Worst Military Commander of WWII?

[Wilhammer]

Yamamoto.

He threatened to resign if he did not get his way in prosecuting the war against the US, a children's act.

Despite the success of carriers, he insisted on having all carrier task forces being large escorted surface fleets. His method and thus that of the IJN was too have the surface ships finish the battle, with the A/C commiting attrition. Despite his own success, he refused to see that carrier aviation was the end all of surface combat.

To him, the CV was not a decisive weapon. He still believed in the Battleship.

Just one example of flawed thinking. AMOF, the entire Japanese method of the war was flawed.

Then, instead of reinforcing success, he wastes his carrier firce on the Great Ocean Adventure, the IJN carriier fleet sailing from the NW Pacific to Ceylon with strikes along the way.

Hardly the proper use of a decisive weapon.

Somehow, he reimnds me of McClellan.

[YECoyote]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Ah! If this is what he meant, then I am sorry. I read it as he was responsible for Pearl Harbor and had prior knowledge of the attack<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sorry I wasn't clearer. but that is exactly what I meant. There were also rumor that The Chief of Staff knew, before hand, that the Japanese was about to attack PH. They wanted to have a reason to enter the war.

The Brits definitely knew about the attack because they decrypted the code at Blechley (sp?) Park. But they didn't tell the US intelligence about it.

[scoop88]

Though not the worst commanders of WWII, you'd have to put Clark and Percival on the list. Clark could have walked his troops into Rome after they landed at Anzio, but decided to have them sit in a perimeter defense while the Germans frantically built up their forces, which the Germans were able to do and then tie down the forces in the beach head.

Percival did remarkably little to stop a Japanese force that was inferior in numbers from taking Singapore.

Paulus was not exactly a bright light bulb either. He paid dearly for not keeping a mobile reserve behind the front that could have blunted, or at least delayed, the Soviet offensive north and south of Stalingrad.

[YECoyote]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Herr Oberst:

Monty gets my vote, maybe not up there at the very top, but definitely in the running. An arrogant, pompous ass.

Yeah, Patton was arrogant and pompous ass too, but at least he knew it, and had good cause to be arrogant and pompous.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually, I find all the Allies' generals to be pompous asses. The exception was Omar Bradley.

[Enoch]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Actually, I find all the Allies' generals to be pompous asses. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think that is a bit of a generalization. I think many generals had large egos no matter what country they fought for. However, I can point to any number of American generals who seem like reasonable guys. Gen. Norman Cota, Gen. Terry Allen, Gen. Lucian Truscott. These are just names I'm pulling of the top of my head. Anyway, I do think that a general does need a certain bit of self-confidence to be a successful commander.

The suggestion of Mark Clark is a good one. He had an opportunity to break out early and failed to seize it. He also wasted many good lives in pointless frontal assaults against Monte Cassino.

[JasonC]

Um, it is not a rumor or a secret, and no they didn't know it was going to be at Pearl in particular. But the war department sent out a war warning in the last week of November, 2 weeks before the attack, saying that hostilities were imminent.

The idea that PH was a "bolt from the blue" is pure fantasy - no one has every maintained that it was, outside of comic books and revisionists peddling their wares, anyway.

The truth of the matter is the US simply underestimated Japanese military capability, and drastically so. War was expected, no one was certain where but Southeast Asia was the leading candidate. The Japanese had occupied Indochina recently, from the Vichy French. Troop convoys were seen leaving Shanghai, but later put in at Saigon.

What nobody expected was that the Japanese would manage to hit Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, Guam, the Philipines in half a dozen places, Hong Kong, Thailand (which quickly changed sides and joined them), and Malaysia (on the way to Singapore), all at the same time. PH and Mac alerted their commands for sabotage when they got the war warning, and Mac cancelled leaves and put the men on alert. Which did little. Readiness was still in the basement.

The pre-war plan expected the Japanese would try to seize the Philipines, as they did. It expected that the US navy would then lead a drive across the central pacific, making use of some island bases and thus needing small contigents of marines and engineers for support, to reopen supply to the Philipines. The Japanese navy might give battle there, or that might come later when the US fleet steamed into Japanese home waters. In any event, there would soon be a decisive surface naval action, akin to the ones that decided the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars, and the US expected to win it by bringing more battleships and through superior gunnery (including analog fire control "computers", etc).

The war plan thought all of the above would take around 6 months. They were off by a factor of 7. The Japanese, incidentally, also thought a decisive surface battle in their home waters would decide the war. But they hoped to reduce US battleship strength before then by the Pearl strike, "sniping" by torpedo-carrying G4M "Betty" bombers, submarines, and night torpedo attack by DD flotillas, before the final engagement. They then counted on the 2 secret super-battleships Yamato and Mushashi, with their 18 inch guns and 70,000 ton bulk, to turn the scales in their favor in the final surface battle. The Japanese rightly forecast that for six months they would "run riot", but afterward the US would have the strategic advantage.

In all of the above, what is clear is that the US simply underestimated the Japanese, and both sides underestimated the importance of the air power revolution for naval warfare. The reason the fleet could not steam across the Pacific in 6 months is that operating too close to enemy land based air, underreduced by friendly planes, was suicidal - as the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse to Japanese air attack off Malaysia showed at the outset of the war.

So first air bases had to be built on isolated islands with no infrastructure, and from them the Japanese air forces had to be defeated, and then new bases farther forward had to be seized, and new bases built, and the whole process repeated clear across the Pacific. Which is why it all took so much longer than the US had expected. This did fit the Japanese idea of "sniping", but they never got another battleship that way because of the methodical US advance.

The final "decisive surface engagement" actually did occur in the battle of Leyte Gulf, and resulted in a clear US victory. But by then US naval air power was so strong, the battleships were a side show to the affair. The key issues turned out to be the 100 new carriers (most of them small CVEs, but more than a dozen large ones) the US built during the war, and the thousands of naval aircraft they carried - an order of magnitude more than anything the Japanese could field.

But nobody knew such things in 1941, on either side. And both sides underestimated the other. The Japanese underestimated US willingness to fight, as well as tech and econ strengths of the US. The US underestimated - drastically - the efficiency and skill of the Japanese naval and air forces. Wars often result from such underestimates, so it is not exactly suprising when they and wars are found together.

But there most certainly was warning about imminent attack from Washington. War department cable number 472 on November 27 to the pacific Army commands, 1941 for example - here is what it said -

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five (the war plan) so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

The Navy message of the same day was even more explicit - its first sentence read "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning". General Short in Hawaii and Mac in the Philipines acknowledged receipt of the messages, Mac placed his troops on alert (for what good it did), and Short took precautions against sabotage.

Back in Washington, the Secs of War, State, and Navy agreed the Japanese were "planning some deviltry", and "Magic" intercepts (from the broken Japanese diplomatic code - the navy code was not yet cracked) confirmed they were holding off a reply in the failing negotiations while waiting for something to happen. They thought an attack was about to occur, but did not know where. All of this has been well known and well documented, undisputed history since the 1950s and 60s, with nothing new about it.

The idea that there was no warning is simply false. Not enough was done with what warning there was, because the Japanese were not expected to be capable of what they actually accomplished in the first few days. That is all. Revisionists have made a minor industry out of alleging otherwise, but almost always by avoiding the whole subject of the actual warnings given, and the long-since published documents, and memoires of the participants, that show warnings were given.

[Ex Bellator]

There was an instance where a large Italian motorised infantry column in the early desert war was menaced by some British armoured cars.

As they approached the commander gave the barely credible order for the infantry to dismount and then form square in the middle of a large open plain ready to receive the cars.

I wish I could recall the name of the guy, perhaps JasonC may know it. I'll check when I can but the 'battle' itself was a massacre as the cars simply drove up and down the square machinegunning it with impunity.

[s_e_avenger]

Mark Clark in the Liri Valley

[Wilhammer]

"The Brits definitely knew about the attack because they decrypted the code at Blechley (sp?) Park. But they didn't tell the US intelligence about it."

If this is true, then why no lawsuits?

Some enterprising lawyers could earn a nice stack with this tidbit.

[Wolfpack]

I've always had a bit of sympathy for Clark and any other general who's cursed with an incompetant higher command. First, he had to deal with Churchill who was a bit like Hitler in that he "knew" exactly what had to be done. His saving grace was that he was definitely the smaller fish among the Allies, so many times his suggestions could be overruled. Alexander had a bad habit of couching his orders in the form of suggestions rather than orders. Which tends not to be the best way to deliver an order...especially when your subordinate isn't the most initiave laden man on God's green earth. I don't think Clark was a great general by any stretch of the imagination, but he wasn't the worst either. As for not breaking out of the Anzio beachead...well, I'm not sure that would have been the wisest course anyway. Consider the flood of German reinforcements that came in to secure the line. Then consider the horrible consequences of having the beachead cut off and surrounded. Then consider the fact that the landing was done with the full knowledge that most of the landing craft were going to be shipped to England to prepare for Normandy within days. If Clark moves those forces in, thereby dispersing them, there's a decent chance that the German counterattack is more effective. As it was, about the only thing that saved the beachead was that it was packed into such a small space that they knew where the Germans would have to attack. I could be wrong of course, and I do tend to be a bit more cautious than most, but to have had the forces in Anzio destroyed because they had overreached thamselves would have been a disaster.

[CombinedArms]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Wolfpack:

I've always had a bit of sympathy for Clark and any other general who's cursed with an incompetant higher command. First, he had to deal with Churchill who was a bit like Hitler in that he "knew" exactly what had to be done. His saving grace was that he was definitely the smaller fish among the Allies, so many times his suggestions could be overruled.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Somebody who worked with Churchill said that "He has 100 ideas a day, all but three of them bad." One of the advantages Britain had, even before it Allied with the US, was that it's a democracy and Churchill didn't have absolute power, so he couldn't always implement his screwy ideas. And he had at least SOME respect for military professionals--like Alan Brooke-- so they could talk him out of things. Later, adding the US to the mix kept his screwy ideas even more in check (though Anzio was largely Churchill's baby--and typical of his addiction for under-supported amphibious flanking maneuvers). He did have some good ideas too, and, with a Chief of Staff and later the Combined Chiefs of Staff to keep him in line, his overall contribution to the war effort (mostly on the morale and moblization level) was vastly positive. But if Churchill had had absolute power, he might have been as destructive to his own forces as Hitler.

BTW, in starting all this, I forgot two of Hitler's greatest blunders as a military commander:

1. Attacking Russia!!!

2. Attempting to conquer the world without a serious Navy.

[bowman74]

How about not taking North Africa and the nearby oil supplies seriously enough to commit the forces nessesary to win that campaign? Hey who needs oil, lets attack Russia instead. I like two front wars, and besides I'm sure the Italians can handle that whole North Africa thing...

Thanks,

Kevin

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CombinedArms:

BTW, in starting all this, I forgot two of Hitler's greatest blunders as a military commander:

1. Attacking Russia!!!

2. Attempting to conquer the world without a serious Navy.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[Scipio]

I vote for Adolf.

As German I must say: thanx god.

I'm not so sure if I would be dressed fine in a black uniform

[moosehead]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by mensch:

Thats easy, ME!.. let me explain.

only to get shot by some cockey morons from Winnipeg... dammit.

who are now happly singing "God Save the Beer and Backbacon" pumping my lads full of pure canadian lead (otherwise known as canadian pennies now a days)

do i get a prize?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, but you did make me laugh, eh!

[Ezmartini]

I gotta vote for French leader de Gaulle. What kind of leader wussies up his military when he knows the Axis are bloodthirsty for imperialism?

Matt M.

De Oppresso Liber

[Blenheim]

OK, Grazianni is the maaaan. I never remember those names, actually. Good history, BTW, JasonC. Write a book or somefink .

Ah, guys, we forgot our beloved early war Blitzkrieg victims the Frenchies. Apart from the never too long Maginot Line (ops, it's not fair!!! Going through Belgium is gamey, you bad Germans !!!) we should remember all the missuse of the beautiful military equipments that France had. Those ubertanks, wasted....

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Ozawa. Weak and indecisive. Had multiple opportunities to decimate US carrier and naval forces in the Solomons in 1942 and failed miserably, thus allowing the pacific campaign to wrap up much faster than it would have.

[Mr. Johnson--]

JasonC, saying that the Americans underestimated the Japanese is quite a compliment. Billy Mitchell warned about a Japanese attack years before the attack. If the Americans choose to ignore him its for one of 2 reasons in my mind.

Racisim....or they knew the attack was coming and opened their doors for the IJN to come in unhindered.

[Aacooper]

For a six-year-long war, you have to make A LOT of mistakes to earn the title of worst commander. Graziani and other losers of one battles cannot get that title.

The winners:

1) Hitler -- of course. Everything he did after France fell was wrong (the otherwise "immaculate" Balkan invasion delayed Barbarossa). Germany's economy was not put on a war footing soon enough. No retreat. On the other hand, Hitler is easily the best up to that time -- bloodless coups of Austria and Czeckoslovakia, then Poland, Norway, Denmark, and he backed the Ardennes plan to attack France.

2) Montgomery - yes, Monty. Any general could have beaten the Germans at El Alamein, his sin was not catching Rommel in the long march across the desert. That setup the Tunisian battle, which slowed the Allied defeat of Germany. In Sicily, he moved too slow. In Italy, his insistance on going up the boot before the Salerno landings put the Germans on alert, and pulled German troops down to the Salerno area when the landings took place. In Normandy, he got nowhere. He couldn't close the Falaise Gap. Operation Market-Garden had the dual sins of ignoring intelligence about SS panzers in Arnhem, and depending on a single road. Not taking the sea passages to Antwerp forced another battle, and delayed the opening of the port (leading to Allied difficulties against the West Wall). In the Ardennes, he had negligable positive effect on the battle (read "A Time For Trumpets"), and wanted to delay the counterattack until February. In the Reichswald, I'll give him a pass because he faced most of the remaining coherent German forces and the groud was muddy. However, Operation Varsity could have been unnecessary if he didn't discourage the 9th Army from capturing a bridge across the Rhine. Once the British crossed the Rhine, they moved slowly, and continued to move slowly until the 82nd Airborne Div spurred them to hurry up and keep the Reds out of Denmark.

For some of the others named, I think Paulus gets an honorable mention. Clark and MacArthur are definitely not the worst, though they definitely are not as good as they thought they were. Clark's main problem was his pride, which interfered during the taking of Rome. Otherwise, his fundamentals were fairly sound. MacArthur make his mistakes, but wasn't the worst.

Lastly, various US organizations had warnings about Pearl Harbor, but remember, they also had a lot of other warnings about things that never happened. That's known as "noise", and seperating the noise from the useful intel is easiest after the fact.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by YECoyote:

Actually, I find all the Allies' generals to be pompous asses. The exception was Omar Bradley.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Can you even name a single Canadian general?

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Herr Oberst:

What, no mention thus far of that certain general who only won in Afrika because he waited until the numerical superiority tilted the battlefield such that my own grandmother could have led those forces to victory? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's the best way to win. Duh.

I am glad the rest of this thread didn't devolve into the same tired old Monty/Patton debate. Both were brilliant in their own right - and Monty's strength was as a trainer. Read about what he did while in command of South East Army; that was where his true talent was.

Interesting comments on Yamamoto. As for Graziani - he is not too well thought of, but of course, his subordinates were not that great either.

But the question for my fellow countrymen is - was Keller really Yeller?

I think Rommel is over-rated in some ways, but we have discussed all this before. He was certainly wrong with his defending on the beaches concept. Not that v. Runstedt had the energy to direct a mobile defence in Normandy (Rommel probably would have been good at that, actually.)

[ 06-26-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Vanir Ausf B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Blenheim:

Ah, guys, we forgot our beloved early war Blitzkrieg victims the Frenchies. Apart from the never too long Maginot Line (ops, it's not fair!!! Going through Belgium is gamey, you bad Germans !!!) we should remember all the missuse of the beautiful military equipments that France had. Those ubertanks, wasted....<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hey, that's a good one that hasn't been mentioned yet. What was the name of that French general that refused to believe the Germans could attack through the Ardennes until they were running amok behind his lines? I remember he had syphilis and resigned a couple of weeks into the offensive.

I don't think Hitler was the worst military leader, but his mistakes had the most profound effect because of their magnitude.

[ 06-26-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Aacooper:

2) Montgomery - yes, Monty. Any general could have beaten the Germans at El Alamein, his sin was not catching Rommel in the long march across the desert. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

How was that Montgomery's fault?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> That setup the Tunisian battle, which slowed the Allied defeat of Germany. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Americans NEEDED a training ground - they fought like **** at Kasserine. Every Omar Bradley thanked God that they had a chance to try out in the minor league of Africa before going to Normandy. Normandy might well have failed had they not gained experience in Italy and Africa.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> In Sicily, he moved too slow. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ever seen the terrain there? The Germans were fighting a fall back defence - they let the Americans take Palermo because they never intended to hold the island. The Allies were too dumb to realize it, unfortunately. But read about Agira or any of the other tough battles leading up to Etna. And tell me how the British and Canadians could have done better.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> In Italy, his insistance on going up the boot before the Salerno landings put the Germans on alert,[ and pulled German troops down to the Salerno area when the landings took place. In Normandy, he got nowhere. He couldn't close the Falaise Gap. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

He was using inexperienced formations; the ones that did have experience were worn out.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Operation Market-Garden had the dual sins of ignoring intelligence about SS panzers in Arnhem, and depending on a single road. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed, but it was an interesting gamble. Had XXX Corps moved faster (which again is not Monty's fault) things may have been different.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Not taking the sea passages to Antwerp forced another battle, and delayed the opening of the port (leading to Allied difficulties against the West Wall). <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed; mention of the name "Scheldt" drives a shiver up my spine.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In the Ardennes, he had negligable positive effect on the battle (read "A Time For Trumpets"), and wanted to delay the counterattack until February. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed; but I'm not sure this should reflect on his ability as a commander - the Ardennes wasn't really his show.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In the Reichswald, I'll give him a pass because he faced most of the remaining coherent German forces and the groud was muddy. However, Operation Varsity could have been unnecessary if he didn't discourage the 9th Army from capturing a bridge across the Rhine. Once the British crossed the Rhine, they moved slowly, and continued to move slowly until the 82nd Airborne Div spurred them to hurry up and keep the Reds out of Denmark.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You forget that the Brits were running out of men. Even the Canadians had adopted conscription by this time, and they were understandably wary of conserving their forces. I'm not so sure there is anything wrong with this.

[YECoyote]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Can you even name a single Canadian general?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have to admit, I don't know many. But Major-General Keller comes to mind.

[The Commissar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by kburns24:

Zhukov has to be up there as one of the worst commanders. After the Stalin purges, this idiot is given the reins? Stalin wouldn't have had nearly the amount of losses had he not killed his best military minds early in the war.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I just couldnt let this one go past.

ZHUKOV?! You mean the same guy who was the first general to ever use massive tank and infantry formations to "Blitz" through the enemy lines before the Germans got the gist of it, against Japanese held Manchuria?

The guy who was largely responcible for many a successful Soviet operation, which was the major contribution to the destruction of the German army?

The same guy who (although of course not singlehandedly) transformed the badly lead, equiped, and mis organized Soviet Army of the mid to late 30's into perhaps the most powerful force at the war's end?

Yes, I realise he had his share of failures. Operation Mars probably taking the cake for his worst blunder. However, when you fight a war this long and against such a foe with such eqipment as was available, it is a miracle he did as well as he had. If you wish to pick on Soviet generals, there are plenty incompetant ones to be found (although most are at a lower level then the Generals, I believe). Zhukov, in my not so humble opinion, does not deserve to be among them. If anything, he should go up as a "military great".

Its unfortunate how the Cold War resulted in undermining the actual performance of the men who won the war in the East, in eyes of the historians.