The Dupuy formula (so as not to get inundated by the IS-3 debate)

[ferdinand]

When I read the title of the thread, I actually expected to find some sort of formula in it, or at least an outline of the methodology. Does anyone here have a reference to these quantitative works ? Is Dupuy an historian using quant. analysis, or a quant. who turned to history ?

[dNorwood]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by ferdinand:

Does anyone here have a reference to these quantitative works ? Is Dupuy an historian using quant. analysis, or a quant. who turned to history ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Try starting with:

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/index.htm

and also

http://www.militaryconflict.org/

(which I stumbled on while searching for the first...)

The former only has books for sale, while the latter has some material posted directly on their site.

[Maastrictian]

If I may interject into the discussion about POWs that Vanir Ausf B and tero are having. I think this "10 men captured 50km away" example is destracting you both from the main point.

Tero sugests that POWs should not be included in the Dupuy equasion. By my understanding the Dupuy equasion looks at casualty figures for an entire battle (multiple divisions engaged) and compares the total casulaties that each side sustained to measure how many Soviet (say) casualties it took to produce one German casualty. Basically a way of comparing the net effect of doctrine, moral, equipment etc.

The question is whether to include POWs, I would say that including them or not including them measures two different things.

Lets think about how the vast majority of POWs are taken. They are not taken in small unit actions, a squad surounded by a platoon will generally fight until one or two men are left. Preferably the squad will fight for a time and then withdraw. Most POWs are not the result of tactical actions but of strategic ones. When a division is surounded by armored spearheads for example. The units an either side of such an encircled unit will sustain mostly KIA, WIA casualties while the encircled unit sustains POW casulties as its supplies are cut of and it surenders. It can even be (generally) said that the purpose of taking tactical casualties is to efect an envelopment that forces the enemy to take POW casualties.

So, in my mind, one could use the Dupuy equasion for two purposes.

1) To predict the hypothetical outcome of a strategic action, the clash of two armies.

2) To predict the hypothetical outcome of a large number of small unit actions. The clash of two companies many times over.

Both are useful. Case 1 better measures the brilliance of oposing generals while Case 2 better measures the training and equipment of troops. Naturally Cases 1 and 2 are interrelated, strategy and tactics do not exist in a vacum, but what I am saying works as a generalization.

The point I am building to (that you have probably already seen) is that when using the Dupuy formula for predictions and analysis similar to Case 1 including POWs makes sence, most of them are incured on a strategic level. When looking at Case 2 including POWs probably does not make sence as POWs tend to be taken due to strategic decisions.

--Chris

[Triumvir]

Not wanting to comment on the SS in any way, but...

as for Anglo-American proclivities towards killing prisoners, read any decent book about WW I, or read An Intimate History of Killing by Joanna Bourke.

On the Western Front, at least, the Anglo-Americans were as willing to shoot German prisoners as the Germans were Anglo-American prisoners.

(and before you ask, there were damn few Anglo-Americans to be taken prisoner on the Eastern Front.)

[Vanir Ausf B]

Chris, those are some good points and I agree with them mostly. I do suspect they would be more relevant to the East front than the West as that Theater seemed to see far more mass surrenderings than the West, at least up until the last few months of the war.

Triumvir:

If you were to talk about WWI or WW2 minus the SS then that may well be, but I have a hard time believing anyone could make such a claim with any degree of certainty as there are no reliable numbers on such things AFAIK. My comments were on the SS only. It isn't very important as I could have had the US shoot the prisoners in my example instead of the Germans and it would not change the underlying dynamics.

[Maastrictian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

Chris, those are some good points and I agree with them mostly. I do suspect they would be more relevant to the East front than the West as that Theater seemed to see far more mass surrenderings than the West, at least up until the last few months of the war.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would argue that my points are relevant to the whole war. I certainly agree that in Italy and in France and the low countries '44-'45 there is a much smaller difference between the "strategic" caluculation and the "tactical" one (with or with out POWs). But this is difference is a result of the terrain of Italy and the strategic choices in western europe (broad offensive vs. narrow one). So I would argue that the lack of difference between strategic and tactical figures on the west front '44-'45 is a result of strategic choices that caused there to be less mass surenderings, the cases I describe are still applicable.

--Chris

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Nor were the Western Allies as good as you'd like to believe. It is just that the popular histories are written by Anglo-American writers who are not impartial or unbiased. The halos of both the CAS and the strategic bombing effort have been stripped. I think there will be more to follow along those lines.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Care to elaborate?

No, I don't think that the Allied air campaigns (both strategic & tactical) were decisive in and of themselves, BUT they were both significant in their own ways to help shape the course of war in the ETO. And ever since the bombs stopped falling in the strategic bombing campaign in specific, the ultimate effect of that bombing has always been a subject of controversy, beginning with the Strategic Bombing Survey right after the war. It's hardly something that's ever existed with a "halo," because I don't see a consensus even amongst UK/US historians on the bombing campaign's effectiveness.

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Maastrictian:

I would argue that my points are relevant to the whole war.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm not suggesting they are irrelevant in the West, just not as relevant. I agree with your reasoning on the causes of the difference, but I'm not sure I see why that matters. It seems to me the fact of the difference is all that the Dupuy formula is capable of considering anyway, as it was never designed to model stuff at the strategic level (if I understand Kip correctly).

Which brings me to the thought that the original point has been lost here somehow. I was rather under the impression that Tero and I were only discussing POWs taken at the tactical or perhaps operational level. That's why we were talking about the relative value of cooks and typists

When you start talking about whole divisions and armies surrendering, those sorts of distinctions become irrelevant. If I did not make that clear, I apologize. Obviously, if an army of 300,000 surrenders for lack of supply, you would be nuts to include those numbers in the formula as it was never intended to model anything on that scale. Kip seemed to be aware of this and I trust he took that into consideration.

I'm not sure how I ended up defending Dupuy in the first place as Kip seems to be the only guy around here who really understands the formula. It should be his job

All I wanted to do was dispute the notion that POWs taken at the tactical level were somehow less important than KIA when determining tactical level combat efficiency. If I implied anything beyond that, it was not my intention.

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Ferdinand Said: When I read the title of the thread, I actually expected to find some sort of formula in it, or at least an outline of the methodology. Does anyone here have a reference to these quantitative works ? Is Dupuy an historian using quant. analysis, or a quant. who turned to history?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

CEV or combat effectiveness values are developed from various formulas originally laid out in TN Depuy's book "Numbers, Predictions and War". The development of the CEV formulas are based on a rather large database of battles examined by Depuy, and later the Depuy Institute. “Numbers Predictions and War” has been out of print for some time. You can find it occasionally listed on web based used book out lets. Interesting stuff.

Zetterling latches onto to CEV correlations in his work on Normandy. He gives a fairly good abridged explanation of CEV calcs.

Incidentally Depuy gives CEV values of German Troops vs. Anglo-American in ETO 44-45 of 1.2 (as I recall).

Zetterling has a whole chapter in "Normandy 1944" in which he tries to prove (somewhat convincingly…although Zetterling has a tendency toward tooting his “Whermacht Horn” just a little to loudly at times ) that the actual CEV number for German Troops vs. Anglo-American the Normandy Campaign is closer to 1.4 (i.e. 1 German soldier combat effectiveness was equivalent to 1.4 British or Americans.)

====================================

I think Kip Anderson's postings are very interesting. He has obviously taken a rather scholarly approach to looking at late war Red Army CEV. At this point I guess I still disagree with his conclusions but would like to find out more about your findings. Are you in the process of publishing something Kip?

====================================

Regarding POWs as non-casualties. Most casualty studies I have seen role POWs, KIA and maimed statistics into the category of “Irrecoverable Losses”.

[PzKpfw 1]

Just to muddy the waters a lil more concering loss ratios on the eastren front Sokolov breaks down German Soviet loss ratios by year as the following in the German's favor:

1941 - 18.1:1

1942 - 13.7:1

1943 - 10.4:1

1944 - 5.8:1

1945 - 4.6:1

*See: Sokolov B.V. The Cost of War: Human Losses for the USSR and Germany, 1939 - 1945 : Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol 9, No. 1 March 1996. p.176

Regards, John Waters

[JasonC]

To Kip -

I have a different take on it. Your 4:1 loss numbers for Stalingrad and Kursk I simply do not believe. It may well be a "definition" difference. The attrition battles in the center, at the city of Stalingrad and in the Kursk salient, I'd believe those figures. But not the overall campaigns, including the breakthrough fighting after both German flanks get crushed in each case.

The center attrition fighting involves the Germans concentrating most of their force on a small portion of the front in slugging offensive action. Which the Russians meet with stand-and-die and copious reserves. It is entirely believeable that the Russians lost heavily - in that sort of ratio - standing in front of the meatgrinder like that. And some might call those the "battles" of Stalingrad and Kursk.

But the campaigns are not just those. Those are the Russians meeting the German strength, in the center in each case. In both cases they also throw their own armor at the German flanks, and break through, and advance hundreds of miles in a few weeks, and destroy large infantry formations "left" by the move. And I do not see any way in a warm place for the ratios you cite, to apply to those portions, and thus to the campaign as a whole.

I'll bet it is a measurement of the schwerpunk, not of the war up until that date. Your implicit assumption, that numbers "that high" mean overall losses to that point were always that high, I think completely unwarranted.

Why do I think this? Because the Russians go to a huge odds ascendency through two of those operations. They start the Stalingrad -campaign- with parity, and end it with 3:2 odds. They start the Kursk -campaign- with 3:2 to 2:1, and they end it with 3:1. The losses are as big as the replacement rates, so this is not build up despite 4:1 losses in low-level fighting.

Remember that all the people doing this stuff were trying to figure out, is whether to make a German infantry corps a 4-4-4 or a 3-3-4 for a game like AH's "Stalingrad". Nothing more involved or more exhaustive than that. Certainly not an assessment of the whole campaign.

In addition, the combat effectiveness numbers are endlessly confused with the loss ratios. No. I don't know why this is so common, I guess some people just think of "effectiveness" one way in their heads and can't be got to see that someone is talking about something different. If the Germans with 100,000 men attack 200,000 Russians and the defenders lose as many men as the attackers (with reserves included, the center-attrition battles of Stalingrad and Kursk were minus-odds German attacks that failed, or rather led to simple exchanges), then German effectiveness is going to be on the moon, without it meaning total losses were different. If the Russians with 100,000 men attack the Germans with 30,000 and the losses are the same, then German effectiveness will be marginally better.

Because effectiveness measures everything -relative- to the odds ratio, and it assumes that defenders have a large edge. Its imputed effects of odds and attacking or defending, its "combat results table" (CRT), stands between actual losses and the effectiveness numbers. Notice, when the Germans do better in effectiveness terms when attacking, this is not merely an odds effect. But it may well involve a limitation of the induced "CRT".

What they actually did was seperated attack and defense factors and left them even for the Germans, while the Russians got higher defense factors than attack factors. Anyone who has played the genre of wargames knows what I am talking about. A German corps is a 4-4-4, and Russian army gets a 3-6-4, or whatever. Which means alone either will repulse the other, while three of either attacking one of the other will give a modest 2:1 "odds" attack. The Dupuy sort of effectiveness numbers are the backstage version of that familiar wargame story, or where the numbers are being estimated.

Now, it is very important to understand that the larger you go up the scale of military organizations, the less of an edge the defender has - the less defense can balance any existing odds ratio. The reason is the attritionist's version of maneuver, or simply putting more guys opposite one part of the front. 150 vs. 100 can be made 25 vs. 25 on 3 parts of the front, and 75 vs. 25 on one.

But scale matters for the ability to do that, for two reasons. One, the range of the support weapons (and for tactical level, even direct fire, but especially artillery at longer ranges) carries over from the areas not concentrated against, into the ones concentrated against. Two, reserves kept out of the initial fighting can top off the defenders in the needed spots and not in others, resulting in a more even odds ratio along the length of the front. This is much easier to pull off at the level of battalions than at the level of armies.

And this means any odds based CRT with a built in defender's edge, is relative to the game scale. Change the scale up or down one or two organizational levels, and the CRT will be flat wrong. I think some here (though I don't see this in your statements, kip) are trying to draw conclusions from C.E. numbers that simply don't follow from them, at all.

On the subject of PWs, it is not true that they only occur in big pockets through successful operational maneuver. That is one way, sure. But they also happen a company and a battalion at a time, when a force is locally outmatched, runs out of ammo, gets cut off tactically, or succumbs to firepower tactics. The western Allies combat histories are full of these incidents. "We came upon a defended village. We set up a base of fire. 13 battalions of artillery fired a time-on-target with 105, 155, and 8" shells for 20 minutes. 250 Germans were killed or wounded, and the rest of the battalion surrendered from their cellars when the infantry advanced". That is how firepower tactics play out. Some U.S. divisions captured their own numbers in single months this way, repeatedly. Without any large operational pocket. The -locally- mismatched odds of pursuits and rear guard fighting, produce such results.

Excluding PWs will never give a clear indication of combat effectiveness, because it will show plus-odds attacks resulting in less than lopsided losses. That is, suppose a Brit column or two battalions attacks a German company rear guard with 6:1 odds. The Germans lose 25%, one platoon, as combat losses and the other 75% surrender, overrun. The Brits lose one platoon as combat losses. The odds were 6:1. The real loss rate was 4:1 in the same direction as the odds. The combat losses alone were even. If you only look at the second, you will get a ridiculously high defender's CE number - "It takes 6:1 odds to expect even exchanges against these blighters". Nooo.

You give the Germans a 1.2 to 1.5 effectiveness so the attack is resolved at 5:1 or 4:1 "odds" (for 1.2 and 1.5 respectively), then put 1-2 "exchange" results out of 6 on the CRT in those odds columns. 3-4:1 German attacks (for 1.5 and 1.2 respectively) will do the same going the other way. Which will not change the basic fact, that if 6 of anybody hit 1, they will take lower losses not higher and the defenders will get wiped out.

This stuff is, incidentally, very simplistic by modern wargame design standards. I mean, I find it amazing that there continues to be such interest in how the combat factors for AH's old boardgames were arrived at. Nobody these days thinks such one-size fits all CRTs can work and give accurate results any more, on the old pattern. Nobody thinks the nature of the fighting in North Africa is adequately simulated by giving a German panzer regiment a "7", no matter how depleted in strength, and a Brit armored brigade a "4", and the same to an Italian armored division.

Today the paradigm everywhere is the TSS one, step losses and mutual fire-based "attack" results, sharply differentiated by "shooter" and target type. Even when old style CRTs are still used, they try for the same effect with seperate columns for "attacker result" and "defender result", step reductions, etc. The old notion that everything about attack vs. defense and this odds vs. that and unit qualities and differential capabilities, could all be rolled into 1-2 numbers for every unit, or even one number for a whole -nationality- - nobody believes such things anymore.

[ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[argie]

There is something I don't understand. If you take POWs in a strategical battle, those POWs could be more, and maybe a lot of them are from rear echelon, and the overall combat capability of the force is reduced (1 or 3 days later almost haven't importance in strategical context). If you take POWs in a tactical combat, seems like the POWs will likely be combat units, with a immediate affect on combat capability. In both cases, tactical and strategical, POWs seems relevant to me.

And Tero gave as example of taking cooks as prisoners a deep penetration n the rear to seize a bridge: if combat positions are bypassed in force, those positions are forced to redeploy, which affacts immediatelly their combat effectiveness (loss of terrain advantages, moving without safe logistical chain, etc), so those POWs are also relevant in some sense

[JasonC]

PzKfw I -

LOL. Those are the silliest figures on this subject I've ever seen. What, perhaps German military KIA vs. Russian civilian and military wounded or worse?

1941 - 18.1:1

1942 - 13.7:1

1943 - 10.4:1

1944 - 5.8:1

1945 - 4.6:1

Average between 10 and 10.5, depending on whether one weights by months or years.

The Germans took ~6.5 million military casualties in the east. Did the Russian military take 65-68 million? Not!

If you look at just KIA (even though leaving out MIAs is even sillier in the east than in the west, since far more of them are really KIA), those numbers would imply 21.2 million Russian military KIA. The actual figure is at most 1/3rd of that, and heaviest in 1941.

The Germans probably didn't get a 10:1 loss ratio even in 1941, let alone average over the whole war. They took 1 million casualties by the end of the battle of Moscow (Typhoon and Russian counterattack). It was certainly the only time they even got close. 2:1 from Kursk on is a more realistic figure - in fact near parity in 44 and 45 is quite possible - with something between 3 and 5 for the period between Moscow and Kursk, at best.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

[QB]PzKfw I -

LOL. Those are the silliest figures on this subject I've ever seen. What, perhaps German military KIA vs. Russian civilian and military wounded or worse?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I merely posted a small part of Sokolov's findings from the article. The ratio concerned only irreversible losses of military personel. Sokolov breaks down Soviet military IR losses by year as:

1941 - 5.5 million

1942 - 7.153 million

1943 - 6.965 million

1944 - 6.547 million

1945 - 2.534 million

Total military IR losses were 24.6 million & Civilion losses at 16.9 milliion. Below are

total German ground force losses on the Eastren Front with German losses on all fronts in ( )'s:

1942 - 519,000 (538,000)

1943 - 668,000 (793,000)

1944 - 1,129,000 (1,629,000)

1945 - 550,000 (1,250,000)*

*As of 01.04.45

Sokolov disagrees with the Krivosheev groups data in several areas, and I posted this as a counterpoint.

Regards, John Waters

[ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Jeff Duquette]

Great info John. Thanks for posting. Glantz goes on in depth regarding East Front casulty stats in "Clash of Titans". I'm at work at the moment but I will post (yet a third perspective ) on this controversy when I get home from the gulag.

Isn't Glantz one of the editors of "The Journal of Slavic Military Studies"

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Isn't Glantz one of the editors of "The Journal of Slavic Military Studies"

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes Jeff, Glantz was/is an editor for the JOSMS. Glantz also used Krivosheev's data in WTC, which wasthe 1st time it was ever used in english.

Also if anyone is interested in this you can do asearch for Sokolov & read my posts their isalso a good 1 IIRC on the areas where the Krivosheev groups & other Russian loss historians disagree etc.

Regards, John Waters

[ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Maastrictian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

On the subject of PWs, it is not true that they only occur in big pockets through successful operational maneuver. That is one way, sure. But they also happen a company and a battalion at a time, when a force is locally outmatched, runs out of ammo, gets cut off tactically, or succumbs to firepower tactics. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I never said that POWs "only" occur in big pockets. In fact, I said the exact oposite:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Maastrictian:

Most POWs are not the result of tactical actions but of strategic ones.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The operative word there is "most." Because of the way the fighting was directed on the west front (broad vs. narrow front) there were very few large scale envelopements. So most POWs taken were from tactical level actions. But there were (I contend) much fewer total POWs in such situations.

Consider (if the data even exists to do such a thing) the POWs taken by the western allies from June 6th to September 16th (from the normandy landings to the begning of Market Garden). Lets exclude any POWs taken from the Falaise (as I think we can all agree that this was a strategic envelopment). Take this number as a proportion of the total Germans engaged at this period of time.

Now lets look at Kursk, a similar sort of campaign (looking very generally). Again look at the whole of the campaign, assault *and* pursuit, until the line stabalised. (I don't know the east war anywhere near as well as the west so I can't give dates). Total the POWs the Russians took. Find the proportion of POWs to total Germans engaged.

My feeling (and I admit it is only a feeling) is that the Kursk proportion will be much larger than the western one.

Anyway, my point remains that most POWs are taken at the strategic level. The exception is western europe b/c the allies were not conducting the war in a way that would cause them to take many POWs. I never said that POWs were *only* taken by strategic actions.

--Chris

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

Sokolov breaks down Soviet military IR losses by year as:

1941 - 5.5 million

1942 - 7.153 million

1943 - 6.965 million

1944 - 6.547 million

1945 - 2.534 million

[ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have seen this before. Let me reiterate my counter points:

1) Sokolov numbers cannot be reconciled with Soviet population numbers. The Soviet losses are just too big. So Sokolov says that Soviet pre-war population count was wrong and real number was 20% higher that the official one. (Sounds like he is willing to do anything to prove his numbers)

2) I won't go through the math again but his numbers are mathematically imposible. They would mean that there were no combat-ready Soviet men by 1945.

3) I believe that he counts purely German losses vs Soviet. He does not take into account losses by all other Axis allies. Just like Stalingrad loss count the only number quoted is for german troops. 100,000 rumanias, 30000 italians and others are not counted.

4) By the September 1942 at least 40% of Soviet population was under german occupation. Therefore Soviets did not had huge amount of combat-able man in 1942 and 1943.

5) I find it hard to believe that 1941 was the year with least Soviet losses.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by killmore:

I have seen this before. Let me reiterate my counter points:

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes Killmore you have

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>2) I won't go through the math again but his numbers are mathematically imposible. They would mean that there were no combat-ready Soviet men by 1945.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't agree with that assessment to use another source as an example as of 1941 the Soviet male population was broke down as:

Under 20yrs old - 43.0 million

30 - 39 yrs - 31.5 million

40 - 59 yrs - 14.7 million

60 & up - 6.2 million

With an additional 23 million more males added from Poland, Bessarabia, Baltic states etc.

Compare that to Germany's 17.2 million males ages 19 - 45 as of Sept 1941. The Germans estimated the Soviets could feild & maintain 2.2 times the number of Divs as themselves, Ie, 469 Soviet vs 213 German Divs, basicly the Germans concluded the Soviet's would have over 6.2 million men compared to 3.4 million German. German reports are almost on the money, BUT not that close on Soviet manpower reserves.

An internal Soviet report compiled for mobilization estimated 46 million males 15 - 50 available for conscription as of mid 1941.

The Second Soviet report done in March 1942 estimated the Soviet male population as 47 million from 16 - 50yrs of age etc. That leaves what 16 - 19 million males to use as replacemenmts in 1942 alone. As well as the ability to maintain Front strength at almost 6 million effectives from 1943 on despite horrendous losses.

Regards, John Waters

[ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

Yes Killmore you have, & I replied to those in the other threads so i wont repeat them here .......

[ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yeah - I get engaged into those discussions. I really want to know the truth. :confused: Can I handle the truth?

But beyond that these numbers seem way inflated.

By the way German accounts (from Clark and another book) say they killed over 18.5 million in occupied areas - more than you were mentioning.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by killmore:

Yeah - I get engaged into those discussions. I really want to know the truth. :confused: Can I handle the truth?

But beyond that these numbers seem way inflated.

By the way German accounts (from Clark and another book) say they killed over 18.5 million in occupied areas - more than you were mentioning.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Whoops you posted while i was editing ....

Regards, John Waters

[Maastrictian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

Under 20yrs old - 43.0 million

30 - 39 yrs - 31.5 million

40 - 59 yrs - 14.7 million

60 & up - 6.2 million

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There were no Russians between the ages of 20 and 29?

--Chris

[Jeff Duquette]

All the 20 to 29 year olds left the country and headed to Canada to smoke pot, wear tie-dye, and listen to the rock'n'roll.

[Jeff Duquette]

This is from "When Titans Clash" by Glantz and House. I checked the numbers against Krivosheev and I think your right John, these are based upon "Soviet Casulties and Combat Losses" by Krivosheev.

[ 06-14-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Jeff Duquette]

In sheer material and human destructiveness the Russian campaign had no equal in World War II. The total German deaths, either as battle casualties or as prisoners of war, probably numbered about 3,500,000. Soviet losses were at least three times as great and may have gone much higher without even beginning to include deaths among the civilian population resulting from German or Soviet action. That Germany lost the campaign can be attributed primarily to its being forced into a conflict of mass against mass which far outran its industrial and human resources. Unable from the first to compete with the Russians in expending human life, the Germans were eventually crushed by the weight of Soviet arms. After 1941, Soviet war materiel production quickly overtook and surpassed that of Germany. Additionally, the USSR received lend-lease aid, mostly from the United States, valued at over $11 billion. Among the more significant items were 409,526 trucks, 12,161 tanks and self-propelled guns, 14,000 airplanes, and 325,784 tons of explosives. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was able to commit more than 90 percent of its military strength against Germany, while the Germans were forced to retain a large part of theirs (35 to 45 percent in the years 1943, 1944 1945) in other theaters.

Earl F. Ziemke

Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History

Department of the Army