What did a German column face in the Ardennes?

[JasonC]

Redwolf asked "How much better is the chance of the KT surviving the ambush?"

Much, because the chances of a Panther surviving were minimal, if the ambush was sprung only once the tanks were broadside to the ambushers. A high chance of surviving, with some chance of being immobilized, was distinctly better for point morale than the likelihood that the lead tank would be knocked out.

And it was more than morale at stake. The roads were narrow. A wreck in the middle of the road, ahead of the column, could mean delay for an hour. At Trois Ponts, the interval between the time a lone 57mm ATG KOed the lead Panther and the time the road was reopened, was all the time the engineers needed to blow both bridges and withdraw to the far bank. It was after Trois Ponts that the King Tigers were put in the lead. They obviously had a better chance of seizing a bridge by a coup de main, running ambush "blocks" and in time, than weak sided Panthers did. A Panther would block the road just as thoroughly if KOed, and was more likely to be KOed.

As for bogging, of course the KT is much heavier, but its ground pressure is only modestly higher than Panthers and Pz IVs. It has about the same floation as a narrow tracked (pre-HVSS) Sherman. Its gas milage is only about 25% worse than a Panthers. With the mix Peiper had, the KTs drank a fifth of the gas of his tank force, while the more numerous Panthers drank almost half and the lighter Pz IVs about a third. As for speed, on the unimproved roads they were crossing, they generally went only about 10 mph regardless - cross country speeds. And the late model Pz IVs were not significantly faster than KTs, because they had been unarmored so much over the years but still had the old engine size.

There was one serious issue where the KT's weight was a drawback - the weight load of bridges. Not many bridges could carry 70 tons, and the US engineers were merrily blowing up the ones that could. There weren't a whole lot of bridges that could carry a 45 ton Panther but not a 70 ton KT, but there were some. A less serious but real problem of the same type, was simply how much the tracks churned muddy, unimproved roads, for the follow-on vehicles, especially the halftracks and trucks with the column. In some places Peiper's tanks were in mud nearly up to their decks, -on- the "road". I call this a less serious problem because more Panthers would have caused nearly the same trouble - it fundamentally stemmed from trying to move 300 armored vehicles over a few narrow, unimproved roads, not from the make of tanks involved.

As for leaving behind fuel, if it wasn't burning the Germans did not leave more than drops. They siphoned from their own vehicles, and from knocked out American ones. If the ground it was on was lost or it did burn, it might mean 100 gallons (the tanks weren't full, of course). Which wasn't enough to move the column a single kilometer. 14 tanks just aren't that big a portion of a 300 vehicle column. And it was actually more than that - that was just the armed or armored ones - he also had trucks for HQ and supplies, etc.

As for the idea of leaving them back to punch holes to him once he got cut off, of course getting cut off was never part of the plan to begin with. The failure of other forces to keep up with him and keep the road to him open is a sorry one - of operational failures, missed assignments, complete confusion about where one's own formations were, let alone those of the enemy, complacency about risks, half measures at recovery - all around, too little and too late.

To understand how bad it was operationally, you have to realize he thought he had an entire German panzer division on his right, that simply wasn't there. He thought 5 infantry battalions of his own division were right behind him, moving down parallel roads, when in fact there was a gap miles wide between his tail and their van. He thought the rest of 3rd FJ division (besides the battalion riding his tanks) was mopping up the hole he had torn, when they were diverted south to block American relief forces sent to help St. Vith. He thought all three divisions were bringing up their guns, when in fact his own Wespe battalion was the only German artillery formation within 20 miles.

But interestingly enough, his own KTs did have a role in holding the road to the rear open too, but they failed. He left a platoon of 4 KTs to help some of his infantry hold one particular village at the rear of his column. 4 US 76mm towed TDs crept onto a wooded ridge with a view of the town from above. They bagged the KTs when they eventually were ready and opened up, and then US infantry attacked the town. The Germans sent 10 tanks to stop them, from farther up the column, and they were doing a decent job of it. Until Tac Air showed up in force, and the tanks had to run for cover, with several lost. With the tanks withdrawn, the infantry fight proceeded on American terms, with numbers and artillery support on their side. They kept the village, and it formed part of the ring blocking resupply to the column.

So they weren't a panacea in the role of holding open the road. They proved quite useful in the defensive phase, when he was surrounded and the Americans were pressing in with tank infantry teams from all sides. There the limited road net worked in reverse, since he wasn't trying to move anymore. The few lanes tanks could move along, he could block with heavy tanks that the Americans could not take on directly.

Overall, they helped with several aspects of the fighting, but proved distinctly less than decisive. Which was part of the point of the whole thread. Operational considerations and overall forces engaged had a lot more to do with success and failure than the quality of his tanks.

The general point about holding the armor for counterblows has merit on a wider scope, though. The thing is, launching the Ardennes Offensive in the first place was the direct repudiation of that idea as a proper use of armor. If they planned to use it that way, it might indeed have gone a lot farther - but there wouldn't have been an offensive to begin with.

On the planning for the operation as a whole, there was an unreality to it. They had full TOE in tanks and guns, excellent items in fine shape. The manpower was mostly brought up to strength (a few exceptions), though getting there involved putting many former Luftwaffe and Navy personnel in the line, and many teenagers. The weapons were fine and the personnel was mostly there.

But the operational frontage had been planned for about 1/3rd more divisions than they actually had for the assault, because they were playing "let's pretend" about what was really available and at what strength. Only 1/4 of the forecast artillery ammo consumption for the first 10 days had been accumulated. And they started with about 1/4 of the gas the operational planners expected they'd need. This was not the first time German commanders had started attacks with the idea of supplying entire Panzer corps with captured fuel. But about the only time that ever worked was for Rommel in Libya. It certainly didn't work in the Ardennes.

It is easy to "correct" such mistakes in retrospect - except, when you are done with all the corrections, the Germans don't attack at all. The whole thing was a gamble, on a shoestring. That is failed is no surprise. Exactly -how- it failed, however, remains an interesting question - the one this thread has been about.

[Redwolf]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

It is easy to "correct" such mistakes in retrospect - except, when you are done with all the corrections, the Germans don't attack at all. The whole thing was a gamble, on a shoestring. That is failed is no surprise. Exactly -how- it failed, however, remains an interesting question - the one this thread has been about.<hr></blockquote>

I agree. The whole thread only make sense if we agree what should have been accomplished.

The only goal making sense for a military discussion is that of reaching Antwerp somehow with a non-cut off force of any kind. Disregarding what happens then, as politics take over.

I forgot that the Panther is a fuel hog as well, the KT certainly carries as much if not more combat power for the same fuel. Maybe they should have used captured T-34...

[Redwolf]

Looking over the Agte's Wittman book and the history of 12th SS for the first Bulge days, I feel more confirmed in my "no King Tigers for Peiper" opinion.

The mentions of King Tigers actually deflecting infantry, guns or tank fire are rare.

On the other hand, the attack on Rochterath-Krinkelt on Dec 18 1944, is desribben as "a perfect tank grave', with heavy losses to Panthers and Panzer IV, from Pak and Sherman fire.

Holding the heavy tanks back to strike at US armoured reserves seems more sensible to me. At the time in the war, the Americans already showed that they were willing to use armoured reserves at rather "indirect" places, not striking directly at intruders, but destroying something else more vital and less teethy. It would have been a safe assumption that a heavy tank battalion concentrated near the start line of the offensive would have found valuable targets, like in Rochterath-Krinkelt, where the Germans lost the fast tanks instead.

On the other hand, KG Peiper was unbalanced. It still had enourmous firepower when mobility and completeness of arms were long gone.

BTW, the 12. SS PZ book also has descriptions of Panzerjaeger Abteilungen (JPz IV) on the attack.

[109 Gustav]

Jason, are 57mm ATGs more effective in CM because they're overmodeled or because the KT is undermodeled?

I vaugely recall somebody saying British tankers sometimes kept using 57mm armed Churchillls (or was it cromwells?) because they had better penetration than the short 75 variants. If this was true, and if the short 75 could penetrate the KT's side as you said, then what was the problem with the 57mms fired from ambush?

[Redwolf]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by 109 Gustav:

Jason, are 57mm ATGs more effective in CM because they're overmodeled or because the KT is undermodeled?

I vaugely recall somebody saying British tankers sometimes kept using 57mm armed Churchillls (or was it cromwells?) because they had better penetration than the short 75 variants. If this was true, and if the short 75 could penetrate the KT's side as you said, then what was the problem with the 57mms fired from ambush?<hr></blockquote>

According to rexford the 75mm in CMBO is about 10% overmodeled. Based on all data he has, which is not very much IIRC, so Charles may have had more reports. The truth is probably some detail like AP shell quality as with the 76mm, which makes the formular used by Charles inaccurate unless an exception is coded.

Villers Bocage has a lot of 75mm against Tiger sides action - it was not invulnerage, but random shots against sides and rear bounced off. So a little more than 80mm penetration sounds right. CMBO can't model the round turret, though.

The 57mm only gets annoying with the 90% armour quality of King Tiger's side armour. With full quality (also supported by rexford) the 57mm would need very favourable angles and fail otherwise, which sounds about right.

[Kanonier Reichmann]

If anybody wanted to get a good idea of how tough it was for KG Peiper to battle through all the opposition they faced, one only has to be a participant for the German side in Gordon Molek's "Rumble II" multi-player game based on the actions of this very unit. His particular scenario with the appropriate restricted map set in damp & foggy conditions gives the player an excellent feel for how treacherous and risky such a road bound spearhead was.

In some respects it's almost too bloody realistic!

Regards

Jim R.

[JasonC]

Gustav 109 and Redwolf raise excellent questions. First on some Brits wanting to keep their 6-pdrs: they Brits had aces in 44-45 that the Americans didn't - 57mm APCR ("Littlejohn" rounds) and APDS ("Sabot" rounds). Both significantly outperformed the short 75mm, while plain AP did not. They are modeled in CM as "T" rounds, with penetration as good as 76mm AP, and I consider that accurate. The towed 6-pdr only costs 1 more point than the 57mm, which is a balance problem since access to "T" ammo is worth a lot more than that, but the actual armor modeling of the nationality difference is sound.

Second on the question of short 75mm AP. The CM figures seem to be a compromise number. The reality is 75mm AP performed significantly better or worse than the CM figures, depending on the exact round used. The plain APC was, as Rexford says, less effective than the CM figures. But the APCBC M61 round was considerably more effective, and could certainly have KOed King Tigers from the side at close ranges.

The CM figures are right between the two. Presumably, since the game model allows some variation in penetration quality, this is supposed to accurately reflect chances of better APCBC (better "penetration rolls") and worse APC (worse "rolls"). A more exact modeling might have the penetration numbers improve from around Rexford's figure in Normandy, to above the current CM figures later on, after they found the problems with the plain APC and fielded more of the M61 ammo. The prevalence of the less effective ammo in Normandy would also show up in cases like Villers Bocage, where 75mm APC had difficulty penetrating Tiger Is even from the side.

The combat reports of US 57mm ATG crews in the Bulge are generally quite negative; they were very disappointed in the gun. If the KT's sides were full quality, the 57mm should not penetrate them. Neither would short 75mm with plain APC. But short 75mm with APCBC M61 would be able to KO them from the side, regularly.

Also, one other item. British tests of German armor hardness show the thickest plates, over 100mm, were indeed about 10% softer than British plate, which would appear to justify the 90% King Tiger armor quality numbers. But the same data shows German plates only 80mm thick were actually harder than British plate of that thickness, though marginally so. Which would seem to imply the side armor of the KT does not deserve the lower number rightly given to the front plates.

I hope this helps.

[ 11-11-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]</p>