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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Good lord this sentiment is so 2024.  We are not even entirely sure if we are looking at defensive primacy, let alone if it will be enduring.  We have suspicions, but we really do not fully understand the full impact of what is, or is not, happening.  I think it may be a little too early to start "challenging our challenges."

The defensive primacy shift of the 19th and early 20th century took roughly 50-60 years to fully emerge.  And then it lasted roughly 30 years before technology broke it.  The current possible shift has taken maybe 20 years to sink in and no on knows how long it will actually stick - if it is indeed a thing.  I personally do not think manouevre is dead, I think its selling points have definitely have taken a hit.  But the principles of manoeuvre are very old - "hit em where they ain't, faster than they can recover" likely has roots in pre-civilization warfare.  What we, in the western military complex appear to have forgotten is that detail (or "task") command and good old fashion attrition ("me smash, you") is not dead, in fact it never was. 

Once this war is over, two things are going to happen. 1) modern militaries are going to scramble like mad to jump on all sorts of bandwagons based on how this thing has gone down.  And 2) they will immediately stuff these new phenomenon into the existing box.  We will see Battalion TFs wearing unmanned hats as next-gen collides with legacy inertia - we can see this already.  Some may over subscribe and read the tea leaves wrong - get ready for some crazy ideas in all this.

I suspect it will take at least a decade to fully unpack what has been happening in this war.  Right now most of the evidence is happening on social media - of one digs around for scholarly analysis, we are not there yet.  What we have are some pretty skeletal frameworks that roughly fit what we are seeing, but I am still not entirely sure why.

As I also tell my students - the trick to this war is understanding what is fundamental and enduring, and what is a unique manifestation that will only occur in Ukraine.   

And every defense contractor is briefing their pet congresscritters on how THEIR product is perfect for the new doctrine, whatever it is...

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46 minutes ago, JonS said:

That's a great point. It took, for example, 40-odd years to unpack and deconstruct "blitzkreig" from a mythically wondrous imagined doctrine to its actual reality as a marketting elevator pitch. And, frankly, 40 years after that epiphany there are still plenty of folks who continue to prefer marketting take.

One concern I have about analysis of this war is availability bias: drone feeds are new and exciting and ubiquitous, but are they representative? I wonder if we give drone's effectiveness too much weight due simply the the large supply of feed videos.

Bias…exactly.  Something is definitely happening, that much I can feel in my bones…exactly what remains kinda opaque.  What do we actually “know?”  Well:

- Mass does not seem to work like it used to.  ISR appears to be having a disproportionate effect on mass.  This is not just drone feeds but AARs and deeper reporting.  Weird densities, weird groupings and sometimes just bizarre packaging.  These all point to some serious pressures on military mass but the exact mechanisms remain largely unknown.

- C4ISR, first war in human history with these levels of C4ISR.  This effecting a lot more than just mass.  How deep this rabbit hole goes remains unclear.

- Artillery is still doing the majority of the killing.  We also know that “precision” appears to be making artillery more effective in rounds per effect (but that is still not proven), but both sides are still using an ungodly amount of fires, as demonstrated by ammo strain.

- Heavy is in trouble.  I think we have seen enough indicators that heavy forces are struggling. Enough reports of tanks and mech being held back or blunted have surfaced to call that one.  But is this forever, or just a temporary condition?

- Unmanned is definitely a thing and is accelerating.  But at this point I am still not sure how much is strike, and how much is ISR.  If we see some sort of data on just how much damage drones are actually doing in comparison to artillery it would help immensely.

- Corrosive warfare (or something like it) is a thing, but we still do not know its full parameters, assumptions, constraints and restraints.  We have seen it happen more than once but “why” it happened is still a bit of a mystery.  Was it projected friction, or was it simply Russian over-extension?

- Denial.  Definitely on the board, particularly in the air.  Some pretty good analysis on this out there.

- Deep Strike.  Appears to be a new form of manoeuvre.  Formerly it has been used to shape and set preconditions but en masse it appears as though it can directly create results, not simply enable them.

I am probably missing something but you will note most of these are only partially visible.  We have seen some possible indicators but no one has been able to pull up the entire UA summer offensive and show that 90% of the time they were using micro-groupings because if they massed above company level they were spotted and hit 82% of the time.  Nor can we see that UAS have outstripped casualties caused by direct fires and artillery by 23%.  All we really see by this point are shadows and hints.

So while I have working theories, they are pretty fluid.  I am getting firmer on some aspects… but watch that will be when things shift again and they are totally blown out of the water.  There was no way the RA was supposed to withstand the Summer offensive.  They were a shattered force that had bled all over Bakhmut at WW1 loss levels…but here we are.

Anyway…strap in, this ride ain’t over yet.

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1 hour ago, dan/california said:

And every defense contractor is briefing their pet congresscritters on how THEIR product is perfect for the new doctrine, whatever it is...

Add one more to the pool - Ex-Google CEO’s secret startup to build Ukraine AI-powered $400 kamikaze drones

Quote

Schmidt emphasized their cost-effectiveness and their relevance to the Ukrainian conflict. He pointed out the dwindling significance of conventional arms deals in favor of these AI-powered weapons.

...

Schmidt's history of advocating for military technology, his extensive government connections, and his strategic investments in defense tech further solidify his role as a key player bridging Silicon Valley and the Pentagon.

 

Edited by Offshoot
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5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- C4ISR, first war in human history with these levels of C4ISR.  This effecting a lot more than just mass.  How deep this rabbit hole goes remains unclear.

- Heavy is in trouble.  I think we have seen enough indicators that heavy forces are struggling. Enough reports of tanks and mech being held back or blunted have surfaced to call that one.  But is this forever, or just a temporary condition?

Tanks behaving like they often get used in CM games? As an uninformed tangent, I always got the impression that most players used tanks in CM (thinking WW2 games here) in a historically unrealistic way, where instead of tanks being the spearhead, in CM games they were more often kept hidden until the infantry had identified targets and enemy AT assets had been located.

In CM, this is the combination of:

(a) scenario balance means that if you've got a platoon of tanks, the other side very likely has the capability to kill a platoon of tanks (as opposed to reality, where an assaulting tank company might just roll through the enemy positions because they didn't have anything that posed a threat to heavy armour - but that would make a boring CM scenario)

(b) Borg spotting, perfect terrain knowledge and the players' ability to co-ordinate their entire force to a wholly unrealistic degree meaning that they can afford to keep tanks at the back because they will be able to scoot forward through defilade to a keyhole firing position to take out a threat in literally 1 minute, while in reality that's more like 15+ minutes with far more chances to screw up, go the wrong way, shoot at the wrong building etc.

So is it possible that the incredible C4ISR available, replicates in effect much of point (b): enemy positions are known pretty well in advance, real time drone observations funneling information back to units on the ground, and so on, mean that something closer to (although still far short of) CM player levels of planning, co-ordination and responsiveness is achievable, meaning small armour packets can be held back and used on demand with more effect than a full platoon could two decades ago - never mind the increasing number of things that can quickly kill an exposed and hard to conceal tank.

And on a higher level, the higher situational awareness, and prevalence of longer ranged things that can kill vehicles in particular mean that it is hard to create a situation where you can mass e.g. a tank force against a position that has no meaningful defence against it. They will see it coming, and tank-killers can hit from a much larger range, so wherever you attack there is going to be meaningful anti-tank capability, meaning you're always in more of a "balanced CM scenario" kind of situation in practice.

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7 hours ago, dan/california said:

And every defense contractor is briefing their pet congresscritters on how THEIR product is perfect for the new doctrine, whatever it is...

The worry is that once western defence companies get involved, and NATO procurement tendencies, you're going to see the $1000 drone made in a shed in Ukraine with an RPG warhead strapped on be replaced with a custom-built state of the art $20,000 drone that does the same job maybe 5% better.

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3 hours ago, TheVulture said:

The worry is that once western defence companies get involved, and NATO procurement tendencies, you're going to see the $1000 drone made in a shed in Ukraine with an RPG warhead strapped on be replaced with a custom-built state of the art $20,000 drone that does the same job maybe 5% better.

"A whale is a shark built to Admiralty specifications."

-Old Royal Navy saying.

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The world's war colleges are busy analyzing what's going on in Ukraine and writing about practices that will shape future CM level battles.

Link to US Army War College
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/

USAWC has a Russia-Ukraine War Study Project
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/5/

The first output I could find is linked below, Ukraine War experience relative to Recon-Strike-Complexes (RSCs), integrated AI, distributed ISR, deep strike attrition of enemy RSC to enable effective concentration of mass, and integrating relevant UAS ISR lessons from Ukraine, for near future major power conventional war. Multiple forum members individually have already some of these points.

https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/9/

'Implications for the US Army' starts at the bottom of page 31. - The lead para is on what is judged unique to Ukraine

"While the Russia-Ukraine War is an illustrative case, it is unique  in many respects. Both sides derive their doctrine from similar sources and  employ similar or identical weapons. Neither side can break the other’s  integrated air defense network—Ukraine for lack of modern airframes, Russia for lack of enough precision-guided munitions—meaning deep strike is primarily a missile-based phenomenon. Russia and Ukraine also field  armies with far less overall experience than anticipated before the war,  having gone through several rounds of mobilization, making logistical and command centralization all the more appealing and strikes against logistics and C2 nodes more fruitful. Russia has refused to deploy  kinetic anti-satellite interceptors, nor is there much available in the open source about satellite jamming, an undeniably relevant factor in future wars. Ukraine and Russia both defend some of the world’s most extensive ground fortifications—in the Ukrainian case, built over years of positional conflict in the Donbas. The US Army should not plan to fight the last war, let alone a war it has not actively fought."

The last two sentences are worth a repeat. Presumably the same would apply to US allies, some of whom experienced enemy attacks on their territory in the last super power conflict (WWII), some of which did not.

"The United States is unlikely to face an adversary it can defeat absent some consideration of strikes on its territory, at least if it hopes to win on a timescale more closely approximating months or years than a decade.  Two equally sophisticated RSCs, then, can increase the likelihood of mutual territorial strikes and the potential for escalation."

Edited by OBJ
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Let me throw this question out there. 

Does anyone think that the drone warfare we presently see become a thing in the past at somepoint in the near future.

In otherwords, I have a hard time believing  that there is not tech weapons being made that can elimate drones from the skies. 

Basically drone warfare in the skies.

I am sure that there is stuff  that has been done in Western developer hands  that could be used for such purposes.

Russia, not so much, they dont seem to have a present answer and if I was a western power with the possible answer, I sure would not expose it now  so that the tech could be mimiced  at this time.

 

 

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Just now, slysniper said:

Let me throw this question out there. 

Does anyone think that the drone warfare we presently see become a thing in the past at somepoint in the near future.

In otherwords, I have a hard time believing  that there is not tech weapons being made that can elimate drones from the skies. 

Basically drone warfare in the skies.

I am sure that there is stuff  that has been done in Western developer hands  that could be used for such purposes.

Russia, not so much, they dont seem to have a present answer and if I was a western power with the possible answer, I sure would not expose it now  so that the tech could be mimiced  at this time.

 

 

Wanna bet someone asked the exact same question when airplanes showed up in WW1?

"‘aviation is a useless and expensive fad advocated by a few individuals whose ideas are unworthy of attention." 

Sir William Nicholson (1845–1918), the Field Marshal Chief of the General Staff 1908-1912

(https://doverhistorian.com/2023/04/16/airfields-to-world-war-i/)

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20 minutes ago, slysniper said:

Let me throw this question out there. 

Does anyone think that the drone warfare we presently see become a thing in the past at somepoint in the near future.

In otherwords, I have a hard time believing  that there is not tech weapons being made that can elimate drones from the skies. 

Basically drone warfare in the skies.

I am sure that there is stuff  that has been done in Western developer hands  that could be used for such purposes.

Russia, not so much, they dont seem to have a present answer and if I was a western power with the possible answer, I sure would not expose it now  so that the tech could be mimiced  at this time.

 

 

I think it's a great question.

Just me but I think fully integrated drone warfare is about where tank and anti-tank development were in 1916 on the western front, or the airplane as @The_Capt pointed out. We also have to account for the limited and unique nature of the war in Ukraine relative to super power conventional war. 

To me from a future technical and tactical practice perspective, Ukraine is more like Spain 1936-39.

Edited by OBJ
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1 minute ago, OBJ said:

To me from a future technical and tactical practice perspective, Ukraine is more like Spain 1936-39.

Good analogy.  I think once we face a serious conventional competitor things will get much worse before they get better.  I think there are serious dangers in trying to see Ukraine in isolation - just as much as seeing it as the sole template for the next war.

First off, we are actively in this war.  Western ISR is deeply embedded in the UA kill chains.  We are the de facto strategic force development and generation enterprise.  It is our system versus theirs in many ways beyond throwing money at the problem.

Next, someone is going to have to solve for the facts that:

- Our stuff is hot and heavy, and not invisible.

- We have no wizards to sweep away PGM and unmanned (surface, subsurface, and air)

- Last I checked we still needed a lot of gas, ammo and data too.

- We can be denied as well as anyone else - entry cost elevation is almost universal.

My single biggest concern is not fighting Russia or China directly - despite the shield banging, I do not think this will be possible without serious risk of nuclear escalation.  My main concern is being pulled into a proxy fight where our opponent is backstopped by China in the same manner we backed Ukraine.  Hell, a highly connected and empowered learning insurgency could really hurt us. 

We can see trends in this war that extend back over a decade.  We need to prepare for the worst and hope for the best, and not wave away any uncomfortable facts in the process. 

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2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Good analogy. 

Glad you liked it. :) 

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

First off, we are actively in this war.  Western ISR is deeply embedded in the UA kill chains. 

Gotta agree, although interested in your references, and if you say you have to kill me to tell me... :) 
Below is what I got from a quick look. For those that are interested:

1. May 22
Moskva's location provided
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61343044
2. June 23
but the link in this section is to NYTs early war article (Mar-May 22) on providing location of Russian Generals.
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-russian-way-of-war-in-ukraine-a-military-approach-nine-decades-in-the-making/
"The Ukrainian Battlefield
Although not always portrayed as such, the war in Ukraine is, or at least has become, a peer conflict, largely because of the extent of Western and especially US support, providing Ukraine with significant amounts of advanced weapons systems—not to mention real-time battlefield intelligence to help identify Russian targets for Ukrainian long-range precision strikes. As a result, this is the first war in history in which both sides are capable of striking throughout the opponent’s tactical and operational depth with a high level of accuracy."
3. Oct 23
I can't find anything on current battlefield deep strike support, but CIA ties going back to 2014, direct intell support leading to string of assassinations in Russia, so hard not to believe UA deep strike being assisted, probably by multiple western intelligence agencies
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/23/ukraine-cia-shadow-war-russia/

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

We can see trends in this war that extend back over a decade.  We need to prepare for the worst and hope for the best, and not wave away any uncomfortable facts in the process. 

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-russian-way-of-war-in-ukraine-a-military-approach-nine-decades-in-the-making/
Same article from 2. above, definitely supports decade of prior trending, actually claims related Russian military thinking from much earlier.

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

My single biggest concern is not fighting Russia or China directly

Fighting China directly might not be something the Canadian military is worrying about or preparing for. The US military is doing both.

Edited by OBJ
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1 hour ago, cesmonkey said:

 

The snow chains is one of those things that is soooooo unsexy that it is likely to be scoffed at by many.  But they are critical for this sort of environment Ukraine is fighting in.  Let's say it averages to 5 tires per vehicle, that's enough to outfit 90 vehicles.  A drop in the bucket, but at maybe $1000k per tire for military size/grade chains, that's $450k plus transit costs.  That sort of cost adds up fast.  The more the better.

Steve

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It seems that at least some Russians have come to similar conclusions about war as this forum:

https://www.armystandard.ru/news/2024129114-TnO1s.html

No comment really, except that we should not stereotype the Russian general staff as a bunch of drunks and incompetents stuck in the soviet past. They are learning, even if implementation is the hard part, not theory. 

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To me, the evolution of drone warfare in this conflict seems to mirror the introduction of aircraft during the First World War. At the beginning, aircraft were mostly thought of as a tool for observation and artillery direction, similar to drones. Then one guy brings a pistol one day and shoots at the other guy. The guy who got shot at was understandably irritated and figured out a way to strap a machine gun to his aircraft. The next thing you know, there are massed arial dogfights with dedicated fighter aircraft, mult-engine heavy bombers (by WWI standards), specialized recon aircraft, etc. When you compare 1914 to 1918, it's hardly recognizable as the same conflict. Then if you compare WWI aviation to the advancements in aerial warfare just within the 20th century, it looks more like what one might expect from an alien invasion.

I have the, uninformed, feeling that drone warfare today (I include unmanned ground vehicles in this as well), will be nearly unrecognizable in as few as twenty or thirty years.

Edited by Audgisil
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1 minute ago, Audgisil said:

To me, the evolution of drone warfare in this conflict seems to mirror the introduction of aircraft during the First World War. At the beginning, aircraft were mostly thought of as a tool for observation and artillery direction, similar to drones. Then one guy brings a pistol one day and shoots at the other guy. The guy who got shot at was understandably irritated and figured out a way to strap a machine gun to his aircraft. The next thing you know, there are massed arial dogfights with fighters, mult-engine heavy bombers (by WWI standards), specialized recon aircraft, etc. When you compare 1914 to 1918, it's hardly recognizable as the same conflict. Then if you compare WWI aviation to the advancements in aerial warfare just within the 20th century, it looks more like what one might expect from an alien invasion.

I have the, uninformed, feeling that drone warfare today (I include unmanned ground vehicles in this as well), will be nearly unrecognizable in as few as twenty or thirty years.

Was just thinking along the same lines when I read this. And that we are in the triplane era, still. 

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2 hours ago, OBJ said:

To me from a future technical and tactical practice perspective, Ukraine is more like Spain 1936-39.

Always tricky to pick out the right lessons though, and even harder to do so if they contradict your existing doctrine. The then Chief of the Air Staff(CAS), Sir Cyril Newall, described the Luftwaffe's support of ground operations in Spain as a gross misuse of air-power!

To be fair to Newall he was subsequently CAS during the Battle of Britain so perhaps deserves some of Dowding and Park's reflected glory.

 

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