The Dupuy formula (so as not to get inundated by the IS-3 debate)

[Slapdragon]

Actually, it is important to take some of Tero's surmises with a grain of salt. First off, the average german squad had a much higher ability to throw lead about than any Allied squads. Dunnigan abstracts from Dupuy that the power of a squad is in its crew served weapons, since squads unless very well trained, spend a lot of time muching dirt, while crew served weapons are put into use more. Thus the LMG in the German squad is an immense advantage over the AR in the US squad. The only way to make Tero's case is to take a 1944 German bolt action armed squad with no LMG and match it against a US squad, where the autoloaders get the nod, but the Germans issue of automatic weapons was far denser at a far lower level than any allied squad.

The next thing was that German troops are not all the steely eyed killers with hearts of steel trained to a massive pitch. German troops varied a great deal from formation to formation, but the game has a way to simulate that. If you want the tough battle scarred Germans fighting incompetent Americans, buy veterans or elite and make the other guy buy green forces. Now you have the mythical 1.4 advantage but the game remains balanced since you paid for your balance.

The big thing is that to make any mythical (racial, cultural, training) advantage work in game terms, it needs to demythisized and looked at objectively. And not just results, but causation. If Germans had better commanders at the battalion level, and better company level tactics, well that is the place of the player to fill that.

And remember that if we start piling on mythical advantages to fit urban legends, Germans though that the US Artillery was the most deadly and accurate in the world, perhaps US artillery needs to be 1.4 times as powerful as german artillery on top of the objective advantages it already enjoys (caused by extensive use of radios and switch phone networks). So for every urban legend adopted on one side, an equal urban legend can be adopted on the other.

If anyone can find an original copy of "How to Make War" by Dunnigan, which is a popular version of Dunnigan's more meaty research done on Dupuy's data, it has an easy to follow and nice discussion of small unit firepower and how it is simulated and researched.

[Tero]

>Actually, it is important to take some of

>Tero's surmises with a grain of salt.

My word has not been canonized. Yet.

>First off, the average german squad had a

>much higher ability to throw lead about than

>any Allied squads. Dunnigan abstracts from

>Dupuy that the power of a squad is in its

>crew served weapons, since squads unless

>very well trained, spend a lot of time

>muching dirt, while crew served weapons are

>put into use more.

Yes. But crew served weapons draw fire more readily than others so it is fair to assume their crews also suffer more casualties and they can go off the air once they are identified for an indeterminable amount of time. That is why it is tought to fire 3 round bursts with your automatics unless the situation warrants sustained fire. Again, diffences in tactics and doctrine are indicated, not differences in harware demographics.

>Thus the LMG in the German squad is an

>immense advantage over the AR in the US

>squad.

MG-42 was supposedly the bane of Allied infantry. But is it known what kind of a percentage did the claim from overall casualty figures, actually ? For it to be highly effective it would have to obtain the benefit of surprise in opening up AND the regular bunching up on allied infantry. Yet again, diffences in tactics and doctrine are indicated, not differences in harware demographics.

>The only way to make Tero's case is to take

>a 1944 German bolt action armed squad with

>no LMG and match it against a US squad,

>where the autoloaders get the nod, but the

>Germans issue of automatic weapons was far

>denser at a far lower level than any allied

>squad.

Lets say a squad is 10 men. I think the standard German 34-44 pattern OB for a squad had 2 SMG's per squad (half-squad leaders + pistol sidearms), 1 MG-42 (2 men, one with ammo and Kar98 and the gunner with pistol sidearm). That leaves 6 men with Kar98. For the American squad that would be 1-2 SMG's, 1 BAR and 7-8 semi-autos (or a mixture of Garants and semi/full auto carbines). In a tactical situation the Germans would be in a disadvantage because:

a) their MG-42 can not reveal its position by firing full blast unless it is to take out several GI's diddy bopping in a bunch. Once it goes full auto it will draw heavy fire.

to get full benefit from their SMG's the Germans will have to let the GI's get close

c) once engaged the GI's WILL be able to put out more led, IF they have not been decimated during the first few seconds of the ambush

From the Finnish experience I know men tend to ditch their less effective weapons in favour of semi- and fullauto weapons. The difference is the Finns could take the weapons off the fallen Soviet soldiers as easily as from their fallen comrades as our army used the same weapons and the same ammo as the Red Army used. That would not have worked for the Germans on a regular basis. In the footage and still pictured taken in France I have seldom seen German soldiers with Allied small arms. And most of them have carried the Kar98, not the SMG's or other automatics.

We keep coming around to the diffences in tactics and doctrine, not differences in harware demographics.

>The next thing was that German troops are

>not all the steely eyed killers with hearts

>of steel trained to a massive pitch.

They were human after all.

>German troops varied a great deal from

>formation to formation, but the game has a

>way to simulate that. If you want the tough

>battle scarred Germans fighting incompetent

>Americans, buy veterans or elite and make

>the other guy buy green forces. Now you

>have the mythical 1.4 advantage but the game

>remains balanced since you paid for your

>balance.

Well... except your Elite German heavy armour is reliable to get shot up and taken out be Green Allied Stuarts and AC on the move due to weak spot penetrations and gun hits.

>The big thing is that to make any mythical

>(racial, cultural, training) advantage work

>in game terms, it needs to demythisized and

>looked at objectively. And not just

>results, but causation. If Germans had

>better commanders at the battalion level,

>and better company level tactics, well that

>is the place of the player to fill that.

It would be interesting to be able to pit Americans vs Americans (or Germans vs Germans) to see if this premise of player deciding the workability of the tactics over the TacAI decision making is true.

And I still say there are too few commands for the player to do anything than approximate actual tactics. It is still the TacAI who ultimately decides what is done in a tactical situation.

>And remember that if we start piling on

>mythical advantages to fit urban legends,

>Germans though that the US Artillery was the

>most deadly and accurate in the world,

>perhaps US artillery needs to be 1.4 times

>as powerful as german artillery on top of

>the objective advantages it already enjoys

>(caused by extensive use of radios and

>switch phone networks). So for every urban

>legend adopted on one side, an equal urban

>legend can be adopted on the other.

Why do you think that I am advoacting a unilateral force modifier ? All the modifiers, advantageous or disadvantageous, would of course be applied to ALL the forces in the game.

If there are aspects in the game that are short changing the Allies (and I think there are presently none) then they would be corrected with the modifiers along with the rest of the modifications.

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Oh no…here cometh Grisha defender of the Motherland! Brandishing the holy sword of Glantz.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Did you say ... Motherland?!

UUUUUURRRRRRRRAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!!!!!!

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Grisha:

Did you say ... Motherland?!

UUUUUURRRRRRRRAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!!!!!!

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

"Wait until you se the whites of their eyes. Do not open fire until I give the order. And when you aim, aim at the belly button. That will take out a man for sure and in his agony he will act as a deterrant to his comrades."

[ 06-18-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Slapdragon]

It still comes down to counter claims of the effectiveness of the MG-42, and player skill. Your veteran German tank getting killed by a Stuart is an historical event. That is player ability. While it would be nice to hotrod German heavies about the board and leave them in exposed positions, in reality they were knocked out, even by little sneaky M-18s. This is an issue ofplayer ability and not engine.

The Mg-42's effective is shown by the fact that it was retained while BAR like ARs were not. It was not a defensive only weapon, but a weapon of offensive nature since it could be fired on the move without switching magazince, could maintain its fire with barrel changes, and could send a hundred round down range in short order if needed. The BAR in terms of firepower was better than a bolt action at advancing fire, but nowhere in its league.

However, if you want to claim that the MG-42 is a ho-hum or merely average weapon, no nore effective than the BAR, then I will bite. Take a look at a German squad's firepower with the MG-42, and compare it to the Bar, and then think of the howl that would come around if it was reduced in effectiveness to that of an AR.

More commands is no problem, there will be more in CM2, and both sides can avail themselves to them.

[kipanderson]

John Waters, hi,

As always you have a huge range of sources and I am always very cautious, when it comes to disagreeing with you, because you clearly know your subject.

However, all I am saying is that the fact that the use of the Krivosheev data to cover the first half of the war gives a “combat power” ratios of, Soviet to German, 1:5-6 is an illustration that the Krivosheev data may not be understating Soviet losses. It clearly does not for the first half of the war. If it does not for the first half of the war then “maybe” his data for the second half is also accurate.

I am more open minded on the subject than I may sound. A second edition of the Krivosheev book would be great. I also realise there are other Russians that have looked into these matters and may know what they are talking about.

I do hold to the view that if Soviet losses had been as high in the second half of the war as some claim, the Soviet would not have won.

Two points to illustrate why the Soviets did win; in my view, however little that may be worth.

Walter Dunn, in his excellent “organisational” history Hitler’s Nemesis, points out that Soviet losses in 1943 were no more than their annual intake of conscripts. When you combine this with the fact that the November 42 edition of Soviet “Combat Regulations” for rifle squad through to company, are what in the UK we would call “pure skirmishing tactics”, you begin to get an idea of why the Soviets won. They were not suffering “unsustainable losses” and were using the correct tactics.

All good fun,

All the best,

Kip.

[Slapdragon]

oblem everyone looking at the Soviet side has is that their data is often suspect and hard to determine veracity. Take something as simple as Zhukov's memoirs (Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya). It it he claims tthat the Byleorussian pocket and Volhynia pockets lost something like a hundred thousand men, few if any captured, while killed 250,00 Germans. Sheer garbage, since more than a million men walked out of those pockets captive and were fairly well accounted for by anal German prison keepers.

The official Soviet History of the Army of the Soviet Union states without blushing that, "weather had no effect in stopping the German advance, only the valor of Soviet soldiers and workers." Ok, I can buy that tenacious Soviet defense may have made more of a difference than the weather, but to fully discount the weather is a fantasy.

Not every Soviet document is fantasy, but to this day we don't know the Red Armies true casualty list, since it changes depending on if the author wanted to point out the power of the Red Army (like Zhukov) or wanted to rub into western faces how much the Soviets did to stop Germany compared to the US (such as History ).

Add that to the fact that primary source material is rare -- much was destroyed, altered, or simply allowed to deterioate, and the fact that without the press present on the front lines major events like the massacre of Polish officers by the Red Army at Stalin's orders could not be confirmed from the Soviet side, and you face a tough task with any Russian task.

In the past year, with the help of Russian speaking friends at the University, I have begun to realize that a lot of the eastern front is probably untellable. Or at least, any surmise from a Soviet source should be surrounded by question marks.

[Tero]

>It still comes down to counter claims of the

>effectiveness of the MG-42, and player

>skill.

Pretty much so. But I think that the Germans did not lose because they did not have enough MG-42's to go around. That is not at least the prevailing school of thought. Then again there might be something to this....

>Your veteran German tank getting killed by a

>Stuart is an historical event.

From the behind, yes. I have not seen any anecdotes or other written data about the frequency of gun damage and frontal penetrations by smaller ordnance due to defective armour as being major contributors in disabling German armour during WWII.

>That is player ability.

Nope. That is a host of variables in the game engine doing the numbers crunching to produce statistically possible occurances. They just occur a tad too often for comfort. Once in a blue moon is OK. Once every 3 games is too often statistically. They occur "naturally" as no two game affect the other statistically from the game engines point of view but they appear too common for the human player. I wonder (and doubt) if any GI saw an event like that IRL twice.

>While it would be nice to hotrod German

>heavies about the board and leave them in

>exposed positions, in reality they were

>knocked out, even by little sneaky M-18s.

That is why it is so infuriating to lose them when you try to ambush the M-18's as they emerge in to LOS and the Germans get so lousy a first shot hit propability (cross section targeting et al.) that they never get off the second round as all Allied armour spot them immediately and make a Swiss cheese out of them within seconds the German tank opened fire.

>This is an issue ofplayer ability and not

>engine.

Sometimes yes. Sometimes no.

>The Mg-42's effective is shown by the fact

>that it was retained while BAR like ARs were

>not.

Interesting point. To counter: M-1 Garand was developed into M-14 while the Kar98 was dropped. That would mean that that the penultimate American post-war squad would be equipped with the M-14 and MG-42. And by Jove they were. M-14 and the M-60 GPMG.

But that is after the fact. We are discussing the relative fire power of the WWII era squads and then we can not take into consideration facts that happened after the war.

>It was not a defensive only weapon, but a

>weapon of offensive nature since it could be

>fired on the move without switching

>magazince, could maintain its fire with

>barrel changes, and could send a hundred

>round down range in short order if needed.

It had also a distinctive, instantly recoqnizable sound that alerted all to its presence making it also a prime target instantly. I wonder if that was ever used by the Germans as a way to lessen the pressure on the defenders.

>The BAR in terms of firepower was better

>than a bolt action at advancing fire, but

>nowhere in its league.

That is true.

>However, if you want to claim that the MG-42

>is a ho-hum or merely average weapon, no

>nore effective than the BAR, then I will

>bite.

No need to.

I am just trying to point out that not every man in a German squad carried one. That means that IF the crew served weapon of the squad was knocked out or it malfuctioned the Germans were instantly much worse off than the Americans.

>Take a look at a German squad's firepower

>with the MG-42, and compare it to the Bar,

>and then think of the howl that would come

>around if it was reduced in effectiveness to

>that of an AR.

I think that there is something to be said against the musical chairs that is performed every time a squad takes a casualty. As things stand the MG-42 stays operational without any interruptions. I wonder if that was the case IRL.

>More commands is no problem, there will be

>more in CM2, and both sides can avail

>themselves to them.

So I hear. Look forward to the beta release.

[Slapdragon]

The M-14 was not a development of the M-1, but a new mechanism and was largely unsuccessful. It was an attempt satisfy the aimed fire gurus of the Army and the Assault Rifle gurus who saw and fell in love with the German assault rifles of late war. It fired a somewhat reduced cartridge (7.62x51mm as compared to 7.62x63mm) that was again a compromise, and while it did have automatic fire capability, the selector was welded in off position after 1956 (when the M-15 was suppose to handle that responsibility, although the M15 did not come into wide service). The M-14 was only slightly better than the M-1, and generally inferior except in sniiping roles to the AK-47 which followed German design ideas.

Again, the argument comes down to is the MG-42 and effective support weapon. If the game over models its effectives, then perhaps it should be reduced, and if Germans let theiir SAWs drop when a gunner was wounded, then that should also be modeled. It was US practice that the BAR was reassigned if possible if its gunner was wounded, which may be why the same thing was done with the MG-42. Perhaps out of sheer ignorance of the German policy of abandoning these ineffective and rarely used automatic weapons on the designers part.

[Tero]

>Perhaps out of sheer ignorance of the German

>policy of abandoning these ineffective and

>rarely used automatic weapons on the

>designers part.

I'm not critizing the procedure, I'm critisizing the timeframe. All the men sit in a ring and they decide who gets dropped out and all else is carried out wthout any delays ? Or in tanks they take turns and it is the commander who is the first to go even if the hull front is hit where the driver used to sit.

[Jeff Duquette]

Touché’ Greg. heh heh heh too funny!!!

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by kipanderson:

John Waters, hi,

As always you have a huge range of sources and I am always very cautious, when it comes to disagreeing with you, because you clearly know your subject.

However, all I am saying is that the fact that the use of the Krivosheev data to cover the first half of the war gives a “combat power” ratios of, Soviet to German, 1:5-6 is an illustration that the Krivosheev data may not be understating Soviet losses.

Kip.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Kip, I was not discussing ratio's I leave that up to you & others who know what their talking about .

Did you read my posts on the areas of contention in the Krivosheev groups data Ie, Krivosheev lists the Soviet irreversible losses for 1942 at 3,258,216 while Volkogonov puts the 1942 IR losses at 5,888,236, Volkogonov's monthly IR loss breakdown for 1942 is 1.8 times higher then the Krivosheev groups.

Anyway compare Sokolov's yearly IR loss total to Krivosheev's IR yearly loss totals, their appears to be a major difrence on IR loss data. & again this is an example of what I was trying to show here before anyone decided 1 source was the bible on this subject.

Anyway Kip I realize you & I are discussing difrent areas, & I was trying to show their is a difrence of opinion on Soviet losses,

& this data apperently is relavent to both discussions I see now as it concerns your ratio data, as Sokolovs data would effect your computations correct?.

And Kip pls if you want to disagree do so I'm here to share & learn & value your posts.

Regards, John Waters

[ 06-18-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

This is from "When Titans Clash" by Glantz and House. I checked the numbers against Krivosheev and I think your right John, these are based upon "Soviet Casulties and Combat Losses" by Krivosheev.

[ 06-14-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes Jeff WTC was the 1st Westren work to use data from Krivosheev's 'Grif Sekretnosti sniat'.

Regards, John Waters

[ 06-18-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Jeff Duquette]

Greg:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Grisha Said: I often hear the term 'steamroller' to denote Soviet tactics, even when describing actions in '44 or '45. I won't disagree with what this implies, but the use of such a term needs some qualification, or elaboration.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Steamroller has been somewhat synonymous with the Russian Army since WWI:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>WHEN THE FIRST WORLD WAR broke out, the Western Powers, especially France, placed great hopes in what was called the 'Russian steam-roller'. Once the Tsarist Army had begun to move, it would overrun the Central Powers by sheer weight of numbers and advance to Berlin. This hope was disappointed. The 'steam-roller', set in motion too early, was able to overrun Galicia with one wheel, but the other became bogged in East Prussia. Later it was smashed by Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

The simile of the 'steam-roller' is, however, excellent as a description of the way in which the Red Army performed in the Second World War, once the first two years of defeats had been weathered. Any appreciation of its performance must at the same time consider the material support afforded by the USA and Britain. This very substantial help enabled the USSR to overcome grave crises and—also aided by Roosevelt's policy— to advance to the centre of Europe.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Just as an aside: German Wartime estimates of Russian casualties as of Early 1944 was in the realm of 14 million (from: an article by Erich Von Manstein "The Development of the Red Army, 1942-1945” written for BH Liddell Hart's "The Red Army"). This is far below Krivosheev's figures for Red Army casualties by this period of the war.

In addition Von Manstein elaborates on typical Red Army strategic numeric superiority on a year-by-year basis, and with the exception of 1945 his estimates range from 2:1 to 3:1. These levels of strategic odds do not seem out of step with what has already been brought to light on this thread (I’ll post or email Xerox copies of the article to you if you are interested).

But again Greg, as we have already bantered about in emails to each other, the Red Army could and did use its large strategic numbers advantage to focus troops and equipment strength at points of maximum effort. Operationally localized odds in the realm of 4:1 to 6:1 were not unusual. At Grand tactical and tactical levels I suspect 6:1 to 10:1 advantages in men and\or equipment at the schwerpunckt was not unusual in the last two years of the war (sorry what is the Russian equivalent of Schwerpunckt).

[ 06-18-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

Anyway compare Sokolov's yearly IR loss total to Krivosheev's IR yearly loss totals, their appears to be a major difrence on IR loss data. & again this is an example of what I was trying to show here before anyone decided 1 source was the bible on this subject.

[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One aspect into this seeming inconsistency is the way in which the Red Army losses are tallied. For example the loss figures for Winter War listed "frostbitten" - or something to that effect - as a separate gathegory. There was a joint Finnish-Russian team of historians who went through the list and it was found out that those frostbitten were actually killed but they were not listed in the ledger as KIA, for reasons best known to the Russians. Most propably to bring down the total number of KIA from ~130 000 where it stands now.

This is why the Soviet archival data is so controversial, even for the Russias. It can be said the numbers are there with a certain degree of accuracy but the man who is tallying it up can excert his own preferences when he is compiling the data. The conclusion can be very different even the same archives are used. And contradictory results can be said to be true. From a certain point of view.

ADDENDUM:

Do the POW's killed in captivity show up on the Soviet/Russian total figures as MIA or KIA ? Or at all ? Stalin had deglared them non-persons so are they listed anywhere after the war after they had gone MIA ?

[ 06-19-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Tero, you make some very bizarre statements about the MG 42.

Firstly, you say that gunners were trained to fire 3 round bursts (I find that amazing, since an MG 42 fires 20 bullets in a second - and everyone knows Germans are no good at fractions....) lest they give their position away.

Then you say that an MG 42 would be at a severe disadvantage in a squad to squad fight since the second it opens up it would draw heavy fire.

That's a lot of unfounded supposition to make. I mean, every man is going to react differently under fire, and I will bet many Germans let training go out the window (even if your "3 round burst" theory is correct) and simply clamped down on the trigger once the adrenaline started pumping.

Secondly, I don't doubt that heavy fire was indeed brought to bear on enemy MGs, but it wasn't anything like instantaneous - I should expect the first thing I would do, as an Allied soldier hearing an MG 42, would be to get my ass down, find decent cover, and check the crown jewels. Maybe then I would try and locate the source of the firing.

Finally, how often would a squad vs. squad fight even take place? Allied platoons operated as platoons, with supporting fire, tanks, etc. Section and platoon objectives were usually quite limited, and I suspect that situations where one complete squad faced off solely against another, complete, squad were very rare (in real life - happened all the time playing the card game UP FRONT but that is another story....)

Really, the entire conversation seems beside the point. I think Slapdragon and I have discussed much of this before in some long forgotten threads - inevitably SLA Marshall gets dragged in, and while I don't want to invoke MEN AGAINST FIRE or whatever it was, I do rather think that discussing squads as tactical entities that faced off against other squads rather silly.

In fact, any kind of "balanced scenario" of the kind we love to play in Squad Leader or Combat Mission was something of a rarity in WW II. Any decent commander will prefer to attack with the odds slanted heavily in his favour.

I don't think many battalion commanders placed faith in either the MG 42, or the M-1 Garand, to imbalance the scales in that manner - and inevitably looked to artillery first, then tanks and air support, to ensure an unfair fight.

[ 06-19-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Tero]

>Tero, you make some very bizarre statements

>about the MG 42.

I think we have a missunderstanding here. Nothing more.

>Firstly, you say that gunners were trained

>to fire 3 round bursts (I find that amazing,

>since an MG 42 fires 20 bullets in a second

>- and everyone knows Germans are no good at

>fractions....) lest they give their position

>away.

I should have perhaps used the term "short, controlled burst" instead of "3 round burst". That is a carry over from my national service. But the fact is I can not believe a platoon or a squad commander of ANY army would risk giving away the location of his prime asset. Inexperienced gunner going trigger happy is one thing, experienced gunner remaining cool and collected another.

>Then you say that an MG 42 would be at a

>severe disadvantage in a squad to squad

>fight since the second it opens up it would

>draw heavy fire.

All the Allied narratives I have read never fail to leave out the MG-42 opening up. I can not believe a platoon sargeant of ANY army would leave it at that without trying to suppress the sucker before anything else is done.

>That's a lot of unfounded supposition to

>make.

Well... I do have 11 months of national service under my belt and some lessons sink in deep. One of the is "never go full-auto unless you told to do so or if the situation is REALLY desperate. When you go full-auto every weapon in range will single you out".

>I mean, every man is going to react

>differently under fire, and I will bet many

>Germans let training go out the window (even

>if your "3 round burst" theory is correct)

>and simply clamped down on the trigger once

>the adrenaline started pumping.

If we assume it is a green recruit fresh out of boot you are propably correct. If we assume it is a combat hardened veteran with 2 years of Eastern Front under his belt I can not see him wasting ammo needlessly (and revealing his position in the process) by throwing a full belt at a single guy he saw ducking behind a cover.

>Secondly, I don't doubt that heavy fire was

>indeed brought to bear on enemy MGs, but it

>wasn't anything like instantaneous - I

>should expect the first thing I would do, as

>an Allied soldier hearing an MG 42, would be

>to get my ass down, find decent cover, and

>check the crown jewels. Maybe then I would

>try and locate the source of the firing.

Depends how you define "instantaneous".

By your definition ALL Allied infantry within earshot should duck and cover every time a MG-42 opens up. Which would not be that unrealistic BTW. But once they find out it is not they who are being fired at they will start to look for the sucker and if they see it and it is within effective range they WILL open up on it to suppress it.

>Finally, how often would a squad vs. squad

>fight even take place? Allied platoons

>operated as platoons, with supporting fire,

>tanks, etc. Section and platoon objectives

>were usually quite limited, and I suspect

>that situations where one complete squad

>faced off solely against another, complete,

>squad were very rare (in real life -

>happened all the time playing the card game

>UP FRONT but that is another story....)

Situations I can envisage are street fighting or fighting in the boggace. Not that uncommon situations in France, I would imagine.

>Really, the entire conversation seems beside

>the point.

It is an offshoot from the subject that took a life of its own.

>I think Slapdragon and I have discussed much

>of this before in some long forgotten

>threads - inevitably SLA Marshall gets

>dragged in, and while I don't want to invoke

>MEN AGAINST FIRE or whatever it was,

Soon the movement to ban landmines would intervene. What a mess.

>I do rather think that discussing squads as

>tactical entities that faced off against

>other squads rather silly.

Not in my opinion. The squad is the most basic tactical unit of any infantry formation.

>In fact, any kind of "balanced scenario" of

>the kind we love to play in Squad Leader or

>Combat Mission was something of a rarity in

>WW II. Any decent commander will prefer to

>attack with the odds slanted heavily in his

>favour.

But of course.

>I don't think many battalion commanders

>placed faith in either the MG 42, or the M-1

>Garand, to imbalance the scales in that

>manner - and inevitably looked to artillery

>first, then tanks and air support, to ensure

>an unfair fight.

I think the question is rather what a battalion commander would do when he KNOWS his opponent has the edge on him in the fire support department.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Situations I can envisage are street fighting or fighting in the bocage(sic). Not that uncommon situations in France, I would imagine. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would say so uncommon that you can't find a single reference in writing to one instance in which a single squad faced off against another squad.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Not in my opinion. The squad is the most basic tactical unit of any infantry formation. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would say the fire team is, actually; German, Canadian, British and American squads were all trained to fight in "maneuver" and "fire" groups...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> I think the question is rather what a battalion commander would do when he KNOWS his opponent has the edge on him in the fire support department<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Refuse to carry out the operation or lobby for more fire support.

Failing that, wait for the artillery preparation to stop, then cross himself and take the first step past the start line.

[Tero]

>I would say so uncommon that you can't find

>a single reference in writing to one

>instance in which a single squad faced off

>against another squad.

I think that is more due to the fact that the books talk about companies, regiments and divisions more than individual squads. And autobiographies are vague as the guy seldom knew how any adversaries he was up against.

>I would say the fire team is, actually;

I stand corrected.

>German, Canadian, British and American

>squads were all trained to fight in

>"maneuver" and "fire" groups...

The term used by the Finns was half-squad.

>Refuse to carry out the operation or lobby

>for more fire support.

>

>Failing that, wait for the artillery

>preparation to stop, then cross himself and

>take the first step past the start line.

Here is a reason we seem to be talking past each other. Different pre-conditioning.

I was thinking more in terms of defence, not offence. If, nay when, a Finnish commander had to go over the start line without much fire support he would not go in frontally but he'd find a nice spot through which he'd infiltrate his forces to outflank the defensive position.