CMSF as a tool for simulating USMC squad assaults

[MHW]

Brendan McBreen, a retired USMC Lieutenant Colonel, ran 300 squad assaults in CMSF and drew insights from them. McBreen, who has 25 years of service as an infantry officer, found that the service's manuals and training materials give only vague and inadequate guidance about how to conduct a squad assault. He used CMSF to run a series of tests, matching a rifle squad against different defenders, and tallied up the results. 

Then he wrote up his findings. The whole series of seven articles appears over on the Tactical Notebook, a Substack run by Bruce Ivar Gudmundsson, a historian in Quantico. 

• Abstract
• Part I
• Part II
• Part III (test setup within CMSF)
• Part IV
• Part V (tactical insights)
• Part VI (recommendations)

Among McBreen's recommendations: "train with simulations" and "use simulations to improve our manuals." 

Fight Club US and Fight Club UK merit acknowledgements.

 

[A Canadian Cat]

Nice, thanks for sharing.

My favourite quote from the article:

Quote

Fifty percent of tactics is dirt. Your techniques are meaningless if you choose poor ground

 

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Same here, and he's not wrong.

[A Canadian Cat]

1 minute ago, Vergeltungswaffe said:

Same here, and he's not wrong.

For sure the more I play CM the more I realize that using the terrain for your advantage as much as possible is super important.

[MHW]

The NTC maps are fantastic for teaching the value of even low relief.

[George MC]

Thanks for sharing. Fascinating article. 

[MOS:96B2P]

On 8/28/2023 at 7:16 PM, MHW said:

Brendan McBreen, a retired USMC Lieutenant Colonel, ran 300 squad assaults in CMSF and drew insights from them. McBreen, who has 25 years of service as an infantry officer, found that the service's manuals and training materials give only vague and inadequate guidance about how to conduct a squad assault. He used CMSF to run a series of tests, matching a rifle squad against different defenders, and tallied up the results. 

+1  Interesting stuff.  Thanks for posting. 

 @Bil Hardenberger you may already know about this CM related substack from USMC Lieutenant Colonel, Brendan McBreen (retired).  But if you don't I thought you might find it interesting. 

[MOS:96B2P]

The below was taken from the above linked Tactical Notebook Substack. 

The empty phrases reffered to below ring very true.  Many times reading US Army and USMC manuals I've come across sentences like these and thought ...................... but how does that translate into the best course of action for this problem I'm dealing with?    

he manual focuses on static definitions and control measures, not useful procedures. When it doesn’t know what to say, it reverts to empty phrases that tell the squad leader nothing. “The assault is launched aggressively…” How? “Assault fire is characterized by violence, volume, and accuracy…” When? “[Marines] put themselves in a position of advantage…” Where?

 

Some more interesting information taken from the article. 

For fire and movement, the standard should be “close to within grenade range (20 meters) of the enemy position without getting shot.” Performance steps should include “suppress until there is no return fire,” “move only when suppression is firing,” “select and move from one covered position to another,” and “avoid moving outside mutual support (behind a building or over a crest).” 

 

A well-trained enemy is dangerous at all ranges, but when his fighting position is visible, it can be continually suppressed by well-coordinated fire and movement—two fire teams shooting while one moves. The priorities are (1) find the enemy, (2) smother with suppressive fire, and then (3) move forward using covered terrain.

 

Don't be in a hurry to die.........

four assaults with six or more casualties were impatient, rushing to poor positions without suppression.

 

When on defense Target Arcs plus the Hide command.   

The biggest advantage of a long assault was that the enemy usually fired early and confirmed their position, weapons, and numbers to the assaulting squad. Most casualties inside 50 meters occurred when the enemy position was not known—or had moved—and the assaulting squad was surprised.

[Halmbarte]

1 hour ago, MOS:96B2P said:

The below was taken from the above linked Tactical Notebook Substack. 

The empty phrases reffered to below ring very true.  Many times reading US Army and USMC manuals I've come across sentences like these and thought ...................... but how does that translate into the best course of action for this problem I'm dealing with?    

he manual focuses on static definitions and control measures, not useful procedures. When it doesn’t know what to say, it reverts to empty phrases that tell the squad leader nothing. “The assault is launched aggressively…” How? “Assault fire is characterized by violence, volume, and accuracy…” When? “[Marines] put themselves in a position of advantage…” Where?

 

Some more interesting information taken from the article. 

For fire and movement, the standard should be “close to within grenade range (20 meters) of the enemy position without getting shot.” Performance steps should include “suppress until there is no return fire,” “move only when suppression is firing,” “select and move from one covered position to another,” and “avoid moving outside mutual support (behind a building or over a crest).” 

 

A well-trained enemy is dangerous at all ranges, but when his fighting position is visible, it can be continually suppressed by well-coordinated fire and movement—two fire teams shooting while one moves. The priorities are (1) find the enemy, (2) smother with suppressive fire, and then (3) move forward using covered terrain.

 

Don't be in a hurry to die.........

four assaults with six or more casualties were impatient, rushing to poor positions without suppression.

 

When on defense Target Arcs plus the Hide command.   

The biggest advantage of a long assault was that the enemy usually fired early and confirmed their position, weapons, and numbers to the assaulting squad. Most casualties inside 50 meters occurred when the enemy position was not known—or had moved—and the assaulting squad was surprised.

Why do I feel that these tactical precepts would be familiar to Roman infantry? 

H

[Bil Hardenberger]

6 hours ago, MOS:96B2P said:

 @Bil Hardenberger you may already know about this CM related substack from USMC Lieutenant Colonel, Brendan McBreen (retired).  But if you don't I thought you might find it interesting. 

Thanks for the heads up... haven't seen this and its now on my reading list... I can't help but think that he could have saved some time if he'd read my blog.   

Seriously, a study like this just hammers home how accurate and realistic this game can be. I wonder is the good LTC (retired) works at Quantico. I might have to reach out to him.

Bil

[MHW]

13 hours ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

Thanks for the heads up... haven't seen this and its now on my reading list... I can't help but think that he could have saved some time if he'd read my blog.   

Seriously, a study like this just hammers home how accurate and realistic this game can be. I wonder is the good LTC (retired) works at Quantico. I might have to reach out to him.

Bil

 

I'm not sure about LtCol McBreen, but the Substack's main author is Bruce Ivar Gudmundsson, affiliated at various points with the Marine Corps University and the Modern War Institute. As an occasional reader, I would be that either writer would welcome a conversation.

https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com

[Bil Hardenberger]

Finally was able to read through this.. luckily for me, this is in line with what I do for a living so its billable.   I do have some feedback however:

1. I found it interesting that he defined "Fire & Movement" as what the assault squad is doing, where the standard historical definition is for an attack consisting of two elements, a Support Element providing suppressive fire, and an Assault Element closing with and destroying the enemy. True, the Assault Squad could be conducting a Squad level Fire and Movement Battle Drill during its Assault movement, so maybe it's right? Seems odd to me though.
2. Platoon level assaults versus a 3 or 4 man position seemed excessive to me, but that is the American way of war! I would expect a Squad to be able to deal with an enemy of that size alone, without the rest of the Platoon.
3. I am surprised that there seemed to be little to no reconnaissance to find the enemy, you know, the first F in the Four Fs (Find him, Fix him, Flank him, Finish him)...
4. The assault was launched before the enemy was located, this led to more casualties than necessary. This premature launching of an assault is the one thing I preach against over and over on my blog... you must find the enemy before you decide how you are going to deal with him. In several of the runs the assault squad was caught by surprise, or suppressed in the open. Neither of these would have happened if a scout team (or three) had been sent forward to recon and locate the enemy... only THEN deciding how to deal with them.
5. The Support element seemed to be really a separate part of the action, where to increase effectiveness they needed to be working as a team, and they needed to be mutually supporting, not something I thought was happening as I read through the AARs.

All in all a very interesting series of posts, appreciate you linking it @MHW, but I can't help but think that I am left underwhelmed by this, and that I could have provided guidance that would have helped them close with the enemy with zero (or close to it) failed assaults, based on the forces involved and the support provided.

Bil

Edited September 11, 2023 by Bil Hardenberger

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Nice analysis Bil, and the reason why I agreed with @IanL that the best thing he said was:

"Fifty percent of tactics is dirt. Your techniques are meaningless if you choose poor ground"

[Bil Hardenberger]

5 hours ago, Vergeltungswaffe said:

Nice analysis Bil, and the reason why I agreed with @IanL that the best thing he said was:

"Fifty percent of tactics is dirt. Your techniques are meaningless if you choose poor ground"

If you know anything about me, you know that I will never argue with someone harping on the value of the wise use of terrain. 

[Vergeltungswaffe]

15 hours ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

If you know anything about me, you know that I will never argue with someone harping on the value of the wise use of terrain. 

Indeed, I would most definitely agree that you have always stressed proper terrain usage.

[Flibby]

I seem to remember the same guy using "Close Combat" to train guys when he was still "in".

 

God I loved that game!

[Centurian52]

On 9/11/2023 at 12:14 PM, Bil Hardenberger said:

Finally was able to read through this.. luckily for me, this is in line with what I do for a living so its billable.   I do have some feedback however:

1. I found it interesting that he defined "Fire & Movement" as what the assault squad is doing, where the standard historical definition is for an attack consisting of two elements, a Support Element providing suppressive fire, and an Assault Element closing with and destroying the enemy. True, the Assault Squad could be conducting a Squad level Fire and Movement Battle Drill during its Assault movement, so maybe it's right? Seems odd to me though.
2. Platoon level assaults versus a 3 or 4 man position seemed excessive to me, but that is the American way of war! I would expect a Squad to be able to deal with an enemy of that size alone, without the rest of the Platoon.
3. I am surprised that there seemed to be little to no reconnaissance to find the enemy, you know, the first F in the Four Fs (Find him, Fix him, Flank him, Finish him)...
4. The assault was launched before the enemy was located, this led to more casualties than necessary. This premature launching of an assault is the one thing I preach against over and over on my blog... you must find the enemy before you decide how you are going to deal with him. In several of the runs the assault squad was caught by surprise, or suppressed in the open. Neither of these would have happened if a scout team (or three) had been sent forward to recon and locate the enemy... only THEN deciding how to deal with them.
5. The Support element seemed to be really a separate part of the action, where to increase effectiveness they needed to be working as a team, and they needed to be mutually supporting, not something I thought was happening as I read through the AARs.

All in all a very interesting series of posts, appreciate you linking it @MHW, but I can't help but think that I am left underwhelmed by this, and that I could have provided guidance that would have helped them close with the enemy with zero (or close to it) failed assaults, based on the forces involved and the support provided.

Bil

Excellent points. I pretty much agree with everything you said. But after trying to consider things from the author's point of view I believe I can offer the following points in their defense.

1. I think "Fire & Movement" is a concept that can be fairly easily nested. You might think in terms of company fire and movement, platoon fire and movement, or squad fire and movement, depending on which level is your focus at the moment. It's probably not much of a stretch to think of a large scale (brigade/division) attack made with air and artillery support as fire and movement on a grand scale, with the smaller subunits (battalions, companies, etc.) conducting their own smaller scale fire and movement at the same time. Since the focus of these experiments was firmly on the squad, it makes sense that the author was speaking in terms of squad fire and movement, even as there was also fire and movement happening on the next level up.

3&4. Assaulting an enemy that hadn't been located yet struck me as odd too. But my interpretation is that they were playing to teach more than they were playing to win. And the disasters that befell squads which launched their assaults before finding the enemy probably do a good job of teaching what happens when you don't find the enemy first. The importance of finding the enemy first was one of the tactical insights they listed in part 5.

5. The lack of activity by the support element may have been about keeping experimental variables down. It seems like the main purpose of these experiments was to gain insights into squad level assault tactics, and they may not have wanted too many confounding variables coming down from the platoon level. Even just the limited variables they did have, combined with the need to have a half-decent sample size for each variation, already ballooned the number of assaults they had to run up to 300.