How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Bearstronaut]

9 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Speaking of War Gonzo, don't forget to vote: 

 

Tulsi Gabbard

EDIT: I mean Lt. Col Tulsi Gabbard, USAR

Edited June 22, 2023 by Bearstronaut

[Huba]

I did a little Google Earth exploring of Crimea, looking for potential chokepoints to RU logistic system:

 

1. There's only one relevant railway in Crimea, which crosses the Kerch bridge and then follows to Dzhankoy, where it splits into lines toward Melitopol and Kherson. Disabling it is IMO the low hanging fruit for the UA. Apart from the Kerch bridge itself, there are numerous bridges and overpasses along it, which when struck would put it out of order for some, and in many cases probably for a very long time. The goal here would be to force Russians to offload all the materiel to trucks as far from the frontlines as possible, instead of driving the trains up to Melitopol or Dzhankoy. Making them switch to trucks in Kerch instead of Dzhankoy adds around 200km to the distance trucks have to travel one-way.

2. There are three road connections between Kherson and Crimea:

2.1 The most direct one leads from Dzhankoy through Chonhar, through the bridges that were attacked today. As far as road transport is concerned this is the one RU would like to use (at least as long as they can use Dzhankoy rail yard) and UA to try to deny to them
2.2 Around through Perekop. No bridges or other chokepoints here, but choosing it adds around 200km to the trip, one way.
2.3 Through Arabat Spit. The shortest connection from Kerch > Semysotka > Henichensk and further to Zaporozhiya front. The spit is super narrow and around 100km long. There wasn't a paved road along most of its length, but Russians reportedly started to build one last year. With rail disabled I guess most of the traffic will go through it soon, as road travel from Kerch by this route is noticeably shorter than through Chonhar. At Henichenks there are 2 subsequent bridges that UA side could attack to mess with RU logistics. Also, in case UA reaches the coast of Azov somewhere, this road would be extremely exposed to drone/ missile strikes.


 

Edited June 22, 2023 by Huba

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, billbindc said:

This brings us back to the surrendering issue. Russian soldiers certainly know that rape, torture and murder are part and parcel with their operations in Ukraine. I would argue that they certainly know that Ukrainians hate them and that Ukrainians have every reason to destroy them and show no mercy. That Ukrainians are often willing is besides the point that the Russian military has internalized their own malignancy.  

I think this is exactly the issue. The system they exist in so brutal it doesn't even occur to them the other side could be different. This is why some of them can't shut up when they realize they are not going to be tortured. The feeling of relief is so strong it sort of breaks their brains.

[dan/california]

 

Seems like a useful trick.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

 

Seems like a useful trick.

Well they are all surface laid...so not really that much of a stretch.  Man, those look like some high densities.  I think the Russians may have found something they are actually good at.

[DesertFox]

 

 

[DesertFox]

Hmm, UAF is strolling around pretty leisurely. Piatykhatky.

 

 

[Kinophile]

Are we so sure its storm shadow?

This is after SS hitting a vertical structure, punching through multiple reinforced floors and destroying the foundations, ground floor, as it's designed to do.

The Chonhar bridge hits are onto horizontal concrete planes, steel reinforced but not defensively. The blast and shock would definitely compromise the structure in all sorts of fun ways, but its certainly fixable and hey, TIR(IU).

SS is essentially designed to punch through fortifications or very heavy structures. The bridges are heavy but it feels like wasting a SS to make a hole in a bridge span. The missile is certainly accurate enough and maneuverable enough to come in from an angle and hit the columns and/or base footings for far, far worse effect on the overal structure and repair times.

The damage from today looks a lot more like those HIMARS strikes on the Antonovsky bridge, even though from the range its obviously not HIMARS. 

But, a longer range missile with a similar sized warhead to HIMARS would match...

HIMARS ~200 lb unitary warhead

Storm Shadow ~ 990lb unitary warhead.

I will note that Bridges are a stated designed target for SS, but I'm curious why use all the 'splody poundage on a bridge span - and not the uprights themselves....

Edited June 22, 2023 by Kinophile

[Lethaface]

On 6/21/2023 at 4:52 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Correct.  In accounting terms an asset is depreciated over time according to a schedule.  At the end of the schedule the asset has no value from an accounting standpoint.  If the item is sold the gain/loss is the difference between price paid and the current depreciated value.  IIRC you can elect to NOT depreciate an asset, at which point the gain/loss is based on the original booked value.  Nobody does that as a matter of routine, though, as it is not likely to benefit the taxpayer.

The key thing is that once an asset is depreciated then it is depreciated.  You can NOT use the original value for any accounting activity, including as collateral on loans, insurance, or anything else that concerns the value of that asset to the holder of it.

I am not an accountant, therefore I might have missed nuances, but there could be no "error" at the Pentagon about this.  Either they are routinely using fraudulent accounting practices to "cook the books", and decided to correct it for this one purpose, or someone indeed made a major and fundamental mistake.  If it was the latter, then there's probably a room full of accountants that need to be fired and prevented from ever handling books ever again.  Then again, accountants that cook the books should also be fired and prevented from ever handling books ever again

This is a scandal in the making, but I'm sure Congress has more important things to do like fight over gender affirming healthcare.  Grr.

Steve

The interesting bit imo is whether the replacement cost (which do actually need to be paid in full one would assume) had come out a specific budget 'jar' labeled 'Ukraine mil support' and now needs to be refilled from another jar outside the defense budget (creating a deficit somewhere else), or are these just labeled costs which are all credited against the overall US Defense budget. 
In the latter case they can just 'change the label' retroactively, which will then also impact the fulfillment of the allowed balance sheet expenses for 'Ukraine mil support' for the difference (and thus open up the difference which seems to be 6.2 Bn). 

In other words, it might be just a simple balance sheet correction exercise. AFAIK the US Mil budget is a sort of current account backed by a large virtual $ printing machine where 6Bn is pocket change. 

But indeed not a good impression on the accounting side of things for the Pentagon, one would expect these things to be checked by teams of controllers and accountants; if you cook the books cook m good :D. 
PS I'm neither an accountant, although did learn a couple of things about it.

[DesertFox]

5 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

But, a longer range missile with a similar sized warhead to HIMARS would match...

Also my bet. Something in the 100-200kg range.

[Lethaface]

On 6/21/2023 at 5:51 PM, Battlefront.com said:

More evidence that Ukraine is far more focused on grinding down Russia's forces than it is taking territory.  This is the correct strategy!  We've been saying over and over again that Russia's lines are thin and reinforcements at any scale unavailable.  Yet a relatively small number of defenders can be a real problem with all those mines and fixed emplacements.  Mines and fixed emplacements without capable defenders, though, are a different thing

So it looks like Russia is stuck.  They have to stay in their positions and there's very little it can do about the attrition.  Attempts to counter attack are just going to make it worse.  And if there's one thing the Russians are consistently good at doing is taking a bad situation and making it worse!

The big question, then, is how long will Ukraine keep this grinding up before it makes major moves forward? 

Sorry for regurgitating yesterday again, but thought this was an interesting post and my thread pace is lacking.

Shooting up the defenses before trying to occupy objectives sounds a bit like the lessons I've learned from CM over the years. What is the time limit for this 'scenario'? :-). If they have a couple of months left before the muds put an end to this phase, while they still have a good number of fresh reserves/reinforcements available for insertion, why would they need to rush moving forward unless it is clear that a position is basically smashed?

Of course sometimes one needs to do a bit of risky pushing to assert whether it is 'safe' to move forward, but other than that I don't see why they would go for a determined move into strong defenses (and or into counter attacking mobile reserves) / unfavorable terrain unless there is a need to take stuff at any cost before a certain cut off. 

Edited June 22, 2023 by Lethaface

[DesertFox]

New vid from one impact on Chonhar bridge:

 

 

[akd]

Definitely Storm Shadow (debris was already shown regardless).  One more similar hit and bridge is probably effed.

Edited June 22, 2023 by akd

[Huba]

To clear the remaining confusion about what was hit and how hard:

Edit: and a video of Pantsir trying to engage the incoming Storm Shadows:

 

Edited June 22, 2023 by Huba

[dan/california]

55 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Sorry for regurgitating yesterday again, but thought this was an interesting post and my thread pace is lacking.

Shooting up the defenses before trying to occupy objectives sounds a bit like the lessons I've learned from CM over the years. What is the time limit for this 'scenario'? :-). If they have a couple of months left before the muds put an end to this phase, while they still have a good number of fresh reserves/reinforcements available for insertion, why would they need to rush moving forward unless it is clear that a position is basically smashed?

Of course sometimes one needs to do a bit of risky pushing to assert whether it is 'safe' to move forward, but other than that I don't see why they would go for a determined move into strong defenses (and or into counter attacking mobile reserves) / unfavorable terrain unless there is a need to take stuff at any cost before a certain cut off. 

I think the biggest limitation is artillery ammo/pgms. They can't maintain this level of fires indefinitely, so it is a tricky calculation to decide ow much you can afford to degrade any given objective before you have to push.

[cesmonkey]

Kofman talks with the Kyiv Independent:

 

[Huba]

16 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I think the biggest limitation is artillery ammo/pgms. They can't maintain this level of fires indefinitely, so it is a tricky calculation to decide ow much you can afford to degrade any given objective before you have to push.

There are some good news coming from the ammunition department today:

Apparently there's a way to feed 2S7s with US 203mm ammunition:

US is ramping up its 155mm production, Rheinmetall is reportedly even further ahead in this regard. In the thread following the tweet below there's a quote from Reznikov about UA using 110K shells per month, and asking for 250K/ month. It is more than official number for RU production, which Shoigu himself said is 200K per month, and in reality probably a fraction of that. Arsenal(s) of democracy are really starting to work, and IMO going froward UA will be in better and better position ammunition wise.

Edited June 22, 2023 by Huba

[Beleg85]

Regarding recent discussion abour prisoners- here record of action that (if true and not staged) is hard to unbelieveable. UA soldiers from 127 TD Brig. captured one Russian, probbaly after failed attack. They used him as a "bait" (they thretened him and installed granade on his back- I think against conventions) to guide their squad into Russian trenches, where they (reportedly, video is cut in several places) convinced rest of Russians that are Russian mercenaries dressed as Ukrainian soldiers on deep patrol. This way they supposedly took that position... seems bond-ish, but Russians look like scarred to death.

Hard to tell if this is true or staged using POV's, maybe Ukrainian members can assess.

 

Edited June 22, 2023 by Beleg85

[dan/california]

We seem to be a bit slow...

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, Huba said:

There are some good news coming from the ammunition department today:

Apparently there's a way to feed 2S7s with US 203mm ammunition:

I am really curious if these worked without modification. I also assume the people who test fired the first one stood way, WAY, back. Excellent news though, hopefully there was a huge pile of them in a depot somewhere, probably because it was too expensive to get rid of them.

[dan/california]

11 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Regarding recent discussion abour prisoners- here record of action that (if true and not staged) is almost unbelieveable. UA soldiers from 127 TD Brig. captured one Russian, probbaly after failed attack. They used him as a "bait" (they thretened him and installed granade on his back- I think against conventions) to guide their squad into Russian trenches, where they (reportedly, video is cut in several places) convinced rest of Russians that are Russian mercenaries dressed as Ukrainian soldiers on deep patrol. This way they supposedly took that position... seems bond-ish, but Russians look like scarred to death.

Hard to tell if this is true or staged using POV's, maybe Ukrainian members can assess.

 

They faked the guy. They literally stuck a stick down the back of his vest and told him he had been wired with an explosive. They got three POWs instead of having to shoot most of them. Not a bad days work, really

[Lethaface]

33 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I think the biggest limitation is artillery ammo/pgms. They can't maintain this level of fires indefinitely, so it is a tricky calculation to decide ow much you can afford to degrade any given objective before you have to push.

Ideally one has discovered all the 'options' (as theCapt says) available to the defender and ran out of good / worthwhile targets for PGMs/fires before starting 'the big' push, if you even need to do a big push.
Maybe it will be most wise to culminate with a lot of successful small pushes :D.

[Kinophile]

Absolutely a Storm Shadow.  I guess hitting the middle of the span to make repair extra onerous and possibly not convinced they could take out the supports. 

[Haiduk]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Video of the strike on the Chongar bridge:

 

Somebody mistakingly posted about car and rail bridges were struck, but it's not. Both bridges near Chonhar are car bridges, but one is old and wasn't in use. Railway bridge is SW from Chongar. This is line Kerch - Dzhankoj - Syvash - Chonhar - Melitopol'

Edited June 22, 2023 by Haiduk

[Lethaface]

27 minutes ago, Huba said:

There are some good news coming from the ammunition department today:

Apparently there's a way to feed 2S7s with US 203mm ammunition:

US is ramping up its 155mm production, Rheinmetall is reportedly even further ahead in this regard. In the thread following the tweet below there's a quote from Reznikov about UA using 110K shells per month, and asking for 250K/ month. It is more than official number for RU production, which Shoigu himself said is 200K per month, and in reality probably a fraction of that. Arsenal(s) of democracy are really starting to work, and IMO going froward UA will be in better and better position ammunition wise.

If true and in place 'in production' could be significant for CB fires and more limitation of Russian ability to effectively use artillery.