How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Butschi]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Well, while Visegard24's reporting wasn't complete, I disagree that these should be called "junk".  Ukraine has the technical capabilities and parts to get at least some up and flying again.  Even if all they do is provide parts to other MiG-29, that is also useful.

But yeah, making it sound like Ukraine has another 11-13 airframes to loft into the air is definitely incorrect.

 

13 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Yup, this website is sensationalist. However, I wouldn't call those fighter planes junk either- even if some are not operaitonal, they still will be of use for Ukrainian AirForce. Spare parts, training etc. Given that they figured out how to carry some Western armament now, they can serve their role

All true. Nothing wrong with handing those planes over to Ukraine. Worst case they have another 11 wrecks lying around somewhere but certainly they are of more use to Ukraine than to Slovakia.

I just strongly dislike Visegrad24 and their way of "reporting".

[TheVulture]

35 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

That is not the issue.  Of course out of control escalation of this conflict is a worry.  What a lot of people in the “must not start WW3” side of things tend to forget is that Russia is just as afraid of WW3 as we are.  Proof: despite severe setback and bleeding at historic levels, Russia has not turned to WMDs in this war.  Now we know that they do have red lines and we cannot forget that; however, we should also remember that we have red lines too.  

I think that's one of the reasons that Russia feels it needs to control Ukraine and Belarus. Strategic depth for a conventional defence. The West tends to disregard this since Russia has nuclear weapons.

The west's logic is: Russia has nuclear weapons. Therefore it doesn't matter if hostile forces are based even in eastern Ukraine and Belarus, since any attack on Russia will get a nuclear response.

Russia's logic is: if hostile forces (read NATO) are based on the border of Russia itself in eastern Ukraine and Belarus, then too much of the economic and industrial core of Russia is undefendable by conventional means, so they have no choice but to go nuclear, which then creates a likely WW3 scenario. Or they don't go nuclear, and get destroyed. Either way, if someone is crazy enough to start a war (and Russia has no control over whether a lunatic ends up with the power to start a war), then Russia is destroyed. Even more so if Finland and the Baltics are also on the NATO side.

On the other hand, if Russia controls Belarus and Ukraine (at least up to the Dneipr), and Finland is neutral (assuming an all out attack from the Baltic States isn't plausible), then there is enough strategic depth to at least give them the possibility of a conventional defence - either successful defence that stops short of Russia's borders, or at least buys time for a solution to appear before Russia is destroyed. This gives them a course of action that isn't suicidal, unlike the previous scenario.

Bear in mind the oft repeated point that Russia judges threats on capability, not intention. Intentions can change quite quickly. The fact that NATO isn't going to attack Russia is irrelevant. It has the capability to do so . Hope for the best, but plan for the worst - as a thought experiment, should a Stalin, Hitler, Genghis Khan type get decisive control over the west, Russia wants a plan where it can survive, and that plan is basically a conventional defence starting at the border of Poland, or as far west as possible. 

Without that depth, the Russian logic goes, any attack from the west leads to the destruction of Russia, with nothing they can do to prevent it.

[Battlefront.com]

Informative video about US efforts to increase artillery production, including pretty neat footage from the Scranton production facility:

 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Couple of interesting Reddit videos:

1.  Here is a factory in Taiwan making purpose built drone bombers with an 8 bomb capacity.  There are indications that such bombers are headed to Ukraine.

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/11to8ss/ukrainian_strategic_bombers/

2.  Ukrainian soldier in a trench (maybe Russian?) takes a shot to the head, flinging his helmet off.  He is not only alive, but really pissed off.  He manages to find and kill the Russian who shot him.  Unfortunately, looks like a Ukrainian KIA next to his starting position.  My view this isn't "graphic" any more than anything else we post here.

https://www.reddit.com/r/PNVmilitary_community/comments/11tpcn2/a_trench_battle_a_ukrainian_soldier_is_shot_in/

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Might be a sign that Russia is beginning to implement another round of partial mobilization, as previously rumored to be in the works.  However, at present it seems to be only prep work plus a continuation of the "covert mobilization" efforts we've seen since this war started.  Specifically, people are being called upon to update their records so Russia can get them easier if need be, but when they go in to update their records they are being enticed to sign up right then and there.  This is the sort of thing Russia does to try and delay the need for mobilization as well as to make the mobilization smaller than it otherwise would be.

And something we've not talked much about since the beginning of the war... the impact of sanctions on Russia's civilian airfleet.  We've seen some evidence that there's problems, including massive reductions in service, but this report has a pretty graphic example of a close call:

Steve

[Letter from Prague]

54 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This actually does have real impact.  Putin now can not represent Russian interests in person outside of Russia, Belarus, and a few other places without concern for his safety.  This might not seem like a big deal now, but it sure doesn't help him maintain the air of normalcy for things like the G-20.

Steve

I don't know. I would more expect the result to be Putin parading around everywhere, nobody doing anything to him because nukes and the enemies of West will use it as a show of how toothless we are.

[kevinkin]

Ukraine demoted commander who gave interview about ill-trained troops:

A Ukrainian battalion commander who gave an interview to The Washington Post describing how ill-trained troops were weakening Ukraine’s position on the battlefield quit his post this week, after his superiors demoted him because of his remarks, he said.

In the interview, Kupol had acknowledged that his remarks could result in disciplinary measures. “As a patriot of my country, I’m worried about my country. That’s all,” he said.

“Do you know what the problem is with our commanders?” he added. “They have a narrow circle, which does not deliver bad news to them. They filter out the bad news.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/16/ukraine-commander-demoted-interview-pessimism/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

Net net, I think this situation is healthy in the long run. Whistleblowing, when done professionally, is a key part of a self governing society. 

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

I don't know. I would more expect the result to be Putin parading around everywhere, nobody doing anything to him because nukes and the enemies of West will use it as a show of how toothless we are.

For sure that is going to be how he plays it.  But the fact is, there's now a huge list of countries that he can not visit without seeming to "beg for permission" to enter.  Remember, Russia sees itself as some sort of super hero of the world, so having an arrest warrant hanging over his head is in no small way humiliating.  Putin is also very, very, VERY aware of what happened to his buddy Milošević.  A man that was actively protected by his home country and then poof... extradited and died in prison.

Putin watchers have said that his incident with Milošević was extremely upsetting to Putin, as were the other incidents like Gaddafi and Hussein.  I am also sure Putin's memories of Ceaușescu don't bring him inner peace and joy.

While the arrest warrants have little short term practical implications for Putin, it is significant and does have long term consequences.

Steve

[Haiduk]

If UKR tactical advance on Polohy direction, Zaporizhzhia oblast, was allegedly successful, that on direction Orikhove - Robotyne (road to Tokmak) the same attempt is failed. One YPR-765 was completely destroyed, three other damaged/abandoned. 

Russian milblogger briefly on the run shows destroyed APC, but three other he showed at the distance - probably vehicles stand on no man land, but closer to UKR positions, so he didn't risk to approach too close

 

 

[cesmonkey]

Another Michael Kofman interview. Mostly about the situation in Bakmut.

 

 

[DesertFox]

1 hour ago, Pete Wenman said:

Seems this is for real, although of very little real impact - excuse the fruity language from Eliot H

 

P

No Bounty Hunter worth his salt available to take care of this job?

[Bulletpoint]

39 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

2.  Ukrainian soldier in a trench (maybe Russian?) takes a shot to the head, flinging his helmet off.  He is not only alive, but really pissed off.  He manages to find and kill the Russian who shot him.  Unfortunately, looks like a Ukrainian KIA next to his starting position.  My view this isn't "graphic" any more than anything else we post here.

https://www.reddit.com/r/PNVmilitary_community/comments/11tpcn2/a_trench_battle_a_ukrainian_soldier_is_shot_in/

Difficult to see what's really going on in this video, because it's cut several times.

The guy who goes down in the beginning does seem to get up again, but stumbles away from the attacker. Then there's a cut and we see some guy approaching the attacker. Maybe it's the same guy, maybe it's a different one.

Odd that there are no armbands or helmet stripes to show who's whom.

[Haiduk]

2S7 Pion and French Renault GBC 180

 

Belgium to send  240 Volvo trucks 

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/03/17/7393839/

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

If UKR tactical advance on Polohy direction, Zaporizhzhia oblast, was allegedly successful, that on direction Orikhove - Robotyne (road to Tokmak) the same attempt is failed. One YPR-765 was completely destroyed, three other damaged/abandoned. 

Russian milblogger briefly on the run shows destroyed APC, but three other he showed at the distance - probably vehicles stand on no man land, but closer to UKR positions, so he didn't risk to approach too close

 

 

It is these sorts of results that make me less optimistic about Ukraine's ability to break through Russia's defenses without taking significant losses.  When Ukraine uses similar small scale unit attacks against Russian lines it seems to often wind up the same as when Russia attacks Ukraine's lines.  Which is... not so great a result.

I know I rarely ask of this from you guys... but think about Combat Mission

If you have a reinforced platoon sized force and you lose most of your rides, what happens?  Attack is a failure and you have just lost a bunch of vehicles without doing much to the enemy, if anything.  Now, what happens when you have a reinforced company trying to take the same position?  Lose a few vehicles and the attack continues, increasing the chances of affecting some sort of positive outcome.  Not guaranteed, but a LOT more likely than if it's just a platoon.

Now picture this attack being only one of two or possibly three in a concentrated area with two reinforced companies.  One attack might not work out so well, but the other might and in doing so may unhinge the otherwise successful defense against your other attack.

Yeah, I know, this is all pretty basic stuff.  But for some reason Ukraine seems content to follow Russia's lead of penny packet attacks.  I fully appreciate the risks of massed attacks on this lethal battlefield, but that's what ISR, deep strikes, counter battery fire, and other things are supposed to help overcome.  All of these things we know Ukraine has.

In short, if Ukraine doesn't figure out how to conduct larger scale attacks against Russian positions this Spring/Summer, then I don't think we're going to be very happy with Ukraine's progress by time Fall arrives.

Steve

[Maciej Zwolinski]

45 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

I think that's one of the reasons that Russia feels it needs to control Ukraine and Belarus. Strategic depth for a conventional defence. The West tends to disregard this since Russia has nuclear weapons.

This is an excuse which is given much too much traction in the West. Along with the alleged Russian trauma from World War 2, which is a variant of this argument.

In fact, in order to feel safe from conventional invasion by the countries of the West it is sufficient that Russia takes stock of the poor conventional military capability of its neighbours, as well as their size. Against whom Russia needs that strategic depth in Belarus? Against Lithuanians, Poles,  Danes maybe? Poland is in the middle of crazy military procurement drive, but 1) it is going to have effects, if any, years in the future; 2) it would not have happened at all unless Putin attacked the Ukraine. So it hardly could have been Putin's motive to start that attack in the first place.

Actually, Russia wants to control Ukraine and Belarus because it wants to have an imperium capable of bullying its neighbours politically, and it needs assets and bodies of those two countries to grow its imperial project. Putin is an autocrat who "owns" the country so for him, the physical enlargement of the state is like growing his own personal wealth. Also, this is a genuinely popular thing among his subjects, Russians like to feel stronger than their neighbours, but not to feel safe (the greatest threats to Russians are generally alcohol and other Russians), but to feel better than them and enjoy symbolically bullying them through various ritual acts of humiliation. Taking the disingenuous RUS narrative about security concerns at face value is just self-deception.

[womble]

57 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

Bear in mind the oft repeated point that Russia judges threats on capability, not intention. Intentions can change quite quickly. The fact that NATO isn't going to attack Russia is irrelevant. It has the capability to do so .

Except it really doesn't. It  certainly didn't before Putin poked the threadbare stuffed pussycat, but Russia, even post-Soviet Russia is really really big and the "West" simply doesn't have the manpower to throw at it and make it stick.

Even with a Baltic-to-Black Sea buffer zone, whatever the West could do from Poland and Ukraine (assuming "our" SEAD capacity works as advertised, which is no given), it could do from Czechia and Germany.

Any capability to actually kinetically "destroy" Russia relies as much on Nukes as the defense of Russia would in the (false/fake/paranoid) Kremlinoid scenario of some nonsensical armoured thrust across the  border from Ukraine by first-line US columns.

You're giving airtime to Kremlin tomfoolery, psychotic justifications for criminal misdeeds. The very same criminal misdeeds that have driven their neighbours to seek shelter under the NATO umbrella.

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

Difficult to see what's really going on in this video, because it's cut several times.

The guy who goes down in the beginning does seem to get up again, but stumbles away from the attacker. Then there's a cut and we see some guy approaching the attacker. Maybe it's the same guy, maybe it's a different one.

Odd that there are no armbands or helmet stripes to show who's whom.

The casualty lying in the open trench has a green armband, so is Ukrainian.  There is an armband on the guy in the dugout that is consistent with being red (though the color quality is crap), which would be Russian.  The guy who got hit in the head and attacked the dugout (it is the same guy, you can see from how his equipment rigging) doesn't have visible markings on him.  It seems pretty apparent that one grenade (not shown) wounded the guy in the dugout, a second one (shown) maybe finished him off before an AK was unloaded on him.

For sure those idiotic circle overlays makes it difficult to see the details.

Steve

[The_Capt]

Just now, TheVulture said:

I think that's one of the reasons that Russia feels it needs to control Ukraine and Belarus. Strategic depth for a conventional defence. The West tends to disregard this since Russia has nuclear weapons.

The west's logic is: Russia has nuclear weapons. Therefore it doesn't matter if hostile forces are based even in eastern Ukraine and Belarus, since any attack on Russia will get a nuclear response.

Russia's logic is: if hostile forces (read NATO) are based on the border of Russia itself in eastern Ukraine and Belarus, then too much of the economic and industrial core of Russia is undefendable by conventional means, so they have no choice but to go nuclear, which then creates a likely WW3 scenario. Or they don't go nuclear, and get destroyed. Either way, if someone is crazy enough to start a war (and Russia has no control over whether a lunatic ends up with the power to start a war), then Russia is destroyed. Even more so if Finland and the Baltics are also on the NATO side.

On the other hand, if Russia controls Belarus and Ukraine (at least up to the Dneipr), and Finland is neutral (assuming an all out attack from the Baltic States isn't plausible), then there is enough strategic depth to at least give them the possibility of a conventional defence - either successful defence that stops short of Russia's borders, or at least buys time for a solution to appear before Russia is destroyed. This gives them a course of action that isn't suicidal, unlike the previous scenario.

Bear in mind the oft repeated point that Russia judges threats on capability, not intention. Intentions can change quite quickly. The fact that NATO isn't going to attack Russia is irrelevant. It has the capability to do so . Hope for the best, but plan for the worst - as a thought experiment, should a Stalin, Hitler, Genghis Khan type get decisive control over the west, Russia wants a plan where it can survive, and that plan is basically a conventional defence starting at the border of Poland, or as far west as possible. 

Without that depth, the Russian logic goes, any attack from the west leads to the destruction of Russia, with nothing they can do to prevent it.

And this is the problem with Russian strategy overall.  I am reading Strategiya by Fridman right now and the Russians come from the same western school as we do.  They have cultural spins but they are basically on the same pages (at least as far as I can tell being about half-way in).  So if it is an escalatory control buffer zone/strategic that Russia is trying to secure then why pursue strategies that run directly opposite to that end?!

This gets to the heart of why this bloody war makes no sense.  Even if they took Ukraine, they would never be able to hold it.  We would have turned it into a grinding resistance with safe havens in NATO treaty nations, so their "buffer zone" would have become an open wound for years.  And then there is the Sweden-Finland effect.  Russia goes all off menu on hard power and literally drives its desired buffer zone right into the arms of its opponent.

It is at this point I call BS on the whole line of thinking.  It is far more likely that Putin is engineering "buffer zone" crisis for domestic consumption - "see I told you they were all against us".  The endgame is to keep himself and whoever he picks as successor in power for another 50 years.

[Battlefront.com]

9 minutes ago, womble said:

Except it really doesn't. It  certainly didn't before Putin poked the threadbare stuffed pussycat, but Russia, even post-Soviet Russia is really really big and the "West" simply doesn't have the manpower to throw at it and make it stick.

Yup.  Defensively, NATO even in its minimalist pre 2021 form, was always more than a match for a Russian conventional attack.  Mostly because Russia's military is so obviously not up to the task of large scale offensive warfare.  And that's being kind

NATO on the offensive, though, is an entirely different thing.  It could wreck much of Russia's big toys and tear apart its air defenses, sink its navy, vaporize any single point target of its choosing, etc... but absolutely in no way could NATO take Russian territory in any meaningful way.

And this presumes that NATO offensively laying waste Russia's conventional military capabilities would not go unanswered by a nuke.  That is an assumption I'd not make.

9 minutes ago, womble said:

You're giving airtime to Kremlin tomfoolery, psychotic justifications for criminal misdeeds. The very same criminal misdeeds that have driven their neighbours to seek shelter under the NATO umbrella.

Absolutely.  Russia is not under threat even today, which proves that Putin's policies are all about imperialistic exploitation of neighbors, not about a conventional military buffer.

Steve

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The casualty lying in the open trench has a green armband, so is Ukrainian.  There is an armband on the guy in the dugout that is consistent with being red (though the color quality is crap), which would be Russian.  The guy who got hit in the head and attacked the dugout (it is the same guy, you can see from how his equipment rigging) doesn't have visible markings on him.  It seems pretty apparent that one grenade (not shown) wounded the guy in the dugout, a second one (shown) maybe finished him off before an AK was unloaded on him.

For sure those idiotic circle overlays makes it difficult to see the details.

Steve

I can't see video on Reddit, but I've seen it in FB. It was issued by 71st yager brigade. They claimed this was their wounded soldier, who shot Russian 

[Harmon Rabb]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Well, while Visegard24's reporting wasn't complete, I disagree that these should be called "junk".  Ukraine has the technical capabilities and parts to get at least some up and flying again.  Even if all they do is provide parts to other MiG-29, that is also useful.

But yeah, making it sound like Ukraine has another 11-13 airframes to loft into the air is definitely incorrect.

Steve

Speaking of Junk, Here is Peskov's comment on Poland and Slovakia sending the MiGs.

Quote

“You get the feeling that these countries are just getting rid of old, unneeded equipment,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, according to Tass. “You don’t need to be a military expert to say that this won’t affect” the war, he added, saying that they will be “subject to destruction” by Russian forces.

Source: Slovakia Will Send Entire Fleet of MiG-29 Jets to Ukraine (Yahoo News)

Interesting how when this war started and the idea of sending these aircraft came up Russia kept beating the "escalation" drum. Now that it looks like it will officially happen and the Kremlin is powerless to stop it, none of these planes will affect the war.

Here's hoping Mr.Peskov will be in a position to explain how useless F-16s are, now that it looks like the Fighter aircraft taboo is starting to vanish.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

All the major press is reporting it, so for sure true.  Not to mention the Twitter account cited seems pretty authoritative

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-03-17/icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrant-against-putin-over-alleged-war-crimes

This actually does have real impact.  Putin now can not represent Russian interests in person outside of Russia, Belarus, and a few other places without concern for his safety.  This might not seem like a big deal now, but it sure doesn't help him maintain the air of normalcy for things like the G-20.

Steve

How does this FUBAR the whole Russian taking over the UNSC chair thing?

[Harmon Rabb]

 

[The_Capt]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

It is these sorts of results that make me less optimistic about Ukraine's ability to break through Russia's defenses without taking significant losses.  When Ukraine uses similar small scale unit attacks against Russian lines it seems to often wind up the same as when Russia attacks Ukraine's lines.  Which is... not so great a result.

I know I rarely ask of this from you guys... but think about Combat Mission

If you have a reinforced platoon sized force and you lose most of your rides, what happens?  Attack is a failure and you have just lost a bunch of vehicles without doing much to the enemy, if anything.  Now, what happens when you have a reinforced company trying to take the same position?  Lose a few vehicles and the attack continues, increasing the chances of affecting some sort of positive outcome.  Not guaranteed, but a LOT more likely than if it's just a platoon.

Now picture this attack being only one of two or possibly three in a concentrated area with two reinforced companies.  One attack might not work out so well, but the other might and in doing so may unhinge the otherwise successful defense against your other attack.

Yeah, I know, this is all pretty basic stuff.  But for some reason Ukraine seems content to follow Russia's lead of penny packet attacks.  I fully appreciate the risks of massed attacks on this lethal battlefield, but that's what ISR, deep strikes, counter battery fire, and other things are supposed to help overcome.  All of these things we know Ukraine has.

In short, if Ukraine doesn't figure out how to conduct larger scale attacks against Russian positions this Spring/Summer, then I don't think we're going to be very happy with Ukraine's progress by time Fall arrives.

Steve

So this highlights what appears to be a modern warfare dilemma forming up - concentrate force and get detected and hit well before you can use it, penny packet smaller profile forces that are harder to detect, but risk being unable to project enough mass and get cut up by inches.  It is basically the AirLand dilemma without the airpower...and now everywhere, all at once (not a bad movie, not sure it should have won) as opposed to discrete regions of the AO.

So we are back to what has worked, corrosive warfare.  One does not form up large mass, one erodes an opponent en masse until their system buckles and then break in, through and out.  I suspect the entire play at Bakhmut has been a corrosive play, much like Severodonetsk et al last summer (which also drew a lot of fire at making "no sense" and UA troops poorly trained and supported).

The UA is not "following the Russian lead' they are also constrained in the battlespace because the RA still has some ISR and strike capability which make large mass formations suicidal right now.  The UA will likely keep "eating snow" until the RA cannot hold up on it own and then mass - and smaller mass than we are used to - has, and may very well work.  So I disagree that the UA needs to solve for "larger scale" attacks, they need to solve for deeper scale attacks, but I think they have a head start on this.

  

Edited March 17, 2023 by The_Capt

[Battlefront.com]

38 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Speaking of Junk, Here is Peskov's comment on Poland and Slovakia sending the MiGs.

Source: Slovakia Will Send Entire Fleet of MiG-29 Jets to Ukraine (Yahoo News)

Interesting how when this war started and the idea of sending these aircraft came up Russia kept beating the "escalation" drum. Now that it looks like it will officially happen and the Kremlin is powerless to stop it, none of these planes will affect the war.

Here's hoping Mr.Peskov will be in a position to explain how useless F-16s are, now that it looks like the Fighter aircraft taboo is starting to vanish.

This is the typical Russian response, actually. 

While being discussed as a possibility - "If you do this you're risking WW3 because it is such an obvious threat to Russian security!"

When it is confirmed happening - "Wow, what a joke!  Well, you're just wasting your money because we'll destroy them without breaking a sweat"

The thing I find funny about this particular one is the line “subject to destruction” .  Just like the rest of the Ukrainian airforce?  Well then, I expect to see these Slovak planes up in the air and hitting Russian targets for years to come

Steve