How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FlemFire]

It's criminal negligence to be in a military uniform commanding the lives of 1,000s of men and not input "thick minefields" into your "what do Russians do on defense?" calculus. To be frank, any discussion of that offensive as being worthy is akin to people who think Pickett's charge was the right idea, just poorly executed. I'll just never understand it.

Edited November 15, 2023 by Khalerick

[Ultradave]

17 hours ago, Sojourner said:

Looks like the U.S is shifting from supporting Ukraine to supporting Russia.

US House passes spending bill without Ukraine aid.

Banned Russian oil flows into Pentagon supply chain.

The idea of the first is to get a continuing resolution passed so the government doesn't grind to a stop. Arguing over Ukraine aid might pass but could have significantly delayed things. This Friday is the deadline I believe. 

There has been talk for quite a while about passing the budget bill, and having a separate bill for Israel aid + Ukraine aid + US Disaster relief funding in one separate bill. 

Now, I'm not sure that's the magic cure, but just that's what been discussed as a way forward. There is still broad support in Congress for Ukraine aid and tying it to Israel aid makes it harder to vote down by those opposed to Ukraine aid. Those are the same people who tossed out former Speaker McCarthy, so while they are a minority, they hold more sway than their numbers.

 

As to the second, no idea why the Pentagon couldn't have discovered that if journalists did. 

Dave

Edited November 15, 2023 by Ultradave

[Haiduk]

More interestig in this video is destroyed light armor at the beginning. This is BMP-1U, UKR-produced limited series of upgraded BMP-1 with Shkval RWS, which was sold to Georgia and almost all dozen vehicles were captured by Russia in 2008. Now even these minor trophies Russia has forced to use in own weponary.

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1724826755402289610

Beacuse of video has 18+ limitattion and doesn't want to insert as a video, only as a link, I post a screen with derstroyed BMP-1U

 

[Rokko]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

The amount of forces Russia burned through trying to retake forward positions was, by all OSINT accounts, on a scale similar to their failed deliberate attacks.  I don't know if on the whole the counter-offensive was worth it, but I do think Ukraine came out ahead militarily in the end.

This is precisely the point where my own impression is the exact opposite of yours. I'd really like to what you base this on, because I am pretty sure we all here have looked at the same footage and accounts and I distinctly do *not* remember seeing images of literal fields full of Russian corpses and entire armored columns smashed to bits like we saw during the last month. All I can think of are one or two clips of Russian infantry retreating on foot from this or that bombed out tiny village while getting a couple of cluster rounds on their heads. In fact, the few concrete sources, that we have access to, also indicate pretty much the exact opposite I'd argue. Personnel losses are basically impossible to reliably estimate from only OSINT sources and for vehicle losses, which are easier to track, the figures indicate at best a 1:1 loss ratio. Below is the only source I've seen so far that explicitly tries to track the losses during the southern offensive.

(The fighting around Bakhmut I find harder to judge since it has been, at least in my perception, almost entirely infantry centric.)

 

So give or take 500 armored vehicles lost by each time between June and October (when the intensity of the fighting decreased notably I'd say). Contrast that with ~220 vehicles lost by Russia in less than a month at Avdiivka, basically half of what they lost in the Zaporizhia direction, in a much shorter timeframe and a ridiculously lopsided fashion. I don't see that as comparable, at all.

https://x.com/naalsio26/status/172310590066203058

I find it incredible enough that Ukraine apparently has managed to kill/destroy Russians as efficiently as they did, all while assaulting the most heavily fortified positions one can think of, but to say that they came out ahead militarily almost borders on wishful thinking in my opinion.

[Kraft]

1 hour ago, Rokko said:

but to say that they came out ahead militarily almost borders on wishful thinking in my opinion.

I want to add that UA needs to maintain a 3(4) to 1 ratio just to keep force parity. A 1-1 ratio is only ever good if it leads to strategic payoffs, which it did not.

Assuming ofc a constant, not declining.. supply of vehicles from the West.

This is a big if too, because I dont see another hundred or so european tanks/.. coming next year, even if the will is there. This can only be really done by the US. Meanwhile Russia will continue to restore and produce with increasing numbers in 2024. 

Now before its brought up, these Russian losses will have paid off if Avdiivka falls. So its too early to judge that in my opinion. The initial push overcame the most defensible and difficult part, albeit at huge losses. But alas, new brigades will take the place of lost ones and the Infantry may well grind this out in favor of the invaders.

Edited November 15, 2023 by Kraft

[dan/california]

13 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Interesting ... add target indicators to the heads-up-display of individual soldiers equipped with MANPADs. 
Any one aware if other militaries are doing this?

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2023

 

https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/09/07/army-approves-next-phase-for-augmented-reality-device/

U.S. has been doing development on a generally similar idea for years. No one seems to think it is ready for prime time. Given the vast failures of much of Russia's comms gear in this war, I would be REALLY surprised if this does much.

[Beleg85]

Since talk about casualties pop up lately due to The Economist article, recent report of " Book of memory of the Fallen" created by various volunteers gives overal estimates of AFU losses at at least 30 thousand KIA. They are still being counted, so will increase, but it is less than from 70k newspaper source gave.

https://novynarnia.com/2023/11/14/knyga-pamyati-22-23/

Their spokesmen said lately also that there is a lot of MIA, whom he estimated at 15 thousand- presumably, mostly dead. Ratio 2:1 in KIA in MIA is quite high given lack of big encirclements in this war, except Mariupol. May be effect of bureaucratic practices.

That would gave us ca.50k perhaps at this moment in time.

Edited November 15, 2023 by Beleg85

[Harmon Rabb]

3 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Since talk about casualties pop up lately due to The Economist article, recent report of " Book of memory of the Fallen" created by various volunteers gives overal estimates of AFU losses at at least 30 thousand KIA. They ares till being counted, so will increase, but it is far from 70k newspaper source gave.

https://novynarnia.com/2023/11/14/knyga-pamyati-22-23/

Their spokesmen said lately also that there is a lot of MIA, whom he estimated at 15 thousand- presumably, mostly dead. That would gave us ca.50k perhaps at this moment in time.

Speaking of The Economist. Here is a recent cover they used.

I'll just let Mr.Golub say it for me.

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

This is precisely the point where my own impression is the exact opposite of yours.

Russia's defenders were mostly infantry based, so only comparing vehicles isn't really telling the whole story.  Also, let's remember that the slaughter fest of Avdiivka in October is an outlier event, so comparing anything against it will create a distorted comparison.

My sense of Russia's losses in the south come from reading the daily summaries and watching the Russian forces there melt away and have to be replaced.  Videos are anecdotal, so not much value in those in determining overall losses.

The daily reports noted wave after wave of Russian counter attacks in the forward positions.  We discussed them constantly here and a lot of us were scratching our heads as to why the Russians were fighting so hard in a zone that normally isn't fought so hard over.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Khalerick said:

It's criminal negligence to be in a military uniform commanding the lives of 1,000s of men and not input "thick minefields" into your "what do Russians do on defense?" calculus.

What evidence do you have that they didn't?  Or do you think all the mine breaching equipment they got from the West ahead of the counter-offensive was something they didn't ask for and thought they wouldn't need?

4 hours ago, Khalerick said:

To be frank, any discussion of that offensive as being worthy is akin to people who think Pickett's charge was the right idea, just poorly executed. I'll just never understand it.

If you apply hindsight to your assessments then sure, I can see why you wouldn't understand it.

Look, it was clear that Ukraine understood VERY WELL that the counter-offensive was going to be costly.  They were preparing people for it well ahead of time.  The overall plan seems to have been pretty sound too.  And as I stated, they ALMOST pulled it off.

What appears to have tipped things in Russia's favor is that the minefield density and depth was far greater than what they expected.  Not that they didn't think it would be dense or deep, just not as it turned out to be.  Nobody expected it because it was orders of magnitude thicker than anybody's high estimates were prior to the offensive.

As I said, not understanding how extremely thick the defenses were appears to have been a failure of intel gathering, not planning.  My guess is that Ukraine didn't monitor Russian activity sufficiently in the year prior.

The other surprise was that Russia was dead set on not just keeping its forward positions but retaking them as they were lost.  Nobody expected this as far as I can tell because it goes against Russian and Soviet doctrine, which for the most part Russia has followed.  We came up with some pretty good theories as to why they did what they did, so with hindsight it makes sense.

Was the counter-offensive worth it?  There were strategic reasons for it that would have become big problems for Ukraine if it had said "we're not going to do anything big this year", so even with hindsight I think they had to do it.  But in the form that they chose?  With hindsight I'd say there were better counter-offensive concepts knowing that the south was going to be as tough as it was.  Without hindsight... unclear.  I don't think we'll really know until the war is over and we can get a better accounting of exactly what happened.

Steve

[Kraft]

Quote

 A Chinese vessel was responsible for damaging a gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea

 This was reported by the Estonian state agency ERR.

According to the Elering company, during the incident, the ship Newnew Polar Bear pulled the Balticconnector pipe 100 meters from the place of damage with the help of an anchor, as a result of which the gas pipeline was displaced for four kilometers compared to the former route.

The company and Estonian experts are already studying ways to repair this section and, as Elering's press secretary Ain Kester stated, it will be more realistic and cheaper to replace a much shorter part of the gas pipeline that has shifted at the intersections with "Nord Stream-1" and "Nord Stream- 2".

 

[Harmon Rabb]

12 hours ago, Carolus said:

https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/07/25/stopping-the-modern-hitler-snipers-hold-the-line-in-ukraines-battle-for-survival/

 

Interview with a Ukrainian volunteer who specializes in fundraising for snipers.

Snipers are or were apparently responsible for the most casualties after artillery (Artillery being almost 90% and snipers being most of the rest).

Interesting troop composition he talks about. Also, every second high-tech scope west of Warsaw should be on the way to Ukraine. 

Reminded me of this post.

Never seen this footage, very dramatic music.

[kimbosbread]

3 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Speaking of The Economist.

Speaking as someone who stopped reading the economist two decades ago as it became lame, that cover is fine. Putin benefits from freezing the conflict and “peace”, as we’ve all discussed ad nauseum.

[Harmon Rabb]

2 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

Speaking as someone who stopped reading the economist two decades ago as it became lame, that cover is fine. Putin benefits from freezing the conflict and “peace”, as we’ve all discussed ad nauseum.

Can't help but feel that it just makes Ukrainians look like the warmongers and Putin the good guy in the eyes of people who have not really been following this war or will even read the article. Unfortunately more than enough people still judge a book by its cover.

I have seen so much victim blaming on the internet regarding this war while I have been following it on places like Twitter and YouTube, that I do not want the Russian propaganda machine be given any ammunition even accidentally. So many individuals already believe that if Ukraine just accepts Putin's demands, we will have not "peace" but true peace in Europe.

No way around it, this cover just does not look good. Going by the "Readers added context", for this cover on Twitter I'm not the only one who has these thoughts.

Edited November 16, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[Battlefront.com]

Ever wondered what a Msta-S SPG looks like disassembled?  Well, this video should help even though most of it isn't to be found:

 

Russian propagandist tells of Ukrainian partisans poisoning Russian soldiers behind the lines.  I'm sure most of this is BS or overstated, but it's interesting that he's pushing this narrative at all.  Demoralizing to Russian soldiers, I should think.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win

Download the PDF

 

If the West Cuts Aid to Ukraine, Russia Will Win. If the West Leans in, Ukraine Can Win.

By Frederick W. Kagan

The positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate. It is not the result of fundamental realities in modern warfare that can only be changed with a technological or tactical revolution, as was the First World War’s stalemate. Neither does it rest on a permanent parity in military capacity between Russia and Ukraine that will continue indefinitely regardless of Western support to Kyiv. It results, on the contrary, from self-imposed limitations on the technologies the West has been willing to provide Ukraine and constraints on the Russian defense industrial base largely stemming from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unwillingness so far to commit Russia fully to this war. The current balance is thus, in fact, highly unstable, and could readily be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West.

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

Tatarigami_UA takes some issues with a BBC article portraying the Avdiivka fight as political more than military.  He points out that Ukraine holding it is a thorn in Russia's side due to its proximity to Donetsk City.  If Russia should take it there are, theoretically, routes of advance available to undermine the sector's defenses.  Russia's history of exploiting a narrow front gain is just about zero, so theory and reality might not line up.

Interesting that he doesn't discuss the many reasons to hold Avdiivka aside from political or as a key geographical point, yet he kinda mentions one of the primary ones:

"The Russians underestimated Ukrainian forces in this attack, necessitating resource diversion from elsewhere for limited advances. Although immediate exploitation is doubtful, they can continue to expand by reallocating forces from other areas, replaced by newly formed units"

Russia diverting resources to Avdiivka from other locations is not a good thing for Russian operations elsewhere.  I'd say the left bank of the Dnepr is more important than Avdiivka, so if Russia is distracted from the bridgehead to seek a militarily questionable objective elsewhere, I'd say that's a pretty good reason to encourage Russia to continue fighting in Avdiivka.

Steve

[Harmon Rabb]

10 hours ago, Haiduk said:

More interestig in this video is destroyed light armor at the beginning. This is BMP-1U, UKR-produced limited series of upgraded BMP-1 with Shkval RWS, which was sold to Georgia and almost all dozen vehicles were captured by Russia in 2008. Now even these minor trophies Russia has forced to use in own weponary.

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1724826755402289610

Beacuse of video has 18+ limitattion and doesn't want to insert as a video, only as a link, I post a screen with derstroyed BMP-1U

 

I found this news interesting as someone who has been following the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia.

Different post of the AFU taking out a BMP-1U without the 18+ restriction. I know some folks don't like clicking external links.

Edited November 16, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[Harmon Rabb]

 

[dan/california]

Very interested in what our Polish friends have to say.

[Harmon Rabb]

Careless smoking?

[Zeleban]

Developing the theme of Ukraine’s unsuccessful summer offensive. Mashovets just wrote a post discussing the long-term prospects of this offensive

Review: Tokmak direction: prospects and options, or why General Zaluzhny is right...

Regarding the events in the Crimean-Tavrian and Donetsk directions, we slightly lost sight of the events in the Tokmak direction. Meanwhile, certain changes are also taking place there.

In particular, over the past few days, north of the village. Verbovoe, the enemy had a certain “incident”:

The enemy's 247th Air Assault Regiment apparently lost control of the heights northwest of this settlement. (level 140), which made it significantly more difficult for himself to maintain the northwestern outskirts of the village.

Moreover, probably in the direction of the village. Novopokrovka (southwest) units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces also have some success in the defense sector of the enemy’s 108th airborne infantry regiment. In fact, from now on, only one forest belt separates them from the village itself.

West of the village Rabotino units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, apparently, a few days ago also managed to push back units of the enemy’s 136th separate motorized rifle brigade towards the village Kopani.

Further to the west, in the area of the village. Nesteryanka and on the segment between it and the village. Kopani, in the defense areas of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, the 104th and 234th Airborne Regiment from the enemy's 76th Airborne Division, quite intense fighting is taking place. The advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine almost came close to the village. Nesteryanka and advancement northeast of the village. Kopani.

By the way, about the last point.

As far as I understand, the commands of the enemy’s 19th Motorized Rifle and 76th Air Assault Divisions have strict orders to hold the Nesteryanka-Kopani line “under any conditions.” And it’s clear why.

However, in the case of Nesteryanka, it will be quite difficult for the enemy to do this. The fact is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, at one time, advanced not only to the north of the village, but also to the west of it.

The main communication regarding the logistical support of the enemy's 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment units defending in Nesteryanka itself and its environs stretches from the village of Mirne in a southwestern direction. But thanks to the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces units managed to approach it between Nesteryanka and Mirne (precisely to the west of the first), they can keep this communication under fire.

It is the village of Mirne that is quite strongly fortified from the northern direction (there is a whole system of enemy strongholds there), but there are windows between it and Nesteryanka. The distance from the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to this road is just over 2 km.

I don't want to hint at anything, but any military man would see certain possibilities in this. Why does the enemy cling so stubbornly to the village of Novoprokovpka?

Because BEHIND it, to the south, the first position of the main line of defense begins with a fairly well-equipped “defense center” in the village Solodka Balka.

Hold s. Novoprokopovka allows the enemy command to prevent the advance of the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this direction (Novoprokopovka - Sladkaya Balka), while simultaneously concentrating and massing its forces and assets on a relatively narrow front area east of this village, where Ukrainian troops were able to wedge into the first defense position - between Novoprokopovka and Verbove.

This is precisely what allows the enemy to hold, with the available forces and means, with a few exceptions, the first position of his main line of defense in the Novoprokopovka-Verbovoye section. Otherwise, he would have to stretch his troops over a wider front. And it’s not a fact that they would be enough for him.

Moreover, BEHIND Novoprokopovka and Sladkaya Balka, closer to Tokmak, the enemy has equipped a second position of the main line of defense with an even more powerful “defense node” in the area of the village Kamyshove. This, in addition to the fact that the city of Tokmak itself is equipped with a separate system of fortified and prepared enemy positions, almost “in a circle.” The second position in this direction stretches from the village Krasnogorka to the village Ocheretuvate.

 

Edited November 16, 2023 by Zeleban

[Zeleban]

Thus, it becomes clear that in order to simply reach the “outer perimeter” of the enemy’s fortifications in the area of the city of Tokmak, in the Rabotino-Tokmak direction, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ strike group will have to gradually and sequentially solve several extremely complex tasks at once:

"break through" the first position in the Novoprokopovka area

assault a fortified area in the area of the village Solodka Balka

reach second position in the area of. Krasnogorka, expecting at any moment enemy counterattacks on its left flank from its powerful defense area in the village Ocheretuvate

break through the second position in the area village Krasnogorka

and only after all this - approach the city of Tokmak

At the same time, if you act “a little to the right”, on the part of Nesteryanka and Mirny, you will have to:

overcome the supply line with the enemy defense area in the village. Mirnoye, which is not even close to comparable to what is equipped in the area. Sweet Balka

reach the first position of the main line of defense equipped by the enemy south of the villages of Pobednoe (upper), Ternovatoe, Stepnoe

break through it, and the enemy’s fortified positions there cannot be compared with those located in the Rabotino-Tokmak directorate, reaching the Novogorovka-Chistopolye line

and only then, reach the “external perimeter” of the enemy’s fortifications in the area of Tokmak through the village Pokrovskoye

At first glance, this seems more realistic than the previous option, which was implemented recently in the direction Rabotino - Novoprokopovka and towards the village. Verbovoe. But, as always, there is one “but”. And, well, quite significant.

The fact is that the distances that the Ukrainian Armed Forces units will have to travel in the first and second options are completely different.

And this is one of the key, if not decisive factors, because it is directly related to time.

Distance from the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the village. Novoprokopovka to the outer perimeter of enemy fortifications in the area of Tokmak in a straight line - 18.4 km, at the same time, the same distance from the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the village. Nesteryanka to the outer perimeter of enemy fortifications in the area of Tokmak - almost 26 km.

Yes, at first glance, the difference of 8 km is not that big. But it’s not for me to explain to you what today at the tactical level means every “extra” kilometer of advance of your troops on terrain that has been comprehensively prepared by the enemy for a stubborn and long-term defense.

Of course, there are several more options for further actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Tokmak direction, in addition to the ones I described above. For example, you can also “turn” towards the city of Pologi (there the distance between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the enemy fortifications equipped to the west and north of the city is generally less than 10 km). You can shift your efforts to the Vasilievka direction, and in general, there are still options, as they say.

Edited November 16, 2023 by Zeleban

[Zeleban]

However, for all this there is no main thing - the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to carry out these tasks (for a variety of reasons). In their current state, they are simply not able to overcome the echeloned and prepared enemy defense system in this operational direction (I suspect that in others too) with an acceptable and adequate pace and scope. For those who have forgotten, let me remind you that this was the “main” direction in the last summer-autumn campaign of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Therefore, General Zaluzhny is entirely right in his assessment of the general (strategic) situation that has developed, no matter who and no matter what objects to him from among the official (and unofficial as well) representatives of our military-political leadership. General Zaluzhny cannot, in his assessment of the situation, proceed from any considerations other than purely military ones.

He, as the Commander-in-Chief, is directly responsible for the planning, organization and practical use of the troops under his command. It makes no sense to him to say black and white or vice versa. He is not a politician, not a businessman.

The only thing that can be “discussed” with General Zaluzhny’s point of view is the methods and forms through which, as he believes, it is possible to correct this situation, and regarding the causes and mistakes that led to it.

But again, I repeat, this discussion should be non-public and exclusively among those people (officials) who are directly involved in making management decisions at the appropriate level. To organize a farce and “showdowns” in the public information sphere on the topic “what did Zaluzhny mean” or “what did Zelensky mean” means very significantly harming the overall implementation of the war strategy of our state.

Edited November 16, 2023 by Zeleban

[Zeleban]

This is what it looks like when a Shahed UAV is shot down by a mobile group. For the last six months, Russia has been launching long-range strikes on Ukraine exclusively at night (closer to the morning)