The U.S. lobby in 'Combat Mission'

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Bruno Weiss:

Brian wrote:

Thank you Brian for clarifying that minuscule technical point. Actually I did read the more important part where Germany and Japan surrendered in complete ruin. (The Italians kept surrendering, they just weren't sure who to surrender to).

So much for their vastly superior technology aye?

[ 08-30-2001: Message edited by: Bruno Weiss ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Their technology was immaterial to the point that it was claimed they never did something they demonstrably had. It ignored that the SIGINT war was very much two sided, not one sided as was claimed.

Indeed, so much so, as I noted that when Rommel lost his ability to actually intercept and read the enemy's signals traffic, his supposedly "brilliant" generalship disappeared.

Being "brilliant" is quite easy, when you're able to find out exactly what your enemy is doing, by reading his every move. The Allies did it, and managed to sustain and improve on it. Rommel couldn't.

The US very foolishly decided that it was more important to seek revenge on an individual with its most secret source of intelligence than it was to guard and control its use to ensure it remained as a valuable source. They were just very lucky that the Japanese didn't put two and two together to get four. If they, despite the superior brute strength of the US might not have meant the war was as relatively short as it was.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian:

Indeed, so much so, as I noted that when Rommel lost his ability to actually intercept and read the enemy's signals traffic, his supposedly "brilliant" generalship disappeared.

Being "brilliant" is quite easy, when you're able to find out exactly what your enemy is doing, by reading his every move. The Allies did it, and managed to sustain and improve on it. Rommel couldn't.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The joys of looking at things in isolation, eh? Couldn't it be that other reasons playing a role were the defense at El Alamein, the reduced supplies for Afrika Korps and the increase in supplies for the Commonwealth, the disappearance of the 8th Army command problems with the arrival of Monty etc.pp. Yep, loss of the radio interception company when the Kiwis overran the HQ of Afrika Korps (think it was then) was a heavy blow, but it certainly was not the reason that Rommel lost his 'supposedly brilliant generalship'. The mistake had been made before that, when he decided to attack into Egypt, and he still had his radio intel then.

Last I checked Rommel still fought a very decent defensive battle around Caen, without any captured radio intelligence - one that was so decent that it became the basis for the NATO concept of Vorneverteidigung, AFAIK.

Faced with the British command pre-Alamein, one could also say it was very easy for Rommel to look good.

I agree that Rommel appears quite a bit over-rated, but the reasons for Rommel's successes and failures are certainly more complex than captured radio intel. Opportunism, quick decision-making, being up 'there', seeing the state of battle, disregard for risks (some might call it gambling), pushing the men hard, a good grasp of the battle, all these can help, and some of them can also be dangerous. You appear to be saying that a monkey handed radio intel can win a battle. I would disagree with that.

[Slapdragon]

One day and no reply from the cause of the row.

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

The joys of looking at things in isolation, eh?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Nope. More the joys of looking at something in reference to the original quote and providing an example.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Couldn't it be that other reasons playing a role were the defense at El Alamein, the reduced supplies for Afrika Korps and the increase in supplies for the Commonwealth, the disappearance of the 8th Army command problems with the arrival of Monty etc.pp.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, apart from the last (Monty's arrival could be claimed to have actually engendered more than they solved), I'd agree with you completely.

However, the supposedly "brilliant" Rommel had overcome similar problems in the past and managed to beat his opponents - how? Was it because he was necessarily the better commander or was there another factor or factors which enabled him to outwit his opponents?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Yep, loss of the radio interception company when the Kiwis overran the HQ of Afrika Korps (think it was then) was a heavy blow, but it certainly was not the reason that Rommel lost his 'supposedly brilliant generalship'.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was an Australian unit, actually, not a New Zealander one. However that minor wound to my national pride aside, it was a major reason why he made as many mistakes as he did during the end of 1st Alamein and through 2nd Alamein IMO.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

The mistake had been made before that, when he decided to attack into Egypt, and he still had his radio intel then.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, I'd say the mistake was when he decided to press on after the fall of Tobruk, rather than wait while Malta as captured.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Last I checked Rommel still fought a very decent defensive battle around Caen, without any captured radio intelligence - one that was so decent that it became the basis for the NATO concept of Vorneverteidigung, AFAIK.

Faced with the British command pre-Alamein, one could also say it was very easy for Rommel to look good.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Depends. Yes, the British commanders left quite a bit to be desired. The British command did not. The main problem was, as for Rommel, political interference which prevented the various C-in-C's from fighting their war, their way, than necessarily because they were bad at fighting it. Both Wavell and Alexander were excellent strategists - Wavel had the added advantage of the use of good tacticians to back him, Alexander did not.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

I agree that Rommel appears quite a bit over-rated, but the reasons for Rommel's successes and failures are certainly more complex than captured radio intel.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No disagreement. However, SIGINT was a significant contributor to victory on both sides. Its interesting that with 1st Alamein, the first continous use of ULTRA decrypts begins by a field commander and at the same time, the main Axis commander in the theatre loses his ability to make the same intercepts. Hardly a coincidence IMO.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Opportunism, quick decision-making, being up 'there', seeing the state of battle, disregard for risks (some might call it gambling), pushing the men hard, a good grasp of the battle, all these can help, and some of them can also be dangerous. You appear to be saying that a monkey handed radio intel can win a battle. I would disagree with that.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, I am saying that if one looks beyond those more obvious facets, of how Rommel commanded to the reasons why Rommel made the decisions that he did, one discovers that it was SIGINT which provided the information on which he based his decisions.

[Username]

Back to the point (this thread is supposed to be about US getting whatever they want). The US used WP in WWII. It isnt modeled in the game.

[Spook]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian:

The US very foolishly decided that it was more important to seek revenge on an individual with its most secret source of intelligence than it was to guard and control its use to ensure it remained as a valuable source. They were just very lucky that the Japanese didn't put two and two together to get four. If they, despite the superior brute strength of the US might not have meant the war was as relatively short as it was.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

A rather narrow interpretation of intelligence usage here. And off the mark.

At the time of the Yamamoto ambush, the IJN still proved a formidable challenge in the Solomons and it the "Slot." It was not until the invasion of Bouganville (months later), and the following isolation of Rabaul, that the Solomons campaign was resolved. So in this time, an opportunity presents where the leading Japanese admiral, regarded at the time as an effective leader by the USA, can be ambushed by fighter aircraft. A chance to "cut off the head" and disrupt IJN command isn't just "revenge," it's military common sense.

I seem to recall that the British, in North Africa, tried a similar stunt with a commando mission to ambush and kill/capture Rommel at his HQ. Was that "revenge"? Regardless, the prior British intelligence was flawed, it wasn't Rommel's HQ that was attacked, and during the raid, the commando group leader (LtC Keyes) was killed. The coastal evacuation attempt for the survivors was botched, too, such that only two of the commando party were able to return to friendly lines.

Might then this failed "revenge" mission allowed the Germans to add two & two in their counter-intelligence efforts in a similar way?

[jshandorf]

I am not sure how many people will agree with me but I am a firm believer that the main over-riding reason for German's loss in N. Africa was the failure in securing Malta.

Up until the execution of operation Barbarosa the German Luftwaffe had the duty of petroling the mediterrainian sea espically around Malta. They were so effective that up until June of 1941 the island of Malta had little to no defenses left and was basically starved for men and equipment. I believe, if my memory serves me right, that not a single allied ship made it into the port of Malta while the luftwaffe patroled that area. Malta was out of ammo and fuel. The island was rendered useless other than a radio communcations point for observation.

When Germany did invade Russia the pulled the entire luftwaffe for the invasion and left the guarding and patroling of Malta to the Italian airforce... need I say more?

Basically the allies where able to resupply the island of malta with aircraft and naval ships which then began to patrol the Med and thusly choke off Rommels supply chain.

If they would have taken Malta Rommel woud have had an easier go at it in N. Africa I believe.

Jeff

[CombinedArms]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by jshandorf:

I am not sure how many people will agree with me but I am a firm believer that the main over-riding reason for German's loss in N. Africa was the failure in securing Malta.

Jeff<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree. The Axis absolutely HAD to have Malta, whatever the cost. My understanding is that Hitler was so spooked by his heavy losses in the (eventually successful) invasion of Crete that he would never authorize landings on Malta. But you can't allow an enemy air and naval base to sit across your line of supply. One big Allied advantage was that they never ignored logistic necessities. Taking Malta was a logistical necessity for the Axis Africa campaign, and they never fully recognized that.

[jshandorf]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CombinedArms:

I agree. The Axis absolutely HAD to have Malta, whatever the cost. My understanding is that Hitler was so spooked by his heavy losses in the (eventually successful) invasion of Crete that he would never authorize landings on Malta.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, and the reason for the heavy loses in Crete was that the Brits knew they were coming since they interecept and deciphered the invasion plans.

They knew exactly when and roughly where they were gonna drop in. Yes, it was a slaughter but not for the reasons Hitler believe, that is, paratroop invasions are too costly.

IIRC that was the last real paratroop invasion the "Green Devils" participated in. After that they were treated almost like a strightleg outfit.

Jeff

[Keith]

Actually, the truth about why Malta was not invaded was due to a decision by Rommel, not Hitler. In 1942 when Rommel took Tobruk and the Afrika Corps was advancing torward the Egyptian border Kesserling gave Rommel two options:

1) Try to provide CAS for the Afrika Corps advance

2) Keep Malta suppressed and invade Malta

Rommel demanded option #1 over the protestations of Kesserling, who was Rommel's superior officer. As a result, when Rommel reach Alamein his supply situation was in shambles because. They were still shipping to Tunis and driving the supplies to the front in Egypt. Of course over half the gas was consumed getting the trucks to the front, not to mention Britsh interdicition efforts which decimated the supply forces.

Without a doubt the Germans did not have a firm grasp on supply plannings. It killed them in Afrika, Barbarossa, and the Bulge. It does not matter how brilliant a tactician you are if your troops have no gas or bullets. And THAT is why the Allies won the war.

[Blackcat]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by jshandorf:

..... I believe, if my memory serves me right, that not a single allied ship made it into the port of Malta while the luftwaffe patroled that area..........

Jeff<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Umm, no. That isn't actually true.

Whilst things did get pretty damn desperate on the island, ships did get through.

The most famous example would be Operation Pedestal which was an very heavily guarded convoy from Gibraltar. The convoy had seven bells knocked out of it by the luftwaffe et al but, whilst it took severe losses, some ships did get make it. Most famously of course was the tanker which limped in some days after everyone. From memory the tanker was American by the name of the "Ohio" but I could swear to it.

Cheers

[jshandorf]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Blackcat:

Umm, no. That isn't actually true.

Whilst things did get pretty damn desperate on the island, ships did get through.

The most famous example would be Operation Pedestal which was an very heavily guarded convoy from Gibraltar. The convoy had seven bells knocked out of it by the luftwaffe et al but, whilst it took severe losses, some ships did get make it. Most famously of course was the tanker which limped in some days after everyone. From memory the tanker was American by the name of the "Ohio" but I could swear to it.

Cheers<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, but that convoy happened AFTER June '41 I think.

JEff

[Clubfoot]

Has anyone noticed that our author friend has appended his initial post. It's now blank.

[Frenchy]

Yes...and not one additional comment.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Clubfoot:

Has anyone noticed that our author friend has appended his initial post. It's now blank.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

He is getting nervous as the forces of light home in on his true identity.

[Richard Morgan]

Major Tom is right, an awful lot of us have been suckered into a US vs GB flamefest :mad: :mad: :mad: The special relationship could be in danger!!!

More seriously, how many of you stateside have read Max Hastings's book "Overlord"? I would be interested to know. This is a totally objective account of D Day and the fighting in Normandy. However, it contains some harsh, but undeniable truths about the capabilities (or lack thereof) of both British and U.S. forces, particularly in comparison with the Germans, "the most professionally skilful army of modern times."

Painful reading, but truth has to be faced, especially when there is evidence to back it up

Richard.

[John Kettler]

Richard Morgan,

I have, and I was so impressed with its quality and content that I reread it recently.

Let's say it won't be seeing the inside of a used bookstore until I die.

Have you read STEEL INFERNO by Reynolds?

Regards,

John Kettler

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Richard Morgan:

[QB]Major Tom is right, an awful lot of us have been suckered into a US vs GB flamefest :mad: :mad: :mad: The special relationship could be in danger!!!

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One can only live in hope...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

More seriously, how many of you stateside have read Max Hastings's book "Overlord"? I would be interested to know. This is a totally objective account of D Day and the fighting in Normandy. However, it contains some harsh, but undeniable truths about the capabilities (or lack thereof) of both British and U.S. forces, particularly in comparison with the Germans, "the most professionally skilful army of modern times."

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have real problems with such superlatives which focus far too much upon the tactical and ignore the strategic levels of command.

The Allies demonstrated IMO that they were very much the masters of the latter and the Germans the former. However, it is the latter which wins wars, not the former.

I also have my doubts about the tactical abilities of the Germans - that was very variable and depended all too often upon factors which declined as the war continued.

While the British all too often like to display an air of amateaurism about their affairs, in reality by WWII they were the tactical masters of the Germans, whereas the Americans were fast approaching that level as well IMO.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Painful reading, but truth has to be faced, especially when there is evidence to back it up

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hasting's problem is that he's a journo, not an historian and that shows in his writing style and analysis - he tends to focus on the sensational rather than look at the underlying factors behind events.

[Richard Morgan]

Brian, thank you for a thoughtful critique of Hastings which made interesting reading. I must state though that I respectfully beg to differ on a couple of points Firstly,you haven't convinced me that the British (or indeed the Americans) were ever superior to the Germans at a tactical level. As Hastings states - citing evidence - whenever we fought the Germans on anything like equal terms, we always came off second best

Secondly, your charge that he concentrates on sensation rather than underlying cause seems completely unfair. Hastings looks in detail at the training, doctrine, weapons and effectiveness of all the respective armies. One very telling point that he makes is that an army is measured by the standard of its ordinary soldiers as opposed to its elite forces. Indeed, much of Overlord is focussed on the hitherto little reported on "bog standard" and mediocre elements. This is just my reading BTW, please feel free to differ.

Regards,

Richard.

P.S. Hastings perspective is certainly that of a journalist, I fully agree with you there!!

[Slapdragon]

I just thought of something. The git that started all of this was all worked up about the CM lobby. Means he visited the CM World Headquarters, but he never made a mention of the gun room, the Weasel Parking Lot, the Computer room, the Wiufe's Garden, the BIliard Room, or that little closet that Steve uses to stick crap that he does not want to clean up. I suspect the gent does not know much about the headquarters, and thus was just a casual visitor. Likely A Londoner tourist who thought the Lobby was some sort of Maine restroom or something.

[Major Tom]

Saying an absolute like NEVER is going too far. All that someone needs to do is find ONE single instance where this NEVER actually was a WAS, and your argument gets thrown out the window.

What about the Devil's Brigade? This American/Canadian force never lost an engagement against the Germans... They did not have any special weaponry but relied on heavy training and intelligent tactics.

There have been instances where regular Allied troops have outfought highly trained and well equipped German formations who also posessed superior numbers and support. I can cite them for you, but am sure that these are of common knowledge.

We did not just win because we out attritioned them (ie. took more casualties than the Germans, but they had less reserves). Our casualty rates (US, UK, Canadian, French) were significantly lower than German casualty rates from Normandy till VE day. Somehow we were 'better' than the Germans.

[Madmatt]

Well, since the original poster has in effect deleted his original post and now people are talking about NON_CM stuff I will move this thread into the General Forum.

Madmatt