What did a German column face in the Ardennes?

[JasonC]

On several recent threads, there has been some discussion of causes of loss of German tanks, with some putting everything down to air, others to lack of fuel, some saying tanks were mostly abandoned instead of KOed, and the like.

I think such claims are often false and even where true are usually misleading, especially to those without a detailed knowledge of unit histories. Not because "abandonment" wasn't a leading cause, or fuel a cause of abandonment, or air a cause of shortages of fuel - all are half truths.

But they don't give a concrete picture of what German tankers were up against, and what sorts of operational or tactical situations could lead to abandonments. I think another fellow was much closer to the truth in a comment in the "Kursk" thread, about the difficulty of anything like operational breakthrough against the prepared and mobile opponents actually faced from mid-war on.

Instead I offer one case, from the Ardennes, of the sort of obstacles a German armored force faced in its changing fortunes, from successful break-in to ultimate defeat. All of the following occurred to one unit, in the course of just a week's fighting. Think of each in CM terms and you will get some sense of the real processes leading to final notations of "abandoned" beside some tanks on the rolls.

AT mines on the road, covered by 3x57mm ATGs

1 TD and a few Shermans

AT mines on the road

Village position with 4x76mm AT, 3x57mm AT, and 4x40mm AA

124,000 gallons of burning gasoline in an anti-tank trench

Engineers with 1x57mm AT, 8xBazooka, Daisy Chain AT mines

Blown bridge

12 Fighter Bombers

Blown bridge

Bridges too weak to carry a heavy tank (later collapses under the weight of a StuG)

Battalion ambush with 4xM10 TD, 5xSherman, 6x105mm, 3x57mm, many zooks and MGs

4x76mm AT firing from ambush on a ridge

60 Fighter Bombers

Night infantry action in a village

Tank-infantry counterattack, company strength in each arm

3000 rounds 105mm HE vs. infantry escorts

Bridge blown behind the column

Battalion village position with 2x90mm AA, 8x76mm AT, 3x57mm AT, 10xSherman

Roadblocks around hairpin curves with registered artillery

Tank-Infantry counterattack, company strength in each arm

Full tank battalion cuts last supply route

Infantry probes off road, along high ground

Tank-Armored Infantry counterattacks down the roads (several, each company strength)

Rolling barrage of 105mm HE, infantry astride a road, tank company along it

Short artillery prep then night infantry assault, in fog

Friendly night counterattacks meet concentrated artillery fire

Night attack by paratroop infantry

Tank-infantry probes at edges of position

Sustained artillery harassment, for hours, by two artillery battalions

Daylight infantry attack pushing bazooka teams close

Night infantry stealth attack on a village, grenade duels house to house

Night flank marches around village positions, to cut roads between them

Concentric infantry attack along wooded ridgelines, reduced to one village

Incessant artillery shelling drives men into the cellars

Infantry probes through woods to edge of village

Friendly probes outward in all directions meet massive artillery fire

With 28 running tanks left but no fuel, vehicles abandoned, wounded left behind

Crews make a break for the rear at night on foot, evading patrols

Short firefight crossing second set of US infantry lines

Finally reach friendly territory again

[ 11-09-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]</p>

[Gyrene]

Nice post Jason.

Who'd a'thunk? The Allies seemed to know how to fight after all, I was really under the impression that they were all bumbling fools, the Americans specially.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> With 28 running tanks left but no fuel, vehicles abandoned, wounded left behind <hr></blockquote>

That's some screwed up priorities.

What sized force was this, btw?

Gyrene

[tabpub]

It's Piepers Kampfgruppe if I'm not mistaken. The narrative sounds like what he faced from the beginning near Stavelot to the end near Stoumont, I believe.

[PiggDogg]

Does sound like Pieper & friends. It is not nice to fight Uncle Sam when Sam is armed & ready. Ouch. :eek:

No wonder and not unexpectedly did the Germans lose at the Bulge. Indeed, after having played many board & a few computer wargames covering the Bulge, one realizes that, once the US applied its force properly, the Germans had no chance of success at the Bulge. :eek:

Cheers, Richard

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Richard Cuccia, the PiggDogg:

Indeed, after having played many board & a few computer wargames covering the Bulge, one realizes that, once the US applied its force properly, the Germans had no chance of success at the Bulge. <hr></blockquote>

Except that of course on the northern flank, it was Monty applying US forces properly That was also where two British divisions (6th Para and 51st Highland I believe) and one armoured Brigade were active.

[Ex Bellator]

Erm, I don't quite get the point of this thread. Am I actually supposed to be either admiring or feeling sorry for Nazi fanatics or have I missed something as usual :confused:

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Rex_Bellator:

Erm, I don't quite get the point of this thread. Am I actually supposed to be either admiring or feeling sorry for Nazi fanatics or have I missed something as usual :confused: <hr></blockquote>

Well, I have gotten ideas for about half a dozen scenarios from the list. So it had some use for me.

[newlife]

Jason,

You wouldn't happen to know any losses from each encounter? It would be interesting to know how many vehicles each of those actions took out.

[Hakko Ichiu]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Well, I have gotten ideas for about half a dozen scenarios from the list. So it had some use for me.<hr></blockquote>

I look forward to playing your interpretation of 3000 rounds 105mm HE against infantry. Should be a blast.

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Hakko Ichiu:

I look forward to playing your interpretation of 3000 rounds 105mm HE against infantry. Should be a blast.<hr></blockquote>

Yeah, that one and the one with lots of burning fuel, look for it at Der Kessel soon. Anyone who looked at 'To the last man' or 'Trun' will know that I am a pyromaniac at hear.

[Enoch]

I've been reading "A Time for Trumpets" over the last few weeks and one thing that really struck me was the amount of gun damage American Tankers seemed to inflict on their German opponents. I know there was a thread recently where this topic came up and some thought gun damage occured too often. There are several passages where MacDonald details the types of damage Americans were inflicting on German tanks. The ends of gun barrels blown off, gun sights damaged, traverse mechanisms fouled.

Just on e of many interesting tidbits contained in that book.

[CombinedArms]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Hakko Ichiu:

I look forward to playing your interpretation of 3000 rounds 105mm HE against infantry. Should be a blast.<hr></blockquote>

Well, we never actually see that in CM because it would lead to scenarios that were "unbalanced". You also never see airstrikes by 12 fighter-bombers (if you did, we'd have fewer complaints about air support not hitting anything.)

This, of course, explains why the US forces often have trouble winning in CM. They're deprived of two of their chief advantages: 1) massive and accurate artillery support; 2) intensive air support. So, in a search for balance, we create situations that are, arguably, both unbalanced and unrealistic.

If I recall, it was really the massive artillery that had built up around his bottled up troops, combined with the absence of fuel, that caused Peiper to abandon his 45 tanks and flee overland. For one thing, a concealed 155mm SP gun (not modeled for Allies in CM) was on high ground, blasting the heck out of the village he was holed up in. And by this time the US forces had entrenched infantry, AT guns, and tanks embedded in all of his possible lines of advance and retreat. Ultimately, the US forces didn't have to charge in and face all of Peiper's KTs and Panthers. They simply surrounded him and starved and blasted him out.

But, as Jason C suggests, they first had to blunt his various attempts to push forward with his whole force, often with small, scratch groups of infantry, engineers, zooks and AT guns. In most of those battles, Pieper would have the superior force, but he'd lose, say, three Panthers and experience delay, and the Allies would blow another bridge or two. Gradually, his force suffered serious attrition and was squeezed into a narrow thread of road along a winding river valley.

[Holien]

I strongly Recommend Trun,

But then again I could be after a free beer...

H

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Holien:

I strongly Recommend Trun,

But then again I could be after a free beer...

H<hr></blockquote>

Whoever said I was above bribing people?

[-Havermeyer-]

Deleted a silly post attributing all German losses to the acts of a few brave Finns. On skis. Even in Normandy. In June.

[ 11-09-2001: Message edited by: -Havermeyer- ]</p>

[Feldgrau]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

...

Bridges too weak to carry a heavy tank (later collapses under the weight of a StuG)...

[ 11-09-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]<hr></blockquote>

This is a minor niggle, but if this IS in regards to KG Peiper, and this reference is to the blown bridge near Staumont / La Glieze (can't remember the exact village), then I believe that this was a JgdPanzer IV which collapsed the bridge, not a StuG. I am basing this strictly off of memory of a picture I saw in a book about the 251'st Combat Engineer's defense against KG Peiper....

If I am mistaken, then I stand to be corrected....

Otherwise, I agree with the body of Jason's comments, as usual.

Regards,

MSP

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>On several recent threads, there has been some discussion of causes of loss of German tanks, with some putting everything down to air, others to lack of fuel, some saying tanks were mostly abandoned instead of KOed, and the like.

I think such claims are often false and even where true are usually misleading, especially to those without a detailed knowledge of unit histories. Not because "abandonment" wasn't a leading cause, or fuel a cause of abandonment, or air a cause of shortages of fuel - all are half truths.<hr></blockquote>

Is it just me or does the contention and conclusion seem to be detached from the "evidence". There is very little information regarding AFV casualties.

• What were the numbers of AFV's knocked-out by tank or anti-tank gunfire?
• Number of AFV's knocked-out by mines?
• Number of AFV's knocked-out during air attacks?
• Number of AFV's knocked-out by artillery fire?
• Number of AFV's knocked-out by bazooka fire?
  

There is only one statement toward the end of the post regarding any casualty numbers, and it suggests only that some folks abandoned their vehicles due to lack of fuel "With 28 running tanks left but no fuel, vehicles abandoned,"…

Is the point simply that most German vehicle casualties were due to abandonment from lack of fuel?

What German Panzer Unit is being referred to? What are the exact dates covered in the blurb provided? What was the original reference for the blurb cited? Surely this isn't another internet quote is it?

[ 11-09-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[JasonC]

Between 1/3 and 1/2 of the actions mentioned were directed mainly at the column's infantry (artillery, night infantry attacks, off road infantry probes, etc). The 1/2 to 2/3 that involved loss of armor generally lead to 2-3 tank losses apiece, with the highest on one occasion being 8 tanks lost. Other vehicles were sometimes lost 10-20 at a time, but more often around 5 at a time. By the end, 70% of the initial tanks were KOed (before the breakout on foot decision - see below for where I get that figure). As you can see, the tank losses came little by little. The road net limited the forces that could engage at any given point in space and time. Sometimes the column was spread over 15 miles, front to back.

Personnel losses were higher before the decision to withdraw, as a percentage of the force, with only about one man in seven reaching German lines again. Most that made the breakout attempt made it. Of course none of the vehicles or artillery did. And yes, I am talking about KG Peiper of course. The end was in Gleize, not Stoumont, however. (Stoumont was the second to last village held).

There are various estimates of the strength of KG Peiper, and much confusion in the accounts. Many put the whole SS sPzAbt-501 with his column, for instance, when losses clearly prove that only one company was with him. Many retellers of the tale confuse US ATGs encountered with armored and self-propelled tank destroyers, simply because the contemporary term, "tank destroyer", was used for the towed item as well as the armored SP one. Etc.

My own best estimate of KG Peiper's initial tank strength is around 90. 14 King Tigers, 40 Panthers, and 36 Pz IVs. Those were 1/Co SS-sPzAbt 501; and 1,2 Co (Panther) 6,7 Co (Pz IV) from 1st SS Pz Div. armor, plus staff from the Panther battalion, and from the regiment.

He also had large numbers of supplimental SP weapons and light armor, however. 18 Wespe, 6 "Cricket" (SP 150mm sIG), 12-18 75mm halftracks, a dozen 81mm halftracks, around 20 20mm Quad AA (a few Wirblewind from the Pz Regiment, most Skdfz 7/1 Flakwagens from an attached light Flak battalion), a few SP 88mm Flak (not Nashorns, 88mm Flak mounted on Sdkfz vehicles), up to 40 armored cars or 20mm halftracks (from 1SS Recce), and around 100 plain MG halftracks. Roughly, 100 apiece of tanks, gun-armed self-propelled this or that, and MG halftracks.

His infantry strength was the equivalent of 3 battalions - 1 armored Pz Gdr in SPWs, 2/3rds armored panzergrenadier from the recce battalion plus their Hvy Wpns likewise mounted, 1/3rd armored pioneers ditto, and 1 battalion of Fallschirmjaegers riding the tanks (picked up from the unit he passed through at the point of penetration). He was understrength in artillery, with only the one Wespe battalion (and some mortars) and those with limited ammo, since little reached him after his breakthrough and less after he was cut off. He was soon out of range of supporting guns from farther back German territory. But he had plenty of direct fire weapons, AA and HE chuckers as well as the tanks.

Half the KTs may have been left at the end, perhaps only a couple, and only about 1/4 of the other types were left. The Panthers lost particularly heavily, because they were called on for some of the hardest duties (unlike the Pz IVs) but not as tough as the KTs under fire. Panthers led the column until a 57mm KOed one from the side at one ambush/roadblock, and after that KTs often had the point. They were no less vunerable to mines blowing out their tracks than the other types, though, so there was a downside to that switch.

The total armor committed against him outnumbered his initial tanks about 3:2 by the end - about 2 battalions of Shermans and 1 of armored TDs. Initially he encountered only a handful of tanks at a time, then most of a company, and by the end multiple companies from several directions. But these were unable to deploy, because his superior tanks successfully blocked the limited road net, once he was on the defensive. Thus the heavy role of infantry movement off-road, and infantry-artillery cooperation, toward the end of the list of actions.

The artillery weight against him was 3 to 1 from about the third day, then 5-6 to 1, and by the end 10 times what he'd started with, after his own artillery was gone. It was better supplied too, with as mentioned up to 3000 rounds expended on single occasions, sometimes. Imagine 8 105mm FOs firing at once (wide sheaf but overlapping), continually for 30 turns, in CM. The infantry odds reached 3 to 1 against him - it would have been 5 to 1, but some of them had to face about to block efforts to cut a way to him again.

One fellow asked what the point of the post was, whether he was supposed to think A or to think B. He may think what he likes. Facts exists as trees exists, and "you can sit in the shade, you can pick bananas, you can chop firewood, you can do as you jolly well please." (Pound) If you haven't been exposed to countless forms of distortion and misleading half-truth, it may not seem an antidote to anything. If on the other hand you've heard endlessly that only "blown bridges, fuel shortages, and air power" had anything to do with the defeat of the Ardennes Offensive, you might learn something. And as another fellow mentioned, there are a dozen fine CM scenarios waiting in that list.

[JasonC]

"AFV's knocked-out by tank or anti-tank gunfire?"

About half of the losses, meaning around 30, with 1-6 lost this way on each of a dozen occasions. On one occasion it was 6, on another it was 4, the rest 1-3 apiece.

"AFV's knocked-out by mines?"

About half a dozen. Mostly mines forces the column to turn (if defended), or causes delay for a few hours (if uncovered and thus removable by engineers). But sometimes the lead tank or two were immobilized and abdandoned, or KOed.

"AFV's knocked-out during air attacks?"

Air attacks got 15-20 vehicles (light armor) but only a handful of actual tanks - less than 10 and perhaps as few as 5. The largest occasion did force 10 tanks to run to woods cover, which helped secure a village behind the column.

"AFV's knocked-out by artillery fire?"

Only about 10, based on the other causes of loss. It might be even lower, with unrecoverable mechanical breakdowns making up the difference.

"AFV's knocked-out by bazooka fire?"

Less than 10, with 2 by this cause in a single fight the best score, and only a handful of successful occasions.

[Redwolf]

Why did they give Peiper the King Tigers? I always wondered about that.

The point about the Ardennes offensive happening in the Ardennes was to strike were the resistence is lowest, at the cost of extremly difficult terrain.

And difficult terrain meant very difficult:

- Bad roads in bad weather in November, snow to be expected, but hardly frozen ground not as likely

- Villages so narrow that big tanks need several attempts to drive through. Or tanks with long guns can't turn between the houses and trees

Ok, if you run into an ambush, you will most likely loose a tank with thin side armour, but putting a KT at the front doesn't really solve the problem. Besides the mines you name, it also slows the column down, you loose a very valuable tank if you run into a swamp and you loose a lot fo fuel and even more time when the head of the column misses its way.

But generally the most dangerous opponents, the only ones were a King Tiger is actually better than a Panther, would be M10s and towed 76mm guns. And even then, an ambush by these that goes to the sides kills a King Tiger as well as anything else. Leading with King Tiger would in fact do exactly the kind of blunder that Steve says is the reason why CMBO players loose King Tigers

The additional requirements of the terrain and time don't look too promising either:

- fuel shortage: the KT is as bad as it gets

- general transport shortage: you can probably carry two or three Panther or PZ IV rounds for each 88 round. More rounds for the 150mmm infantry gun vehicles would be a better use of the room to get HE

So why King Tigers? And not a few Hummels or Brummbaers? Or Panthers for that matter.

The only reasonable explanation I came up so far is that the division had nothing else they didn't need as badly for the other formations and that they were not willing or not allowed to take formations from other units.

[JasonC]

They sent the heavy tanks with the lead spearheads to help them fight through whatever they encountered, of course. Each of the two Panzer Armee sized thrusts had a single Tiger battalion attached. These were then parcelled out in company strength to individual divisions, and Peiper got the 1SS company, since he was leading the way for the whole division.

They weren't up front for the initial breakthrough, Panthers were. That helped somewhat with the early mined roads. The obvious reason the Panthers led is because their front armor was enough to defeat short 75mm Sherman guns, 57mm ATGs, and bazookas, which were the most common US AT weapons in the whole sector.

But the Panthers were vunerable to all three of those from the side. Once the US roadblocks learned to wait until the German tanks came abreast, at close range, before opening up, they KOed lead Panthers relatively easily. After losing one to a 57mm ATG manned by engineers, the Germans put a platoon of King Tigers up front. The King Tiger was not vunerable to zooks or 57mm from the side, and with any side angle to speak of, the 75mm wasn't likely to get it either.

The Sherman was the largest (and loudest) of the three common AT shooter and thus the least likely to remain undetected until the German tanks were right alongside. It was also less common than bazookas and 57mm ATGs, which were present in every infantry formation, and in every battalion sized formation, respectively. So by putting the KTs up front, the Germans reduced the likelihood of losing the lead tank to AT ambush.

When they attacked town positions held by larger forces, so that it was necessary to deploy rather than just punching down the road single file, they used a mix of KTs and Panthers to lead their attacks. Most of the tanks would remain back and suppress with direct fire. Then a few Panthers, or those and KTs, would rush the area, sometimes with infantry riding them, sometimes not. If they established a foothold inside a town, the infantry would enter there, and establish a perimeter around them. Then the tanks could shoot the infantry into the next house or block easily enough. They lost a number of tanks doing this, to side shots by zooks or ATGs, and some to 90mm AA (Panther turret fronts, or KT sides).

Note that half the motivation for this use of KTs is absent from CM today, for the modeling reasons being discussed in another thread (are KTs modeled correctly?). In CM, a short range side shot by either a 57mm ATG (not British, not APDS) or a bazooka, can routinely KO a King Tiger. That was not the case in the real deal. If you look at the penetration numbers, you will see both depend in CM on the 90% armor quality rating of the King Tiger's side armor (80mm at around 30 degrees will stop a zook round or 57mm AP, but 80mm x .90 quality = 72mm, at the same angle, stops neither).

[ 11-09-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]</p>

[Redwolf]

Forgive me pressing the point. What you said is clear to me. The Tiger is a breakthrough tank, it was made because "real" tanks would be too vulnerable when pushing into known opposition.

However, was it worth it?

How much better is the chance of the KT surviving the ambush? High, but not overwhelmingly high.

How much chance is there that a lead KT bogs down where a Pz IV driver could still say, ups, "that feels swampy, get back and warn the others"?

How much damage is caused to the progress of the column if a King Tiger blocks a road due to breakdown or knockout?

How much faster would the column be without KTs, anyway?

How many smaller tanks can you take with you for the explicit purpose of leading into possible ambushes? How much fuel does the lead force consume over the whole march, assuming a high number are knocked out? I would guess less than the KTs.

How much combat value is lost with each KT? How much fuel is left behind in an abadoned KT?

I imagine the following scenario: Forget about the King Tigers in the lead formations. Give them some more Wespes (or Hummels if you have them) and foremost, more trucks with fuel and ammo, even better would be armoured ammunition carriers.

Then, assign the King Tigers the task to counterattack forces that try to cut off your lead columns. Or to let the Allies close a ring and then cut off the ring between two points. Force the Americans to either commit further reserves to rescue the first reserve or face substancial losses of armour when continuing to chase the lead column. The King Tigers would be ideal for that, especially if the lead force would have left observers with radios to direct them.

It is unlikely that the Americans would have taken that bait, but Montgomery might have. Or if you don't like Monty-bashing, there is a reasonable chance that one of the two commanding instances could be caused to throw less forces on the lead column.

BTW, where did the KTs took the lead?

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by redwolf:

I imagine the following scenario: Forget about the King Tigers in the lead formations. Give them some more Wespes (or Hummels if you have them) and foremost, more trucks with fuel and ammo, even better would be armoured ammunition carriers.<hr></blockquote>

You are kidding, right? If not, you should know that despite the abuse the Wespe and Hummel experience at the hands of CMBO players, they were artillery pieces, and not assault guns. The only reason they were lightly armoured was protection against counter battery, and the only reason they were tracked was so that they could keep up with their division. Had a German Panzer divisional commander put together a column the way you describe, he would have been relieved because of insanity. Putting the divisional 150mm artillery in the lead of an attack, great plan.

Monty would have seized it and bashed the living daylights out of whoever came up with that.

[Redwolf]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Germanboy:

You are kidding, right? If not, you should know that despite the abuse the Wespe and Hummel experience at the hands of CMBO players, they were artillery pieces, and not assault guns.

<hr></blockquote>

Hey, easy.

In fact I meant they should be given to the KG as indirect-fire artillery. As they already had with the Wespes, but too little. The lack of artillery (own or from main force body) was a key problem. Giving them more artillery on their own might have been more useful than giving them the Tigers.

I never choose Wespe or Hummel in Quickbattles, but I love my 2" mortars when the opponent does...

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by redwolf:

Hey, easy.

In fact I meant they should be given to the KG as indirect-fire artillery. As they already had with the Wespes, but too little. The lack of artillery (own or from main force body) was a key problem. Giving them more artillery on their own might have been more useful than giving them the Tigers.

I never choose Wespe or Hummel in Quickbattles, but I love my 2" mortars when the opponent does...<hr></blockquote>

Ah right, my apologies.

Yes, more artillery may well have helped them getting past a hasty roadblock. Having said that, they were not the only ones who had problems when they outran their artillery support. Happened to the Red Army too. Just goes to show how important artillery was on the WW2 battlefield.