How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[chuckdyke]

One of our politicians would say: " Even a cattle dog would beat the Red Cap Contender in an election!" But anything is possible in the USA. 

[Letter from Prague]

I don't want to get into it because Steve said 655 times we shouldn't. I shouldn't have even posted the previous thing to be honest.

[Kinophile]

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

Just as the Russians can conduct a form of mechanised attack (albeit with heavy losses) it seems so can the AFU, though at much smaller scale. Nice to see smoke usage as well. 

[Holien]

A short presentation on how Ukraine is coping with the Russian attacks on their energy market.

Maybe of interest to folk. 

 

 

[The_Capt]

Finally reading that Kofman paper, and this jumped out:

“These choices in force design were not just driven by an effort to balance resources but also by a coherent set of beliefs within the Russian military that the modern battlefield would be fragmented, with highly maneuverable formations engaging indirectly by detecting enemy forces and employing precision guided weapons or artillery against them under the conceptual rubric of reconnaissance-strike (dynamic employment of precision weapons at operational depths) and reconnaissance-fire (dynamic employment of fires at tactical depths) complexes.¹⁶The view was that a high density of forces to hold large amounts of terrain was no longer required and that the initial period of war would not hinge on a strategic ground offensive. Much of the training and concept development for Russian ground forces emphasized maneuver defense alongside positional defense. Both approaches were meant to be characteristically ‘active,’ meaning persistent engagement of an opponent’s force, and their support, throughout the course of the defensive operation. These ideas drove the belief that the Russian military required fewer infantry and logistical support for ground offensives and, instead, placed more emphasis on fires, strike systems, and supporting enablers in ground force formations.^17”

The Russians were right but didn’t finish it. The battlefield is highly fragmented and dominated by ISR and fires, while very low troop densities are required to hold ground. The problem is that this is for defensives and favours defensive primacy.  There was nothing fundamentally flawed in the BTG concept, if you planned to keep it on the defensive. As Russia learned, very much the hard way, BTGs do not work in such an environment for offensive operations. In fact not much is really working for offensive operations right now. The RA read the room correctly but missed that one critical last conclusion: Attacking on a fragmented battlefield dominated by ISR and fires needs something they did not have.

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/assessing-russian-military-adaptation-in-2023?lang=en
 

[billbindc]

5 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

I don't want to get into it because Steve said 655 times we shouldn't. I shouldn't have even posted the previous thing to be honest.

As long as it doesn't become a partisan bun fight, it's quite relevant to the war. One of the outcomes will lead to the immediate reduction in the sanctions regime and the collapse of American material support for Ukraine. The other outcome will be increased sanctions and long term material support for Ukraine. It's that stark and every analysis of this war needs to take it into account. 

[Holien]

7 hours ago, Holien said:

president Trump forces "peace" and end of sanctions,

No way can he force that.

Certainly he can make and WILL make life harder for Ukraine.

There are a bunch of other countries involved in supporting Ukraine and they will not be doing Trumps bidding.

I would bet there are contingency plans in place if he does seize the presidency.

 

[dan/california]

9 hours ago, JonS said:

What's the supposed value proposition here?

Well if you also have audio associated with that sim card that make it clear its owner is a particularly competent, or a particularly unpleasant, Colonel, it seems like it would be militarily useful to instruct him in better communication security protocols.

The other obvious possibility is something like the aggregate plant Ukraine finally took back, where an infinity of cubic meters of heavy duty Soviet concrete made simply knocking it down almost impossible, and storming it expensive.

Edit: And as Charlie 43 just posted, Using a cell phone carelessly will ALREADY get you a 155 mm answer.

Edit#2: All of this is infinitely easier in a conventional war with defined line lines of engagement like Ukraine. In a counter insurgency situation where civilians are probably present it takes at least one order of magnitude more intelligence resources to be sure you are adequately discriminating targets. 

Edited 9 hours ago by dan/california

[Letter from Prague]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

As long as it doesn't become a partisan bun fight, it's quite relevant to the war. One of the outcomes will lead to the immediate reduction in the sanctions regime and the collapse of American material support for Ukraine. The other outcome will be increased sanctions and long term material support for Ukraine. It's that stark and every analysis of this war needs to take it into account. 

Trump in power would be a dictator with complete immunity as per US Supreme Court. He already said he will do a purges in military to replace generals and other with "loyalists". He said he will do the same thing with FBI and various security services.

He can do what you said. Or he can start giving ISR to Russia. Or he can start giving weapons to Russia, like he have them COVID vaccines. Or he can outright order airstrikes on Kyiv, who would stop him?

Edit: realistically, Trump would be removed from power very quickly because he's losing the ability to form a coherent sentence now, and will likely completely fall apart mentally by January. So the question is more like "what would President Vance do" but honestly, that's the same list or worse.

Edit 2: like, seriously, anyone tell me how I'm wrong before I totally spiral, Trump in power could do literally anything, because who would stop him? What would stop him? It's like Putin but retarded and in charge of world most powerful military and economy.

Edited 8 hours ago by Letter from Prague

[sburke]

1 hour ago, Holien said:

I would bet there are contingency plans in place if he does seize the presidency.

Exclusive: Europe seeks to underpin Russia sanctions, fearing Trump overhaul | Reuters

[billbindc]

17 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

Trump in power would be a dictator with complete immunity as per US Supreme Court. He already said he will do a purges in military to replace generals and other with "loyalists". He said he will do the same thing with FBI and various security services.

He can do what you said. Or he can start giving ISR to Russia. Or he can start giving weapons to Russia, like he have them COVID vaccines. Or he can outright order airstrikes on Kyiv, who would stop him?

Edit: realistically, Trump would be removed from power very quickly because he's losing the ability to form a coherent sentence now, and will likely completely fall apart mentally by January. So the question is more like "what would President Vance do" but honestly, that's the same list or worse.

Edit 2: like, seriously, anyone tell me how I'm wrong before I totally spiral, Trump in power could do literally anything, because who would stop him? What would stop him? It's like Putin but retarded and in charge of world most powerful military and economy.

Trump in power would come in thinking he has complete immunity...or better yet claiming it and seeing how far that would get him. He will certainly try to get military officers/police who will do his bidding and try to purge the bureaucracy. That will be a chaotic process and face tons of institutional resistance. In fact, pretty much everything he does will face resistance. 

The likeliest outcome if he wins is not a Hitlerian dictat but more like a messy Orbanism with arsonist tendencies. Vance would be essentially the same thing with Yale-isms lacquered over it. Neither strikes me as likely to have a particularly successful run and I think the counter reaction over time would be immense. 

The issue for our purposes is that a lot of toothpaste out of the tube events would have already transpired. Fatally kneecapping NATO, trade wars, selling out Ukraine are simply not reversible. Any future administration would be trying to rejoin the sinews of an international order that has been shredded. And as I'm sure you know, that does not typically happen without significant kinetic conflict. 

I would strongly urge you not to spiral. Face facts and plan accordingly.  

[kimbosbread]

Back to the cellphones for targetting data; I wonder if it wouldn’t be worth strapping a stingray on a fixed wing drone and flying a bit deeper into Russian territory (say 50-100km) and look for targets that way.

[kimbosbread]

48 minutes ago, billbindc said:

The issue for our purposes is that a lot of toothpaste out of the tube events would have already transpired. Fatally kneecapping NATO, trade wars, selling out Ukraine are simply not reversible. Any future administration would be trying to rejoin the sinews of an international order that has been shredded. And as I'm sure you know, that does not typically happen without significant kinetic conflict. 

But the toothpaste is already all out of the tube, and all over our faces:

• Nonproliferation is dead
• A good fraction of Europe would happily make peace with Russia, and happily ignores sanctions via Central Asia
• We’ve have handicapped Ukraine with equipment delays, refusing to allow strikes into Russia and discouraging attacks on oil infrastructure, etc.
• Russia shows no signs of surrender/withrawal/etc.
• Russia has demonstrated that the West won’t respond strongly enough to matter to attacks on civilians (hospitals, dams, shopping centers, etc.)

Sure, Russia may economically and militarily implode in 2025, but China appears to be happy to keep them in business and war. However, the biggest problem is we the West have no strategy, and are simply reacting. Trump can make it even worse, but the situation is already really bad, in my mind, mostly of our own doing.

[nposborn]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

The likeliest outcome if he wins is not a Hitlerian dictat but more like a messy Orbanism with arsonist tendencies.

If you are a trans person being beaten to death by an empowered bigot or a central-American refugee being sent back to a gang-controlled village I'm not sure if this distinction means so much.

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:

But the toothpaste is already all out of the tube, and all over our faces:

• Nonproliferation is dead
• A good fraction of Europe would happily make peace with Russia, and happily ignores sanctions via Central Asia
• We’ve have handicapped Ukraine with equipment delays, refusing to allow strikes into Russia and discouraging attacks on oil infrastructure, etc.
• Russia shows no signs of surrender/withrawal/etc.
• Russia has demonstrated that the West won’t respond strongly enough to matter to attacks on civilians (hospitals, dams, shopping centers, etc.)

Sure, Russia may economically and militarily implode in 2025, but China appears to be happy to keep them in business and war. However, the biggest problem is we the West have no strategy, and are simply reacting. Trump can make it even worse, but the situation is already really bad, in my mind, mostly of our own doing.

Have things changed? Sure and some things for the worse. But to your points: 

• Until ROK, Japan, Taiwan, Poland, etc are getting nukes this simply isn't true.
• Ukraine would have lost a year ago without US efforts which exist in a highly complicated decision matrix.
• Not at all a done deal.
• Has it? I think 600,000 casualties might make a different argument. 

Final point: catastrophizing the present and denigrating imperfect efforts in the past is not going to help anyone beat Russia.

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, nposborn said:

If you are a trans person being beaten to death by an empowered bigot or a central-American refugee being sent back to a gang-controlled village I'm not sure if this distinction means so much.

IIRC, one is not required to note every possible bad outcome in a general description of a bad outcome. Nor, I think would anyone who's been reading me hear for while imagine I'm some sort of apologist.  

[kimbosbread]

2 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Final point: catastrophizing the present and denigrating imperfect efforts in the past is not going to help anyone beat Russia.

Eh, I think the end of non proliferation is pretty bad, and the fact that lots of our allies think we have no fortitude… not good either.

Also, I think it’s intellectually dishonest to avoid criticism of the efforts taken by saying any criticism is denigrating. Imperfect efforts are that: Imperfect. We deliberately chose a path, against loud objections from many quarters. Obviously we lack a coherent strategy and goals, but we could have taken many smaller, obvious steps that would make our present lives easier (Flying Tigers 2.0, more Bradleys, ATACMS sooner).

Moreover, when we say all criticism is denigrating, we lose the ability to identify how we can improve. DC needs to look long and hard at every choice we’ve made (and ones we avoided) because the ugly consequences of our approach are going to rear their head soon all over the place.  What are we going to do when China seizes the nearest Taiwanese islands? Stick our heads up our asses and pretend we can contain the problem?

[Battlefront.com]

13 hours ago, CHARLIE43 said:

Of course I make a wisecrack (FISA warrant and all) and eat my words....

https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-military-leaders-need-rethink-battlefield-intelligence-smartphone-era

Ukrainian forces recently leveraged Russian phone signals to strike a temporary base in the occupied city of Makiivka, killing dozens (or more—the toll is highly disputed). The Russian Defense Ministry subsequently issued a rare statement attributing the unprecedented loss to the widespread, albeit unauthorized, use of personal phones. While powered on, the phones had been pinging Ukraine’s cellular network, allowing Ukrainian forces to triangulate precise location information.

Then this PDF report:

https://www.enea.com/insights/location-tracking-on-battlefield/

Maybe, my whole idea doesn't pan out, but then again both state some reasons for using cellphones.

This was a huge thing in the beginning of the war, for both sides.  Ukraine's intelligence services had a field day publishing audio clips of Russian service personnel because their communications were going via cell through Ukraine's cell infrastructure.  And back in 2014 Ukraine lost the better part of a battalion to a single Russian artillery strike because they were near the Russian border and their use of cellphones was going through Russia's cell infrastructure (they also had plenty of agents and software taps on Ukraine's cell infrastructure, I'm sure).

Steve

[kimbosbread]

So maybe instead of Stingray you do a cellphone honeypot (artillerypot?) where you stick cellphones on drones, land them at a certain spot, make some calls, and then fly away and hope a strike is called in so you can do counterbattery?

[dan/california]

16 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

So maybe instead of Stingray you do a cellphone honeypot (artillerypot?) where you stick cellphones on drones, land them at a certain spot, make some calls, and then fly away and hope a strike is called in so you can do counterbattery?

The game goes on forever, the party never ends...

[chrisl]

17 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

So maybe instead of Stingray you do a cellphone honeypot (artillerypot?) where you stick cellphones on drones, land them at a certain spot, make some calls, and then fly away and hope a strike is called in so you can do counterbattery?

Cell doesn't work well without LOS, so the eavesdroppers are also likely to be getting an optical picture of your drone doing that.

[kimbosbread]

10 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Cell doesn't work well without LOS, so the eavesdroppers are also likely to be getting an optical picture of your drone doing that.

Meh not if it is a small one 1kft up, or you drop a phone into a tree or something.

[sburke]

2 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

Sure, Russia may economically and militarily implode in 2025, but China appears to be happy to keep them in business and war. 

While there are definitely some aspects where China is supplying whatever they can sell, there are many more where China has clearly limited support for Russia out of concern for western sanctions.  The financial hardships Russia has had purchasing and selling to China and the collapse of a major pipeline deal speak to a more nuanced approach by China.  Frankly while Russia is clearly playing a negative role for the west, its actual usefulness to China is mixed.  For one the western military alliance is now stronger than ever with NATO also getting some clear experience at the weaknesses in the alliance that need to be addressed.  Russia also blew the whole western rule of law concept so when approaching China's intentions, we are a lot more clear headed about the consequences of not addressing aggression.

Overall I think Russia is more a negative for China than a positive. Russia has become the new "sick man of Europe".  Not exactly comforting when this is your major partner.

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, chrisl said:

Cell doesn't work well without LOS, so the eavesdroppers are also likely to be getting an optical picture of your drone doing that.

You could aways go land it on top of tall building before you turn it on. Monitoring your backfield for cells towers you don't think should be there is just going to be one more thing on the infinite check list of a brigade's EW company.

I am fairly certain there are not enough people with masters degrees in radio frequency engineering to staff those companies in the entire U.S., much less the military. The Pentagon is going to have to start waving full ride scholarships at bright high schoolers to fill those roles in the longterm.