How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[cesmonkey]

This was on C-SPAN radio today, a panel from April 3rd:

Atlantic Council Discussion on the Russia-Ukraine War
https://www.c-span.org/video/?527122-1/atlantic-council-discussion-russia-ukraine-war#

as kind of a follow-up to this article:

Game-changers: Implications of the Russo-Ukraine war for the future of ground warfare
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/game-changers-implications-of-the-russo-ukraine-war-for-the-future-of-ground-warfare/
 

[sburke]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think Ukraine needs to avoid urban fighting generally.  Melitopol is likely well defended or at least well prepared for defensive ops.  Attacking it would preclude doing many other things that have a much higher chance of success.

The thing is, for Ukraine to attack into Melitopol it will need to at least envelop if not surround it.  That won't happen unless it clears at least a 60-80km wide path to it from current positions.  That in and itself is a tough assignment, but then having to defend it against counter attacks?  That would be even more challenging.

It is possible for Ukraine to drive straight towards Melitopol and then push east and west from the breach.  But that is a LOT of territory to cover and I do not think Ukraine has the resources to achieve it.

Short of a Russian military collapse, I don't think it is wise to drive straight toward Crimea or Azov from the north.  My suggestion of clearing out the east first seems far more sure of success and will, in the end, neutralize Melitopol's importance because it will be cut off from Crimea.  Dealing with such a large urban area can then be done at Ukraine's discretion over time instead of as an absolute short term need.

Steve

the one other factor that could way into that is if UA can infiltrate units into Melitopol in advance.  Defending an urban are for the Russians could be problematic if they don't actually fully control the urban area.

[Kinophile]

I'm very curious how the Russian/Wagner forces would manage if suddenly thrown on the defensive. 

They  are heavily formatted to offense,  they don't seem to have deep logistical sustainment capacity and they are not well lead except at the bleeding edge. 

Is a ZSU counter offensive between SiversDonetsk and Donetsk proper feasible? 

The attack wouldn't have a definitive geographic object other than cutting GLOCS N/S,  would be punching directly into the maw of the bear and pushes RUS forces back onto existing LOCS and bases,  helping them strengthen their defense as they fall back. So not great. 

But they would be able to inderdict GLOCS of both Donetsk and Luhansk... 

 If the ZSUs 2023 strategic objective is gutting the fighting heart of the Russian expeditionary army,  then destroying the forces between Severodonetsk &  Donetsk would achieve that. The cost could be very high but as Perun says,  Russian trend line go down right now, whereas ZSU is very much trend line go up. 

Trashing a bunch of Mobiks and tier 2 units around Melitopol gives the ZSU more territory to defend,  leaves the higher quality core of the Russian army in Ukraine still intact and creates Melitopol as an unresolved operational problem. 

Two very significant results of the Kharkiv and Kherson operations is that they solved their generating geographic problems -  Kherson fell,  giving Ukraine the Dnepr and Kharkiv was secured, blockading Russia back into the Donbass. 

Attacking South but not taking Melitopol doesn't solve a particular geographic objective. It enhances the damage ZSU can do to Russian logistics (absolutely not to be sneezed at) but leaves the AFRF intact, gives the ZSU a lot more territory to defend,  clean up and watch and burdens Ukraine with the additional population support. 

Basically I suspect that reconquering territory is actually not in Ukraines long term interest - as Steve himself said several times before,  the ZSU needs to kill as many of the right Russians as possible. 

Im not convinced that will be done in a limited land grab operation around Melitopol. 

Edited April 10, 2023 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

56 minutes ago, sburke said:

the one other factor that could way into that is if UA can infiltrate units into Melitopol in advance.  Defending an urban are for the Russians could be problematic if they don't actually fully control the urban area.

Partisan activity didn't do much in Kherson in terms of changing the dynamic, so I would not count on it doing so in Melitopol.  Now, maybe if UA forces were already mostly surrounding the city and showing signs of getting in, then partisan activity might have a real impact.

Otherwise, partisans operating to disrupt Russian LOCs is the way to go.  This worked very well on all fronts in WW2, whereas partisan attacks within urban areas were generally rare.  Warsaw was the largest scale uprising and we know how that went.

47 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I'm very curious how the Russian/Wagner forces would manage if suddenly thrown on the defensive. 

They  are heavily formatted to offense,  they don't seem to have deep logistical sustainment capacity and they are not well lead except at the bleeding edge. 

Is a ZSU counter offensive between SiversDonetsk and Donetsk proper feasible? 

Maybe, but the terrain is terribly easy to defend against a mechanized attack.  The only reason why UA did so well in the Kharkiv offensive was the defenders were scattered unprepared to fight at all, not to mention in prepared positions.  Once Russia realized what was happening they shut down the momentum pretty solidly.  Ukraine can not afford to have that happen to them this year.

47 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

 If the ZSUs 2023 strategic objective is gutting the fighting heart of the Russian expeditionary army,  then destroying the forces between Severodonetsk &  Donetsk would achieve that. The cost could be very high but as Perun says,  Russian trend line go down right now, whereas ZSU is very much trend line go up. 

I think it would be a hard and difficult slog, but I do agree that if such an attack was successful it would likely have a huge impact on the course of the war.  However, it is a less sure bet than attacking in the south and Ukraine really needs as sure of a bet as possible.

47 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Attacking South but not taking Melitopol doesn't solve a particular geographic objective. It enhances the damage ZSU can do to Russian logistics (absolutely not to be sneezed at) but leaves the AFRF intact, gives the ZSU a lot more territory to defend,  clean up and watch and burdens Ukraine with the additional population support. 
 

Depends on how you calculate the Dnepr as a frontline.  If you exclude it completely, then indeed the frontline in the south goes from about 150km to about 350km.  If you include it entirely the frontline is reduced from 450km to 350km, which is a major reduction.  However, this probably isn't as important because...

The presumption is that if Ukraine makes it this far the Russians will have lost quite a lot of manpower, equipment, and supplies and Ukraine will not have suffered the same scale of losses.  If Ukraine invests 30,000 new forces into the mix, they should have enough to cover the line better than Russia.  Especially bottling up Crimea as that will take minimal forces due to the geography and Russia's inability to easily attack out of it.

47 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Basically I suspect that reconquering territory is actually not in Ukraines long term interest - as Steve himself said several times before,  the ZSU needs to kill as many of the right Russians as possible. 
 

Actually, I think taking back a large amount of territory is what Ukraine should focus on this year.  Ask yourself... what was the public's reaction to Ukraine retaking huge amounts of territory last year vs. achieving a possible 5:1 favorable kill ratio in Bakhmut?  The first one was inspirational, the second one was depressing.  Not just for the Ukrainians fighting, but for everybody following the war even a little bit.

47 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Im not convinced that will be done in a limited land grab operation around Melitopol. 

Ah, but it isn't limited at all.  It would be more territory than was retaken last year.  Roughly 29,000 km2 vs. something like 15,000 km2 last year. 

Liberating that much area and trashing Russia's forces in the process is a good enough goal all on its own, but it is far better than that.  Sealing off Crimea would take the *only* land based goal Russia achieved since this horror show of a war started.  Namely, establishing a land bridge and providing territorial security for Crimea.  That would be GONE through the direct action of the Ukrainian military.  It would be a huge defeat that Russians would care more about than zinc coffins.

Then there's the divide and conquer concept of destroying purely Russian formations instead of hybrid Russian/DLPR.  Far more bang for the buck smashing forces in the south as they are mostly Russian.

Plus, I see some limited counter offensives in Donbas being feasible once Russia drains its forces there to go fight in the south as it did last year.

Steve

[kluge]

3 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

Is there some other major goal that would justify an attack nearer to the "center" of the front? What about going for Lychansk and threatening the rear of the Russian forces at Bakhmut?

The density of forces is highest near the center of the front. There will likely be opportunities to attrit significant Russian forces in that area with relatively small localized maneuvers like the one you describe.

That being said, the Kremlin views its irregular formations as expendendable. And I don't necessarily see Ukraine using its elite units to threaten the Wagnerites at Bakhmut. Perhaps somewhere else nearby though.

[Battlefront.com]

Not Ukraine related as it was done before the war for non-military purposes, but it does make you think...

 

[Battlefront.com]

Article in Moscow Times putting forth the idea that blockading Crimea is better than trying to retake it.  A theme that has come up here over and over again:

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/08/why-blockading-rather-than-retaking-crimea-might-be-kyivs-best-option-a80755
 

Ben Hodges just had an article out about this subject as well and they quoted him:
 

Quote

Ukraine does not, however, need to drive occupying forces out of Crimea to render it less hospitable to Russia's purposes. Combinations of modern technologies could enable Ukraine to blockade and barrage Russian operations. Former U.S. Army Commander in Europe Lieutenant General Ben Hodges maintains that with long-range strike capabilities, Ukrainian forces could “make Crimea untenable for Russian forces” by the end of the summer.

The article has some good points and was going along pretty well until they suggested that the Crimean bridge attack was done by a boat bomb.  I don't want to give RAND more crap, but the two authors are RAND guys.

The point, though, is that Crimea is a very difficult territory for Russia to maintain during wartime.  Especially if Ukraine cuts off the water supply and continually strikes Russian naval assets, air bases, and of course the Kerch bridge.  Could prove more valuable as a distraction for Russia.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

A good summary article of Girkin's recent rapid fire actions which are crossing the line between fake treason (i.e. critical of Putin's government) and real treason (i.e. setting up the makings of an insurgency).  As ISW or someone else pointed out, it's unclear who Girkin's patron is, but whomever it is must be extremely powerful.

https://www.businessinsider.com/moscow-headed-military-defeat-commander-igor-girkin-russian-fighter-ukraine-2023-4

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Good article on the massive failure of Russia's missile strikes on Ukraine, including how much it cost the Kremlin treasury.  Unfortunately the charts are in Ukrainian.  One costs, they summed it up like this:

Quote

"Thus, the shelling of Ukraine became one of the most expensive missile campaigns in modern history. But unlike the operations of the US and its allies, they did not give a tangible advantage to the Russian Federation on the battlefield and did not become effective in destroying the economy of Ukraine," Forbes summarized.

https://censor.net/en/news/3410712/russia_launched_almost_5000_missiles_at_ukraine_worth_16_billion_infographics

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Maybe, but the terrain is terribly easy to defend against a mechanized attack.  The only reason why UA did so well in the Kharkiv offensive was the defenders were scattered unprepared to fight at all, not to mention in prepared positions.  Once Russia realized what was happening they shut down the momentum pretty solidly.  Ukraine can not afford to have that happen to them this year.

I think it would be a hard and difficult slog, but I do agree that if such an attack was successful it would likely have a huge impact on the course of the war.  However, it is a less sure bet than attacking in the south and Ukraine really needs as sure of a bet as possible.

True. 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Actually, I think taking back a large amount of territory is what Ukraine should focus on this year.  Ask yourself... what was the public's reaction to Ukraine retaking huge amounts of territory last year vs. achieving a possible 5:1 favorable kill ratio in Bakhmut?  The first one was inspirational, the second one was depressing.  Not just for the Ukrainians fighting, but for everybody following the war even a little bit.

Yes, but that's my earlier point above - the objectives taken/secured were clear and easy to explain. Bahkmut was always a hard one to explain, other than Dont Give Them An Inch for free. Plus Bahkmut ground on and on. Kherson really seemed to be outlasting its initial welcome by the end. Bottling up Crimea is all well and good and very sound militarily but its not a definitive, simple-to-grasp achievement for Zelenksy to point to.

To be clear, you're saying tie off Crimea from the northern land end, (opposite perekop and Syvash), clear out the land between that and Melitopol and ideally isolate/choke off Melitopol, without a direct assault?

Yes youre beating up a bunch of Russian forces, but they're nothing critical. The real teeth are in the center of the front and they'll be untouched. If they reinforce Melitopol or extend its defenses then ZSU has a real problem.

For Crimea to be cut off, the ZSU also also needs to cut down between Melitopol and Mariupol.

Edited April 10, 2023 by Kinophile

[Offshoot]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

A good summary article of Girkin's recent rapid fire actions which are crossing the line between fake treason (i.e. critical of Putin's government) and real treason (i.e. setting up the makings of an insurgency).  As ISW or someone else pointed out, it's unclear who Girkin's patron is, but whomever it is must be extremely powerful.

https://www.businessinsider.com/moscow-headed-military-defeat-commander-igor-girkin-russian-fighter-ukraine-2023-4

Steve

Vlad Vexler has an analysis of a letter Dugin wrote about Prigozhin where he essentially takes Prigozhin's side against Girkin. In it Vlad comments that Prigozhin has 0% support within Russia whereas Girkin could actually call on a following of Z-radicals (potentially 10-20% of the population). Perhaps Girkin does have a patron(s), but it is also possible that his "patron" are those masses of nationalists that Putin needs to keep onside, especially as he attempts to shift society to encourage more people to become nationalists.

Video should start where more specific discussion about Girkin begins:

 

Edited April 10, 2023 by Offshoot

[Battlefront.com]

I don't know how accurate this information is, but it is at least a starting point to understanding where Russia intends on defending against Ukraine's offensive.

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1rRKs40IEbGRsV0Fhky25l5OkPJ_vUvQ&ll=46.384906887284764%2C34.31372935173266&z=8

This is largely as MilitaryLand had on their maps, which is what I used for looking at Ukraine's options. 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

To be clear, you're saying tie off Crimea from the northern land end, (opposite perekop and Syvash), clear out the land between that and Melitopol and ideally isolate/choke off Melitopol, without a direct assault?

Yup.  3 months of fighting to get all of this accomplished is better than 3 months of slogging it out over a smaller amount of terrain or for one city that nobody outside of Ukraine will recognize as important.

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

Yes youre beating up a bunch of Russian forces, but they're nothing critical. The real teeth are in the center of the front and they'll be untouched. If they reinforce Melitopol or extend its defenses then ZSU has a real problem.

If Ukraine starts racking up territory you can be assured that those forces you speak of will come south.  If they don't, then Ukraine gets a pretty easy and massive victory with the end result having Crimea cut off.

The alternatives all are pretty bad.  Russian troop density and quality is higher everywhere else along the line.  Terrain favors the defender.  Russian logistics are shorter and very well established.  Opportunities for rapid advancement are just about zero.  Contrast that with the south where troop density is much lower, quality lower, ability to resupply more difficult, and opportunities for bypassing problem areas high.

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

For Crimea to be cut off, the ZSU also also needs to cut down between Melitopol and Mariupol.

How so?  There's two roads and rail lines going into Crimea.  Melitopol is 100km away from Crimea.  Sever anywhere along that 100km and Melitopol is out of the game. Nothing else needs to be done.  No need to even think of Mariupol. 

The big shortcoming of any drive south is flank attacks.  Earlier you made mention of increasing the frontage, well a drive towards Mariupol adds at least 150km of frontage to defend.  Worse, it's a salient which can be snipped off, giving Russia a massive victory if it manages to obligate Ukraine to retreat or worse get bottled up.  And even if this operation gets Melitopol fairly easily, then what?  Fighting westward while also holding the new front to the east would be very difficult, if not impossible, to do with whatever time and forces they have remaining at this point.  Any attacks over the Dnepr as I envision, would not have any direct support from the main attacking force already on left bank, so such crossings would be unlikely to succeed.

It all boils down to Ukraine having one shot at this.  The more it is focused on hard fighting, the less likely it will yield positive results before the offensive power that Ukraine has built up over the last 6 months is spent.  Since there is no way it can get all of its 2022 territory back in 2023, it's best to start with a realistic plan.  There's a lot of talk about what would be cool for Ukraine to go after, but almost none of what I've seen discussed here seems viable.  Hell, I'm only 50/50 thinking my concept will work, which is why I say a great feature of it is it can stop at any point and become a defensible line.

Steve

[_Morpheus_]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

As we saw from the drone footage, these guys had a LOT of LATW available to them and there was no evidence of any being used.  They just hunkered down, which obviously didn't end well for them.

Interesting that the Ukrainians didn't seem all that interested in taking the LATWs, but instead focused on small arms and electronics.

Steve

They are interested in it, but looks like all of them are destroyed by the fragmentation after the shelling.
5:35 they are checking the RPO Shmel that is destroyed. Actually they also mentioned that they will take broken weapon for the spare parts.

[sburke]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Partisan activity didn't do much in Kherson in terms of changing the dynamic, so I would not count on it doing so in Melitopol.  Now, maybe if UA forces were already mostly surrounding the city and showing signs of getting in, then partisan activity might have a real impact.

Otherwise, partisans operating to disrupt Russian LOCs is the way to go.  This worked very well on all fronts in WW2, whereas partisan attacks within urban areas were generally rare.  Warsaw was the largest scale uprising and we know how that went.

Steve

Kherson isn't a good comparison as it was pretty much the main hub at the front line.  Melitopol is fairly deep in the Russian rear and may consist of mostly rear area personnel.  Pure conjecture there, but if true those folks would be more susceptible to panic if the UA has a breakthrough and suddenly these guys find themselves under attack.  An unlikely event but it is something to dream about if we are gonna put together an early Christmas list.  

As to Warsaw there is some contention that the Red Army deliberately let it fail though Glantz seems to be of the mind it was launched too early and the Red army was unable to do much.  Likely there is a bit of truth in both.

Edited April 10, 2023 by sburke

[chuckdyke]

 

[Billy Ringo]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not Ukraine related as it was done before the war for non-military purposes, but it does make you think...

 

Are we finally going to see, sometime in the next 30-90 days, what a drone swarm can actually do on the battlefield?  Potentially a very significant event in the evolution of warfare.  

[Beleg85]

4 hours ago, sburke said:

As to Warsaw there is some contention that the Red Army deliberately let it fail though Glantz seems to be of the mind it was launched too early and the Red army was unable to do much.  Likely there is a bit of truth in both.

That + HA command due to difficult communication with structures east of the river seriously underestimated German ability to temporarly beat off Red Army assault at the battle of Radzymin.

Better comparision would be Paris uprising, as in this case true ally regular force approached the city. But generally Melitopol had only ca. 150 k before the war, many left, some are pro-Russian or indifferent, and potential partisan movement is probably much less powerful than true underground guerilla structures that we saw during WWII. They seem to focus on eliminating core collaborants, recon and maybe occassionaly blowing some stuff.

But indeed perhaps Russian forces in Melitopol may be second-rate and supports. There is additional factor of terrain- as much as I read accounts of Kharkiv advance, crucial was usage of forests as cover for fast-moving light infantry forces. Here ability to simply move around in 4x4's to strike 10kms behing the frontline will be much more restricted.

[Offshoot]

An interesting article on the drone arms race and the changing tactical conditions for drone use in Ukraine. It's based on interviews with only three drone operators but they certainly have experience:

"They’re starting to die’: fears Ukraine’s drone supremacy may soon be over. Frontline drone operators say Russia is close to countering their most popular models – setting off a race to find replacements" - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/10/in-war-there-are-no-emotions-ukraine-drone-squads-bakhmut

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

That + HA command due to difficult communication with structures east of the river seriously underestimated German ability to temporarly beat off Red Army assault at the battle of Radzymin.

Slaughtered is more like it.  I did some of the CMRT campaign battles in this area, and it was not pretty for the Red Army.

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Better comparision would be Paris uprising, as in this case true ally regular force approached the city. But generally Melitopol had only ca. 150 k before the war, many left, some are pro-Russian or indifferent, and potential partisan movement is probably much less powerful than true underground guerilla structures that we saw during WWII. They seem to focus on eliminating core collaborants, recon and maybe occassionaly blowing some stuff.

Exactly.  And let's also not forget that, unlike Warsaw, the German commander of Paris, General von Choltitz, wanted to surrender the city instead of seeing it destroyed.  So we don't know what would have happened if he tried to carry out Hitler's orders and was given more resources to do it.  There's a good chance that the partisans would not have succeeded on their own.

In any case, my point is that there's very few examples of urban uprisings against the Nazis until it was obvious that they were about to be defeated by advancing Allied forces.  Likely few of these incidents changed the military situation to any significant extent, but the thousands of attacks on rail bridges, supply columns, and rural garrisons absolutely did.

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

But indeed perhaps Russian forces in Melitopol may be second-rate and supports.

The forces actively keeping a lid on Kherson City's activities were Rosgvardia.  I expect the same is true for Mariupol.

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

There is additional factor of terrain- as much as I read accounts of Kharkiv advance, crucial was usage of forests as cover for fast-moving light infantry forces. Here ability to simply move around in 4x4's to strike 10kms behing the frontline will be much more restricted.

This is the dilemma, isn't it?  Forests provide protection for both sides, but the rough terrain and copious water obstacles, make rapid advance impossible unless the defender is significantly lacking in all meaningful ways.  This is not going to be the case for any attacks into Luhansk or Donetsk, therefore slow and costly attacks should be expected.

The opposite of this is found in the south with largely flat, open terrain.  Cover is non-existent, but the lack of significant terrain obstacles means there's far more options for attacking any specific defensive position.  In most situations there are multiple options for "going around" resistance points.

The way Ukraine can make this work is to overwhelm the defenses quickly and in too many places for the Russians to react to.  By attacking along a front greater than Russia's artillery range, Russia has to directly stand in the way of an advance.  Since Ukraine knows where it wants to go, this means it can concentrate on keeping the path clear instead of having to worry about flanks.

In short, any plan for the south must be based around the concept of speed of advance.  Urban areas slow advances, large urban areas pretty much guarantee the advance stops.  Which is why taking a big city like Melitopol can not be a primary objective for the offensive.  Especially because taking it isn't necessary.  Cutting it off from Crimea is.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

An interesting article on the drone arms race and the changing tactical conditions for drone use in Ukraine. It's based on interviews with only three drone operators but they certainly have experience:

"They’re starting to die’: fears Ukraine’s drone supremacy may soon be over. Frontline drone operators say Russia is close to countering their most popular models – setting off a race to find replacements" - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/10/in-war-there-are-no-emotions-ukraine-drone-squads-bakhmut

We've seen this stated several times since last summer.  Maybe it is finally happening?

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Video of how careful one has to be around seemingly harmless mines...

Russian propaganda messaging now switching over to the message that the "shoe is on the other foot" and now Ukraine is coming for them?  It is still amazing to me how zombified the Russians are to not understand what their own media's messaging means.

Steve

[Yet]

once again spotless gear. oh and his chechen flag badge is right, the russian one upside down?!

could be as well filmed 100km behind the lines. 

[A Canadian Cat]

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ask yourself... what was the public's reaction to Ukraine retaking huge amounts of territory last year vs. achieving a possible 5:1 favorable kill ratio in Bakhmut?  The first one was inspirational, the second one was depressing.

Not to mention the RA just had to lie about the casualty count and regular folk could not really be sure who was giving the correct numbers but if you control territory there is no lying about it that will stick. Sure you can fib about a few blocks here or there but when the press are entering liberated towns and villages and talking to people about their experience under Russian occupation there's no amount of lying the Russians can do that will fool regular folk about who controls what.

[_Morpheus_]

Talks with 3rd Separate Assault Brigade (Azov) near Bakhmut (with english subtitles).
Folks really happy with NATO weapons and asking for more.