How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

@akd

New upgrades for old T-80BVs:

Russia is going to renew producing of T-80 tanks "from zero".

https://www.interfax.ru/amp/919914

Recently Russian MoD considered refurbished tanks from storages as "new produced", so numbers of production in "1600 tanks for year" in this sense can considered as correct. But now it's talks exactly about restart of T-80 production. Intersting that this can turn out about next refurbishing of mathballed T-80 fleet, which will be passed off as "new". I doubt Russian production capabilities can replenish so scale losses timely. Resource of appropriate stored T-72 for modernization is exhausted, now Russia is unpacking T-80B/BV fleet. By assessments about of 3000 T-80B/BV tanks in relative good conditins can be raised from storages. Total number of T-80 of all models in USSR was about 5500.  

It's be interesting if Russian is goiing to make T-80 tank as main tank for army, considering current fuel crisis. Gas turbine engines of T-80 consume much more fuel than diesel of T-72/T-90.

And here on that photo could be probably first example of "new produced" T-80. This is T-80BVM obr.2022 "Obnovlyonnyi" ("Upgraded") under testing. The tank got cope cage with ERA, designers claimed it protects against top-attack HEAT ammunition like Javelins/NLAWs FPV drones and dropped ammunition. Also tank got EW devices "Volnorez" (these round things on top-front turret), having purpose to supress contol channels of FPV drones.

Edited September 10, 2023 by Haiduk

[kevinkin]

12 minutes ago, Tux said:

“There's still a reasonable amount of time, probably about 30 to 45 days' worth of fighting weather left, so the Ukrainians aren't done.”

I was just puzzled why he mentioned exact numbers. Maybe irresponsible. 

[Haiduk]

SItuation on Tokmak direction

Unofficial TG of 46th air-assault brigade told UKR troops had success west from Robotyne and seized several new Russian position toward Kopani. Russians unsuccessfully counter-attacked with small forces. 

UKR advanced deeper east from Novoprokopivka to "Surovikin line", but height 163.9 under Russian control interferes more fast progress. 

In Verbove area UKR forces try to push enemt west and south-west. But without control of heights on south and north/north-west attacking and seizing of Verbove hasn't any sense, because the village lays in lawlands. 

Since Deepstate today issued a map with clarifying of contact line on the line Novopokrovka - Verbove, turning most of Russian-controlled zone back, Russian TG shared info about "successfull counter-attack of Russian troops in heavy strenght, which allowed to fight back previously lost positions". But UKR twitters don't confirm any significant Russian attacks from western direction

[Jr Buck Private]

6 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

It does sound too good to be true, but if someone in the world is dumb enough to prioritize fuel for needless war instead of for food, it is Putin and his regime.

Oh but Putin will still have his food, prepared by a different chef of course.

[kevinkin]

https://www.wsj.com/world/putin-wants-his-hit-man-back-5bd759f8

Interesting story for the Sunday WSJ

Moscow seeks the return of a covert operative serving a life sentence in Germany, possibly in exchange for Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and others held by Russia

Shortly after his sentencing, authorities moved Krasikov from Berlin to an undisclosed high-security facility in Bavaria. There were fears that Chechen inmates in Krasikov’s former prison would try to kill him.

In his compound by the Danube River, Krasikov has the comforts afforded prisoners under German law, including daily walks in the garden and books in his own language. He has been reading Soviet-era novels glorifying the exploits of a Kremlin secret agent.

In the scheme of things, a sub plot. But we would all like Evan released. 

 

 

[Haiduk]

Imagination of UKR officer (I think platoon-level) from Zaporizhzhia front

My imagimation from Zaporizhzhia - infantry forgot what is to respect a shovel and dig until sh...t out. Fast growing of units and people on duties, caused absence of combat control skills. Battalion comamnder, who personally controls over dozen of men and AGS this is strong, of cousrse. 

I didn't see some fu...g hell enemy line. Shellins on the level less, than I сaught in own time. Only KABs impressed, but this weapon is croocked [in mean "not properly working"] and not super-accurate. Separately what is missing - for most of people these are their first combat and it's need not only to poke in the map with words "go fu..k here", but to chew [explain in details] everything

In comments he told most of soldiers, about what he told had training in Britain.

Edited September 10, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

 

[kevinkin]

Article by David Lapp-Jost (M.Ed.) is a Friedensarbeiter (Peace Worker) with the German Mennonite Peace Committee, which since World War II has worked for peace in Europe. It is a sober view for sure. But he does not offer any short term solutions. Just published to summarize and appreciate the massive toll on Ukraine and cries for US leadership. 

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/09/09/victory_at_what_price_in_ukraine_978456.html

After World War II, the U.S. helped end a pattern of generationally recurring violence in Western Europe, not only with the Marshall Plan but also with new institutions of exchange and friendship that continue today, with hundreds of thousands of exchange students going both ways and deep civil society engagement. It was a significant error to not cultivate that same level of friendship in Eastern Europe after 1990. Now there will be a new chance in Ukraine. It was also a catastrophic mistake to build the European economy on Russian energy exports, which funded half of the Russian state budget and military.

Well I do have personal knowledge of exchange students and young summer workers from eastern Europe after 1990. But it has seemed have slowed down over the last 10 or so years. 

 

[kimbosbread]

For all the talk about diesel shortages, what I’d really like to know about is the conditions of Russia’s trains. I know they don’t make bearings, and I know partisans have been burning signal boxes (the most vulnerable part of the network). Has anybody heard anything about the state of the rail network, both for military and civilian purposes?

[kevinkin]

Interesting but sometimes odd review of open source intel:

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3511951/russia-ukraine-and-the-future-use-of-strategic-intelligence/

The nature of the crisis—the first major state-on-state conflict in Europe since the Second World War—demanded a unique response. The United States thus sought to leverage intelligence in a manner to convince allies of the imminent threat and, to a lesser degree, dissuade Moscow from acting, while signaling that it had deep insights into the Kremlin’s plans. More than anything else, the United States had the benefit of the truth on its side—Washington was seen as a trusted information broker by most, particularly in the face of a belligerent and perceived pathological liar in Russia. Furthermore, the truth of the intelligence was validated by a far more established third-party open-source community than in previous incidents.

So that begs the question: why didn't the US stare down Putin if we so good and knew so much? 

[dan/california]

 

[Haiduk]

Russian TG claims, during retreating of Russian troops from Opytne toward Donetsk airport, Russian artillery mistakingly hit them, because spotters thought this is Ukrainian forces advance. As claimed 27 killed, 34 wounded, several vehicles destroyed.  

Repeating of 2014 situation, when battalion "Vostok" eliminated almost whole detachment of Russian volunteers "Iskra", retreating from Donetsk airport, passing them as Ukrianian troops, which brokethrough to the city

 

[dan/california]

Just a bit of light politicking, Russian style.

[The_Capt]

20 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Just a bit of light politicking, Russian style.

Why do they all cut their own hair in that country?  Did they outlaw hairstylists?

[Tux]

49 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

So that begs the question: why didn't the US stare down Putin if we so good and knew so much? 

Alright, I’ll bite (just this once) in case clearing it up once and for all might stop it being posted 3-4 times a day…

What does this even mean?  Amongst all the thoughts you post (which are honestly sometimes pretty hard to untangle) this one seems to come up more often than anything else.  It’s an analogy, right?  ‘staring down Putin’?  What is it actually an analogy for?

The article in your own post points out that “The United States thus sought to leverage intelligence in a manner to convince allies of the imminent threat and, to a lesser degree, dissuade Moscow from acting, while signaling that it had deep insights into the Kremlin’s plans.”

So the US basically told Russia they knew about their plans, told all their allies, told Ukraine and mobilised the alliance we see today to implement unprecedented sanctions against Russia and unprecedented financial and military support for Russia’s intended enemy.  I’m honestly not sure what other reasonable measures could have been taken at the time.

What else do you mean by “stare Putin down”?

Oh and, fair warning: if your response mentions B-52s or a no-fly zone I will be forced to conclude that you’re either trolling or basing your suggestions on video game experience, at which point I’ll apologise to the rest of the board for bringing it up and duck out.

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

And yet not entirely surprising.  To sustain national infrastructure, let alone a war footing situation, you need: people, money and information.  These are the things that keep infrastructure working and energy moving to feed that infrastructure. Russia has been hemorrhaging the first two and was pretty poor on the third one to begin with.  This may be isolated or could be a growing trend, but Russia does not have one critical strategic resource that Ukraine does…western wallets.

Yup, which ties into the discussion we had last week about the destruction of 10 fuel trucks (which was actually done last year).  Russia has had to divert civilian transporters to move around heavy equipment, dragon's teeth, fuel, food, etc.  All of that transport capacity wasn't sitting around doing nothing before the war, and it certainly hasn't been magically replaced since.  Therefore, when a civilian truck is moving something for the war it is NOT moving something for the regular economy.  The more they are tasked with war related activities, the more problems are created for the civilian economy.  It's rather straight forward.

One of the things many people don't understand about these sorts of disruptions to supply chain is that usually it takes a while to translate into a crisis.  People at the start of this war declaring sanctions weren't working don't understand this (nor did they understand the true impact of 2014/2015 sanctions) A healthy economy with a healthy capacity for logistics can handle such disruptions without seriously affecting the economy.  Maybe some prices go up a bit, perhaps service is a bit slower, but things largely continue.  The pandemic, on the other hand, shows what happens when extreme and prolonged stress hits economies.  Russia is experiencing something closer to the pandemic situation than a routine disruption.

Lastly, these sorts of problems that eventually cause significant disruption tend to take longer to settle down than they did flair up.  It's why many economic sectors across the globe are still trying to address problems caused by the first year of the pandemic.

Russia isn't some sort of magical fairy tale land where the normal rules of supply and demand don't apply.  Russia cannot continue this high intensity war without suffering economically for it.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, Tux said:

So the US basically told Russia they knew about their plans, told all their allies, told Ukraine and mobilised the alliance we see today to implement unprecedented sanctions against Russia and unprecedented financial and military support for Russia’s intended enemy.  I’m honestly not sure what other reasonable measures could have been taken at the time.

Exactly this.  I have the same reaction when I hear people say there's endless ways to get the violently mentally ill to not do something violent.  Sometimes everything that can be done is done and it still results in a nutjob hurting someone.

I think the US did just about everything it could, including things that no government I know of has ever done.  Putin knew his cover was blown.  He knew everybody was going to gang up against him.  He knew that major retaliatory measures were already agreed to.  He knew the West was going to arm the Hell out of Ukraine.  Yet he still attacked.  Why?  Because he thought none of this would matter because he could win a quick war and then go back to business as usual.

Hard to "stare down" someone who isn't smart enough to blink in the face of a stiff wind.

Steve

[Rokko]

2 hours ago, Tux said:

Did you read the link?  From what I saw the headline was slightly misleading. Milley said “There's still a reasonable amount of time, probably about 30 to 45 days' worth of fighting weather left, so the Ukrainians aren't done.”  I think it’s the headline writer who has turned that into “Ukrainian offensive could only have 30 days left”.  Not helpful, for sure.

In any case nobody knows how long the offensive has left and even Milley wasn’t trying to imply that his estimate is a hard-and-fast number.  We all know that wet weather (not the cold weather the article-writer seems hung up on) could force a halt due to mud.  If for some reason it doesn’t get too muddy then the weather may not halt the offensive at all.  And of course the offensive could run out of steam all on its own before the next 30 days are up.

 

Time passes. Things change. It’s a non-story. 

I do wonder, with the Ukrainian slow, methodical and infantry-centric approach during this counter offensive, how much do classical notions of "campaign weather" actually matter? With advances measured only in a couple of kms every week, I somehow doubt mud is going to be a major issue for, e.g., supply. I believe @Haiduk has alluded to this previously in a report about UKR units training how to assault half-flodded, soggy trenches. Current tactics will still likely have to be adapted, like driving tanks cross-country to shoot up enemy dugouts from up close, and we have already seen how bad weather can negatively affect drone operation (Wagner storming Soledar at -20C this January comes to mind).

If the counter offensive is really as sustainable in terms of force exhaustion as some claim, I feel we might see neither a rapid breakout nor the counter offensive slowly petering out, but rather an extended slow slog through fall and winter. What *will* probably become impossible, is the kind of high speed breakout movement that everyone has been hoping for at the start of summer once the weather finally breaks.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Pair of UKR tanks of 116th mech brigade ride in grey zone NE of Novoprokopivka, Khorne Group UAV team of this brigade tracks their movement

Tanks are shooting on move almost point blanc at any suspicious places, where Russian positions can be. At 0:30 several AP mines have exploded under leading tank tracks. At 2:15 enemy ATGM missed the leading tank from side direction. Drone operator exclaims: "Men! You have skipped ATGM!" Then drone operator calls fire: "Come on! At the mid of "Tenneesee" [likely position name] near a ravine!" 

At 2:46 drone operator has spotted Lancet, strifing on leading tank, and shout "Lancet! Fu...g Lancet! Transmit to tankrers!". But leading tank crew had lucky day - enemy Lancet missed too (2:54)   

Geolocation:

 

A drone operator being able to spot a Lancet in the area or on an attack run is a novel way to undermine them IF the drone operator can communicate their presence to likely targets in time.  Which, although theoretically possible, is pretty difficult to make happen given how quickly situations like this develop.

Steve

[Tux]

34 minutes ago, Tux said:

…I will be forced to conclude that you’re either trolling or basing your suggestions on video game experience…

Quick note: the above was unnecessary and disrespectful, so I apologise for that.

[Tux]

11 minutes ago, Rokko said:

I do wonder, with the Ukrainian slow, methodical and infantry-centric approach during this counter offensive, how much do classical notions of "campaign weather" actually matter? With advances measured only in a couple of kms every week, I somehow doubt mud is going to be a major issue for, e.g., supply. I believe @Haiduk has alluded to this previously in a report about UKR units training how to assault half-flodded, soggy trenches. Current tactics will still likely have to be adapted, like driving tanks cross-country to shoot up enemy dugouts from up close, and we have already seen how bad weather can negatively affect drone operation (Wagner storming Soledar at -20C this January comes to mind).

If the counter offensive is really as sustainable in terms of force exhaustion as some claim, I feel we might see neither a rapid breakout nor the counter offensive slowly petering out, but rather an extended slow slog through fall and winter. What *will* probably become impossible, is the kind of high speed breakout movement that everyone has been hoping for at the start of summer once the weather finally breaks.

Agreed, although I wonder whether the negative impact deep mud may have on the effectiveness of Ukrainian artillery might be more of an issue?  Come to think of it, I assume it would be an especially bad idea to keep firing DPICM at targets in ‘soft ground’…

Still, I see your point and won’t be shocked if Ukraine try to keep the pressure on all through autumn and into winter. Once/if the ground freezes everything speeds up again anyway (except the drones).

So, yeah, “30 to 45” days sounds like a reasonable guess based on certain well-known assumptions, to be taken with a healthy lump of salt.

[Letter from Prague]

51 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Why do they all cut their own hair in that country?  Did they outlaw hairstylists?

More importantly, there has been significant expansion of Chechnya ... in a way.

[billbindc]

17 minutes ago, Rokko said:

I do wonder, with the Ukrainian slow, methodical and infantry-centric approach during this counter offensive, how much do classical notions of "campaign weather" actually matter? With advances measured only in a couple of kms every week, I somehow doubt mud is going to be a major issue for, e.g., supply. I believe @Haiduk has alluded to this previously in a report about UKR units training how to assault half-flodded, soggy trenches. Current tactics will still likely have to be adapted, like driving tanks cross-country to shoot up enemy dugouts from up close, and we have already seen how bad weather can negatively affect drone operation (Wagner storming Soledar at -20C this January comes to mind).

If the counter offensive is really as sustainable in terms of force exhaustion as some claim, I feel we might see neither a rapid breakout nor the counter offensive slowly petering out, but rather an extended slow slog through fall and winter. What *will* probably become impossible, is the kind of high speed breakout movement that everyone has been hoping for at the start of summer once the weather finally breaks.

I was wondering this exact thing. If Ukraine simply maintains a grinding bite and hold offense, how much does the weather really affect the pace?

[Tux]

17 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

…IF the drone operator can communicate their presence to likely targets in time.

..and if the likely targets have anything they can do to escape/counter the Lancet in time. That was my main thought when watching the video: the drone operator may have been shouting “Lancet! ****ing Lancet!” but I bet the tank commander was shouting back “What the **** do you expect me to do about it?!”

[dan/california]

37 minutes ago, Rokko said:

(Wagner storming Soledar at -20C this January comes to mind).

 

Of course this might be part of the Ukrainian plan, or at least their backup plan. Really bad weather might suppress the advantages of drone dependent defensive scheme more than they suppress the ability to attack, it probably doesn't do a single good thing for Russian fixed and Rotary wing aviation either. So wait until a butt cold, windy day and launch a, hopefully, more or less surprise attack at a weak sector of the front. Their certainly seem to be some weak sectors out there if the recent Ukrainian advances towards Donetsk airport are any indication.

Edited September 10, 2023 by dan/california