How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

1 minute ago, Bulletpoint said:

They had been holding out in that tiny village less than 500x500 metres for nearly a month (since 20/08). Sounds to me like they were shelled into submission and finally overrun.

Im not sure I agree.  Ive  seen other posts emphasizing the rapid cutting nature, implying flank collapses, cutting reinforcement etc. 

[Bulletpoint]

15 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Im not sure I agree.  Ive  seen other posts emphasizing the rapid cutting nature, implying flank collapses, cutting reinforcement etc. 

I'm sure they did everything they could. But that little village has been jutting out like a salient since 20/08. I'm really surprised they held out so long.

And just in case anybody thinks I'm trying to praise the Russian army - no, I'm not.

I'm just saying that when a village barely 500x500 metres is able to hold out for nearly a month despite being surrounded on three sides, only to finally get totally destroyed instead of surrendering, then that doesn't sound like the typical story of clueless and demotivated mobiks that we so often hear.

Hopefully those guys were the last competent Russians in the army, because if they have many more of the same kind, then this will be a long war.

Edited September 15, 2023 by Bulletpoint

[holoween]

46 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Why UA is not massing?  Well it may also be for the same reason the RA has avoided it, mass is dangerous.  The few times last year the RA tried massing they got severely damaged doing so.  We saw the UA go through the same thing earlier this summer.  The reason is that massing dramatically increases ISR signatures and opens one up to counters.  There has been a drive towards higher distribution of forces this entire war and I do not think it is a question of coordination or ability as much as it is that concentration of forces is a good way to lose them.

The UA’s current “small bites” is not that different from the RA’s over the winter, albeit delivered via different tactical capability.  I suspect they are small-biting until the RA are eroded to a point that UA massing cannot be countered, then we may see a larger concentrated break out.  For now I am not even sure traditional air superiority would do it as ISR is everywhere and unmanned/PGM cannot be countered by conventional air systems.

I have heard this “well why are they not just doing X?” from western military experts and the answer is likely “because they tried that and it does not work”.  I also am starting to believe that “not working” is not due to UA shortfalls in C2 or training after 18 months of western support and lessons learned from this war.  Instead it is likely due to shifts in warfare itself.

They dont need to actually mass in the sense of more troops per km of frontline.

Take their current company attack occupying maybe 2km of frontline. now add another 2 on each flank. the overall attack now occupies 10 km.

You now have reduced the enemys guns able to react to each individual attack significantly. Same goes for the own firesupport but massing your own guns in such an area is far faster than the enemys reaction.

Couple the attack with strikes on the hqs and you also dramatically reduce the reaction times when it matters.

Have reserve forces ready to push further oncr the first wave has taken the forward lines.

You never have forces more densely packed than currently, can dilute the defenders support and potentially cause a catastrophic failure of the defense.

Maybe ukraine is already doing this and were just not hearing it or they arent for some reason.

And i would be cautious with assuming ukrainians are doing everything as they should from a nato perspective. I wasnt particularly impressed with the performance of the ukrainians we trained so im skeptical their officers are generally much better.

[Kinophile]

Hmmm stubbornness in simple defence is a classic Russian trope, and extensively exhibited in this War. 

Im more interested in the actions surrounding the brigade,  how UKR was able to penetrate and cut off such a significant contingent and also beat off the relief attempts. 

How much maneuver did they actually do? How heavy was the mech aspect?  

@Haiduk do you know which UKR units,  incl artillery,  were involved? 

[Kinophile]

Separately,  on the drone/counter drone front,  UKMoD is looking at soldier level defence. 

https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/smartshooter-showcases-british-army-smash-technology-at-dsei-2023/

I can see a point soon where every soldier carries Drones on them like hand grenades, acting as personal bodyguards v Drones. 

Edited September 15, 2023 by Kinophile

[Centurian52]

14 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

Maybe there's gonna do the crossing of the river (in large force) or an amphibious operation with the Russians stretched?

I assume the constant raiding across the Dnipro is about keeping up a constant pressure, so that the Russians either have to maintain forces to prevent a river crossing or suffer the Ukrainians actually conducting a river crossing. I seriously doubt they have any major river crossing operation planned beyond being ready to conduct an opportunistic crossing if the Russians ever move too many units away.

As for an amphibious invasion of Crimea, I don't think it's even on the cards. Amphibious invasions are extremely risky and difficult (complicated to supply and reinforce, and failure could mean the loss of the entire invasion force). Historically they are only conducted when success is virtually guaranteed. Air and naval superiority are also generally considered prerequisites for any amphibious invasion.

[cesmonkey]

https://lenta.ru/news/2023/09/15/back/
The State Duma announced the deadline for the return of those mobilized from the Northern Military District zone
 

Quote

He also spoke about the rotation of military personnel at the expense of contract soldiers.

“They will return home after the completion of a special military operation. No rotation is provided. They are entitled to leave for every six months of service, and they now go on these holidays,” the deputy stated the return date.

The parliamentarian noted that the vacation period does not include time spent on travel. Kartapolov also named the goal of active recruitment of contract soldiers by the Ministry of Defense.

 

[Centurian52]

13 hours ago, Halmbarte said:

An isolated Crimea with supplies barely tricking in is a jail for Russians that aren't quite POWs. How long does Putin let Russian soldiers in Crimea die from malnutrition & disease? 

H

I think we've established that starving the Russians in Crimea isn't an ideal way of defeating them, since that starves the civilians too. In fact it might be worse for the civilians, since the Russians will probably steal food from the civilians before starving themselves.

But once Crimea is cut off the Russians won't just be cut off from food resupply, but from ammunition resupply and reinforcements as well. Their ability to resist a determined push will be decidedly finite. It might still come to starving them (if that's what it takes then that's what it takes), but for the sake of keeping civilian suffering to a minimum I don't think that should be plan A.

[The_Capt]

42 minutes ago, holoween said:

They dont need to actually mass in the sense of more troops per km of frontline.

Take their current company attack occupying maybe 2km of frontline. now add another 2 on each flank. the overall attack now occupies 10 km.

You now have reduced the enemys guns able to react to each individual attack significantly. Same goes for the own firesupport but massing your own guns in such an area is far faster than the enemys reaction.

Couple the attack with strikes on the hqs and you also dramatically reduce the reaction times when it matters.

Have reserve forces ready to push further oncr the first wave has taken the forward lines.

You never have forces more densely packed than currently, can dilute the defenders support and potentially cause a catastrophic failure of the defense.

Maybe ukraine is already doing this and were just not hearing it or they arent for some reason.

And i would be cautious with assuming ukrainians are doing everything as they should from a nato perspective. I wasnt particularly impressed with the performance of the ukrainians we trained so im skeptical their officers are generally much better.

It is not the frontage in contact, it is the mounting.  You have to get that Battalion with enablers to the front line on visible LOCs.  So vertical density, not horizontal.  It is what killed the RA last summer.

As to UA capability, I have heard similar tactical anecdotes but the UA has already demonstrated an ability to conduct large scale manoeuvre last fall at Kharkov.  They also used the "Coy - bites" approach at Kherson, which also worked in the end.  I know they have senior officers on some pretty high level courses in the US and Canada, so they have the command skills being taught.

I am not sure how anyone is supposed to cram several coys through minefield belts kms deep while their opponent has eyes all over the sky, long range ATGMs that cannot be cleared and artillery.  Toss in a few helicopters able to hit out to 10kms and I think the "NATO perspective" may be the problem.  The act of driving such a force to the front is going to set of all sorts of alarms and counter-fires...and this is the RA we are talking about.  It also answers the question as to why the RA has not been able to conduct massed formation manoeuvre even though their doctrine is built on it.

This whole NATO "everyone is doing it wrong except us" is a really bad way to go in my opinion.  

[FancyCat]

This is a war of attrition. It would be a strategic mistake for the West to cut and run or pursue negotiations without battlefield pressure on Russia. Putin and Co have wagered that the West is incapable of long term conflict, if we fail to demolish that motion, then we reinforce that notion, and we make it more likely for China to consider the same in regards to Taiwan, and it make it harder for the West to reassure vulnerable allies of our commitment. If the nature of warfare is shifting such that favors attrition, then we need to ask if it's so wise for the west to forgo long term commitment to Ukraine and not signal to potential anti-china states like Vietnam, India, South Korea, the Philippines, that Western power is not there to stay.

Also I'm unsure if the burden on the West is such that it's actively causing issues at home. Oh sure billions thrown about make big headlines but let's put it in focus. A lot of this is military procurement, a lot of this does translate back home as jobs, investment, long term investment in military buildup of reserves.

And finally we have no indications that Putin and co are willing to negotiate terms that don't result in a Ukraine that is 1. At risk of further Russian offensives, 2. Inspire a Ukraine that can operate under NATO or EU membership.

I will express my opinion right now, there will never be EU or NATO membership for Ukraine as long as territorial issues remain unsettled by the force of Russian arms.

Unless territory is traded in exchange for NATO and EU membership, and codified, the EU and NATO will be too chicken**** to allow Ukraine to join in fear of a conflict with Russia.

The only option for the West is to match Putin and arm and reinforce Ukraine with the aim of reconquering occupied Ukraine with military force. The only way your gonna get Putin to the table is by offering him the option of battlefield defeat or "goodwill gesture Kherson 2.0".

And I certainly don't see any reason why our military industrial complex cannot ramp up to meet the occasion. I honestly think it's essential for the West to prove itself here, lest we find ourselves with emboldened enemies and fights that aren't proxy wars.

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

I will express my opinion right now, there will never be EU or NATO membership for Ukraine as long as territorial issues remain unsettled by the force of Russian arms

Good points but I disagree here.  First off, this falls into the "Russian total defeat" trap.  By this criteria, Ukraine will never be allowed to join NATO/EU without a total defeat of the entire Russian state.  By setting this as a condition we actually incentivize Russia to keep an open wound in Ukraine as a counter to their being pulled into the western sphere.  Russian force of arms could "unsettle territorial issues" indefinitely even if they do suffer major battlefield defeats.

Second, NATO is not that binary.  We left Greece and Turkey in after that little tussle down in Cyprus.  We pulled Finland into NATO in months after people went on about how it will take years.  There is a whole lotta "NATO will never" going on, which has been challenged quite a bit as a result of this war.

[Butschi]

2 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

This is an interesting perspective, and you may well be right about the Russian war culture. But I don't think the Western audience is so worried by high Ukrainian casualties. Saddened, yes, but we are saddened every time we turn on the news. It's not our countrymen returning home in boxes - apart from a few Western volunteers of course.

I think the main narrative shift is from "this war will be won easily" to "this war will be won with high losses" and then finally to "this war cannot be won - we need a negotiated settlement". In this shift, it matters a lot whether Ukraine is making gains on the battlefield or not.

Again, I might be wrong about the offensive failing. I have been wrong before about this war. But I think there's a lot at stake here in these last few weeks before winter.

From the German perspective: A failed offensive doesn't mean we are just going to cancel support for Ukraine. Not because we are so kind and patient but because it  just doesn't work like that.

While still quite present in the media, the war has transitioned to being one of multiple crises we are facing. The prime topic is Germany sliding into a full fledged recession, I'd say. So every Euro spent that Germans don't profit from directly will be that much harder to justify. Currently we are seeing a surge in approval for the far right AfD. This is mostly due to domestic topics but especially the conservatives try to regain voters by taking AfD positions. AfD is quite Putin friendly and has been demanding negotiations and stuff like that basically since the start of the war.

The other parties won't just copy the AfD stance, that would still be political suicide. But with a failed offensive I guess(!) we may see an increase in politicians stepping forward and arguing we should, while of course still supporting Ukraine 100%, try to meditate between Russia and Ukraine. Because of the human cost, suffering civilians and all that. And maybe, because we absolutely like to present ourselves as honest brokers, there will be an increased reluctance to send over the latest and greatest equipment - on top of the already existing reluctance, of course.

[Centurian52]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This will be an interesting read

That quote above is completely valid.  Simulations and gaming (a type of simulation) are double edged swords.  Done right, they can provide valuable insights and help shape policy, weapons, tactics, future purchases, etc.  Those in turn can produce better results quicker than they otherwise could have come about.  However, done wrong and the exact opposite can happen.

Two examples from this war:

1.  A wargame was conducted while Russian forces were surrounding Kyiv and occupying what was their maximum footprint north of Kharkiv.  It made all sorts of dire predictions, but in the few days between when they conducted the wargame and published the results, Russian forces pulled out of northern Ukraine because they were totally spent and teetering on operational collapse.  The wargame obviously got it very, very wrong.  What decisions were made by the US and its allies, even Ukraine, based on flawed analysis like this?  I don't know, but I doubt the answer was "none at all".

2.  General Milley stated that wargaming/simulations done with the Ukrainians ahead of the counter-offensive indicated Ukraine would make much faster progress than it has.  This, no doubt, is part of the inflated expectations for what Ukraine could do and therefore questioning them.  Me?  I think it is more likely that there were some fundamental mistakes made by NATO planners in assumptions about what NATO training and equipment could do in the face of thick Russian defenses.  We're still seeing these perception errors playing out now so it's unclear how much impact they have had, but again I would bet it isn't "none at all".

The first example is a carry over of what existed before the war, which was a gross overestimation of Russia's capabilities, an underestimation of everybody else (not just Ukraine).  Two examples of the US getting it wrong about its own capabilities matched up against Russia's:

The US Army Doesn't Seem Real Sure It Could Stop a Russian Invasion of Europe

https://www.vice.com/en/article/j59kyy/the-us-army-may-not-be-able-to-hold-off-russian-attack-in-europe

And this as well:

If Russia started a war in the Baltics, NATO would lose in 36 hours

https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-could-steamroll-into-the-capitals-of-natos-most-exposed-members-in-36-hours-2016-2

I remember when these reports came out and I vehemently disagreed.  I thought they were fundamentally flawed in large part because I thought the Baltic countries would fight more-or-less as Ukraine did and that Russia would, more-or-less, have similar problems as it did in February and March.

However, proving that a good analysis of a bad wargame/sim can produce good results... not that it matters a hill of beans, but looking at this stuff back in 2016 caused me to think about Russia's problems and NATO's strengths in a way that gave me great confidence well ahead of January 2022 that Russia was going to get its arse handed to it.  If I had not see this report in 2016, I might not have been so sure.

Steve

I'm very pro-simulation as a learning tool (I really feel that CMAK, CMBN, CMFI, CMRT, and CMFB have given me insights into the tactical level of WW2 that even some fairly reputable WW2 historians lack). But I think there is a right way to do it. For one thing, just any old game won't do. It needs to model reality as closely as possible (it needs to be a good wargame). The number of rules it takes to do a half decent job of modeling reality is probably more than any human player could be reasonably expected to learn or remember, so I really think computer wargames (which can have an almost endless number of rules, all being processed by a CPU instead of a human brain) are the only way to go (it's actually a bit distressing that the US DoD is still relying on tabletop wargames). 

It also needs to be recognized that even the best game will never do a perfect job of modeling reality (no offense intended, but I could produce a pretty lengthy list of ways in which even Combat Mission falls a bit short of reality). Any attempt to use wargames to learn or develop modern tactics, or predict the course of a modern war, should begin and end with a discussion of all of the ways in which the wargame doesn't quite match reality, and how those deltas might have influenced the outcome. When using wargames as an aid to studying military history, I think they need to be combined with a healthy amount of reading to help identify elements that the wargame may have missed or imperfectly modeled (I really do advocate this approach, since I think you can learn a lot more about different eras of warfare from wargaming + reading than you can from reading alone).

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

Hmmm stubbornness in simple defence is a classic Russian trope, and extensively exhibited in this War. 

Im more interested in the actions surrounding the brigade,  how UKR was able to penetrate and cut off such a significant contingent and also beat off the relief attempts. 

How much maneuver did they actually do? How heavy was the mech aspect?  

@Haiduk do you know which UKR units,  incl artillery,  were involved? 

This is the issue that many, and in this case Bulletpoint, are missing in the analysis.  I'll illustrate...

Russians hold tiny village or position with 100 men.

Ukraine attacks and in a day or two renders those 100 men combat ineffective (dead, wounded, exhausted, demoralized).

Ukraine then moves to try and occupy the position and finds it is still defended by 100 men that were pushed in at night or even during the battle.

Ukraine attacks again and in a day or two renders those 100 men combat ineffective ()dead, wounded, exhausted, demoralized).

Ukraine then moves to try and occupy the position and finds it is still defended by 100 men that were pushed in the night or even during the battle.

Ukraine attacks again and in a day or two renders those 100 men combat ineffective ()dead, wounded, exhausted, demoralized).

Ukraine then moves to try and occupy the position and finds it is still defended by 100 men that were pushed in the night or even during the battle.

OK, my setup for the point is established

The situation results in a position that Ukraine should logically be able to take precisely because Russia is illogically expending Human and material capital completely out of proportion to the position's actual value.

Russian counter attacks are similar in nature, where you might say "holy crap, Russia is an offensive juggernaut!" because X brigade mounts 3 attacks per day for a week.  But in reality very few of the soldiers from Day X are available for Day Y because they are not fit for combat.

And this gets me to addressing Bulletpoint's "heresy".  Next post for that.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

I know it's almost heresy to say on these forums, but as we are now halfway through September and Ukraine is still quite far from Tokmak, and Tokmak is quite far away from the sea of Azov, I've begun considering the offensive a failure.

I know it's almost heresy to say on these forums, but as we are now halfway through September and Ukraine is still quite far from Tokmak, and Tokmak is quite far away from the sea of Azov, I've begun considering the offensive a failure.

For sure it isn't hearsay.  I don't think there is anybody here who would say the counter-offensive has met expectations, even for those of us (like me) who had far lower expectations than others.  I would have been quite pleased for them to be in Tokmak right now while others thought Sevastopol.  That's quite a big range to judge what has actually hapened.

 

7 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

Ukraine has been fighting hard and taken heavy losses, and still only have very few gains to show for it. The Verbove penetration is only about 10x10 kilometres and even though it's now two weeks since the Russian line was claimed to be penetrated, the front line has barely moved since then.

This, again, is part of the problem with evaluating the relative success of this counter-offensive.  Ukraine was never, and will never, win this war by retaking terrain.  It will only win by defeating Russia.  This is NOT word gymnastics or two ways of saying the same thing.  These are two entirely different concepts.

In the first concept the measure of success is counted in meters.  The second concept the measure of success is Russia's ability to continue fighting the war.  In the end they might both amount to Russia defeated and Ukraine's territory liberated, but WHILE the fighting is going on there's a massive difference in how to evaluate Ukraine's progress towards that ultimate goal.

7 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

Ukraine has been fighting hard and taken heavy losses, and still only have very few gains to show for it. The Verbove penetration is only about 10x10 kilometres and even though it's now two weeks since the Russian line was claimed to be penetrated, the front line has barely moved since then.

Let me use an analogy.

Company A and B are fighting for market share for a Gizmo.  They are the only two in the market and, ultimately, both company's shareholders are going to judge their interest in supporting the company based on Gizmo market share.

Company A started out with full market share, Company B came in and took a large chunk of it.  This is Company A's only product, Company B has lots of other things to focus on.

The two companies are expending enormous resources to change the equation in their favor.  At any given time, though, it looks like Company B is holding what it took with Company A nibbling at the margins.  From the outside it might look like Company A has lost the battle for market share.

In reality Company A is able to secure the financial and intellectual capital it needs to keep pushing to regain its market share.  Company B, on the other hand, is dysfunctional and rife with bad management.  For sure they still hold most of the Gizmo market it took from Company A, but it's in real financial and intellectual trouble.  The shareholders are not very bright or vocal, but they aren't happy either.  Some of the larger shareholders are extremely unhappy. 

All the while Company B is finding it harder and harder to maintain what it took because Company A still has plenty of resources to throw into the battle.

Then one day Company B files for bankruptcy and is forced to restructure, exiting the Gizmo market completely as part of that process.

 

No analogy is perfect or nuanced enough to really mimic a complex real life situation, but the above is close.  Ukraine is wearing out Russia's ability to keep the terrain it has.  Looking at a map is not really all that meaningful.

 

7 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

I'm thinking about what will happen if it has indeed failed. Just for the sake of the argument, let's say autumn rain and mud arrives and Ukraine is still barely halfway to Tokmak. What happens then?

Presuming I accept your concept of "failure" (I wholeheartedly do not), the fighting will continue with Russia ever weakening towards collapse.  When will collapse happen?  Nobody knows.  Logically it should have happened long ago, but as we keep saying... Russians are not logical in the same way we are.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

9 hours ago, Doc844 said:

I would not be surprised if we see something really break on the RA defensive line in the next week or so and I mean REALLY break.  The timing of all these strikes is just to specific.  Thoughts?

These ships were in drydock and everybody knew it.  Ukraine has had Storm Shadows for many months now and Russia's ability to knock them out of the sky hasn't been all that good.  Putting aside some possible complications that needed to be worked out, it does seem like Ukraine could have zapped these ships at any time in the past few months.

I am thinking along the same lines as you that Ukraine deliberately set the drydock aside as a target until there was a specific time they felt would maximize its effect.

Think about it... this was no target of opportunity.  There is, in fact, few better targets to put aside for timing reasons than massive ships sitting in dry dock.  They aren't going anywhere without ample warning.  If Ukraine saw water being put into the dry docks they could have said "timing be damned, let's pop them before they leave" they could have done that.  A functional ship, even moored or docked, doesn't present the same opportunities for flexibility.

Steve

P.S.  thanks for the bayonet drill perspective.  Yes, sometimes soldiers are trained to do things or in a way that might seem silly, but still has meaning.  Marching in parade formation, for example, is not just about looking sexy for prospective mates

[Centurian52]

6 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

I know it's almost heresy to say on these forums, but as we are now halfway through September and Ukraine is still quite far from Tokmak, and Tokmak is quite far away from the sea of Azov, I've begun considering the offensive a failure.

Of course I can't say for sure. I'm no military expert, and I don't have access to much information. Maybe the Russians are close to breaking point and collapse. Hopefully they are. But the front line is just not moving very much.

Ukraine has been fighting hard and taken heavy losses, and still only have very few gains to show for it. The Verbove penetration is only about 10x10 kilometres and even though it's now two weeks since the Russian line was claimed to be penetrated, the front line has barely moved since then.

But I'm not writing this to start another debate about whther the offensive has failed or not.

I'm thinking about what will happen if it has indeed failed. Just for the sake of the argument, let's say autumn rain and mud arrives and Ukraine is still barely halfway to Tokmak. What happens then?

I'm guessing both sides would try to struggle on through autumn and winter, but mostly the war would be in pause. How does the situation look next spring, then, both militarily and on the political level?

For all the talk about whether the Russian people are fed up with the war, how about Western voters? When I look around here in Denmark, it seems the war has gone from a matter of great urgency to just background noise. I think that a failed offensive would lead many people in the west to conclude that this was is not really winnable.

Before, there was this sense that since Ukraine had beaten Russia so badly in the beginning of the war, with Russia at full strenght and Ukraine armed with pitchforks and home-made molotovs, surely the Ukrainian counteroffensive would be a great success now that Russia has been mauled and Ukraine has been supplied with some of the best weapons NATO has to offer. Yet that's not what we see. And I think that's a sobering thought for many.

Not heresy at all. I'll grant that there seems to be a positive correlation between people who voice doubts about Ukraine's capabilities and people who have trouble following basic etiquette for healthy discourse. And that may have had the unfortunate side effect of giving the impression that this community is hostile to any naysaying towards Ukraine (maybe it is a little). But I believe this community is open to bad news if it can be supported.

I'll admit that I've started to have doubts that Ukraine can reach the Sea of Azov this year. The offensive has been going very slowly after all, and they haven't taken anywhere near as much ground as I think most of us had hoped by this point (I don't think I was expecting them to reach the sea in days, but I had certainly expected that they would have reached the sea after three months). But it's easy enough to find counterpoints.

• First, the offensive isn't a failure until it is over. And I think the Ukrainians can continue to maintain the offensive for a very long time.
• Part of their slow progress after the first two weeks is due to a deliberate strategy of force preservation and attrition over gaining ground.
• The weather will slow, but not stop the offensive. Mud is not helpful for any operation. But it is most disruptive to fast paced mechanized maneuvers. It won't be as disruptive to the kind of small, set piece, infantry-centric attacks that Ukraine has been conducting so far. So I think the offensive will be able to continue through the fall and winter, and into 2024.
• The Sea of Azov is the big objective. I think the offensive can only be considered a complete success if they reach the sea before the offensive culminates. But Tokmak is also a valuable objective, and I think the offensive can be considered a partial success if the Ukrainians manage to take it, or at least cut the rail line that runs through it, even if they don't manage to reach the sea. The offensive can be considered a failure if they don't manage to even take Tokmak.
• Things could always speed up if the Russians run out of units they can safely strip from other fronts, they suffer a general collapse, if the Ukrainians pick their way through the last of the minefields, or if the Ukrainians shift their strategy back towards rapid advances (say, if they decide that the Russians have been degraded enough). Things have already been moving a bit faster over the last couple of weeks, so its entirely possible that some of this has already started to happen.

[Battlefront.com]

Good "dot connecting" article in the Washington Post going back and looking at major shifts in Russian military leadership just before Prig's plane had it's "malfunction":

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/15/wagner-prigozhin-military-commanders-russia/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most

Nothing new to us here, but it is a good summary of the higher level changes that took place in addition to Wagner getting blown out of the sky.

Steve

[Centurian52]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

https://www.amazon.com/lamp-oil/s?k=lamp+oil  

https://store.steampowered.com/app/1480560/Lawn_Mowing_Simulator/

For the average “I just want things to go boom” player, perhaps.  If you want a serious realistic wargame simulation then obstacles and breaching ops are clearly a requirement.

 

I concur. Some more breaching assets in future CM titles and modules is a must (don't hold up anything already in development for breaching assets though, if they weren't already planned (I'm all too aware of the dangers of feature creep)).

[Bil Hardenberger]

1 hour ago, Centurian52 said:

... I really think computer wargames (which can have an almost endless number of rules, all being processed by a CPU instead of a human brain) are the only way to go (it's actually a bit distressing that the US DoD is still relying on tabletop wargames). 

It also needs to be recognized that even the best game will never do a perfect job of modeling reality (no offense intended, but I could produce a pretty lengthy list of ways in which even Combat Mission falls a bit short of reality). Any attempt to use wargames to learn or develop modern tactics, or predict the course of a modern war, should begin and end with a discussion of all of the ways in which the wargame doesn't quite match reality, and how those deltas might have influenced the outcome. When using wargames as an aid to studying military history, I think they need to be combined with a healthy amount of reading to help identify elements that the wargame may have missed or imperfectly modeled (I really do advocate this approach, since I think you can learn a lot more about different eras of warfare from wargaming + reading than you can from reading alone).

My day job is developing wargames for the USMC, and I wanted to address the bolded part above. Computer simulations are great, but they do not answer all the objectives of professional wargames, in fact many time the result is not even that important, many times the discussion and insights learned from going through the process are all that we are after. Computer sims also have a way of stifling this conversation, trust me when you have 50 professional Marine, Army, and/or Navy officers in a room, a table top game is the best tool for the job if you want to invite conversation and in-depth topic discussions.

There is also a dopamine hit players get from the tactile nature of a map and counter wargame and rolling dice that you rarely get from a computer simulation. That also has a value to get player buy-in, interaction, and enjoyment.  

Simulation based professional wargames are great when the results are important, testing a new tactical organization, weapon system integration, etc., but they usually turn into a series of in-depth planning sessions with a simulated vignettes occuring for flavor. There is also a stovepipe mentality with these types of games with different player cells huddled around their machines that is absent in table top games.

I've seen it all and there is value for all types of wargames in the professional setting and which is used depends on the objectives and research questions we are trying to answer. Table top games in professional wargames will not be going away anytime soon.

Bil

Edited September 15, 2023 by Bil Hardenberger

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

First, the offensive isn't a failure until it is over. And I think the Ukrainians can continue to maintain the offensive for a very long time.

I'd go further than that.  Think Combat Mission's asymmetric Victory system.  It exists for a reason.

Player B might think he won because he still held all the objectives, but then finds out Player A won because his objective was to destroy Player B's forces.  Player B didn't know this any any observer of the game, who did not have inside information, wouldn't know it either.

It doesn't matter what Player B or the observers think in terms of "failure" or "success", it only matters how Player A evaluates it.

It's pretty clear that Russia's CM type Victory Conditions are to not only hold ground but to take more.  Friendly losses aren't a concern.

What we don't know is what Ukraine's Victory Conditions are.  We are GUESSING that they wanted to get all the way to Azov, but for all we know they didn't see getting any further than Melitopol this season.  We are GUESSING that they hadn't planned on the amount of casualties they have suffered so far, but maybe they considered that and currently losses are still within "acceptable" boundaries.

Since we don't know, none of us can fairly judge any of this as a "success" or "failure", or to what degree of either.  All we can do is guess and that means introducing our own personal bias. 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I agree, but would add 2 more factors for the discrepancy, which I think were significant: 2. different Russian behaviour than simulated. The fact that the Russians had built before the offensive multiple lines of defence suggested that they had planned to make tactical retreats and trade space for time and casualties much more often, than in reality. Actually they defended in place on the 1st line and always counterattacked. Adopting a different posture of the RUS logically should have resulted in longer advances, but lower casualties in the wargame;

I think this as well.  One of the most important parts of any wargame or sim is to correctly anticipate what the other side will do with any given set of challenges.  Russian forces are not following their own doctrine which, in turn, is based on Soviet doctrine, which in turn goes back to late WW2.  Instead we are seeing Stalin like 1941-1942 behavior of not yielding any ground for any reason, no matter how reasonable! 

In theory the staffs conducting the wargame/sims would have taken this possibility into consideration.  They would have cased things out a number of different ways, including covering possibilities that seemed illogical and/or irrational up to that point.  How much of this happened and how well they covered the range of possibilities isn't know to us.  But it is entirely possible there is some Colonel who ran OPFOR in one of the iterations who is saying "see, I told you so".

Steve

[The_Capt]

11 minutes ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

Computer sims also have a way of stifling this conversation, trust me when you have 50 professional Marine, Army, and/or Navy officers in a room, a table top game is the best tool for the job if you want to invite conversation and in-depth topic discussions.

A reason for this is that computer sims cannot be argued with. They roll the dice and something happens.  If an expert has context that may shape that outcome and the computer does not have it programmed in, it is hard to get it rolled in during the wargame itself.

It really depends what one is doing.  If you are doing a staff wargame to explore COAs/Options Bil’s table top systems is definitely the way to go.  An e-table to make that easier is always nice.  

If you are doing training, sims can be very valuable in compressing time and space while getting students to exercise the skills they will need.  It also gives them a feedback loop to hone skills.  The trick is ensuring the sim does not teach the wrong lessons or build in dependence that won’t be there in reality.

If you are doing Operational Research then a very high resolution simulation may be invaluable, but these tend to be much narrower in scope.  So if you want to know what a certain new system is doing to do to your larger organization for example, a simulation can be very effective.

 

[Beleg85]

Still take with solid grain of salt:

 

[kimbosbread]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

https://www.amazon.com/lamp-oil/s?k=lamp+oil  

https://store.steampowered.com/app/1480560/Lawn_Mowing_Simulator/

For the average “I just want things to go boom” player, perhaps.  If you want a serious realistic wargame simulation then obstacles and breaching ops are clearly a requirement.

 

 

2 hours ago, holoween said:

They dont need to actually mass in the sense of more troops per km of frontline.

Take their current company attack occupying maybe 2km of frontline. now add another 2 on each flank. the overall attack now occupies 10 km.

You now have reduced the enemys guns able to react to each individual attack significantly. Same goes for the own firesupport but massing your own guns in such an area is far faster than the enemys reaction.

Couple the attack with strikes on the hqs and you also dramatically reduce the reaction times when it matters.

Have reserve forces ready to push further oncr the first wave has taken the forward lines.

You never have forces more densely packed than currently, can dilute the defenders support and potentially cause a catastrophic failure of the defense.

Maybe ukraine is already doing this and were just not hearing it or they arent for some reason.

And i would be cautious with assuming ukrainians are doing everything as they should from a nato perspective. I wasnt particularly impressed with the performance of the ukrainians we trained so im skeptical their officers are generally much better.

 

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Separately,  on the drone/counter drone front,  UKMoD is looking at soldier level defence. 

https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/smartshooter-showcases-british-army-smash-technology-at-dsei-2023/

I can see a point soon where every soldier carries Drones on them like hand grenades, acting as personal bodyguards v Drones. 

Neal Stephenson and William Gibson of course have written about this. Obviously we’ll get smart hand grenades that have multi-mode warheads, and maybe they’ll fly. I’d be more excited a drone that pipes data to infantry on the ground to a hud or little viewscreen like google glass. Then the next step is to allow soldiers, UAVs and UGVs to share/designate targets.

Soldier level drone defense is very hard on the other hand. Maybe squad level where you have a some loitering anti-drone munitions set up, or lightweight mini missiles (ie drones) available at the squad level? More weight though.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I am not sure how anyone is supposed to cram several coys through minefield belts kms deep while their opponent has eyes all over the sky, long range ATGMs that cannot be cleared and artillery.  Toss in a few helicopters able to hit out to 10kms and I think the "NATO perspective" may be the problem…

This whole NATO "everyone is doing it wrong except us" is a really bad way to go in my opinion.  

Yeah agreed. Coordinating attacks when you have these kind of obstacles is hard, and stuff will immediately get out of sync and bogged down.