How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Grigb]

Looks like General Teplinsky is done.

Nope. My mistake.

Edited July 24 by Grigb

[Thomm]

23 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Combat Mission 3: Complex Warfare. Then promote it as the only wargame that accurately simulates modern warfare (all competitors are at least year behind).

Imagine you could take over drones for terminal guidance in first-person mode. Now that would be a game!

Especially if it had appropriate flight models.

Edited July 24 by Thomm

[mosuri]

10 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Unironically funny to see Orban go right to the EU after spending so long ranting about it. 

Given the amount of squealing, sounds like it hurts.

Also funny that they are threatening with blocking aid ... which they have already been blocking for some time

"As long as this issue is not resolved by Ukraine, everyone should forget about the payment of the €6.5 billion of the European Peace Facility compensation for arms transfers," the Hungarian foreign minister vowed

https://www.politico.eu/article/european-union-hungary-ukraine-oil-lukoil-russia-war-slovakia/

Not much of a threat since they've been doing it for months already? From May:

https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ministers-outrageous-hungary-blocks-military-aid-arms-ukraine/

 

[mosuri]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

We can only guess at it, but anecdotally I would say the average FPV operators are in their 20s whereas the average infantryman seems to be pushing 40, with some units being well above that.

The US military has noted that there is a generational advantage at play.  Even 30 sometimes did not grow up with this sort of tech, 20 somethings have.  It's the same advantage historians bestowed upon the Soviet soldier in winter.  They likely grew up with that sort of thing, Germans likely grew up in cities in much warmer areas.  It's not hard to know who to put money on making it through a tough winter.

Steve

Figure out a way to conduct war in a turn by turn PBEM fashion, and the members of this forum will be the most elite mercenary force on the planet!

More seriously though, while I am an old curmudgeon now I've lived with computers since the 80s and e.g. played the heck out of GTA3 a few years back, even if I usually enjoy more sedate turn by turn games better. So I don't totally buy the "digital native" argument here. Guys in their 20s have an edge in vision and reaction times though.

[Grigb]

19 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Doesn’t need to do it in seconds, and doesn’t even really need to hit the tanks.  Armor and mech have long and heavy lines of logistics support in order to function. 

First, we have no cases where UKR strikes at RU logistics prevented RU from operating tanks/AFV. Yes, the strikes resulted in significant shortage of fuel and, in some circumstances, significantly limited the RU's ability to employ armor. But that is all. 

Second, mass and concentration does not work any more for infantry and armor in Grey zone. Key concept now - dispersion and low density of maneuver element. Where you previously employed Abrams platoon now a single Brad (supported by drones) would suffice. So, modern logistical support of modern maneuver element is significantly smaller and lighter.

19 hours ago, The_Capt said:

We cannot protect those lines from ISR and about 1/2 dozen types of over the horizon fires.  

Yes we can. Drone based long range ISR is hilariously vulnerable to LMM type MANPADs and Drone interceptors. On top of that RU long range ISR drones are electronically noisy (not difficult to detect literally miles away).

Finally, dispersion, proper camo, fortifications and finally Electronic emission awareness dramatically minimize impact of over horizon strikes on rear targets. RU vids of successful Iskander strikes litteraly show that UKR-targeted units failed to properly hide, fortify, and maintain sufficient EW awareness.

The effect of drone-supported over-the-horizon strikes on rear area targets is overhyped. RU combat logistics collapsed as a result of FPV strikes on logistical vehicles near to the front line, rather than over-horizon strikes on depots.

 

19 hours ago, The_Capt said:

 The NATO 120mm only works if you can get it to within 3 kms of the target and as we have seen in this war, 3kms is point blank range.

In reality UKR routinely get Brads at litteraly point blank range to RU targets. Not 3 km away but mere dozens meters away. And most of the time get back in one piece (most of the time). You can argue that Brad is smaller than Abrams. But Brad is not that small. 

Putting tank a 3 km away from target is challenging but not really big deal. 

 

19 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Fully autonomous UAS are demonstrated now and will likely be on the battlefield in the next few years in numbers.  There is no proven c-UAS technology against these systems.

Ask drone pilots about these systems, and you'll be surprised by their reaction. IRL they are not as effective as many think. And we know it from real world experience - Lancets for all intends and purposes are autonomous UAS. Lancets are not cheap (RU for years cannot increase their production despite being primary RU CB weapon). Yet, their performance is meh.

Based on what I saw, autocannon and shotgun-based PD, as well as short-range shrapnel dischargers (similar to smoke dischargers), will help. However, skills and overall tactics is what decide their effectives.

 

19 hours ago, The_Capt said:

We have seen FPV flights destroy mechanized and armored attacks.  What we do not know is how far this whole thing goes.

No one can really predict where this is going, no definitive answers are verifiable with the evidence at hand.  End of story.

If you mean doctrinally then very far. Classical maneuver warfare is obsolete. But not everybody (including many UKR conventional officers) realize it yet. And yes, we already know what is next - Complex Warfare, which in essentially a combination of complex unmanned and manned maneuvers.

 

19 hours ago, The_Capt said:

No one can really predict where this is going, no definitive answers are verifiable with the evidence at hand.  End of story.

The problem is that the information currently available to English-speaking analysts is limited, incomplete, and biased. However, even from open sources, we have enough untranslated material to answer almost all of the questions raised here.

I will give you example - currently battlefield ISR is considered to be an magical eye that sees everything and that ruins all maneuvers. This view was confirmed by Gen. Valery Zaluzhny himself:

Quote

The general said modern technology and precision weapons on both sides were preventing troops from breaching enemy lines, including the expansive use of drones, and the ability to jam drones. 

Now is reality check - let go back in time to Avdiivka battle. Avbiivka successfully without all encircling attempts, direct assaults on AKHZ plant, stalled direct assault though industrial zone. However, it disintegrated completely within a day after the start of the final assault.

We assumed it happened becasue they successfully found major weak spot and becasue they extensively bombed UKR defenders. What we did not know is that certain RU Nats tired of ramming UKR defenses devised ways to mitigate UKR superiority in ISR drones. 

They used meticulous recon (including their own drones and emission detectors), destruction of static UKR observation devices, drone jamming where appropriate, and carefully selected terrain (along with other infiltration techniques such as camo suites, thermal blankets, silent electrical bikes, and so on) to create a corridor through which they infiltrated a significant number of troops, who were able to quickly overwhelm UKR defenders and collapse the entire pocket at the appropriate time.

We already know from real-world war experience that drone-based ISR is not flawless and can be defeated using appropriate techniques facilitating quick breaching of enemy defenses. 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

12 hours ago, dan/california said:

You just made me want a new modern game even more, and I didn't think that as possible! 

Steve, can we request a  new terrain type for this? 

A new terrain type for placing trenches and when the fighting starts, finding out that you can't see **** out of them? No need for a new terrain, the current terrain tiles do his effect perfectly. At least when I play.

In fact, I would like to have terrain tiles which do not do that, thank you very much.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

4 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Finally, dispersion, proper camo, fortifications and finally Electronic emission awareness dramatically minimize impact of over horizon strikes on rear targets. RU vids of successful Iskander strikes litteraly show that UKR-targeted units failed to properly hide, fortify, and maintain sufficient EW awareness.

In the context of mechanised assault and exploitaton, the over-the-horizon drone attack scenario is specifically the approach march to attack behind masking terrain. You can't do dispersion, camouflage, fortifications then - you have to have a mechanised company or tank company driving high speed in column, throwing up plumes of dust and exhaust. You can do limited emissions control, but not 100%. The main thing that is supposed to protect that unit is the LOS blocking terrain between it and the enemy forward line, which used to work well enough when only indirect threat was conventional tube artillery or MLRS. With PGMs and drones, it does not. There is a lot of films on the Internet showing exactly this situation. 

I actually think that the difference in vulnerability of units in this scenario vs the scenario you mentioned (with vehicles dispersed, camouflaged and fortified) is a very significant driver of defence ascendance. Basically, if you can only defend by hiding, and you can only hide by going underground or piling a lot of camouflage on top of yourself, then you can't move and if you can't move, you can't attack with terrain objectives. 

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

Looks like General Teplinsky is done.

Nope. My mistake.

Not that far: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/07/24/7467163/

Torgashev was in charge of Satellite Unit in Russia, though not sure if this was the one deciding things. Perhaps revenge for Kyiv hospitals?

 

[Tux]

That's the main point, isn't it?  It's not that OTH strike capability is causing huge piles of flaming logistics behind clumps of stranded armour, it's that the threat is preventing traditional mass and manoeuvre from even being attempted.

32 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Where you previously employed Abrams platoon now a single Brad (supported by drones) would suffice. So, modern logistical support of modern maneuver element is significantly smaller and lighter.

Why do you think combatants are choosing significantly smaller and lighter logistical support?  Perhaps because anything bigger/heavier has a good chance of getting crushed?  Otherwise just send in the platoon of Abrams and enjoy your drive through the enemy lines, right?

[Grigb]

19 minutes ago, Tux said:

That's the main point, isn't it?  It's not that OTH strike capability is causing huge piles of flaming logistics behind clumps of stranded armour, it's that the threat is preventing traditional mass and manoeuvre from even being attempted.

Except it is not OTH or threat of OTH against at the rear areas that caused abandoning of traditional mass and manoeuvre. It is caused by drone controlled arty and FPV strikes directly on the battlefield. 

 

19 minutes ago, Tux said:

Why do you think combatants are choosing significantly smaller and lighter logistical support?  Perhaps because anything bigger/heavier has a good chance of getting crushed?  Otherwise just send in the platoon of Abrams and enjoy your drive through the enemy lines, right?

Combatants chose using single and pair of vehicles becasue their classical formations were constantly crashed directly on the battlefield. End of story.

Simple reality

• Drone controlled arty and FPV strikes crash (given time and space) classical platoons and anything bigger
• Single or pair of armored vehicles can successfully operate short periods of time not just 3 km away but dozens of meters away from enemy forward positions (given you have proper AFV and not RU crap)

Edited July 24 by Grigb

[hcrof]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

 

Now is reality check - let go back in time to Avdiivka battle. Avbiivka successfully without all encircling attempts, direct assaults on AKHZ plant, stalled direct assault though industrial zone. However, it disintegrated completely within a day after the start of the final assault.

We assumed it happened becasue they successfully found major weak spot and becasue they extensively bombed UKR defenders. What we did not know is that certain RU Nats tired of ramming UKR defenses devised ways to mitigate UKR superiority in ISR drones. 

They used meticulous recon (including their own drones and emission detectors), destruction of static UKR observation devices, drone jamming where appropriate, and carefully selected terrain (along with other infiltration techniques such as camo suites, thermal blankets, silent electrical bikes, and so on) to create a corridor through which they infiltrated a significant number of troops, who were able to quickly overwhelm UKR defenders and collapse the entire pocket at the appropriate time.

We already know from real-world war experience that drone-based ISR is not flawless and can be defeated using appropriate techniques facilitating quick breaching of enemy defenses. 

This is an interesting point and worth considering. I do wonder how much luck had to do with it though - the russians are happy to have 3 infiltrations get massacred if the fourth is successful. A western army will not fight like that so has to think about drones in a different way when planning our own attacks. 

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, holoween said:

Artillery.

 

You go from 1kg munition to 3kg munition just using the rpg7 tandem warhead. And suddenly your drone sits at 6-8kg rather than 2-3. At that point youre just getting an atgm thats worse in every way but possibly max range and price.

How many crewman on a gun team?  How many on the logistics train?  How many to maintain the system? How much does a gun and ammo weight? There is no way an FPV squad with support takes up as many men and resources as a single gun…even the fancy new automated ones.  Kofman just came up with a laughable UAS “shortfall” and there seems to be a lot of that going around.

Now your point on warhead weight is valid.  The problem is that none of these warheads were specifically designed for the UAS, and none of these UAS were specifically designed for warfare.  I suspect both of those issues will be solved pretty damned quick.

“Max range and price”…oh is that all?  

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

We assumed it happened becasue they successfully found major weak spot and becasue they extensively bombed UKR defenders. What we did not know is that certain RU Nats tired of ramming UKR defenses devised ways to mitigate UKR superiority in ISR drones. 

They used meticulous recon (including their own drones and emission detectors), destruction of static UKR observation devices, drone jamming where appropriate, and carefully selected terrain (along with other infiltration techniques such as camo suites, thermal blankets, silent electrical bikes, and so on) to create a corridor through which they infiltrated a significant number of troops, who were able to quickly overwhelm UKR defenders and collapse the entire pocket at the appropriate time.

We already know from real-world war experience that drone-based ISR is not flawless and can be defeated using appropriate techniques facilitating quick breaching of enemy defenses. 

Adiivka was just as likely caused by the RA successfully using Zap Branigan’s doctrine as any ISR failures and surprise.  They sent wave after wave to die for 100m gains until a weak point was created.  We know this because they have been doing the same thing for months.  This is not an ISR blind spot because 1) they are spotted, and 2) all the dying stuff.

The thing you are missing is that not all ISR is drone-based.  Ukraine, and to a lesser extent Russia, have layered ISR systems linked into a complex.  Ukraine has tactical drones, ground sensors, operational systems (unmanned and manned) and strategic (space based)…along with OSINT and SIGINT, ELINT and a few “INTs” we are still finding names for.  No major muscle movements are happening in this war without being spotted.  And by “major” I mean Company and above.  Hell, the RA is getting patrols spotted and being hunted down by UAS…but I suspect we are not universally down to that level of resolution yet.

So while denial of local tactical ISR can be achieved, no one can deny operational and strategic ISR...and here is the rub, both of those are cheaper and everywhere.  They are also very high resolution.  Maybe not “hey clear that hole to your right” but damned close.

We are not seeing “quick breaching”, we are seeing iterative attrition.  And we definitely are not seeing breakthrough and breakout.  Once that happens…if that happens…then the “drones aren’t all that” crowd can go on about there shortfalls and the glories of mechanized warfare…while conveniently forgetting the two years of static warfare largely due to those pesky drones.

[The_Capt]

As to Kofman, he is an academic who is making a lot of bank on speaking gigs at military symposiums - just saw him at one of ours this Spring.  He knows where his bread is buttered and does not want to become a “drone nutter” in the eyes of the community currently paying for his thoughts.

The fears that lead to that terrible summation of Clancy’s are a horrid host.  But central is the spectre of obsolescence. Every military service and competent in those services are terrified of becoming obsolete. So when a major disruption occurs in warfare - of which all domain ISR definitely merits - they run like scared children, then cover their eyes and try not to see. Cover the ear as not to hear.  And then punish “heresy” at mere mentions of emerging reality.  We in such a time.

[Tux]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

Except it is not OTH or threat of OTH against at the rear areas that caused abandoning of traditional mass and manoeuvre. It is caused by drone controlled arty and FPV strikes directly on the battlefield. 

Yes, ok, I understand.  Surely though, if drone controlled arty and FPV strikes have become so effective directly on the battlefield that is synonymous with the threat of the same happening to logistics trains?  Even if ISR fidelity and arty/FPV drone ranges don't currently stretch that far you know that, the second they do, those strikes would hit your logistics trains too, right?  If so, I'm not certain we can meaningfully differentiate between battlefield strikes discouraging mass at the bleeding edge vs the threat of OTH strikes to bloated logistics trains doing the same thing.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Adiivka was just as likely caused by the RA successfully using Zap Branigan’s doctrine as any ISR failures and surprise.  They sent wave after wave to die for 100m gains until a weak point was created.  We know this because they have been doing the same thing for months.  This is not an ISR blind spot because 1) they are spotted, and 2) all the dying stuff.

Actually for the bigger picture it does not matter if Avdieievka was captured through months of iterative attacks until one got lucky or meticulous infiltration which took months to prepare. While both methods differ in many important aspects (in particular the losses), they result in similar tempo of maneouver. They both will not move the front at a sufficient pace to break the stalemate.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

Combatants chose using single and pair of vehicles becasue their classical formations were constantly crashed directly on the battlefield. End of story.

Simple reality

• Drone controlled arty and FPV strikes crash (given time and space) classical platoons and anything bigger
• Single or pair of armored vehicles can successfully operate short periods of time not just 3 km away but dozens of meters away from enemy forward positions (given you have proper AFV and not RU crap)

This reminds me of someone on the Internet (on this site or another, I forgot) recalling his service in the Bundeswehr during the Cold War, when the Unteroffizier was trying to make his soldiers accustomed to the necessary dispersion on the battlefield. Apparently, whenever the soldiers gathered in a group of three or more, he would roar "Atomziel!" and proceed to physically push them apart.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

52 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

As to Kofman, he is an academic who is making a lot of bank on speaking gigs at military symposiums - just saw him at one of ours this Spring.  He knows where his bread is buttered and does not want to become a “drone nutter” in the eyes of the community currently paying for his thoughts.

To be fair, he also relies on what the Ukrainian officers tell him. I am sure a lot of them when asked about the war will frame their answers in traditional terms: sufficiency of replacements, training levels, availability of ammunition, etc.

[ArmouredTopHat]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

First, we have no cases where UKR strikes at RU logistics prevented RU from operating tanks/AFV. Yes, the strikes resulted in significant shortage of fuel and, in some circumstances, significantly limited the RU's ability to employ armor. But that is all. 

Second, mass and concentration does not work any more for infantry and armor in Grey zone. Key concept now - dispersion and low density of maneuver element. Where you previously employed Abrams platoon now a single Brad (supported by drones) would suffice. So, modern logistical support of modern maneuver element is significantly smaller and lighter.

Yes we can. Drone based long range ISR is hilariously vulnerable to LMM type MANPADs and Drone interceptors. On top of that RU long range ISR drones are electronically noisy (not difficult to detect literally miles away).

Finally, dispersion, proper camo, fortifications and finally Electronic emission awareness dramatically minimize impact of over horizon strikes on rear targets. RU vids of successful Iskander strikes litteraly show that UKR-targeted units failed to properly hide, fortify, and maintain sufficient EW awareness.

The effect of drone-supported over-the-horizon strikes on rear area targets is overhyped. RU combat logistics collapsed as a result of FPV strikes on logistical vehicles near to the front line, rather than over-horizon strikes on depots.

 

In reality UKR routinely get Brads at litteraly point blank range to RU targets. Not 3 km away but mere dozens meters away. And most of the time get back in one piece (most of the time). You can argue that Brad is smaller than Abrams. But Brad is not that small. 

Putting tank a 3 km away from target is challenging but not really big deal. 

 

Ask drone pilots about these systems, and you'll be surprised by their reaction. IRL they are not as effective as many think. And we know it from real world experience - Lancets for all intends and purposes are autonomous UAS. Lancets are not cheap (RU for years cannot increase their production despite being primary RU CB weapon). Yet, their performance is meh.

Based on what I saw, autocannon and shotgun-based PD, as well as short-range shrapnel dischargers (similar to smoke dischargers), will help. However, skills and overall tactics is what decide their effectives.

 

If you mean doctrinally then very far. Classical maneuver warfare is obsolete. But not everybody (including many UKR conventional officers) realize it yet. And yes, we already know what is next - Complex Warfare, which in essentially a combination of complex unmanned and manned maneuvers.

 

The problem is that the information currently available to English-speaking analysts is limited, incomplete, and biased. However, even from open sources, we have enough untranslated material to answer almost all of the questions raised here.

I will give you example - currently battlefield ISR is considered to be an magical eye that sees everything and that ruins all maneuvers. This view was confirmed by Gen. Valery Zaluzhny himself:

Now is reality check - let go back in time to Avdiivka battle. Avbiivka successfully without all encircling attempts, direct assaults on AKHZ plant, stalled direct assault though industrial zone. However, it disintegrated completely within a day after the start of the final assault.

We assumed it happened becasue they successfully found major weak spot and becasue they extensively bombed UKR defenders. What we did not know is that certain RU Nats tired of ramming UKR defenses devised ways to mitigate UKR superiority in ISR drones. 

They used meticulous recon (including their own drones and emission detectors), destruction of static UKR observation devices, drone jamming where appropriate, and carefully selected terrain (along with other infiltration techniques such as camo suites, thermal blankets, silent electrical bikes, and so on) to create a corridor through which they infiltrated a significant number of troops, who were able to quickly overwhelm UKR defenders and collapse the entire pocket at the appropriate time.

We already know from real-world war experience that drone-based ISR is not flawless and can be defeated using appropriate techniques facilitating quick breaching of enemy defenses. 

Excellent post. Fantastically well articulated.

I personally imagine that in the next half a decade we will see a very heavy emphasis on gun based CUAS systems with the goal of denying as much drone ISR as possible. We know that the old generation of SPAAG somewhat struggles to detect such small targets reliably (Gepard for instance seems to do well against Gerans but not so much against the smaller drones) but we are already seeing small, purpose made radars and other drone detection systems being made that can readily detect small drones. Said drones are, despite their visually small size quite detectable via noise, emission or heat and this can be exploited. 

Such proliferation will probably not deny drone based recon entirely, but it could very well heavily constrain operations in the enemy's rear cost effectively to make heavier concentration at least a bit more of a realistic possibility without immediate detection. I personally think that is worth the price of investing into such systems, especially if they could up as defence against drone based munitions as well, either on dedicated vehicles or as a system mounted on a tank or IFV. Given the loss rate of drones as it stands in Ukraine, mixing in copious amounts of gun based systems can surely make such an environment even more attrition based for drone units. This is not even considering the more widespread application of drone interceptors as well which we are already seeing to some degree in Ukraine. 

As a question, where do you see mines in all this? We have seen some Ukraine units complain about the lack of them being the reason for the initial Kharkiv pushes earlier this year. Are there any attempts to create smart / mobile mines that have been brought up here before, or is the focus on the classic soviet anti tank mine and producing them in as vast a quantity as possible?

Edited July 24 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

[ArmouredTopHat]

The drama never ends it seems

[Grigb]

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Adiivka was just as likely caused by the RA successfully using Zap Branigan’s doctrine as any ISR failures and surprise.  They sent wave after wave to die for 100m gains until a weak point was created.  We know this because they have been doing the same thing for months. 

 

Is it based on some relevant sources?

The RU Nats who did it form one of the RU units with the most powerful anti-drone capabilities. They are like RU counterpart of Birds of Magyar. And you casually declare that UKR ISR failure just happened by accident exactly when they were there.

Do not support that view.

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 This is not an ISR blind spot because 1) they are spotted, and 2) all the dying stuff.

There was ISR blind spot that allowed RU to concentrate enough troops to swamp the area quickly instead of slowly grinding their way forward. It was so quick that UKR lost access to AKHZ plant (entrance to underground facilities was near the penetration and it was quickly captured). Avdiivka defense was hinged on AKHZ plant. Once it was lost there was no reason to defend Avdiivka and it was abandoned.  

 

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The thing you are missing is that not all ISR is drone-based.  Ukraine, and to a lesser extent Russia, have layered ISR systems linked into a complex.  Ukraine has tactical drones, ground sensors, operational systems (unmanned and manned) and strategic (space based)…along with OSINT and SIGINT, ELINT and a few “INTs” we are still finding names for.  No major muscle movements are happening in this war without being spotted.  And by “major” I mean Company and above.  

Final assault on Avdiivka was performed by 114 Brigade, so the assault echelon was around company-battalion size or couple of hundred men. They walked several kilometers without tactical drones, ground sensors, operational systems (unmanned and manned) and strategic (space based)…along with OSINT and SIGINT, ELINT and a few “INTs” we are still finding names for seeing them.

enough said.

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So while denial of local tactical ISR can be achieved, no one can deny operational and strategic ISR...and here is the rub, both of those are cheaper and everywhere.  They are also very high resolution.  Maybe not “hey clear that hole to your right” but damned close.

Imagine that all of the offensive forces (that still in the rear) are spread in separate platoon and company columns throughout a substantial area. They all move at their own speed on various local routes. So, while they all move in the same overall direction, movement at individual periods appears to be random since local roads have different directions.

You with your shiny tools might detect increased traffic but that is all you see. No specific direction. No specific groups of vehicles. Nothing that clearly demonstrates the movement's goal.

At a certain point in time, these columns are ordered to concentrate at a specified location and launch an attack. You will see that. But the sighting needs to be analyzed and reported, decision needs to be made and information must be passed to field commander. So, by the time you call field commander with the news that RU are launching their attack he will reply back  that he is fully aware becasue there is RU tank is on top of his dugout.

AFAIK, this method was used for initial surprise attack on Avdiivka (along with utilizing bad weather).

 

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So while denial of local tactical ISR can be achieved, no one can deny operational and strategic ISR...and here is the rub, both of those are cheaper and everywhere.  They are also very high resolution.  Maybe not “hey clear that hole to your right” but damned close.

Can your toy look inside underground dugout and detect how many men are there? 

 

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

We are not seeing “quick breaching”, we are seeing iterative attrition.  And we definitely are not seeing breakthrough and breakout.  

We saw “quick breaching” that resulted in quick decisive collapse of the pocket. It was private initiative of the RU Nats volunteers unit that got tired of following official orders. And breakthrough and breakout did not happen exactly becasue it was private initiative of a single unit not supported by overal RU command.  

 

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Once that happens…if that happens…then the “drones aren’t all that” crowd can go on about there shortfalls and the glories of mechanized warfare…while conveniently forgetting the two years of static warfare largely due to those pesky drones.

That crowd is mistaken. I am not part of that crowd. I've been reading for a years RU complains about Ukrainian drones.

Simple truths I got from reading UKR and RU sources.

• Drones are here to stay
• Drones fundamentally change the way we fight
• Classical mechanized warfare through concentration and mass of armor is obsolete

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, hcrof said:

This is an interesting point and worth considering. I do wonder how much luck had to do with it though - the russians are happy to have 3 infiltrations get massacred if the fourth is successful. A western army will not fight like that so has to think about drones in a different way when planning our own attacks. 

There's that and there's also the fact that months of attrition of Ukrainian defenders meant that their lines were ever thinning, not to mention lacking reserves to plug holes.

So what Grigb described is a fairly typical situation we've seen in this war where Russia pretty much obliterates Ukrainian manpower in a particular sector and "walks in".  This Russian strategy takes a long time and a lot of resources, not to mention horrendous losses, but it works.

All of the tricks that Grigb noted the Russians doing did not, on their own, result in the collapse of Avdiivka.  What it did was decided that it happened on that particular day instead of later.  From the Russian side it also meant fewer casualties and resources expended in the final push.

To summarize, the tricks and techniques that Grigb outlined are significant and worthy of careful examination.  But ultimately, they weren't decisive.  What was decisive was Ukraine didn't have sufficient infantry to defend.

Which is a lesson we have seen over and over again.  As bad as the other combined arms can be, ultimately it still comes down to a grunt with a rifle taking ground from another grunt with a rifle.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

The drama never ends it seems

This comment s a true winner.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

It's been a while since Ukraine reduced the ability to move things to/from Crimea, so this is really good news.  It's not as immediately important as it was last summer, but both sides are playing the long game and therefore it's a big deal for that.

Steve