How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Tux]

I think the "breach" caused by tac nuke use would last as long as it takes for new drones to arrive overhead and start hitting logistics/providing targeting coordinates to artillery on the shoulders of the breach.  So maybe an hour or two?

If the frontline is currently being pinned down by the use of largely airborne ISR alongside assorted types of PGM then any breakthrough has to be predicated not on simply removing them from the battlefied but in preventing the enemy from being able to sustain their presence on the battlefield.  For that you need a lasting effect, not an impulse-weapon like a big bomb.

Powerful and sophisticated new types of EW or asymmetrical drone denial through localised, low altitude air superiority are, I think, better candidates for enabling a productive breach than a tac nuke.

[Tux]

Also, if the intent is to somehow profit from the idea that the West has become 'distracted', then I can't think of a better way to make damned sure you get their attention right back than by employing a nuclear weapon.  As several posters have noted, the West absolutely has escalation dominance in this war so Russia can only make things worse for themselves by flipping a WMD into Ukraine. 

[OBJ]

8 minutes ago, Tux said:

Also, if the intent is to somehow profit from the idea that the West has become 'distracted', then I can't think of a better way to make damned sure you get their attention right back than by employing a nuclear weapon.  As several posters have noted, the West absolutely has escalation dominance in this war so Russia can only make things worse for themselves by flipping a WMD into Ukraine. 

I agree @Tux Russian use of Tac Nukes would definitely get the West's attention. I am not sure what the timing or nature of a battlefield meaningful response would be.

I think your ideas on the biggest problem for a Russian attacker using tac nukes to make a breach is to maintain the breach and support the breakthrough force is spot on. Like you, I would think the Ukrainians could 'flow back in' ISR drones and supporting artillery on the shoulders to interdict support. I don't have a feel for what kind of reserves the Ukrainians have. Presumably, but maybe not, the Russians would be smart enough to 'shape the battlefield' before striking.

[billbindc]

14 hours ago, OBJ said:

@The_Capt and @billbindc thank you both, all of us looking at the apparent deadlock, I was more thinking if there was a nation to use tac nukes to blow open an offensive corridor(s) intent on decisively restoring battlefield mobility, it would be Russia. I am not sure the West has prepared to effectively counter were this to occur. Like you, I doubt the western response would be escalation to total nuclear war.

Thanks also @sburke @dan/california @Bulletpoint and @Butschi for perspective on the author and 'The Telegraph.' If the author of The Telegraph article I read/cited is the Colonel Hamish Stephen de Bretton-Gordon OBE, he may have changed his tune since last May on the likelihood of RA use of tac nukes in the offensive. The article I cited was just posted. 

"There are now rumblings in Moscow that a decisive offensive to turn the tides of the war squarely in Russia’s favour may soon be underway."

The problem is that according to the Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, the Russian military is likely unable to “conduct an operation to seize significant territory in Kharkiv Oblast in the near term”

This does not mean that such an assault is impossible. It simply means that it would require weapons on the battlefield we have yet to see. In my opinion, the only weapons that Russia has which could achieve this in this time frame would be a tactical nuclear weapon or some sort of chemical or biological attack. 

The why of using nuclear weapons is a lot less important than the if. The US, China, India, Brazil, EU, etc have all made it very clear that using nukes in any context is a game changer. And using them *offensively* is actually far more destabilizing than if they were used in an attempt to stave off some final defeat. The rule of thumb when analyzing any contemplated move is to ask "Ok, what happens next?" and in this case Russia would be opening up a future in which 'just tactical' nukes would be considered to be an acceptable gambit in warfare against opponents who might easily take tactical use as justification for going full bore strategic and up the escalation ladder we go. 

 

 

[Tux]

56 minutes ago, OBJ said:

I agree @Tux Russian use of Tac Nukes would definitely get the West's attention. I am not sure what the timing or nature of a battlefield meaningful response would be.

I think your ideas on the biggest problem for a Russian attacker using tac nukes to make a breach is to maintain the breach and support the breakthrough force is spot on. Like you, I would think the Ukrainians could 'flow back in' ISR drones and supporting artillery on the shoulders to interdict support. I don't have a feel for what kind of reserves the Ukrainians have. Presumably, but maybe not, the Russians would be smart enough to 'shape the battlefield' before striking.

Aye, but if they manage to shape the battlefield to the extent that the Ukrainians can't sustain drone warfare/ ISR over the breach then they probably don't need a nuke to affect the breakthrough in the first place.

To my mind tac nukes are 'cheat code' weapons from a bygone era, designed to delete troublesome formations fast without having to engage them in combat.  That may work well in a world in which an enemy reaction force would have to walk/drive through your breakthrough's flank security but if they can just fly over it and, as you say, 'flow back in' then the advantage gained from the initial strike has been substantially eroded.

As far as a meaningful battlefield response from the West is concerned, I don't think that would be the primary response.  I would rather expect it to be open season on Russia's international/diplomatic interests, along with renewed and unprecedented vigour behind the effort to supply and support Ukraine, including lifting any 'ban' that may exist on strikes within Russia's borders.  The intention would be to effectively cut Russia loose from global trade and influence, including expulsion from the UNSC, subsequent UN-backed global sanction schemes, etc.  NATO boots may well also find their way onto the ground as far as Lviv or so but that would almost be a sideshow to the primary response.

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

"This does not mean that such an assault is impossible. It simply means that it would require weapons on the battlefield we have yet to see. In my opinion, the only weapons that Russia has which could achieve this in this time frame would be a tactical nuclear weapon or some sort of chemical or biological attack".

Funny how a guy who specialises in chemical and biological weapons predicts an attack by chemical or biological weapons. When you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

I think he's either a Cold War fossil who is unable to realise that the world has changed since he was in the army in the 1980s, or maybe he's paid or instructed by someone to play scaremonger in order to put pressure on the Western public and politicians to provide more aid to Ukraine. Because his scenario seems to make no sense to me.

His piece seems to rest on the assumption that just because some ultra-nationalists in Moscow want a grand offensive, Putin somehow has to deliver that. But Putin doesn't need to take the whole of Ukraine to declare victory. He just has to keep what he has taken.

Also, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon seems to think that you could just use a couple of tactical nukes to "blow a hole" in the front line and then "exploit by mechanised formations". That's Cold War stuff and not how it works now in an age of ATGMs and drones everywhere. You don't just pop a small hole in the front and then race to Kyiv. Especially not now that Russia's mechanised formations have been ground down.

If Putin wanted to use nukes, he would have to nuke the entire front line, burning up most of the Ukrainian Army. And even then, those Russian columns would get mauled by Nato conventional airstrikes inside Ukraine within a couple of days. And then what?

This too. 

The likeliest outcome from such an effort would be territorial gains initially and then absolutely decisive Western intervention and involuntary economic juche. 

[dan/california]

I am not going to quote everybody, but I agree with the general consensus that using a tactical nuke would cost the Russians far more than it would gain them, and even Putin can figure that out.

I do have one technical question, although the answer doesn't effect the overall conclusion above. How wide an are would the EMP of a tactical nuke wipe all civilian grade electronics, including drones. Of course it would wipe the Russian drones too, although they might be able to protect them somewhat if they wanted to risk the element of surprise. Again this doesn't change the overall conclusion, but I would like to have some idea of the answer.

[Battlefront.com]

Every time we come back to the nuke discussion (this might be the 893rd?  I've lost count!) it boils down to the same arguments from the same body of evidence.  The conclusion always is that there are only three plausible conditions in which Russia would use nukes in any way:

1.  Putin ceases to be a "rational actor" and (this is important) there is absolutely nobody opposing his instructions.

2.  Russia is facing a cataclysmic military situation where Ukrainian forces are driving to Moscow or Sevastopol with only a couple of TikTok Warriors™ standing in the way.

3.  Russian leadership is so desperate to take more territory that it concludes tactical nukes offer a solution *and* it is worth risking the response to its use.  This may be misguided and stupid, but it is rational.

That's it.  Always these these three scenarios. 

The most probable use of tac nukes would not be on the battlefield as has been discussed.  Why pollute what you want to keep for yourself?  No, the more probable use would be to drop one on some part of Ukraine that Russia has no desire to take any time soon.  The purpose of which would be to get Ukraine to surrender.  This is in keeping with Russia's overall plan to wear down Ukraine's will to fight and doesn't rely on their shoddy ground forces to do anything except march in a victory parade after.

Steve

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, OBJ said:

To be very clear, I hope nothing goes nuclear. I don't want anything to go nuclear. My service conditioned me to abhor that possibility, but also not to discount its use by the Russians, and to be prepared in the event the Russians exercised the option.

If the author of the article is credible, and based on research by folks here, he seems to be, his opinion is internal pressure on Putin to order a 'decisive offensive' based on perceived waning western will and window of opportunity created by the distraction western elections cause, could drive use of tac nukes to break the stalemate, create the breakthrough, exploited by conventional mechanized forces.

So put a pin in tac nuclear - found this site on the web:

https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/  (things have come a long way since the old Radiac Wheel)

I plugged in a 50kt yield (which is pretty much the high end of tac nuclear) at Avdiivka:

So basically we are looking at a 800m hole blown into a defensive line...maybe.  Dug in troops are very hard to kill and even a surface burst is going to have  a pretty modest crater.  From tests with the B61 for bunkers:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B61_nuclear_bomb#:~:text=A 50-kiloton yield detonating,within the circular error probability.

"A 50-kiloton yield detonating on the ground produces a crater with a radius of 30–68 meters, depending on the density of the surface, effectively putting the bunker within the circular error probability.^[49]"

So it might clear a lane in the first minefield but do nothing for the next one.

So what?  Well tac nukes are not a magic wand that erases defending forces or systems.  They were actually designed to break up heavy formations on the move.   To break a determined defence Russia would not be using a single tactical nuclear weapon, they would need to use many in depth.  For example to blow a 5km line in depth, they would likely need 6-10 nuclear weapons.  And that is only for 5kms.  The strategic risks of Russia firing off 6-10 tac nukes at 50kt each are not small in the least.  And even then a full breakout might not work.

Then the uncomfortable question of "break out to where?" Solvyanks always looked like the major operational objective - a lot of rail and roads.  It is 70km from Avdiivka - that is one long push in this war.  UA reserve forces would be all over that advance and western C4ISR would light it up from space.  So Putin crosses the nuclear threshold in a major way and blows a 1 x 5 km hole in the UA line.  Pushes what is left of his mech forces to try and exploit 70km deep - which is a pretty long extension for the RA right now.  The remaining 65km are likely to be an FPV and HIMARs hell on earth.

And then they take Slovyanks...then what?  Well looking at the map the strategic objective that makes the most sense is Poltava because it would slice the Southeastern UA front in half and separate Dnipro from Kharkiv. That is around 230km...in this war?  I mean unless the UA completely collapses, and 10 tac nukes aren't going to do that, the RA risks creating and overstretched salient.  Which is a steep price to pay for the strategic blowback.

In summary, tac nukes likely will not work.  And the cost/risk of their use far outweigh the payoff on an RA offensive.  I would rate this one as LOW likelihood and frankly MODERATE threat as far as COAs go. 

[billbindc]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So put a pin in tac nuclear - found this site on the web:

https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/  (things have come a long way since the old Radiac Wheel)

I plugged in a 50kt yield (which is pretty much the high end of tac nuclear) at Avdiivka:

So basically we are looking at a 800m hole blown into a defensive line...maybe.  Dug in troops are very hard to kill and even a surface burst is going to have  a pretty modest crater.  From tests with the B61 for bunkers:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B61_nuclear_bomb#:~:text=A 50-kiloton yield detonating,within the circular error probability.

"A 50-kiloton yield detonating on the ground produces a crater with a radius of 30–68 meters, depending on the density of the surface, effectively putting the bunker within the circular error probability.^[49]"

So it might clear a lane in the first minefield but do nothing for the next one.

So what?  Well tac nukes are not a magic wand that erases defending forces or systems.  They were actually designed to break up heavy formations on the move.   To break a determined defence Russia would not be using a single tactical nuclear weapon, they would need to use many in depth.  For example to blow a 5km line in depth, they would likely need 6-10 nuclear weapons.  And that is only for 5kms.  The strategic risks of Russia firing off 6-10 tac nukes at 50kt each are not small in the least.  And even then a full breakout might not work.

Then the uncomfortable question of "break out to where?" Solvyanks always looked like the major operational objective - a lot of rail and roads.  It is 70km from Avdiivka - that is one long push in this war.  UA reserve forces would be all over that advance and western C4ISR would light it up from space.  So Putin crosses the nuclear threshold in a major way and blows a 1 x 5 km hole in the UA line.  Pushes what is left of his mech forces to try and exploit 70km deep - which is a pretty long extension for the RA right now.  The remaining 65km are likely to be an FPV and HIMARs hell on earth.

And then they take Slovyanks...then what?  Well looking at the map the strategic objective that makes the most sense is Poltava because it would slice the Southeastern UA front in half and separate Dnipro from Kharkiv. That is around 230km...in this war?  I mean unless the UA completely collapses, and 10 tac nukes aren't going to do that, the RA risks creating and overstretched salient.  Which is a steep price to pay for the strategic blowback.

In summary, tac nukes likely will not work.  And the cost/risk of their use far outweigh the payoff on an RA offensive.  I would rate this one as LOW likelihood and frankly MODERATE threat as far as COAs go. 

Exactly, the costs are far off the benefit.

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So basically we are looking at a 800m hole blown into a defensive line...maybe.  Dug in troops are very hard to kill and even a surface burst is going to have  a pretty modest crater. 

Yup, which is why you'd drop one on some sleepy little town on the other side of the Dnepr and say "we can do this all day long, so why don't you quit now before we do?".

Steve

[Hapless]

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So put a pin in tac nuclear - found this site on the web:

https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/  (things have come a long way since the old Radiac Wheel)

I love that website.

It's always a good wake up call as to the limits of nuclear weapons- as in this case.

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, OBJ said:

So, for the sake of discussion,

1. Do we here believe Russian conventional forces attrition has been significant enough they could not muster conventional exploitation forces or can not build up such a force by May 2024?
2. If we believe the Russians can build up such forces what do we believe we know about Ukraine's reserves to blunt and contain a breakthrough? 
3. What do we believe the nature and timing would be of any Western response directly impacting either or both the Russian breakthrough and Ukrainian attempts to contain the breakthrough?

Coming back to this one:

1.  Yes.  Add to this that the UA can lay mines too, we have seen this.  I suspect the UA will be mining the crap out of their lines this winter.  So the RA faces the same problems: 

- Can they muster enough force?

- If they can muster, can they do a minefield breaches and depth exploitation without concentrating mass? (because we know that does not work right now.)

- If they somehow pull off those first two...can they sustain a breakout in depth?

I gotta tell you, if the UA had problems doing that after a year of western support and training, I have serious doubts the RA could pull it off especially after two years of heavy attrition.

2.  I don't know exactly what the UA has in reserve but as we have seen, in defensive primacy they don't really need much.  The bar to defence is very low right now so long as one has C4ISR and Ukraine has a lot of C4ISR (that is one thing they don't need US Congress money for).  So projecting denial appears really low cost right now.  So I am frankly not worried about an RA breakthrough.  I mean strange things can happen but a great Russian horde breakthrough this spring really does not look likely unless Putin pulls a massive mobilization lever...and even then.  I mean what do you equip 1 million men with in Russia right now?

3.  Well it would need to happen first.  I suspect it might lead to rapid pushing of more stuff at Ukraine.  But if you are asking whether or not we would get directly involved (eg airstrikes) I think the answer is still "no".  We did not directly engage when the RA was at the doorstep of Kyiv.  A RA breakthrough in Southeast Ukraine is not likely going to change the western posture.

[OBJ]

ok, appreciate everyone's responses, and patience. Understand, I am seeking to understand, and ranting, both at the same time .

We've spent time discussing how to restore and sustain militarily meaningful battlefield mobility. We also have tried to peer into 2024 to see how the military situation in Ukraine could evolve. We have touched on global geopolitics.

So, synthesis so far on Russian use of tac nukes to breach Ukrainian defenses:

1. Use of multiple tac nukes in a row to make a breach might initially be successful

2. Likely any Russian breakthrough could not be sustained, me adding now, with caveat assumed no further use of tac nukes to maintain the Russian military advantage

3. Russian use of tac nukes results in rapid and overwhelming Western economic and diplomatic response, crippling Russian state, likely military ejection or diplomatically imposed withdrawal from some or all of Ukraine. Again, adding here, assuming no follow on use of tac nukes resulting in decisive Russian military advantage, Ukrainian capitulation

4. Only one of the three scenarios Steve has consolidated for us posits Putin seeing things the way we do, and us seeing things the way Putin might (second one, 2.). 

1. Putin ceases to be a "rational actor" and (this is important) there is absolutely nobody opposing his instructions.

2.  Russia is facing a cataclysmic military situation where Ukrainian forces are driving to Moscow or Sevastopol with only a couple of TikTok Warriors™ standing in the way.

3.  Russian leadership is so desperate to take more territory that it has concluded that tactical nukes offer a solution *and* it is willing to risk the response to its use.  This may be misguided and stupid, but it is rational.

The thing is, from my limited understanding, Dictators, and dictatorships, think differently than liberal democracies about the use of force, exhibit A Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It's my understanding the war in Ukraine is being pitched in Russia as Russia standing up to the west, all of the west. How they remain in power and go backwards, peacefully co-exist with the west, seems problematic? I think a cease fire now, with Russian forces left in place in Ukraine, will only result in a resumption of hostilities later.

Also, from the little I know, Putin is a 'double down' kind of guy, and not big on consensus unless everyone agrees with him.

Edited January 11 by OBJ

[Tux]

22 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well tac nukes are not a magic wand that erases defending forces or systems.  They were actually designed to break up heavy formations on the move.   To break a determined defence Russia would not be using a single tactical nuclear weapon, they would need to use many in depth.

I stand corrected. Thanks for the info. 

[OBJ]

Swedish defense, military chief, war warning. 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67935464

[Battlefront.com]

Detailed article in Politico about tech transfers to Russia.  Not surprisingly, the big culprit is third party transfers and the 1st party not seeming to care about them.  Proposal at the bottom is to impose restrictions on exporting to countries that are known to facilitate 3rd party transfers.  This will make it difficult for domestic needs in those countries, hopefully persuading them to put a stop to exporting to Russia.

https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-find-way-around-sanctions-battlefield-tech-report/

Steve

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, OBJ said:

ok, appreciate everyone's responses, and patience. Understand, I am seeking to understand, and ranting, both at the same time .

We've spent time discussing how to restore and sustain militarily meaningful battlefield mobility. We also have tried to peer into 2024 to see how the military situation in Ukraine could evolve. We have touched on global geopolitics.

So, synthesis so far on Russian use of tac nukes to breach Ukrainian defenses:

1. Use of multiple tac nukes in a row to make a breach might initially be successful

2. Likely any Russian breakthrough could not be sustained, me adding now, with caveat assumed no further use of tac nukes to maintain the Russian military advantage

3. Russian use of tac nukes results in rapid and overwhelming Western economic and diplomatic response, crippling Russian state, likely military ejection or diplomatically imposed withdrawal from some or all of Ukraine. Again, adding here, assuming no follow on use of tac nukes resulting in decisive Russian military advantage, Ukrainian capitulation

4. Only one of the three scenarios Steve has consolidated for us posits Putin seeing things the way we do, and us seeing things the way Putin might (second one, 2.). 

1. Putin ceases to be a "rational actor" and (this is important) there is absolutely nobody opposing his instructions.

2.  Russia is facing a cataclysmic military situation where Ukrainian forces are driving to Moscow or Sevastopol with only a couple of TikTok Warriors™ standing in the way.

3.  Russian leadership is so desperate to take more territory that it has concluded that tactical nukes offer a solution *and* it is willing to risk the response to its use.  This may be misguided and stupid, but it is rational.

The thing is, from my limited understanding, Dictators, and dictatorships, think differently than liberal democracies about the use of force, exhibit A Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It's my understanding the war in Ukraine is being pitched in Russia as Russia standing up to the west, all of the west. How they remain in power and go backwards, peacefully co-exist with the west, seems problematic? I think a cease fire now, with Russian forces left in place in Ukraine, will only result in a resumption of hostilities later.

Also, from the little I know, Putin is a 'double down' kind of guy, and not big on consensus unless everyone agrees with him.

The clearest indication that Russia isn't thinking that differently is that if using tactical nukes were a viable option then why haven't they used them already? This war almost led to a coup, it's grinding down the Russian economy, using nukes wouldn't be a problem within Russian domestic politics, etc. Yet it hasn't happened...because it isn't worth it even in terms of Putin's silovik mindset. 

Edited January 11 by billbindc

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, OBJ said:

The thing is, from my limited understanding, Dictators, and dictatorships, think differently than liberal democracies about the use of force, exhibit A Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Absolutely.  Someone thinking he can shoot his neighbor and get away with it is different thinking than someone who doesn't think shooting people is the right way to solve a dispute.  The shooter's plan may be unrealistic and immoral, but that doesn't mean it is irrational.  It crosses over to being irrational when the rejection of objective reality is so extreme that the decision is based on fantasy.  For example, the shooter thinking that he's God and therefore anything he does is acceptable.

It can be a fine line, but there is one.  The classic example is Hitler in his bunker ordering fantasy formations around with the thought that he can still save the Reich.  The orders may be rational ("order Steiner to move his forces here"), but the expectation of what those orders will achieve is irrational.

The evidence suggests that Putin understands the complications that come from using WMD, therefore he rationally has not used them.  There are likely some circumstances that would change the calculation, but military hardship and failure to achieve political goals does not appear to be amongst them.  That is rational.

1 hour ago, OBJ said:

How they remain in power and go backwards, peacefully co-exist with the west, seems problematic? I think a cease fire now, with Russian forces left in place in Ukraine, will only result in a resumption of hostilities later.

Also, from the little I know, Putin is a 'double down' kind of guy, and not big on consensus unless everyone agrees with him.

Sure, which is why he pursued the war despite the West throwing a huge monkey wrench in the chances of its success.  Every reasonable opportunity he's had to come out ahead of where he started has been rejected because it isn't "good enough".  Which is why we can not totally rule out nukes being used.  However, there is zero evidence to suggest he thinks this will get him what he wants.  In fact, he's been pretty careful to not antagonize NATO in any significant way.

Think about this.  If Putin were willing to risk using nukes, why wouldn't he be trying to blow up Western aid coming into Ukraine via Poland?  There's all kinds of things he could be doing that he's not because if an attack screws up it risks Article 4 and 5.  Ergo, he doesn't.

Steve

 

[Hapless]

0:35 DPICM at night on Russian column:

Hard to tell how much DPICM that is- definitely a couple of rounds- but looks like a good demonstration of the psychological effect. That assault group seems to disintegrate almost immediately.

[billbindc]

"Putin might have convinced the West that time is on his side, but the urgency suggests that he is not convinced of this himself. Given adequate support for Ukraine by the West, the balance of advantage is likely to turn against Russia in 2025."

https://icds.ee/en/the-moment-of-truth/

[Beleg85]

Reportedly Russian local authorities in Belgorod started to fortify...bus stops. So war is coming to them, albeit in rather odd form.

 

[omae2]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Coming back to this one:

1.  Yes.  Add to this that the UA can lay mines too, we have seen this.  I suspect the UA will be mining the crap out of their lines this winter.  So the RA faces the same problems: 

- Can they muster enough force?

- If they can muster, can they do a minefield breaches and depth exploitation without concentrating mass? (because we know that does not work right now.)

- If they somehow pull off those first two...can they sustain a breakout in depth?

I gotta tell you, if the UA had problems doing that after a year of western support and training, I have serious doubts the RA could pull it off especially after two years of heavy attrition.

2.  I don't know exactly what the UA has in reserve but as we have seen, in defensive primacy they don't really need much.  The bar to defence is very low right now so long as one has C4ISR and Ukraine has a lot of C4ISR (that is one thing they don't need US Congress money for).  So projecting denial appears really low cost right now.  So I am frankly not worried about an RA breakthrough.  I mean strange things can happen but a great Russian horde breakthrough this spring really does not look likely unless Putin pulls a massive mobilization lever...and even then.  I mean what do you equip 1 million men with in Russia right now?

3.  Well it would need to happen first.  I suspect it might lead to rapid pushing of more stuff at Ukraine.  But if you are asking whether or not we would get directly involved (eg airstrikes) I think the answer is still "no".  We did not directly engage when the RA was at the doorstep of Kyiv.  A RA breakthrough in Southeast Ukraine is not likely going to change the western posture.

The more i read you the more i feel that you think that this conflict will not move anywhere. Now i might be wrong but this is why i ask your opinion about two things:

1.: What do you think is the short, mid and long term plan of the USA in this conflict? I was sure in the first couple of months that the NATO will use this opportunity to bleed the russians dry. But they seems to be hesitant, and its seems that we are in a position where Ukraine did pay with blood just as russia but the later have more of it so in the end it will not matter.

2.: If the conflict will freeze or a peace deal will be signed that let russia keep the occupied territories what do you think will be the short, mid and long term effect of that in eastern Europe?

[OBJ]

OK,  

As someone else said, this community is made up of military professionals and well informed non-military professionals.
As someone else said, learning how to think is much more important than learning what to think.

So, consensus now:
Fact, Russia has not used tactical nuclear weapons
We see, at present, the only scenario Russian tac nuke use is in defense, Russia faced with some existential threat
We see, at present, continuation of conventional defense primacy/continuing stalemate in Ukraine along current front
We have conflicting inputs on the likely near future (24-25) from many credible sources

[cesmonkey]

Meanwhile in the U.S. Congress, ...

I sure hope he is successful.

National Security Challenges Are Test Of America’s Credibility, Senate Must Not Fail
https://www.republicanleader.senate.gov/newsroom/remarks/national-security-challenges-are-test-of-americas-credibility-senate-must-not-fail

Edited January 11 by cesmonkey