How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is the sort of math pro-armor guys hate.  We have just (back of envelope) calculated that one could clear 16 lanes near simultaneously with this investment *OR* acquire a single Ogre that will likely be unable to clear a single lane, at best, within the same timeframe.  Further, if that one Ogre is lost, for ANY reason (including some numbnuts mechanic forgetting to put oil in the engine), it means probably a year before replacement (realistic) or 6 months (wildly optimistic).  Drones, on the other hand, mean a couple of weeks tops.

I'm happy to concede that drones are likely going to do a better job than anything vehicular when it comes to mine clearance, provided everything works practically of course. (Beyond the current issues of jamming) I am only a little concerned that we have for a long time been able to change a mine at minimum cost to make it difficult to detect.

The Schu mine is a good example of this in that mines can be adjusted to be difficult to detect by traditional means. Eluding drone detection in similar ways would be a major problem for a large system of counter mining, and that is before we consider mobile mines that have been talked about before. 

 

[sburke]

hey look!  A dead horse. let's go flog it some more!

[sburke]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Given Ukraine's ability to blow things up 2x further than Toropets, I'm surprised they didn't hit this sooner.

Steve

Wonder if they have been monitoring it to see how lax the new conscripts and convicts have been getting and simply waited for

1 a certain qty of storage filled

2 the sloppy procedures creating the perfect opportunity to wipe it off the face of mother earth.

wonder how many folks working there got erased.  The Russian MoD definitely won't be paying these families "we have no proof they were actually there, we have found no remains."

[dan/california]

9 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

that is before we consider mobile mines that have been talked about before. 

I haven't seen anything that even pretends to solve for these. And while actual mobile mines would be new tech, artillery and rocket delivered mines are a very real thing right now, and almost as hard to solve for. It is HARD to kill every artillery and MLRS battery within twenty or thirty miles of a breach. Furthermore the effectiveness of these systems has been proven in this war, and so of course there will be more of them around going forward.

Kursk has worked because the Russians simply were not ready there. And still aren't apparently.

Edited yesterday at 05:06 PM by dan/california

[ArmouredTopHat]

Extremely rare pov footage of Gepard in action. I expect we might see a revival of such systems given how efficient they are for operational level CUAS. 

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 minute ago, dan/california said:

I haven't seen anything that even pretends to solve for these. And while actual mobile mines would be new tech, artillery and rocket delivered mines are a very real thing right now, and almost as hard to solve for. It is HARD to kill every artillery and MLRS battery within twenty or thirty miles of a breach. Furthermore the effective of these systems has been proven in this war, and so of course there will be more of them around going forward.

Kursk has worked because the Russians simply were not ready there. And still aren't apparently.

The only thing I can suggest is some sort of hunter killer drone that loiters around friendly assets and detects and attacks said mines, but this sounds like a very expensive and complicated drone solution to what is a relatively simple problem that is already on the battlefield in a simple format via remote mining as you say. 

I got nothing else to suggest really, its a disturbing theoretical that could further empower defensive warfare even further than it already is. 

[sburke]

7 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Extremely rare pov footage of Gepard in action. I expect we might see a revival of such systems given how efficient they are for operational level CUAS. 

I don't know if they are or aren't but this seems somewhat contradictory

"extremely rare footage" and then saying how efficient they are.  I would think if they were really good at it, there would be more footage.  Do we have any numbers on kills etc?  Would be pretty interesting to see.  I could easily see a unmanned version that was smaller and more mobile.  if the weapons system is effective, producing a cheaper more easily produced variant sounds like an option.

Edited yesterday at 05:13 PM by sburke

[ArmouredTopHat]

Russian pov of the recent drone strike seems to corroborate the likely theory that whatever hit it had some sort of jet propulsion, it comes in -fast-. 

Also bonus for seeing Russians sh*t themselves. 

[ArmouredTopHat]

8 minutes ago, sburke said:

I don't know if they are or aren't but this seems somewhat contradictory

"extremely rare footage" and then saying how efficient they are.  I would think if they were really good at it, there would be more footage.  Do we have any numbers on kills etc?  Would be pretty interesting to see.  I could easily see a unmanned version that was smaller and more mobile.  if the weapons system is effective, producing a cheaper more easily produced variant sounds like an option.

The AFU are pretty restrictive when it comes to releasing Gepard footage (really air defence footage in general) for whatever reason, but they themselves claim the system is monstrously good at hitting Shaed size drones and praise it very frequently, which is why they have been trying to source ammo for them after Switzerland messed around by not doing so. Germany I believe is now manufacturing and actively sending said ammo to the Ukrainians as I last recall via new production line.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/09/08/ukraines-nearly-50-year-old-gepards-are-still-the-best-air-defense-guns-in-the-world/

https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/analytics/ukraine-s-iron-dome-how-ukrainian-military-1708507826.html

Second source has some evidence on the kill front, one Gepard with 5 shaed kills and 3 cruise missiles. I suspect the issue is less about hitting the target or detecting it but being in a position to shoot at them in the first place. If the latter condition is met the Gepard system seemingly has very little issue in downing the offending target...which makes sense given the radar on it was designed to hit fast moving jets. (And seems remarkably good at detecting medium sized drones despite its age...I suppose the Germans never did anything by halves) 

Edited yesterday at 05:20 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

I dug up a master thread on the Veseloe incursion. Clearly shows that despite a fair bit of overwatch fire and some vehicular losses, the AFU were able to push the fortifications definitively, despite the manned positions (including atgm sites), artillery and drones. The AFU really deserves some praise for being able to strike, breach and push this. 

I really dont think we can call this a poorly defended or thinly held line given the pretty ferocious combat in the area. (I will actually have a seizure if someone claims this was not defended at this point) 
 

 

Edited 23 hours ago by ArmouredTopHat

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I dug up a master thread on the Veseloe incursion. Clearly shows that despite a fair bit of overwatch fire and some vehicular losses, the AFU were able to push the fortifications definitively. 

I really dont think we can call this a poorly defended or thinly held line given the pretty ferocious combat in the area. (I will actually have a seizure if someone claims this was not defended at this point) 
 

 

We clearly have extremely different definitions for what is "light" and what is "heavy" in this context.  I also don't know what you just saw that would qualify as "ferocious", because I've not seen anything that even comes close to being classified as that.  What I define as heavy and ferocious is what was seen in the south in 2023.  If you think the Kursk defenses that Ukraine just breezed through are heavy and ferocious, I am curious what adjective you would use to describe what the 47th Mech encountered last year.

What I see in these videos shows a very lightly defended set of obstacles that were fairly easily breached in broad daylight after plenty of strategic and operational notice that this sort of thing could happen. 

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

29 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

We clearly have extremely different definitions for what is "light" and what is "heavy" in this context.  I also don't know what you just saw that would qualify as "ferocious", because I've not seen anything that even comes close to being classified as that.  What I define as heavy and ferocious is what was seen in the south in 2023.  If you think the Kursk defenses that Ukraine just breezed through are heavy and ferocious, I am curious what adjective you would use to describe what the 47th Mech encountered last year.

What I see in these videos shows a very lightly defended set of obstacles that were fairly easily breached in broad daylight after plenty of strategic and operational notice that this sort of thing could happen. 

Steve

I would describe the conditions the 47th had to deal with last year as nothing short of hellish. Conditions that I doubt even a NATO brigade would of been able to cope with on its own. 

The difference comes from not telegraphing to the Russians where exactly you were going to attack for 6 months and a breaching operation that clearly had a bit more thought into it than the 47th driving into thick minefields under overwatch and helicopter gunship fire. The Kursk operations clearly had a bit more planning put into them and the conditions are more favourable, this does not make it easy or a breeze however.

Obviously the 2023 counter offensive fighting was especially intense and ferocious against the most well defended sections of the line, but that should not take away the fact that the AFU pulled off some pretty difficult breaching here. While the Russian defence is less concentrated, the same is true for the AFU units attacking. Source below indicates perhaps two battalions taking part in the fresh incursion. 

Ukrainian sources certainly indicate that the most recent incursion is being quite a bit more defended against than the first, presumably owing to Russians actually having reserves in the area now. 

https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/09/16/forbes-ukraine-expands-incursion-into-russia-with-new-thrust-into-kursk-oblast/

This source at least suggests Khorne group are claiming to be going up against VDV as well as conscripts. 

Edited 23 hours ago by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cwyl9048gx8t

Walkie talkies are now exploding across Lebanon, along with potentially other electronics. Either a lot of procurement was compromised or batteries overloaded I guess. Crazy amount of disruption though that could have implications for conflict elsewhere. 

Not a good week to be in Hezbollah...

Edited 23 hours ago by ArmouredTopHat

[sburke]

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I dug up a master thread on the Veseloe incursion. Clearly shows that despite a fair bit of overwatch fire and some vehicular losses, the AFU were able to push the fortifications definitively, despite the manned positions (including atgm sites), artillery and drones. The AFU really deserves some praise for being able to strike, breach and push this. 

I really dont think we can call this a poorly defended or thinly held line given the pretty ferocious combat in the area. (I will actually have a seizure if someone claims this was not defended at this point) 
 

 

It was not defended.  At all.  fake pics.  Nobody was there....... (checks ATH cardiogram) Nah!  Stand down, he looks good. I think he was just joking.

[TheVulture]

Not got a good link yet,  but the BBC are reporting that in a follow up to the Hizbollah exploding pager event,  today there's been a similar attack with exploding walkie-talkies killing 14 and injuring around 450 across Lebannon.

Apparently Mossad (or whoever did the first attack) figured they had to use it now or lose the capability once Hizbollah started looking more closely at their consumer electronics.

[TheVulture]

 

15 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

Not got a good link yet,  but the BBC are reporting that in a follow up to the Hizbollah exploding pager event,  today there's been a similar attack with exploding walkie-talkies killing 14 and injuring around 450 across Lebannon.

Apparently Mossad (or whoever did the first attack) figured they had to use it now or lose the capability once Hizbollah started looking more closely at their consumer electronics.

Excerpt from BBC:

 

The latest from Lebanon in three parts

published at 19:28 British Summer Time

19:28 BST

It's been around four hours since we first received reports of exploding walkie-talkies in southern Lebanon.

 

In the aftermath, the BBC's Hugo Bachega described seeing chaos in Dahiya, a suburb of Lebanon's capital Beirut and a Hezbollah stronghold. Here's where things stand now.

 

Exploding walkie-talkies: There were frenetic scenes this afternoon as reports emerged of more communication devices blowing up in Lebanon. The UN Security Council is set to meet to discuss the situation before the end of the week, and its secretary general Antonio Guterres is "deeply alarmed" by the situation.

 

Aftermath of yesterday: Funerals were held today in Beirut for victims of Tuesday's pager blasts. Several countries, including Russia and Iran, have backed Lebanon and blamed Israel for the action. Israel has remained silent and the US says it had no involvement. Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant also said the country is "opening a new phase in the war".

 

Death toll and injuries: Fourteen people have died today, and a further 450 are injured, after the latest attacks. Yesterday's pager blasts killed 12 people and left almost 3,000 injured. Doctors have reported treating patients with severe eye and hand injuries.

Edited 22 hours ago by TheVulture

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I would describe the conditions the 47th had to deal with last year as nothing short of hellish. Conditions that I doubt even a NATO brigade would of been able to cope with on its own. 

The difference comes from not telegraphing to the Russians where exactly you were going to attack for 6 months and a breaching operation that clearly had a bit more thought into it than the 47th driving into thick minefields under overwatch and helicopter gunship fire. The Kursk operations clearly had a bit more planning put into them and the conditions are more favourable, this does not make it easy or a breeze however.

Obviously the 2023 counter offensive fighting was especially intense and ferocious against the most well defended sections of the line, but that should not take away the fact that the AFU pulled off some pretty difficult breaching here. While the Russian defence is less concentrated, the same is true for the AFU units attacking. Source below indicates perhaps two battalions taking part in the fresh incursion. 

Ukrainian sources certainly indicate that the most recent incursion is being quite a bit more defended against than the first, presumably owing to Russians actually having reserves in the area now. 

https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/09/16/forbes-ukraine-expands-incursion-into-russia-with-new-thrust-into-kursk-oblast/

This source at least suggests Khorne group are claiming to be going up against VDV as well as conscripts. 

Well for sure it helped that the Russians weren't as prepared for this offensive compared to the 23 one. But, even before that offensive was 'announced' the Russians were already creating a massive defensive line there; to protect their land bridge. Which we were making fun of at first, but 3km (IIRC) deep mixed minefields turned out to be quite the obstacle. Even if only held lightly by some troops  in hardened strongpoints with ATGMs, drones, drone directed/corrected artillery and a couple of KA-52s on call. 

The obstacle on the Kursk border seemed to be a 30m deep minefield with some barbed wire and loosely placed dragon teeth. Now that might be a bit of an exaggeration, but the fighting for the border was quite 'rapid' IIRC. A few drone strikes/artillery, some point blank tank fires and all defenders surrendered. 

I don't think the success comes from more planning, there is no evidence that they planned 'more' for this.

They had a better plan, perhaps, although after the fact that is easy to conclude :). Operational security was more strict as well, that is clear.
But it isn't really complex; They attacked where defense was lighter, so they got through more easy. That was basically the reason that this 'breach operation' succeeded while the previous year one faltered with serious casualties and little gain.

Edited 22 hours ago by Lethaface

[FancyCat]

Gepards are partly expensive since they stopped making them...and the West was sleeping on drones rising...in 2013, if what im reading is correct, Jordan purchased 60 of them for 23 million euros, or about 350,000 euros per. According to Haaretz, costs of Shahed-136 drones are 193k but once Russia has domestic production, down to $50k potentially. If a single Gepard takes down 3 or 5 of them, definitely worth the cost. As for lack of footage, tapping down on air defense assets being located via footage is always good. 

https://thedefensepost.com/2023/11/14/us-jordan-gepard-systems-ukraine/

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2024-02-21/ty-article-magazine/gold-for-drones-massive-leak-reveals-the-iranian-shahed-project-in-russia/0000018d-bb85-dd5e-a59d-ffb729890000

[dan/california]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Given Ukraine's ability to blow things up 2x further than Toropets, I'm surprised they didn't hit this sooner.

Steve

Ukraine Today said they sent over a hundred drones at that base to get ~five through the defenses. Pretty clear they waited until they had the throw weight to get it done. IMHO anyway.

42 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

Not got a good link yet,  but the BBC are reporting that in a follow up to the Hizbollah exploding pager event,  today there's been a similar attack with exploding walkie-talkies killing 14 and injuring around 450 across Lebannon.

Apparently Mossad (or whoever did the first attack) figured they had to use it now or lose the capability once Hizbollah started looking more closely at their consumer electronics.

The the next question in Lebanon is does The Israeli hacking of absolutely EVERYTHING extend to actual munitions. If tomorrow morning even a quarter of Hezbollah's missiles go sky high in place....

29 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Gepards are partly expensive since they stopped making them...and the West was sleeping on drones rising...in 2013, if what im reading is correct, Jordan purchased 60 of them for 23 million euros, or about 350,000 euros per. According to Haaretz, costs of Shahed-136 drones are 193k but once Russia has domestic production, down to $50k potentially. If a single Gepard takes down 3 or 5 of them, definitely worth the cost. As for lack of footage, tapping down on air defense assets being located via footage is always good. 

https://thedefensepost.com/2023/11/14/us-jordan-gepard-systems-ukraine/

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2024-02-21/ty-article-magazine/gold-for-drones-massive-leak-reveals-the-iranian-shahed-project-in-russia/0000018d-bb85-dd5e-a59d-ffb729890000

There is only one thing wrong with Gepards, NATO needs 5,000 of them. Even if truly mass production were applied in the most efficient way possible that would be an almost incomprehensibly large number. And that would be five thousand crews, and a whole logistics chain that needs paying for, more or less forever. For the sake of all of our tax bills I am hoping drones killing drones works out.

2 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Extremely rare pov footage of Gepard in action. I expect we might see a revival of such systems given how efficient they are for operational level CUAS. 

See above...

Edited 21 hours ago by dan/california

[sburke]

53 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Gepards are partly expensive since they stopped making them...and the West was sleeping on drones rising...in 2013, if what im reading is correct, Jordan purchased 60 of them for 23 million euros, or about 350,000 euros per. According to Haaretz, costs of Shahed-136 drones are 193k but once Russia has domestic production, down to $50k potentially. If a single Gepard takes down 3 or 5 of them, definitely worth the cost. As for lack of footage, tapping down on air defense assets being located via footage is always good. 

https://thedefensepost.com/2023/11/14/us-jordan-gepard-systems-ukraine/

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2024-02-21/ty-article-magazine/gold-for-drones-massive-leak-reveals-the-iranian-shahed-project-in-russia/0000018d-bb85-dd5e-a59d-ffb729890000

True - but one thought on this

it isn't the Gepard, but rather the weapons system it carries.  I would bet that a better platform could be designed, possibly even unmanned that would be cheaper and in theory produce the same result.  If it really is an effective platform, it seems worth at least a review of options.  if the defensive platform is effective enough to change the situation where the offensive weapons become effectively costlier than defensive - winner winner chicken dinner.

[sburke]

30 minutes ago, dan/california said:

There is only one thing wrong with Gepards, NATO needs 5,000 of them. Even if truly mass production were applied in the most efficient way possible that would be an almost incomprehensibly large number. And that would be five thousand crews, and a whole logistics chain that needs paying for, more or less forever. For the sake of all of our tax bills I am hoping drones killing drones works out.

See above...

Well we have 8000 M1s in the US.... crazy huh?    maybe we take 5000 of them, remove the existing turrets and mount Gepard turrets.  LOL  Just kidding... I think.

[poesel]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

  How much does A SINGLE Ogre cost?  We don't know, but let's be super generous and say $20m fully outfitted.

Rheinmetall asked about €150m for 24 of them. So 'just' about €6m a pop.

[Butschi]

3 hours ago, dan/california said:

I haven't seen anything that even pretends to solve for these. And while actual mobile mines would be new tech, artillery and rocket delivered mines are a very real thing right now, and almost as hard to solve for. It is HARD to kill every artillery and MLRS battery within twenty or thirty miles of a breach. Furthermore the effectiveness of these systems has been proven in this war, and so of course there will be more of them around going forward.

Kursk has worked because the Russians simply were not ready there. And still aren't apparently.

So maybe I'm a bit naive here but I imagine that within the context of a breaching operation, mobile mines might be much easier to solve for. I admit I don't know how you defect mines using drones in the first place. But anyway, given you want to keep a fairly limited amount of ground free of mines, like a number of lanes, isn't all you have to actually do keeping a few drones in the air that that monitor these lanes? If you are able to field a thousand drones to clear the lanes you will certainly be able to spare enough to monitor the cleared lanes. Now, while detecting mines may usually be complicated, I imagine detecting moving mines in an area you keep eyes on is much easier, as that should even be doable comparing camera images (instead of specialized sensors). This scenario at least seems much simpler than moving mines that crawl into all the places you can't keep monitoring.

I find two issue with using masses of drones for demining btw:

1. Although individual drones are small, massing thousands of drones, supplies and controlling equipment in a limited area is certain to picked up by an opponent. (Not to mention the force that is actually going to go through the minefield...) So you are kind of back to the problem that massing gets detected and probably stopped early. But maybe it is still easier to disperse?

2. I am convinced AI can do it but we are not really there just yet, I think. So, for now you'd have to coordinate lots of remote controlled drones. That doesn't sound so much fun. Plus, as this happens in a small area, jamming is really effective. 

 

[akd]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

True - but one thought on this

it isn't the Gepard, but rather the weapons system it carries.  I would bet that a better platform could be designed, possibly even unmanned that would be cheaper and in theory produce the same result.  If it really is an effective platform, it seems worth at least a review of options.  if the defensive platform is effective enough to change the situation where the offensive weapons become effectively costlier than defensive - winner winner chicken dinner.

ahem…

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skyshield

[sburke]

35 minutes ago, Butschi said:

So maybe I'm a bit naive here but I imagine that within the context of a breaching operation, mobile mines might be much easier to solve for. I admit I don't know how you defect mines using drones in the first place. But anyway, given you want to keep a fairly limited amount of ground free of mines, like a number of lanes, isn't all you have to actually do keeping a few drones in the air that that monitor these lanes? If you are able to field a thousand drones to clear the lanes you will certainly be able to spare enough to monitor the cleared lanes. Now, while detecting mines may usually be complicated, I imagine detecting moving mines in an area you keep eyes on is much easier, as that should even be doable comparing camera images (instead of specialized sensors). This scenario at least seems much simpler than moving mines that crawl into all the places you can't keep monitoring.

I find two issue with using masses of drones for demining btw:

1. Although individual drones are small, massing thousands of drones, supplies and controlling equipment in a limited area is certain to picked up by an opponent. (Not to mention the force that is actually going to go through the minefield...) So you are kind of back to the problem that massing gets detected and probably stopped early. But maybe it is still easier to disperse?

2. I am convinced AI can do it but we are not really there just yet, I think. So, for now you'd have to coordinate lots of remote controlled drones. That doesn't sound so much fun. Plus, as this happens in a small area, jamming is really effective. 

 

I think your view of the moving mines is pretty accurate.  They should be simpler to watch for and respond to.  Sure they can be briefly disruptive in that you'd have to stop traffic, clear them etc, but still not overly difficult.

in terms of masses of drones I am not sure I agree. The supplies and controlling equipment could be a huge distance away.  The controller could be connected via antenna, so I don't know what the limiting factor there is on when distance becomes an issue. The drones themselves are the only thing that needs to be near the breech.

on the other hand as you noted the actual offensive force is still out there.  Seismic sensors could detect the actual breeching attack.  Now you have the attacking force probably located, then the actual points of the breeching attack - wouldn't take a whole lot to just shut that down right quick.

The layers of force it takes to conduct the attack including the breech and the exploitation force not to mention the logistical tail that now has to traverse the known cleared lanes just makes the whole thing very susceptible to counter attack.  The drones may make the clearing option itself faster and safer, but that is the only part of the equation it might solve for.

The UA successfully pushed through at Kursk.  Now we do not know what their goal was or just how big the force commitment was, but they did not obtain an operational breakthrough.  Not sure they have either the resources to or if they even considered it.  That offensive was likely about as optimal as the UA can hope for in terms of defensive depth and covering force resources.  We do know that the UA down south without the uber extensive minefields and struggling to keep up manpower resources while also committing an offensive up north is still trashing units of the RA.  I suspect if the UA could lay mines as extensively as the RA we wouldn't be seeing much movement at all down south.

It is kind of funny we are getting wrapped up in figuring out how to breech a defensive line with minefields when it doesn't seem we have answered how to conduct an offensive even without minefields.