus the number of US tanks killed are based on two different numbers. US tanks were those knocked out and requiring extensive repair or which were not able to be repaired. Some of those would return to service if they were a better model, or be turned into tractors and the like if they were not. German kills are those tanks that were so shot up as to be abandoned in place and counted by toe touch, but not including those without any damage (stuck in the mud) because they were listed as captured. You also need to be careful reading these because some armies reported halftracks as AFVs, and some did not, and some counted German halftracks as AFVs and US as transports.

For all of the talk about German orderly record keeping, it is worse with german numbers. I have a report to Berlin which states Hoehne's LXXXIX Corps and von Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army killed more US 3rd Army tanks during September of 1944 then were on hand with 3rd, 1st, and 9th Armies all together. A friend has told me that battalion level reports are much better, but that once you get above division German paperwork becomes a fantasy for fear of Hitler.

That does not mean that I do not think the kill numbers for some units are not impressive and warrant some consideration by the list. I was really surprised to find that M36 / M18 TD battalions were killing as many tanks as they were, and those numbers reliably reported. Added to that fact that more than half there losses were because of Infantry or Artillery. It seems to me that these two types of tank destroyer were carrying the post september 1944 tank war on their shoulders, but I have never read that before in literature (although a number of oral histories say that they were very effective).

[Grisha]

Dang! 94 replies and only now do I get wind of this thread. I'm I getting old?

After going over this thread, I really only want to add a few things.

Soviet Losses

My assessment of Soviet losses are that things didn't really start to improve until the Belorussian campaign of summer '44. If you look at just the pure levels of Soviet casualties, 1943 is quite heavy. The Battle of Kursk is part of that, but so is the Drive for the Dnepr. The Soviets were engaged in a front-wide offensive which while overwhelming for the Germans was also very costly for the Soviets in equipment and men/women.

As for Stalingrad, it's well known that the Soviets seriously underestimated the size of the 6th Army, think there were a mere 90,000. Of course, the number was about three times that(?). This resulted in more losses than expected when it came to closing the ring, since the actual troops originally assigned to do this were not enough for the task.

Going back to 1943, in winter of 43/44 the STAVKA came to the conclusion that future plans for a front-wide offensive were out of the question, because a)the front would shorten and allow for a denser German line, and b)the terrain would become more defensible as they pushed westwards. Thus, something else needed to be done to compensate, and their answer was a higher level of maskirovka, strategic maskirovka. At this level of deception, it was very important to send false impressions to OKH such that strategic reserves would be placed in the wrong area. A major reason for the winter/spring campaigns in the Ukraine, Romania and the Baltic were to set the table for the offensive against Army Group Center. This, in turn, was to set up the actual Vistula-Oder operation. Thus, a series of feints in the expected areas, followed by the real thing in an unexpected area, followed by the real thing in the expected area was a nightmare for the OKH in 1944. It got to the point where German Intelligence was making knee-jerk reactions to anything even remotely resembling an offensive. This was how the Soviets cut down on their casualties: they were hitting where the Germans did not expect them. And, when the Germans did expect them, the Soviets resorted to hitting them when they did not expect them. This was only possible through a strategic plan that was composed of interrelated operations, each setting up the other.

Soviet Tactics

I often hear the term 'steamroller' to denote Soviet tactics, even when describing actions in '44 or '45. I won't disagree with what this implies, but the use of such a term needs some qualification, or elaboration. The Soviets did not possess the level of tactical flexibilty and expertise that the Germans had - ever. And there was good reason for this that could be found within the doctrinal as well as practical aspects of Red Army training. Basically, the Red Army started on the worst foot possible, then never had the time to really implement a level of training that could approach German excellence. Still, the Soviets found ways of augmenting what level of expertise their troops did possess through other means, and eventually found out that some things were more important than top-notch tactical training. This was operational art, the combination of intelligence, maneuver, and deception that became the Soviet way of war. With the effective use of these three components the actual initial battles were usually anticlimactic, so certainly had the Soviets amassed factors and odds in their favor. It didn't matter that the Germans were better tactically than the Soviets anymore, because from an operational level where tactical engagements were expertly orchestrated by the Soviets, all the important battles were assured through massive numerical superiority, accomplished via deceptive redeployment, simulated troop concentrations, and diversionary attacks. So, in a sense the Soviets did 'steamroll' over the Germans, but only at places of their choosing, and with the intention of creating opportunities for maximum exploitation. And, the key was that the Germans were rarely allowed to either detect the scale of these operations, or if detected, to react in time or with enough reserves.

[Slapdragon]

The use of the word steam roller in regards to the Soviets originated in 3 or 4 places, but one which makes me interest was German General Hoth who used the term to refer to the Soviet lack of finesse 1943. The reason he was flabbergasted was that the Soviets would line up a dozen or more division and just charge in to battle with not much manuever, and suffered great losses for it, but succeded becuase they had so much. In part, it seemed that Hoth and other German generals were trying to explain away German war failures (caused because Germany really had no long range plans, just Hitler's gut feelings that could change from day to day), but there turns out to be some truth in Hoth and others critiques. It seems that during the first six months of the war Stalin had something like 10000 officers shot. Often, senior officers would get shot, and Stalin would order Beria and gang to shoot the officer's entire staff. This had been going on at a very low level since the great purges of the officer corps, but by late 1941 it had the effect that the Soviet Union had plenty of division commanders, plenty of commanders at the highest rank (who were often personal friends of Stalin) but that a huge whole had been kicked in Army and Corps level commanders and staff.

To fill this hole, the Soviet Army merely eliminated the Corps. Armies (fronts) now had divisions attached directly to them. But an Army command was never designed to manuever divisions, that is a coprs job. Lacking that step would reduce the alarcity at which divisions could move about, so Amry commanders began to use divisions more like "bullets" in a gun. You spend so many to achieve X result.

By late 1944 enough commanders had come up the ranks the hard way the Corps were readded, and the 1945 assault on Germany was much better coordinated, although Army commanders could still use men up wastefully when urged hard enough by Stalin (for example, Berlin).

[Jeff Duquette]

Oh no…here cometh Grisha defender of the Motherland! Brandishing the holy sword of Glantz.

Hey Greg where’s my Kharkov turn!!! Just cause its father’s day doesn’t mean you should shirk in your wargaming responsibilities.

[Tero]

>Agreed. Again the relative operational

>advantages or disadvantages – or better yet

>stereotypes -- one often associates with

>Army “X” or Army “Y” become rather pointless

>to try and model at a tactical level.

Only if you plan on creating a game with a hardcoded, predetermined outcome.

>Although as you say game designers have been

>doing it from as far back as I can remember.

I think that what the game designers have been trying to do is to work out a system that resembles the real event by modelling the values that you can easily quantify. Ie. armour thickness, ordnance armour penetration capabilities etc. What you get is a pretty solid hardware compatibility between the game and the real life history. What they have not been able to model "properly" is the human behaviour associated with the conditions. This includes the differences in the basic training each army gives to its recruits. Anybody who has gone through basic training knows it is a simple process of instilling automated, instictive responces to life treathening stimuli (for example hit the dirt instead of run when being fired at). These responces are intended to override the basic human responces (for example run from danger) in such conditions. They are very closely connected to the tactics the army in question is using. People say you can simulate real life in CM by using proper tactics. That is not quite true as there are very many basic commands missing from which you can choose from. You can only use a very limited selection of generic commands. That is why the TacAI is more vital to the outcome of an engagement than the tactics the player is trying to approximate.

One way to get more "life" out of the current TacAI would be to increase the number of commands available to the player.

>This was the intent behind my comments about

>not directly employing Dupuy’s (spelling

>correct ) 1.4 CEV as a means of

>justifying arbitrarily multiplying a squads

>firepower level factors by 1.4.

Exactly. If you compare the basic American and the basic German squads you can not arrive to any other conclusion that the American squad had more firepower, if you compare both the cyclic ROF and the practical ROF of the weapons in an average squad. That is why there has to be other, more human, reasons for these seeming discrepencies in actual performances of these squads. And I do mean other than the differences in the level of experience. Even a green recruit fresh out of boot camp will finish the learning curve of "do's and don'ts during combat" in a matter of minutes if he survives the first few seconds of his first engagement.

>Again, a bad player will always be a bad

>player and will go from game to game

>wondering why his digital Germans are not

>consistently beating the Americans, or

>British or Russians. “This has to be a

>function of the game engine.”

I'd rather say a bad player is not working the game engine to his advantage but is relying too much on what he has been told about the game engine and how it works. It not the more obvious traits of the game engine that get you, it is the quirks you never knew about.

>A bad combat leader typically is dead or

>wounded in fairly short order.

I wonder of common was the "natural selection" done by the underlings.

>He doesn’t have time to lament about weather

>a games engine requires tweaking in order

>artificially force more historically

>consistent battle results.

As things stand you can always go to the previous Autosave and start over.