The Dupuy formula (so as not to get inundated by the IS-3 debate)

[Tero]

>I should just have said that all my comments

>referred to the German/Soviet fighting and

>not Finnish forces or the Winter War.

That goes without saying. If he had applied the formula to the Finnish/Soviet figures the result would have bent the Gauss curve out of shape and the results would have been made null and void as a statistical anomaly.

>I claim to know nothing about Finnish forces

>and the Winter War other than that the Finns

>are regarded as the best by all those that

>know.

That is not the first time I see a statement like this.

>When it comes to Soviet causalities I

>believe we are no longer in the dark. Both

>David Glantz and John Erickson, in my view

>the worlds top men on the Eastern Front, in

>the English language, regard the work by

>Colonel-General GF Krivosheev, Soviet

>Causalities and Combat Losses in the

>Twentieth Century, as reliable and unbiased.

Arguably, yes. But even the right honourable Glantz uses Soviet/Russian and GERMAN sources when he is discussing the Finnish involvement. That is why I do not think he is totally un-biased.

>If the Germans had been defending against

>forces that numbered the same as Soviet

>forces “actually did” but, were in ever

>detail, “clones” of Germany’s own forces

>then the casuality ratio, attacker to

>defender, would have been 1.44:1. In reality

>it was 1.64:1, Soviet to German. This tells

>us that the Soviet forces performed nearly

>as well as German forces would have done in

>similar circumstances. All comments refer to

>the post Kursk period.

What about the pre-Kursk period ?

>PS. If you use the casualties from the above

>book for the early period of the war you

>find that the gap between German and Soviet

>forces is just as great as the Germans

>claimed in the fifties. It is just that from

>about the autumn of 43 onwards the Soviets

>were far better soldiers, and far fewer in

>number, than the Germans liked to claim post

>war.

I think the 10-1 claim has a grain of truth in it. If you look at total figures spread over a map on a coffee table you are correct, the forces look equal. But I have never heard that even this late in the war the Soviets would attack the most heavily defended portion of the defensive line. That is to say they sought numerical superiority in the place they attacked. And at that focal point the superiority may well have risen to as high as 10-1. The forces may be equally strong but the defender is fighting with the forces at that location only while the rest are spread all over the landscape and moving to intercept. That means that the Soviets could count on having this superiority for as long as it would take the reinforcements to arrive.

They had also deviced a concept of feint attack in which they took advantage of their knowledge of the defenders tactics. A breach was made in the defensive line in order to draw counter attacks which in turn were hit with heavy artillery fire, IF they were done according to tactics and doctrine. If the counter attack was done in an unconventional way the Red Army wound up in troubles.

[Tero]

>I agree, Kip. Especially wrt Soviet numbers

>there is no way the Soviets fielded an army

>that was 8:1 or 10:1 times larger than the

>Germans in Russia. Physically impossible,

>because the Soviet had neither that many men

>of military age, nor the equipment to arm

>such a tremendous host. From late 1943, on,

>the Soviets became very adept at deceptive

>redeployment of their forces along the

>front, thus creating the odds that German

>memoirs quote so often. The German memoirs

>weren't wrong, there really were that many

>Soviets in the main attack axes. But, those

>numbers were the result of redeployments

>done through deception operations, something

>the Soviets became second to none at. So, as

>far as the Germans were concerned every time

>the Soviets launched a major attack from

>late 1943 until the end of the war the

>Germans encountered heavy numerical odds in

>their disfavor.

I think that the misconception rises from the fact that the German figures are taken to mean the entire situation along the entire lenght of the front. They were being hammered by superior forces up and down the frontier but never in two places at the same time. I think it is odd that the Anglo-American historians never picked up that little tidbit. Then again the Cold War needed some fuel to keep the fires burning...

>Naturally, it seemed like the Soviets were

>just swarming across the countryside, but

>nothing could be further from the truth. In

>fact, the Soviets had developed the means

>whereby they could take substantial

>forces(which were never higher than 3:1 in

>numerical superiority, and that in late

>1944), and redeploy them laterally along the

>front(along with STAVKA reserves from the

>rear) to weakpoints in the German line, and

>German intelligence was by and large unable

>to detect it.

I still think that the 10:1 (or near that anyway) superiority in combat effective troops was reached once the defensive lines were breached and the Red Army switched to exploitation phase.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Don't confuse local superiority at the tactical and operational level with strategic superiority. They are not the same thing.

Everyone tries to achieve local superiority as a matter of course (and to prevent their opponent from achieving it). That's Basic Warfare 101. If the Russians were frequently able to achieve local superiority of 10:1 or greater while only having 3:2 or even 3:1 superiority over all (strategic), then this is evidence that they did indeed out-maneuver and out-plan the Germans,which is the whole point of what Kip was saying.

[Roksovkiy]

At the end of the war the mean soviet combat loss ratio was 4:1 in favour of the Germans. This rounds off into the 12 million soviet military casualties to the 3 million Germans.

Also an immense number of soviet casualties incurred against the Mongolians, Georgians etc, were not even recorded. During the assault on Berlin the 2nd Guards Tank Army actually ran out of infantry.

Given this stark reality that if a soviet soldier was not a member of the communist party his death was not recorded and even his family would not be informed.

[Tero]

>Don't confuse local superiority at the

>tactical and operational level with

>strategic superiority. They are not the same

>thing.

I am not confusing them. I am just taking the point of view of the lowly groundpounder at the receiving end. To him it does not matter if the superiority he is facing is classed as tactical/operational or strategic level. He is till facing the odds then and there.

>Everyone tries to achieve local superiority

>as a matter of course (and to prevent their

>opponent from achieving it). That's Basic

>Warfare 101. If the Russians were frequently

>able to achieve local superiority of 10:1 or

>greater while only having 3:2 or even 3:1

>superiority over all (strategic),

I am not disputing Kips logic or the validity of his point. I'm just pointing out that in additon to the actual numbers you have to take into account the actual disposition of the forces. The situation seldom resembles a coffee table top where you can see all the troops involved in the battle in the same space.

For example, the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 against the Finns the overall odds were not very serious, 2-3:1 (order of magnitude in men, worse in aircraft, artillery and tanks). But the Finnish army was dispersed to defend two isthmusses so the actual overall superiority of the Red Army in the Karelian Isthmus was 5:1 or greater in men. And the superiority in the Red Army Schwehrpunkt was close to 10:1 in the outset. The Finns had to fall back while the army reserves were massed to the final defensive line NW of Viipuri. The Finnish army maxed out at 500 000 men that summer so it can be said that the Red Army superiority in men did not reach or exceed much over 2:1, overall. But the local superiority they were able to adcheive initially was 5:1 or worse (better, depending where you are looking that from ). When the odds evened out their attack was repulsed.

>then this is evidence that they did indeed

>out-maneuver and out-plan the Germans,which

>is the whole point of what Kip was

>saying.

Out-plan. Yes. They had the initiative so they could pick the time and the space. The Germans had resources to respond only.

I would hesitate to say they outright out-manouvered the Germans. I would rather say that it was a case of a sumo wrestler against a bantam boxer. The bantam boxer was agile and could hop around the sumo wrestler right to the end but the sumo wrestler used his superior weight to wear down the bantam boxers defences. The boxer was furthermore following his trainers orders to stand fast and not to take one step back so he lost the inherent advantages of his agility and better responce time in fixed positions.

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Vanir Ausf B Said: If the Russians were frequently able to achieve local superiority of 10:1 or greater while only having 3:2 or even 3:1 superiority over all (strategic), then this is evidence that they did indeed out-maneuver and out-plan the Germans,which is the whole point of what Kip was saying.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Strategic superiority of 3:1 or 2.5:1 is a huge numeric advantage indeed. It is far easier to focus strength at intended points of attack when you are enjoying a 3:1 strategic superiority than vise-versa. I hardly see how this is an implication that the Soviets were consistently “out maneuvering” the German Army in order to gain local advantages of 10:1.

This is the difference between having an Army of only 2 million men at your disposal or having an Army of 6 million men. The larger Army can easily pin the 2 million with 2 million of its own and subsequently focus the other 4 million at points of maximum effort.

[Ari Maenpaa]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Roksovkiy:

Also an immense number of soviet casualties incurred against the Mongolians, Georgians etc, were not even recorded...

Given this stark reality that if a soviet soldier was not a member of the communist party his death was not recorded and even his family would not be informed.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Were there lots of Soviet soldiers without the party card?

Are/Were these casualties recorded as MIAs? Surely they are somehow compensated in the casualty statistics? What does Krivosheev say about them, for example?

Ari

[Maastrictian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa:

Were there lots of Soviet soldiers without the party card?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have to assume that Roksovkiy is wrong when he claims non-party member casualties were not recorded. Being a member of the party was a major status symbol (in a classless society ) in the Soviet Union. At most 1 or 2 percent of the population was a member of the party. In the army you almost *had* to be an officer to be in the party. So I seriously doubt that the Soviet Union only kept track of party members.

--Chris

[kipanderson]

Hi,

These discussions are always fun and we will never all agree. All adds to the fun.

Tero, Jeff, hi,

The Dupuy formula already assumes the sort of concentration of forces you talk about. I agree fully with both of you, but so does Dupuy. His formulas “can” work with battalion level forces, just one click up from CM. However, Dupuy is quite open about the fact that his formulas are designed for “operational” level analysis. He recommends forces of 15,000-60,000 should be used. In my calculations I have assumed German forces of 20,000 and Soviet forces of 54,000. As I say, concentration of force by the attacker, as you both mention and describe, is assumed.

Vanir Ausf, hi,

Yes, I agree with you.

Roksovkiy, hi,

The Soviets did keep full records of casualties in the form of “strength” reports. This is not the same thing as reporting losses to relatives or keeping records of names and addresses.

I have dug out some stuff I posted a few months ago. It is almost on the same topic as we are discussing here, but not quite. Anyway for what it is worth here it is,

“Soviet Combat Effectiveness.

Hi,

You have asked a lot of interesting questions, only some of which I may know the answer to. Over the years I have done a lot of work on trying to calculate Soviet Combat Effectiveness during WW2 and due to the flood of great books and articles over the last five years I believe a clear picture has now emerged. I have been threatening to do a longer post on this topic, for what it’s worth, but for the time being here are some of my conclusions.

There are three forms of analysis I have used, a) TN Dupuy’s classic quantitative “combat effectiveness” approach, losses per one hundred frontline riflemen, per combat day and finally c) what might be called the “historical” record, i.e. the narrative of events in books such as those by David Glantz.

All this is now possible because since the archives were opened in the early 1990s it has become clear that the Soviets did, in fact, keep detailed records of losses and the forces employed.

Here are my conclusions, however little they may be worth.

a) If you set Soviet combat effectiveness, during the second half of the war, from 1/7/43 to 31/3/45, to equal 1 then German combat effectiveness over the same period equals 1.15. To set this in context the similar figure for the Germans against both the Commonwealth and American forces during the campaign in NW Europe was 1.20 i.e. Soviet forces were of marginally higher quality than the western allies. The reason for this relatively high figure for Soviet combat effectiveness is that their losses and their overall force ratio advantage, were both very much lower than had been believed before the true figures became known. Taking into account all factors, importantly, including the relative size of the forces employed, one would have expected Soviet losses to number 1.4 times those of the Germans assuming, and this is a very important point, that Soviet forces had been of “identical quality” to German forces. In fact Soviet “actual” losses over the period numbered 1.6 times German losses. Only 0.2 different from the losses the Germans would have inflicted on their enemy had they been fighting “clones” of themselves but numbering the same as Soviet forces “actually” numbered.

When looking at losses per one hundred frontline riflemen, per combat day, I did not compare Soviet and German forces but Soviet and American forces. This does not tell us, directly, anything about Soviet combat effectiveness but does tell us something about the tactics being used, the style of combat. If the Soviets were suffering twice as many casualties per one hundred front line riflemen, per combat day, as the Americans in Europe then it can be taken as evidence that they “may” have been using more bloody tactics at the small unit level. If you go through the statistics in detail what you find is that from the autumn of 43 onwards losses per one hundred frontline riflemen, per combat day, were the same in US and Soviet units. Contrary to popular belief life in a typical, frontline Soviet rifle-company was no more dangerous than life in an American rifle-company. There was still horror and tragedy in bucket loads but not the mass slaughter some German accounts imply. What this implies, I put it no more strongly than that, is that similar tactics were being used by the Soviets and the Americans. No more mass infantry attacks against concentrated machine-gun and artillery fire, unless something had gone horribly wrong, as it did now and then.

c) When is comes to the “historical” record the operation that has never really been able to “fit” into the traditional German view of Soviet combat effectiveness is Bagration, or the Destruction of Army Group Centre. It is not that the Soviets “won” the overall battle, but the nature of their victory, that has always been the problem. The Soviets won at both Stalingrad and Kursk. However, at Stalingrad the loss ratio, Soviet to German, was 4:1 at Kursk 3.5:1. During Bagration the overall loss ratio, Soviet to German, was 0.7:1, during the first two weeks 0.2:1. Something very different was happening. If one looks at he battle in more detail the picture becomes even more puzzling for those that take the “German” view of Soviet combat effectiveness during the latter half of WW2. German pockets of 10,000-20,000 troops, in areas that had been fortified as “fortress cities”, were being collapsed in 2-3 days and at very little cost to the Soviets. What was happening was that German combat teams were being despatched to block an advance, along one of the few “dry” corridors through the swampy terrain, and being pushed aside with ease. The speed with which the German pockets were collapsed, and the very light Soviet casualties, means that at the level of the contact battle, company v company, the Soviets must have been the equals of the Germans. If this had not been the case the causality ratio in the first two weeks would not have been so in the Soviets favour. Also the German pockets would not have collapsed as quickly.

Non of the above is conclusive, there are imperfections in the approach on all counts. However, taken together the above has convinced me that, indeed, Soviet combat effectiveness during the second half of the war was every close to that of the Germans. I will end with two pieces of information that go some way to illustrating why the view of Soviet combat effectiveness has changed in the last five years.

Firstly, it is now known that Soviet losses during 1943 were no greater than the annual intake of conscripts. Even as early as 43 the Soviets were no longer being “bled to death” as the Germans hoped, and many believed.

Secondly, the following is a paraphrase of something written by David Glantz in the mid-eighties. “ During the second half of the war force ratios were not as high as the Germans claimed, 7-8:1, nor as low as the Soviets claimed, 2-3:1. More likely they were 4-5:1 in favour of the Soviets.” We now know that the average force ratio throughout the second half of the war was 2.7:1. (These figures can be found in David Glantz’s own books form the mid nineties onwards, and other sources.)

As the true figures have emerged so the view of Soviet combat effectiveness, post Kursk, has changed.

I know from previous posts that Steve, as in BTS, believes the Soviets did not return to the level of combat effectiveness they had in 1940 until 1945. Clearly, I disagree with this. However, that is what makes the subject so interesting, we nearly all disagree.

The good news is that, for those of us that are interested, there is likely to be a continuing flood of new books on the subject for sometime to come.

All the best,

Kip.

PS. Sometime I will get round to making a far longer post giving a blow by blow account of how all the calculations are done, i.e. Dupuy’s combat effectiveness and others, with a full list of sources for all the data. (If any one is interested.)”

It is worth stressing the point that all three of the above forms of analysis, using the same source I used above, confirm that during the first half of the war in the east the Germans generated 5-6 times the combat power for similar sized units. However, by the autumn of 43 all that had changed.

[kipanderson]

Ari, Maastrictian, hi,

The Soviets counted all, non-party members, Mongolians, the lot. Krivosheev makes it clear that the Soviets did keep detailed strength and loss figures. They kept records of types of wounds, recovery rates, all sorts of things. What they did not bother with was names and addresses and reports to relatives and so on.

All the types of statistics that are militarily useful, and casualties certainly are, were collected and kept.

All the best

Kip.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

just seen Grisha's comments on the other thread.

Yup, we agree on this one.

All the best,

Kip.

[JasonC]

"If the Russians were frequently able to achieve local superiority of 10:1 or greater while only having 3:2 or even 3:1 superiority over all (strategic), then this is evidence that they did indeed out-maneuver and out-plan the Germans"

Exactly. They seized the initiative when the overall forces were still about equal. They retained after Kursk, the last time the Germans tried their own concentrating offensive maneuver to get local odds, when the Russians had about 3:2 overall.

Then they maneuvered better. When the Germans attacked they met PAK front and reserves, and did not achieve local odds for long. When the Russians attacked after that, they did, though more commonly 3:1 or 5:1, not 10.

And then the effects of attrition kicked in, because of that. As the Germans lost large forces for roughly even losses on the Russian side, the odds ratio moved further in the Russians favor. So that, by the time of Bagration, they -did- get ~3:1 overall odds. And continued to exploit that advantage well via maneuver, resulting in all the 10:1 memoires (especially noticable in the infantry, which couldn't maneuver as well).

Production and mobilization only got the Russians between 3:2 and 2:1. They turned that into no-odds German attacks and plus-odds Russian attacks by outplaying the Germans operationally. They turned the resulting victories into 3:1 overall odds (and by the very end, even more) through subtraction from the German side of the ledger. In the form of dead army groups.

Production got the Russians a recovery from the disasters of 1941 and a 1 year jump, because of German failure to mobilize the economy. It wasn't anything else - the Germans produced as much by 1944 as the Russians were making, they just didn't get it so high so soon. Everything else, the army did through maneuver and attrition.

And incidentally, it starts getting pretty silly when the Russians supposedly are performing worse than the Germans because they are winning battles that they have very high odds ratios for, which odds ratios they brought about by better operational maneuver. Where does operational maneuver fit in the "better" and "worse"?

The truth is, Dupuy was after more tactical stuff because he was estimating combat factors for sims, and all the higher level stuff, including the operations the Russians did better, were above the level he was looking at. He thus was not assessing the performance of the armies, but instead the performance of the soldiers. The two differ by how they are organized and used, in the sense of how they are ordered about.

The German soldiers and low level officers performed very well against daunting conditions. The higher German officers and high command put them in those daunting conditions, not Allied production successes.

Oh sure, eventually when the west front was opened too, production alone would have been quite sufficient, and the ultimate outcome was "overdetermined". But the war was decided before then, in the east. And it was won as wars usually are won - on battlefields.

Not tactically, not technologically, not even economically, though each of those created some advantage, the last probably the largest of them. I don't know why everyone always looks for privates, engineers, or businessmen to decide wars, instead of expecting them to be decided by the decisions of generals. I guess it is a sociological reductive fad, or perhaps is about shifting responsibilities.

But obvious reality is that political high commands and decisions of the highest level generals have the largest impact on war outcomes. The Germans decided to batter Stalingrad while stripping the flanks, to batter Kursk, to hold at all costs in retreats. The Russians decided to build reserves and then isolate Stalingrad by armored maneuver, to hold large reserves and then to counterattack aiming all the way for Kiev by armored maneuver, to seize Belorussia by combined arms concentric attack.

The Russians had certainly gone to school to learn how to do such things, in 1941 and 1942. The Germans had thrown their brains out the window for prestige objectives, psycho-twaddle about the cult of the offensive, will over material, and technological fantasies. They repeatedly blundered while Russian "play" was solid, so they predictably got clobbered.

[Jeff Duquette]

Kip:

You are aware that The Depuy Institute has done additional combat effectiveness studies dealing with the WWII Red Army since the original release of "Number Predictions & War"?

[Battlefront.com]

Hi Kip,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I know from previous posts that Steve, as in BTS, believes the Soviets did not return to the level of combat effectiveness they had in 1940 until 1945.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I do? I don't know what this means The Red Army of 1940 and 1945 were not even in the same league in terms of effectiveness, so I can't possibly believe the army of 1945 returned to 1940 effectiveness

It is VERY hard to boil down anything on the Eastern Front (in particular) to simple "better" and "worse" kinds of statements. As general trend the Soviet abilities in the field steadily increased as the war went on. At some points it went up dramatically, say in summer 1943 compared to summer 1942, but you can still pick that statement apart and say that this or that element didn't improve much vs. that or the other element.

I think one thing can be generally laid out. The Soviet's ability to fight as an offensive force really took hold in summer 1943. This was partly due to the lessons learned in the previous years, but also because the Germans were a less capable foe at around the same time. I therefore think that the bulk of the lessons learned by the Red Army were already under its belt. From summer of 1943 on they started to really show what they learned on the battlefield, at all levels of command as well as with their organization and equipment.

Steve

[Jeff Duquette]

German CEV from Numbers Predictions and War for the Russian Front Indicate:

Ukraine 1941________3.58

Leningrad 1943______1.47

Kursk 1943__________2.68

Belgorade-Kharkov___1.52

In other words in Ukraine 1941, 100 German were approximately the combat equivalent of 368 Russians.

Depuy indicates the following:

“There is an interesting phenomenon evident in this data summary. The calculations demonstrate that there was a major German combat effectiveness superiority over the Russian in all four of these battles. But that superiority over the Russians was much greater in all battles in which the Germans were on the offensive and successful than in those in which they were unsuccessful.”

With respect to Bagration – surely the crown jewel of Red Army Operations during the War – the forces arrayed against each other included: 200 Soviet Divisions with some 2,000,000 combat troops, 6,000 tanks, and 45,000 Guns and Mortars.

Army Group Center strength was approximately 400,000 combat troops in 52 divisions. Panzer strength returns of AGC on Jun 1 was 553 AFV’s of which 480 were Stug III assault guns. 4th Army apparently had a staggering 29 Tiger I’s in its inventory (of which only about half were actual “runners”). Artillery strength was approximately 9,500 guns and mortars.

Combine this with standard issue Hitler induced operational restrictions on retrograde movements and you end up with a recipe for disaster for AGC.

Casualties:

Army Group Center was estimated to have suffered between 300,000 to 350,000 casualties of whom 150,000 were POW. AGC for all practical intents ceased to exist following Bagration. Krivosheev indicates total Red Army casualties were in the realm of 765,815. Daily avg. rates of casualties for the Red Army were 11,262 men during the operation. Irrecoverable losses;180,000. The Red Army also suffered some 2,900 tank losses and 2,500 artillery tube losses.

The Red Army got their Cannae. But I’m not personally convinced that Bagration wasn’t a traditional Soviet Steam Roller victory.

[ 06-12-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[PJungnitsch]

The 'gist' I got out of reading up on Bagration was that the Germans were counting on being able to block the Soviet advance in that area by holding the 'dry zones' through which armies normally had to go. The difference this time was that the Red Army was suddenly very well motorized with a flood of American six wheel drive trucks, the best transport trucks of the time. So while the Germans were holding the dry areas, the Soviets just drove around them. And not only could the Soviets use the bad terrain to advance, but they could advance in it much faster by truck than the Germans could retreat and reorganize by feet and horse.

[kipanderson]

JasonC,

Yup, agree with all you say, Soviet Operational Art was their secret, or not so secret, weapon. I would just add a couple of points.

Now the Soviet true losses are known my views of Stalingrad and Kursk have changed, and are a little unconventional. I am not so sure I count them as victories for the Soviets. What I mean by this is that a loss ratio of, Soviet to German, 4:1 at Stalingrad and 3.5:1 at Kursk was “too” much. If the Soviets had continued with that sort of loss ratio during the period September 43 to September 44 they would not have won the war in the East. The fact that the loss ratio fell to 1.64:1 was a “necessary” but not “sufficient” condition for their victory. The Soviet Operational Art alone, would not have won them the war in the east. It was this, which kept many Germans fighting. The Germans no longer controlled the battlefields after the fighting so they did not “know” how many causalities they were inflicting. Had they still been inflicting losses in the ratio they did up to and including Kursk they would have succeeded in bleeding the Russians dry.

Steve,

You did say something along the lines I quoted. I think you did anyway, stuck in my mind because I thought it was a bit strange. I may be wrong, my brain may be going….

Anyway, to me the important thing is that I do trust the fact that you are open minded and “if” someone can make a strong case you are willing to listen. As you can tell I am hugely looking forward to CM2.

Jeff,

No, I did not know that the Dupuy Institute was still producing work. Will look into it. What is necessary is that post 1995 data is used, or there abouts.

When it comes to Bagration we are counting in slightly different ways. Agree 100% with your figure of 765,815 for Soviet losses, page 145 of my edition of the Krivosheev book. However, you will notice that is in regard of a 68-day operation by a starting force of 2.3 million men. The losses on the Soviet side depend on the time you cover and how wide you go on the flanks. David Glantz counts the main Soviet forces as numbering 1.2 million, rising to 1.6 million. He also gives German losses on a totally different time scale. Quote from When Titans Clashed,

referring to Bagration,

“ In the twelve days from 22 June to 4 July, Army Group Centre had lost 25 divisions and well over 300,000 men. In the ensuing weeks it lost more than an additional 100,000.” The figures that stuck in my mind, probably from a Glantz book, in the same time period, are 400,000 German losses and 250,000 Soviet. Anyway, if we sat down together and looked at all sources we could find I am sure we would agree a figure for a given time scale and force.

Only I do not believe we are still looking at a Soviet “steam roller”, something very different is afoot from Kursk a year earlier.

Machineman,

I agree with your point about the importance of US trucks in the attack.

All fun stuff,

All the best,

Kip.

PS. As I indicate above, the strange thing is I take a “far less flattering” view of the Soviets during Stalingrad and Kursk than most. Given the knew, true figures, I am not at all sure they won.

[Tero]

>Yup, agree with all you say, Soviet

>Operational Art was their secret, or not so

>secret, weapon.

I think it has been so secret because the Western Historians were harnessed to keep up the Cold War view of the Red hordes which the Western armies could beat with one hand tied behind their back, provided they were given the expensive toys they called for.

>I am not so sure I count them as victories

>for the Soviets.

I think they were almost defeated at Kursk. It was only their ability to recover from such blows better than the Germans could by that stage that decided which way the scale tipped.

>What I mean by this is that a loss ratio of,

>Soviet to German, 4:1 at Stalingrad and

>3.5:1 at Kursk was “too” much.

Staligrad was a prestige target for both so I think a victory there justified the casualties sustained. Stalingrad made the Germans uneasy so that was a morale buster as well.

>If the Soviets had continued with that sort

>of loss ratio during the period September 43

>to September 44 they would not have won the

>war in the East. The fact that the loss

>ratio fell to 1.64:1 was a “necessary” but

>not “sufficient” condition for their

>victory.

How much of the German losses were actually POW's ? And how much of the previous years Soviet losses had been POW's ? I would say that the ratio got better because it was the Soviets, who captured the POW's this time around, not the Germans. This is why I really think the inclusion of POW's in the Dupuy equation distorts the outcome too much for it to accurately reflect the actual fighting capabilities of the armies it is trying to measure.

>The Soviet Operational Art alone, would not

>have won them the war in the east. It was

>this, which kept many Germans fighting. The

>Germans no longer controlled the

>battlefields after the fighting so they did

>not “know” how many causalities they were

>inflicting. Had they still been inflicting

>losses in the ratio they did up to and

>including Kursk they would have succeeded in

>bleeding the Russians dry.

I would rather say they still inflicted the combat casualties as effectively (or even more effectively, given the fact they were defending) as before. It is just that they lost more men without the possibility to recover them. Their WIA for example often fell into the hands of the Soviets. The Soviets on the other hand could take care of their wounded and they did not lose men as POW's in anywhere as near numbers as they had lost in 1941-43. The Germans were subjected to the same conditions as the Soviets had been under earlier.

>Only I do not believe we are still looking

>at a Soviet “steam roller”, something very

>different is afoot from Kursk a year

>earlier.

The Finnish books describe the summer of 1944 assault on the Finns as much improved vesion of the 1939/40-style assault. But IIRC they do not say that it was that much different in its execution. The use of artillery was more flexible and CAS was more prolificate than it had been before but that was about it. Then again the terrain very different from that in which the Bakration was fought.

>PS. As I indicate above, the strange thing

>is I take a “far less flattering” view of

>the Soviets during Stalingrad and Kursk than

>most. Given the knew, true figures, I am not

>at all sure they won.

Was the invasion in Italy, which coincided with Kursk, coordinated so that it would distract the Germans ?

[Simon Fox]

tero,

It was the invasion of Sicily and it was probably not calculated since the timing of Kursk was up to the Germans and the timing of Husky was up to the allies. Unless they were in collusion of course

I am confused as to your justification for discounting POW as a combat statistic. Exactly what do you think they are? Certainly not irrelevant I would think. Whether you deny the enemy the use of his manpower through death, wounding or capture the effect upon his capabilities is similar. Excepting of course you have to look after the POW. Perhaps you are suggesting that by executing POW one could improve the combat efficiency of your units?

[Tero]

>It was the invasion of Sicily and it was

>probably not calculated since the timing of

>Kursk was up to the Germans and the timing

>of Husky was up to the allies. Unless they

>were in collusion of course

The stellar constellations came together favourably ? And Hitlers astrologist missed that ? Bad astrologist, bad BAD !

>I am confused as to your justification for

>discounting POW as a combat statistic.

>Exactly what do you think they are?

I am thinking from the purely tactical point of view

>Certainly not irrelevant I would think.

When it comes to tactical effectiveness they are irrelevant. Take a look at the German and Allied losses sustained during the opening phases of Overlord for example. The Allies lost an insignifican amount of men as POW's while a sizable portion of the German losses were POW's. If you lose the POW's you get the number of actual COMBAT losses. In that light you can see that the Germans did perform better in combat than the numbers which include the POW's lead on. Sure, the strategic significance of the number of POW's is significant but when we are talking about things from purely tactical point of view the POW's are superfluous. Look at it this way: If we lose the POW's the loss ratio becomes less favourable to the Allies. We can not have that, now can we ?

>Whether you deny the enemy the use of his

>manpower through death, wounding or capture

>the effect upon his capabilities is similar.

Yes. But is that denial tactical or strategic in nature ? How many KIA would you say equals ,lets say, 1 000 POW's ? And how much do the POW's actually affect the fightig capabilities of a unit ? The POW's captured might be rear echelon troops. If a company loses a few men as KIA but most of its cooks and bakers as POW the company is still almost 100% combat effective. Until they run out of food in a few days. Lose your horse train and you'll run out of ammo in a few days, at best. These kinds of losses are strategic in nature, they are not tactical losses.

>Excepting of course you have to look after

>the POW. Perhaps you are suggesting that by

>executing POW one could improve the combat

>efficiency of your units?

Actually, no.

I believe there is a provision for the excution (or was it disposal of) of POW's in the Geneva Convention though. I'll have to look that up.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

When it comes to tactical effectiveness they are irrelevant.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wrong.

An American company surrounds a German 10 man platoon and the Germans surrender. The Americans lose 5 men in the action. 50 km away, a German SS company surrounds an American 10 man platoon. The Americans surrender, and are executed soon after. The Germans also lose 5 men in the action. The American loses are counted as KIA, the German as POW. This sort of thing did happen quite a lot, Geneva Convention be damned. If your Eastern Historians say otherwise, they are not as accurate as you think.

Both companies won their respective tactical engagements, but under your logic, the German company performed better in combat than the American. Hmm...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>How many KIA would you say equals ,lets say, 1 000 POW's ? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

1000

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

The POW's captured might be rear echelon troops. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The KIAs might be rear echelon troops as well. If the front line troops are still alive and kicking how is it the rear echelon guys are getting captured anyway?

Sorry, Tero. Any way you slice it, the Germans just weren't as good as you'ld like to believe.

[ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Tero]

>An American company surrounds a German 10

>man platoon and the Germans surrender. The

>Americans lose 5 men in the action. 50 km

>away, a German SS company surrounds an

>American 10 man platoon. The Americans

>surrender, and are later executed. The

>Germans also lose 5 men in the action. The

>American loses are counted as KIA, the

>German as POW. This sort of thing did

>happen, Geneva Convention be damned. Under

>your logic, the German company performed

>better in combat than the American. Hmm...

Nononononono.

You are propagandizing the story to provoke emotional responses.

The story should go:

An American company surrounds a German 10

man platoon and the Germans surrender. The

Americans lose 5 men in the action. Two of the German captives die later in unclear circumstances but the men guarding them are cleared of all charges. 50 km away, a German SS company surrounds an American 10 man platoon. The Americans lose 10 men as MIA, presumed dead. When the Americans capture area later they find the MIA dead with their hands tied behind their backs and a gunshot wound in the back of their heads. The Germans also lose 5 men in the action. The American loses are counted as MIA, the German as POW.

BTW, as you well know that 50km gap between the two places does not fit inside the CM scope.

See, I'm starting to learn the lingo.

>This sort of thing did happen, Geneva

>Convention be damned.

Yes. But how often did it happen to be statistically significant ? Did the Americans shoot their German captives, ever ? You are trying to lead this debate into a bog.

>Under your logic, the German company

>performed better in combat than the

>American. Hmm...

Hmmmm... my ass.

They performed better in combat if they inflicted more combat casualties. which they did not in your example, unless they inflicted more KIA and WIA on the American troops they were fighting in addition to those 10 MIA.

In your example what they did not do was act according to the laws of war. Lets keep that one a separate subject.

>>How many KIA would you say equals ,lets

>>say, 1 000 POW's ?

>

>1000

Please give some reasoning for your figure.

>>The POW's captured might be rear echelon

>>troops.

>

>The KIAs might be rear echelon troops as

>well. If the front line troops are still

>alive and kicking how is it the rear echelon

>guys are getting captured anyway?

Deep penetration attack to capture a vital bridge for example.

>Sorry, Tero. Any way you slice it, the

>Germans just weren't as good as you'ld like

>to believe.

Nor were the Western Allies as good as you'd like to believe. It is just that the popular histories are written by Anglo-American writers who are not impartial or unbiased. The halos of both the CAS and the strategic bombing effort have been stripped. I think there will be more to follow along those lines.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

You are propagandizing the story to provoke emotional responses. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

LOL! Who's propagandizing here? Of course stuff like this was done by all sides to some extent or another, but if you actually think the SS were no more likely to shoot prisoners than the Americans, I'm afraid there is little more I can say to you.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>BTW, as you well know that 50km gap between the two places does not fit inside the CM scope.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have no idea what this has to do with anything. It could be any number. The distance is irrelavent.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>They performed better in combat if they inflicted more combat casualties. which they did not in your example, unless they inflicted more KIA and WIA on the American troops they were fighting in addition to those 10 MIA.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

? If bodies are found, they are counted as KIA, not MIA. I think there are not many US servicemen still listed as MIA from the ETO. Those who are can be reasonably assumed to be KIA. So the whole MIA thing is a red herring.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> your example what they did not do was act according to the laws of war. Lets keep that one a separate subject.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The "laws of war" have nothing to do with it. At the end of the day, who is still on the front lines ready to fight and who is not is all that matters for our purposes.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Please give some reasoning for your figure.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Everything I have said is reasoning for my figure.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Deep penetration attack to capture a vital bridge for example.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And just how did they get so deep in the first place? Think about it.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Nor were the Western Allies as good as you'd like to believe. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

How good do you think I think they were? For the record, I think they were about as good as Kip's Dupuy numbers suggest. Last I looked, Kip was not a Western historian. Dupuy might qualify as such, but you seem to accept him.

[Tero]

>LOL! Who's propagandizing here? Of course

>stuff like this was done by all sides to

>some extent or another, but if you actually

>think the SS were no more likely to shoot

>prisoners than the Americans, I'm afraid

>there is little more I can say to you.

The SS were mostly rough, oppinionated bastards but that does not diminish their tactical effectivness in any way. It was the SA which was seen as amateur bullies, not the SS. They were professinal hench men.

>I have no idea what this has to do with

>anything. It could be any number. The

>distance is irrelavent.

The fact is that that 50km gap most likely means that the two incidents are unrelated tactically.

>? If bodies are found, they are counted as

>KIA, not MIA.

That is totally dependant on the timeframe. They were most likely deglared MIA (presumed dead or captured) when they went missing. When their bodies are found, even years later, they become officially KIA.

There are still Finnish service men who are officaly MIA but they are deglared legally dead. There are several expeditions each summer to former battle grounds to bring these guys remains back to be buried in their home cemeteries.

>I think there are not many US servicemen

>still listed as MIA from the ETO. Those who

>are can be reasonably assumed to be KIA.

So are the Finnish servicemen. But they were listed as MIA until a court ruled them legally dead after some years.

>So the whole MIA thing is a red herring.

It most certainly is not.

>The "laws of war" have nothing to do with

>it.

In your example these laws do have everything to do with it.

>At the end of the day, who is still on

>the front lines ready to fight and who is

>not is all that matters for our purposes.

Yes. But should the number of capture LW ground crew reflect on the effectivness of the ground forces ?

>Everything I have said is reasoning for my

>figure.

Not really. In combat an experienced typist is as valuable as an experienced gunner ?

>And just how did they get so deep in the

>first place? Think about it.

By bypassing the strong points. They left the defenders alone and force them to widraw by making their strategic situation unbearable. How does that diminish their short term (tactical) combat effectiness ?

>How good do you think I think they were?

Not as good as the history book lead on.

>For the record, I think they were about as

>good as Kip's Dupuy numbers suggest. Last I

>looked, Kip was not a Western historian.

>Dupuy might qualify as such, but you seem to

>accept him.

Actually I see potential in his (Dupuy that is ) formula. But I am in disagreement with the criteria he with which he chooses the variables.

[Vanir Ausf B]

I can't believe you actually said that about the SS. "Tough, opinionated bastards"? You make then sound like the Dirty Dozen or the A-Team. I think I begin to see how your opinion of the German army is so... positive. Not really relevant to this discussion but enlightening nonetheless.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>That is totally dependant on the timeframe.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exactly. And we are using 2001 numbers here, not 1944.

As I stated, all current MIA can be considered KIA for our purposes here, regardless of their official legal status. Or do you think Germany is still holding some POWs? I don't understand why this is so hard to grasp.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In your example these laws do have everything to do with it.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Whether someone is killed in accordance with the Geneva Convention or not has nothing to do with the reality on the ground. He is just as dead either way. It's not like he gets to be resurrected and rejoin his unit if the other side "broke the rules". Your hang-ups on strict legal definitions baffle me.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Not really. In combat an experienced typist is as valuable as an experienced gunner ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Typists can be KIA just as easily as POW. When rear areas were threatened typists and cooks tended to grab a gun and become soldiers.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>By bypassing the strong points. They left the defenders alone and force them to widraw by making their strategic situation unbearable. How does that diminish their short term (tactical) combat effectiness ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

If they bypassed the strong points that is a tactical failing on the defender's part. There is more to tactical combat effectiveness than shooting straight. Proper recon and manouever are just as important.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Not as good as the history book lead on.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Which book? There are so many...

Bias is not something unique to Anglo-Saxons. If you think non Anglo-Saxon historians are any less prone to bias, that shows a degree of bias in yourself. Unless you can prove it.

And BTW, most of the people I have come across who buy into the Uber German myth have been Americans. Sad, but true.

[ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]