How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[CHEqTRO]

12 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, so that's what I'm talking about in terms of AT.  On the battlefield these days weapons like RPG-22 and ILAW are not really an AT weapon.  Sure, they can do more than annoy a Soviet IFV or make an ERA protected tank think twice, but only if the situation is highly favorable for the shooter.  As we can see in this video that didn't happen.

A platoon sized force attack should have someone with a more capable AT system dedicated to overwatch.  Something better than an RPG-7 would be ideal, but for a situation like in this video it could work out OK.  Why?  Well, for exactly the reasons we saw in this video.  Not only did their attack quickly go from bad to worse when the armor showed up, but they weren't able to extract themselves very well either.

On the Ukrainian side they have access to a larger variety of AT weapons, perhaps even more so than the average NATO infantry unit.  Platoons have direct access to several systems that are vastly superior to disposable LATW.  Imagine this same scenario with the Ukrainians attacking a Russian trench and Russian armor shows up with even *1* soldier hanging back in the woodline with an NLAW, RPG-7, PzF-3, AT-4, or any number of other systems provided to Ukraine in quantity.  At the very least the infantry would likely have done a lot better extracting themselves.

Yes, there's a hundred battlefield conditions to take into consideration as well as "bias confirmation" from videos to account for as well.  I understand that.  But it seems to me that there is a pattern of Russian units seemingly under armed, or perhaps under motivated, to engage armor.

Steve

 

Well, counterpoint ;), I think that they did in fact had some form of support/overwatch group. When the AFVs appear on the battlefield, you can see them firing acually "deeper" into the treeline, while there seems, atleast thats what the drone view would suggest, that both the assault and the flanking group were closer to the T junction, closer to the drone. Considering that it seems that there is some level of coordination with the vehicles and the drones, I find interesting that the BMP keeps strafing the same patch of treeline, even thought it seems that no one is there. Can you imagine the damage it could have caused to those russians behind the trees if it had been firing against them? Why didnt the drone, if they did in fact had communication between them at all, correct the BMP fire?

Well, I guess there is some other circunstances as to why they fired there, just firing blindly into suspected enemy positions, or they just saw some movement, or, maybe, there was indeed an overwatch group stationed there. If they were actually able to get an RPG round, or if the BMP saw them before they could do that, we dont know; however in case that the second option happened, it would have not mattered wether they were armed with, an RPG-7, AT-14, NLAWs, PZf-3 or a Javelin. They would have been overwhelmed by the fire coming from the BMP. Obviously, in case of the first option, they would have had more hit chances with an NLAW than with an RPG.

All in all, in a standard platoon (a 30 or so group) you can expect, doctrinally, like what, 3 dedicated AT weapons? At the very least we know there was one, and I am sure they had some more deep on the treeline. So yeah, not convinced that the russians have a particular motivation (reference back to the video I mentioned before of them firing at a tank repeatedly), or lack of AT weapons problem. Having something better than those RPG-7s would indeed be ideal, thats for sure 

[Kinophile]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

What strikes me again and again and again... Russia goes into these situations without any AT capability at all.  Not even RPG-7 in evidence.  Not only is that a bad idea in case the Ukrainians have armor in support, but it also means less punch to take enemy positions.

A few days ago (last week?) we saw the clip of the tank breaking through the treeline and laying waste the retreating Russians.  Now we have better context for it.  Even at the time it was clear that the tank did what it did because it was in contact with the drone operator.  "They are in full retreat on the other side of the treeline, no AT weapons in evidence".  That gives the tank both a target it couldn't see and the reassurance that bursting through to the other side wasn't a suicide charge.

I wish we could have seen more from the engagement at the rear of the trench.  Ukrainians got lucky there as the guy who got shot shouldn't have moved until his buddy threw the grenade.  If he had waited, things might have turned out differently.  Looks like the grenade either bounced back into the main trench or the Ukrainian tossed/kicked it out of his dugout.  Either way, it didn't do what was needed and it seems the Russian lacked either grenades or courage to keep up the fight.

Steve

Personally I was unimpressed with that article. It's an intel officers view, but it's limited by his prior experience and personal biases (aren't all opinions, including mine). 

But he really gives Putin the benefit of the doubt. He fails to note how much Putin has backed himself in a maximallist corner, politically, and how much capital has been invested not just in the situation as-is but going forward.  He seems to view Putin's international behaviour separate from his domestic situation and internal power balancing.  On here we've often noted how so many of Putin's actions are internationally counter-productive yet maje sense domestically. 

This paragraph sums up the authors stumbling blocks, for me:

Quote

But in the end, Putin will have to accept that these are the wages of sin, the inevitable result of a disastrous miscalculation. (1) He cannot expect that NATO will maintain something like the status quo ante in terms of its expansion, when he has gone so far as demonstrating that the possible eventuality which NATO’s post-cold-war continuation was designed to forestall is, in fact, not a hypothetical but a clear and present danger. His alternative will be to risk utter, humiliating defeat. (2)

1. We're way past the point of Putin accepting any sort of blame,  guilt,  responsibility,  etc,  either personally or as "Russia". Putin has made Concessions for Peace not just anathema or even heresy,  they're worse -  a threat to his legitimacy. 

2. He's been risking that since 3 days in and hasn't budged an imperial inch. 

Also, UKR opinion and the trauma of the society seems irrelevant to this guy.  Not even a radar blip. Which begs the question,  does he really have a clue a out how Ukraine would negotiate? Because it sure as hell won't be done Mano e Mano  between Zelensky and Putin. 

Zelensky can only negotiate with Putin from a position of MAXIMUM Strength, not just from a weakened Russian Army. 

Nothing half-done wil do. The ZSU's Summer Offensive (I'm doubtful of a prong one) must either reconconquer the Donbass OR Crimea OR crush the AFRF to a point where the loss of either/both Ext year is blatantly inevitable. 

Anything less than an unbeatable ZSU overmatch in capablities, capacity and momentum will only invite Putin to "stay the course" and "outlast the West".  His own danger must be imminent and unavoidable for him to show any flexibility. 

Edited March 26, 2023 by Kinophile

[Butschi]

3 hours ago, dan/california said:

This is actually on the Europeans, mostly. Zelensky can, maybe, concede the DPR/LPR and Crimea if FULL NATO and EU membership was signed on the same day, at the same table, by the same people. The FULL part of that sentence is important. So what does the EU want more, five years of this war blowing hot and cold, or maybe they work round a few pages in the rule book and get this done?

Why is this mostly on the Europeans? a) NATO was and is still a US hegemony. Decisions aren't made without the hegemon. b) We are talking about Russia, so NATO makes only sense for Ukraine if it includes the nuclear umbrella - I doubt France and UK would be sufficient for that.

And what has EU membership to do with it? Apart from the fact that this "rule book" isn't just there to make some bureaucrats happy, Ukraine already gets a lot of money from the EU. So what do you think Ukraine would gain in addition by a rushed full membership? With instantaneous FULL membership Ukraine would now compete on the European market without any possibility to protect their own market by e.g. tariffs. Much of the Ukrainian economy would instantly implode. Their most skilled citizens would now be free to take up much better paid jobs all over the EU. Why would they want to stay in a country ravaged by war? In addition all their currently new best friends from CEE would suddenly be competitors for the limited amount of money the EU has to distribute. More for Ukraine means less for them. Moreover, many European companies currently transfer industry jobs to, mainly, Hungary and Bulgaria because they are cheaper than other European countries. They would just move on to the next cheaper country - which would help to mitigate the otherwise imploding economy but won't make for good friends among their neighbors.

[dan/california]

As far as NATO goes i think the U.S. is 100% on letting Ukraine in the day the shooting stops. I think there is a pretty good understanding that if we had let them in sooner we might have avoided this tragedy. And now not even Russia is stupid enough to think they can fight NATO. Would love for billindc and The_Capt to chime in on that. 

As far as the EU goes it is literally what the Ukrainians are dying for, the hundred martyrs died for it on the Maidan in 21014, and they have been paying in blood ever since. The bureaucrats can ca go do bureaucrat things, but if Zelensky can tell Ukraine they are in the club, he can tell them they have won this war. Is that easy for Europe, obviously not, is it easier than five years of a frozen conflict followed by another full scale war? You tell me? 

Edit: Oh, and it is an unspin-able loss for Putin, which isn't nothing.

Edited March 26, 2023 by dan/california

[JonS]

28 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Why is this mostly on the Europeans?

Probably for the same reason that Taiwan should be a full member of AUKUS, like yesterday!

I.e., it makes no sense but does include a couple of acronyms, therefore it sounds cool and we should definitely do everything that sounds cool.

[Offshoot]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

What strikes me again and again and again... Russia goes into these situations without any AT capability at all.  Not even RPG-7 in evidence.  Not only is that a bad idea in case the Ukrainians have armor in support, but it also means less punch to take enemy positions.

Ignore this, I see now it has been covered already.

I'm pretty sure that near the beginning of the first video a Russian fires what looks like an RPG at the trench line and it ends up exploding on a tree. Still not much but because of the way they used it they didn't have it when armour did turn up.

Edited March 26, 2023 by Offshoot

[Butschi]

12 minutes ago, dan/california said:

As far as the EU goes it is literally what the Ukrainians are dying for, the hundred martyrs died for it on the Maidan in 21014, and they have been paying in blood ever since. The bureaucrats can ca go do bureaucrat things, but if Zelensky can tell Ukraine they are in the club, he can tell them they have won this war. Is that easy for Europe, obviously not, is it easier than five years of a frozen conflict followed by another full scale war? You tell me? 

Those rules are there for very good reasons and they protect the potential new members just as much as they protect those already in the club. Nothing wrong with having Ukraine enter EU when they are ready. I personally doubt that right now Ukrainians fight this war to get into EU instead of defending themselves against a Russian invasion and to prevent more Buchas. But I don't know, maybe our Ukrainian forumites here can comment. If the only way to have peace is Zelensky lying to his electorate about a rose tinted future they can have right now if they just accept peace then maybe this is a really, really bad idea. Germany has experience with one country joining a club unprepared being promised consumer heaven and a flourishing economy. It was not an awesome experience for West Germany but a traumatizing experience for many East Germans that has negative effects even after 30 years the reunification.

 

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Personally I was unimpressed with that article. It's an intel officers view, but it's limited by his prior experience and personal biases (aren't all opinions, including mine). 

But he really gives Putin the benefit of the doubt. He fails to note how much Putin has backed himself in a maximallist corner, politically, and how much capital has been invested not just in the situation as-is but going forward.  He seems to view Putin's international behaviour separate from his domestic situation and internal power balancing.  On here we've often noted how so many of Putin's actions are internationally counter-productive yet maje sense domestically. 

This paragraph sums up the authors stumbling blocks, for me:

1. We're way past the point of Putin accepting any sort of blame,  guilt,  responsibility,  etc,  either personally or as "Russia". Putin has made Concessions for Peace not just anathema or even heresy,  they're worse -  a threat to his legitimacy. 

2. He's been risking that since 3 days in and hasn't budged an imperial inch. 

Also, UKR opinion and the trauma of the society seems irrelevant to this guy.  Not even a radar blip. Which begs the question,  does he really have a clue a out how Ukraine would negotiate? Because it sure as hell won't be done Mano e Mano  between Zelensky and Putin. 

Zelensky can only negotiate with Putin from a position of MAXIMUM Strength, not just from a weakened Russian Army. 

Nothing half-done wil do. The ZSU's Summer Offensive (I'm doubtful of a prong one) must either reconconquer the Donbass OR Crimea OR crush the AFRF to a point where the loss of either/both Ext year is blatantly inevitable. 

Anything less than an unbeatable ZSU overmatch in capablities, capacity and momentum will only invite Putin to "stay the course" and "outlast the West".  His own danger must be imminent and unavoidable for him to show any flexibility. 

This one's better: 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-wouldnt-win-a-war-of-attrition-nato-west-weapons-ukraine-resolve-china-peace-deal-crimea-sanctions-7ca7f128

 

 

[sburke]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

Probably for the same reason that Taiwan should be a full member of AUKUS, like yesterday!

I.e., it makes no sense but does include a couple of acronyms, therefore it sounds cool and we should definitely do everything that sounds cool.

Just think, if they join this summer it could become AUKUST in august!

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://www.google.com/search?q=eu+flag+ukrainian+parliment+walk+in&oq=eu+flag+ukrainian+parliment+walk+in&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i10i160j33i299l2.26308j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#fpstate=ive&vld=cid:6331dded,vid:HVSzS8OcGeg

This was after some minor advance in Ukraines E.U. application. Europe needs to say yes one more time. It might not be easy, and you might be able to do some sort of five year guaranteed program, as opposed to immediate entry, but this needs to happen.

 

[Huba]

 

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

 

This was after some minor advance in Ukraines E.U. application. Europe needs to say yes one more time. It might not be easy, and you might be able to do some sort of five year guaranteed program, as opposed to immediate entry, but this needs to happen.

 

I'll just sneak in this post in haste while The Missus is sleeping  So from my perspective, what's really crucial for Ukraine is the NATO membership, or at least security guarantees that will assure that Russia will not try the Invasion 2.0 in the few upcoming years. These would ideally include some tripwire NATO/ guarantors force on the ground making sure that the cost of renewing hostilities for Russia will be absolutely unacceptable. Second sine qua non requirement is that the peace deal to be acceptable as permanent for the UA side, assuring that they will be OK to proceed with the rebuilding without further territorial demands. In other words, be it better or worse, the peace deal has to be acceptable as nominally permanent for the Ukrainians. If that is achieved, the nominal NATO and UE membership process can proceed at it's own relevant pace. I'd think that NATO membership would be much more important short term, because without sufficient security guarantees the rebuilding process can not reasonably start.
When this is assured, UE membership should definitely proceed at the pace that assures the interests of both the Union and the Ukrainian state. The moment UA formally joins the European Union is practically irrelevant. In case of Poland, it took a decade before we fully joined all the UE mechanisms (for example, the regulations pertaining to acquiring the real estates by foreigners). It's already clear that there's no other way for UA than integration with the EU and when the particular step in this process takes place is not that important; what counts is adamant assurance that there's only one outcome of the membership negotiations, and that the process itself is beneficial for both EU and UA.

It is way to early for both NATO/ guarantees and UE membership details to be worked out at this point, but it seems that the consensus is already in the works, the main obstacle for the practical discussion being the territorial situation after the peace is made. Below is an excerpt from Simoyan's TV show. While she says that the "Western Ukraine" should be under the Polish control (really not something anybody in PL is considering, but perhaps something more acceptable to RU viewers), here is a deal she proposed in her latest TV appearance: 

"US should encourage Ukraine to sell it's occupied territories to RU, in exchange of a considerable sum, including war reparations. Many wars were concluded this way.
After that, the unified Ukrainian state would be more stable, and in time be able to join the UE and event NATO."

This unofficial offer obviously assumes holding to the present territory control situation, but if UA Spring Counteroffensive succeeds, I think it would be a great starting point for the actual peace negotiations.

 

Edited March 27, 2023 by Huba

[JonS]

9 minutes ago, Huba said:

Many wars were concluded this way.

Selling territory as a way of ending a war is common? Not in the last couple of hundred years it isn't, and not since countries stopped being the personal property of monarch to be bought, sold, wagered and mortgaged as they alone saw fit.

[Huba]

22 minutes ago, JonS said:

Selling territory as a way of ending a war is common? Not in the last couple of hundred years it isn't, and not since countries stopped being the personal property of monarch to be bought, sold, wagered and mortgaged as they alone saw fit.

No discussion here, this narrative is straight from the cabinet wars era, but it's what the Russkie propagandists peddle to their serfs. However silly this sounds to us, it is more or less in line with what we here think the ultimate outcome of the war will be, i.e. negotiated peace that will settle the Crimea/ Donbas situation.

Edited March 27, 2023 by Huba

[dan/california]

29 minutes ago, Huba said:

 

I'll just sneak in this post in haste while The Missus is sleeping  So from my perspective, what's really crucial for Ukraine is the NATO membership, or at least security guarantees that will assure that Russia will not try the Invasion 2.0 in the few upcoming years. These would ideally include some tripwire NATO/ guarantors force on the ground making sure that the cost of renewing hostilities for Russia will be absolutely unacceptable. Second sine qua non requirement is that the peace deal to be acceptable as permanent for the UA side, assuring that they will be OK to proceed with the rebuilding without further territorial demands. In other words, be it better or worse, the peace deal has to be acceptable as nominally permanent for the Ukrainians. If that is achieved, the nominal NATO and UE membership process can proceed at it's own relevant pace. I'd think that NATO membership would be much more important short term, because without sufficient security guarantees the rebuilding process can not reasonably start.
When this is assured, UE membership should definitely proceed at the pace that assures the interests of both the Union and the Ukrainian state. The moment UA formally joins the European Union is practically irrelevant. In case of Poland, it took a decade before we fully joined all the UE mechanisms (for example, the regulations pertaining to acquiring the real estates by foreigners). It's already clear that there's no other way for UA than integration with the EU and when the particular step in this process takes place is not that important; what counts is adamant assurance that there's only one outcome of the membership negotiations, and that the process itself is beneficial for both EU and UA.

It is way to early for both NATO/ guarantees and UE membership details to be worked out at this point, but it seems that the consensus is already in the works, the main obstacle for the practical discussion being the territorial situation after the peace is made. Below is an excerpt from Simoyan's TV show. While she says that the "Western Ukraine" should be under the Polish control (really not something anybody in PL is considering, but perhaps something more acceptable to RU viewers), here is a deal she proposed in her latest TV appearance: 

"US should encourage Ukraine to sell it's occupied territories to RU, in exchange of a considerable sum, including war reparations. Many wars were concluded this way.
After that, the unified Ukrainian state would be more stable, and in time be able to join the UE and event NATO."

This unofficial offer obviously assumes holding to the present territory control situation, but if UA Spring Counteroffensive succeeds, I think it would be a great starting point for the actual peace negotiations.

 

Very well stated, and Simoyan's proposal is certainly the the sanest thing we have heard on Russian TV in a while. Now that is an extremely low bar,  but it still might be the beginning of the negotiation Russia has to have with defeat. It is also possible she is out a window in the next 24 hours.

21 minutes ago, JonS said:

Selling territory as a way of ending a war is common? Not in the last couple of hundred years it isn't, and not since countries stopped being the personal property of monarch to be bought, sold, wagered and mortgaged as they alone saw fit.

It is only a 155 years since the U.S. bought Alaska, more to the point it is how Putin thinks about things, everyone seems to agree it is to hard to burn down the Kremlin and hang the man. So I guess we we are going to have to negotiate with him instead, at least a little bit.

7 minutes ago, Huba said:

No discussion here, this narrative is straight from the cabinet wars era, but it's what the Russkie propagandists peddle to their serfs. However silly this sounds to us, it is more or less in line with what we here thing the ultimate outcome of the war will be, i.e. negotiated peace that will settle the Crimea/ Donbas situation.

This, if it humanely possible this war needs to end with an actual peace, not a DMZ and a seventy five year staring match. That might be to much to hope for, but it should be the goal. Of course this negotiation is not going to happen until after the Ukraines spring/summer offensive.  So the first question is what do both armies have left.

[JonS]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

It is only a 155 years since the U.S. bought Alaska

As part of a peace settlement?

[Huba]

5 minutes ago, JonS said:

As part of a peace settlement?

Not an acceptable way to think of that for you or me, but still relevant for somebody learning history in Russian high school - and this is the the recipient of Simoyans TV show. But if you remove the XIX century aesthetics, the Simoyans hypothetical terms are quite reasonable.

Edited March 27, 2023 by Huba

[JonS]

To summarise this exchange ...

Russian tv: wars end with swaps of territory for cash!

Jon: not anymore

American commenter: we bought Alaska!

Jon: that wasn't done to conclude a conflict, so what is the relevance here?

 

 

Incidentally, the Alaskan purchase was about three Russias ago, maybe four, making it even less relevant.

[JonS]

21 minutes ago, Huba said:

the Simoyans hypothetical terms are quite reasonable

If it was just empty land, then perhaps.

But it isn't. Selling citizens to a hostile foreign power sounds the very opposite of reasonable.

[Huba]

2 minutes ago, JonS said:

If it was just empty land, then perhaps.

But it isn't. Selling citizens to a hostile foreign power sounds the very opposite of reasonable.

That is true for the territories occupied in 2022/23, but for the Crimea and Donbas. ? UA would like to get these back (especially Crimea)l, no doubt, but these surely are more negotiable than the land bridge/ Luhansk oblasts. I honestly wish the UA to regain these, hell, even getting the Belgorod and Kuban would be great - but these are hardly realistic, at this point at least.

[sburke]

I’m with Jon. Giving up territory undermines the whole point of supporting Ukraine, the defense of a rules based order. A temporary option for ceasefire and continued negotiation is one thing, but a full settlement giving Russia legitimized ownership should (and from Ukraine’s stated position) not be on the table. At best there should be a timeline for Russian withdrawal and perhaps a vote under neutral party control AFTER a complete Russian withdrawal.  Also included in those terms, war crimes trials and compensation for the pain and loss inflicted on Ukraine. Let’s face it, Russia isn’t likely to agree to any terms acceptable to Ukraine. Any negotiation will likely only happen with a clear Russian military defeat. 

[MikeyD]

Even if conceding territory were a good idea (a very big 'if') you don't walk into negotiation already telegraphing your concessions. The starting point is 'Russia entirely out of Ukraine, the abducted population repatriated and substantial war reparations', plus throw in some war crimes handovers to boot. That's where you start from. Then Russia can haggle to try to get it down.

Edited March 27, 2023 by MikeyD

[Huba]

If we, as the collective West are up to supporting Ukraine till it achieves all it's military goals, then I absolutely agree we should, and this is would be the best outcome of the situation I could imagine. But if we're. not up to it, and the peace will be forced upon Ukrainians at some point (perhaps autumn 2023)l, Simoyan's initial terms sound not that bad, despite it's XIX century reasoning.

Edited March 27, 2023 by Huba

[Harmon Rabb]

 

[dan/california]

Gentlemen, for the record, I think NATOs entire air force should be committed to this war, and every Russian soldier in Ukraine, Crimea and Donbas included, sent home on fire. I am just musing a little on where things could wind up because political support for my plan A seems limited. My plan B is to send Ukraine enough stuff to win just as completely, albeit more slowly. We are are just BARELY staying on track with that one. The spring /summer offensive will tell us one way or the other.

That said, and assuming there is not a sudden agreement about NATO getting involved, Simoyan's latest screed is  RELATIVELY much less crazy than than what most senior Russian propagandists say, most of the time. It is not a rant that they will nuke London unless we give them Kyiv, with references to child sacrifice and pagan rituals. Is this significant or just filler for Russian TV on a Sunday afternoon, I have no idea, but it is a bit different.

[Kinophile]

15 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

 

Yah I've been listening to this.

@chrisl you might have a better read on his overview, approach and conclusions? Seems decently rigorous and straightforward.