How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[cesmonkey]

ISW on the drone incident:

 

Quote

The incident will not cause an escalation to direct conflict between Russia and the US. Russian forces have used coercive signaling against US and allied flights and naval vessels for decades in multiple theaters without triggering conflict.[17] The US and Russian presidents retain full freedom to choose how to respond to such incidents, and there is nothing automatic about escalation in such situations. Given President Joe Biden’s repeated commitments to avoid committing US forces to direct conflict with Russia and the Kremlin’s clear and repeatedly demonstrated reluctance to get into a war with NATO, there is no reason for incidents such as these to cause dangerous escalations.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2023

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

Not to be "that guy".. but the proper designation for this UAV is MQ-9.  

 

When I'm being called for dinner for the 3rd time I do kinda get a bit sloppy with the details

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

20 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

ISW on the drone incident:

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2023

Yup, this is what should be expected.  However, this is no doubt going to bite Russia in some way at some point.  Could be as simple as being a tie breaker in some decision that was bound to happen sooner or later.  Since it is unlikely the US will engage in an overt tit-for-tat response we might never know what the consequences are.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Joint investigative report on Russia's plans for Moldova and the recent "protests" that were a part of the destabilization phase:

https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-russias-secret-document-for-destabilizing-moldova-230008434.html

This quote nicely sums up where Russia is strategically these days:

Quote

“The Moldovan leadership has taken a clearly pro-Western course,” a Western intelligence official with firsthand knowledge of the strategy document told Yahoo News. “Thus, the Kremlin’s strategic goals are becoming more difficult, not easier, to achieve over time. They’ve steadily increased the pressure and are using more aggressive tactics to realize these goals.”

Russia's coercive power has been on the decline for quite a long time.  There's only so much interference, bribes, and puppets can do when the population is fed up with being slaves to Moscow.  Hence Russia's response to Yanukovych being ousted right through to today.  War was the only option Russia had left to keep Ukraine from permanently getting out from under its boot.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Another day and another announcement that Ukraine is staying in Bakhmut:

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Some info fresh (i.e. Monday and Tuesday) from just west of Bakhmut and to the north.  About 4km away with units that were either rotating out or rotating in.  This is from a journalist I know who can be trusted with this sort of stuff because he's a CMer from the start.  There's a lot of info so I'm just going to cut and paste some of the stuff relevant to the discussions we've been having:

Quote

Morale was good. It varied from “We are going to fight and it may be tough but we intend to hold here” to “Send more Russians so we can kill them faster.” Among soldiers I encountered nothing even vaguely resembling nervousness. I saw no shell jumpiness. Some were joking and had an excellent sense of humor. Others were pretty serious and kept close to armored vehicles, basement entrances, etc.

The general view about the Wagner guys is that they are getting killed in packets but they keep on coming, and that means accumulated UAF casualties over time.

...

I encountered assumption, anywhere, from any UAF soldier, that the Russians will keep coming until the very last Russian.This is different from Ukrainian (never mind western) civilians who seem to think Russian soldiers are robots that are happy to die. I didn’t talk with anyone about this, but I assume the somewhat less panicky view among the soldiers comes from the common view that Russians aren’t that bright tactically and killing and wounding them doesn’t require special talents. A couple told me the Russian regulars were more competent than the Wagner guys, but, they said that as long as there is enough artillery and mortar ammo it wouldn’t matter who’s attacking.

...

In general, the plan seems to be to try and catch the infiltrators with drones and then hit them with mortars or artillery, and if that doesn’t work then the UAF infantry defends its holes until the Russians get too close. So the Russian tactic “works”, but in the sense that Russian gains literally can be from fighting position to fighting position - at times a matter of dozen meters or so. The attacks are not constant and according to the soldiers I talked to most of the time they just fail, everyone is killed or run off. One officer pointed out that the Russian army is advancing in Bakhmut about 1/10th of a kilometer a week, probably.

...

 

I can say without a doubt that where I was Ukrainian fire outweighed Russian fire (outgoing vs. Incoming) by ten to one, and no I am not exaggerating. So it seems possible someone figured out that a shell/mortar round famine in the UAF around Bakhmut needed to be eliminated. I can’t speak for all times in all places, but when I was there, my observation, the Ukrainians were clearly dominating the indirect fire fight.Not just mortars either, big stuff as well.

...

Morale is overall good, I would say. As I gather, for most holding out is a given, the thing is, for a few who happen to be in the not-so-many holes or buildings the Russians have picked for the days attacks, you may run out of ammo, get Russian infantry inside your position, find out company or battalion can’t give you fire support like you need it, or die. But most of the guys in a given day just hold their positions, or do their specialty job whatever it is. Morale goes up when people hear Ukrainian guns outshooting the Russian ones.

...

the garrison is supplied via a pair of roads running through the village Chasiv Yar, and this section of the roads, and a good distance further back, is within range of Russian artillery fire. However, I observed vehicles and supply trucks and armored vehicles moving both ways. It’s dangerous but it can be done, and as always, if the Russian artillery shoots the Ukrainians try to shoot back.

...

What is the best way for Ukraine to exploit Russian fixation on Bakhmut? My personal instinct is that holding Bakhmut is a good call, but compared to Zaluzhny and Zelensky I’m very poorly-informed. I can tell you for sure the UAF has strong fall-back positions and defense terrain just to the west of Bakhmut.

...

I think two things have happened. First, somehow, the Russians are in a shell shortage and the Ukrainians have if not unlimited ammo then enough to go out and try and kill things on a regular basis. This plus Ukrainian drone advantage - the Russians admit this openly, they complain about it - means that the Ukrainian artillery over time has probably had more ability to hit priority targets the drones find, which without question include Russian artillery. I saw UAF artillery which by type and location almost certainly was doing counter-battery work. Whether or not the trend is significant, don’t know, but I do know when I was in the area the Ukrainian bangs seriously outnumbered the Russian bangs.

 

In all of our discussions about Bakhmut, casualty ratios, relative force capabilities, etc. that his first hand experiences are reasonably inline with what the more positive thinking we've expressed here.  I don't see the sort of pessimism and doom that Kofman et all got from their trip only a few days earlier.  I'll ask our friend about this and get back to you.

 

Steve

[Yet]

10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

But that's just it... it appears that early in the war the usual Russian harassment activities were ratcheted back.  Presumably this was ordered by Putin to avoid his numbnuts military from accidentally giving NATO a reason to widen the war.  If not directly, then by enthusiastically providing something to Ukraine that Putin rather have the West continue hem and haw over.  So this incident was (almost) totally out of character since early in the war.

The Russians say they had a threat coming in and they went up to investigate, causing the US drone pilot to do something dumb that resulted in the AQ-9 falling into the sea.  Anybody believe that?  I certainly don't.

The best thing to do is take a Russian statement and change all the wording to be the opposite.  If you do that, the Russians knew it was an AQ-9, knew it wasn't headed towards Russian airspace, went to intercept it because it was an AQ-9, then engaged in in a way that caused it to crash.

These AQ-9 flights are routine.  There is no reason to suggest this one specific flight was any different than any of the hundreds of others.  Which suggests someone made a decision first then ordered the planes to go up close and personal. 

Not only did the Russians likely know what this was even before the went up into the air, it would have been very easily confirmed almost instantly once getting into visual range.  No need to get within collision distance.  Which means the Russians most likely intended to bring the drone down.

The fuel dump was the first attempt at a plausible deniable take down of the drone, but it didn't work and so hitting the prop with a wing did the trick.

The amount of time and precision flying that is necessary to clip the prop instead of missing or catastrophic collision is immense.  It is also unlikely that the Russian plane was flying so close that it couldn't have maneuvered out of the way if the AQ-9 suddenly changed its flight pattern (which, as I understand it, is not SOP for these situations).

Improvisational confrontations with the US are not something lower level or even senior level commanders would do on their own.  That isn't the sort of thing Russians do, so that leaves either complete accident (facts say otherwise) or orders from Putin himself (generally, at least).

Steve

they could easily have blown the asset. wouldnt it be logical that RU gets a great deal from -say China, Iran or so - if RU takes down one of them in 1 piece to collect and do some reverse engineering?

[Haiduk]

BTR-4 survived after ATGM strike (or SPG-9 or other HEAT projectle) and even kept moving capability. Probably cage armor degraded hollow charge stream.

 

Edited March 15, 2023 by Haiduk

[cesmonkey]

https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/to-help-ukraine-uk-explores-supplying-eurofighter-typhoons-to-european-mig-29-operators/

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The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) is currently investigating the possibility of supplying Royal Air Force (RAF) Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 1 fighter jets to European MiG-29 operators, so the Soviet-era aircraft can, in turn, be gifted to Ukraine.

 

[SteelRain]

15 hours ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

Without a doubt.. you can even make out, if you look close enough, the bore evacuator in the middle of the barrel.

In my opinion this is some kind of early T-72 without ERA stuck in reverse gear. The bore evacuators on both T-62 and T-72 tanks are roughly at the same spot. The presence of what looks to be a luna search light on the right hand side of the barrel would support my assumption as it sits in the distinctive spot since the introduction of the T-64.
The gunner moved the turret to the 7 or 8 o'clock posotion propably to allow the driver to escape. Sideskirts and the sudden violent cock of scheme are also more in line with a T-72.

I've upressed a screencapture with Photoshop.

[Butschi]

8 hours ago, Fenris said:

Any validity to this one?  What is the impact of this in Germany currently?

 

It is based on an article in FAZ that looks rather sound. Keep in mind, though, that FAZ is as conservative as it gets so you won't find that many SPD fans there.

I only briefly scanned over it. That Schröder had a network should surprise noone because you need one in order to rise to power. And that this network rose with Schröder is also hardly surprising.

I won't defend Schröder here, he has obviously lost it but back in the day the world looked a bit different. After the fall of the iron curtain many thought that we don't need NATO any longer. This view was amplified by George W. Bush & Co. The idea of replacing NATO with something European of which Russia should be part in some way did sound much more reasonable back then.

The article mixes up a few things and quotes politicians like Egon Bahr a bit out of context but that is to be expected.

Anyway, about what impact that has nowadays: We should not forget that after Schröder came 16 years with Angela Merkel as chancellor. And while SPD was part of that administration over much of that time, foreign policy was made in the Kanzleramt and thus by Merkel herself.

[Endyamon]

7 minutes ago, SteelRain said:

In my opinion this is some kind of early T-72 without ERA stuck in reverse gear. The bore evacuators on both T-62 and T-72 tanks are roughly at the same spot. The presence of what looks to be a luna search light on the right hand side of the barrel would support my assumption as it sits in the distinctive spot since the introduction of the T-64.
The gunner moved the turret to the 7 or 8 o'clock posotion propably to allow the driver to escape. Sideskirts and the sudden violent cock of scheme are also more in line with a T-72.

I've upressed a screencapture with Photoshop.

In my humble opinion, it's a t-62. I see no smoke launcher on the turret. They should be located at the front of it

[LongLeftFlank]

4 minutes ago, Butschi said:

And while SPD was part of that administration over much of that time, foreign policy was made in the Kanzleramt and thus by Merkel herself.

[SteelRain]

23 minutes ago, Endyamon said:

In my humble opinion, it's a t-62. I see no smoke launcher on the turret. They should be located at the front of it

Not necessarily. The early T-72's came without smoke launchers. This would fit the assumption that the Russian reserve of T-72 tanks is almost depleted.

Here is an early T-72 without smoke launchers.

[Endyamon]

1 minute ago, SteelRain said:

Not necessarily. The early T-72's came without smoke launchers. This would fit the assumption that the Russian reserve of T-72 tanks is almost depleted.

Here is an early T-72 without smoke launchers.

Yes, I didn't think of the old t-72. I'm used to see smoke launchers everywhere nowadays. I agree with you

But the most important thing is that the russian tank is dead, no matter the type

[Harmon Rabb]

Related to the discussion we had here last week.

Putin does not seem to be a fan of the idea that some Pro-Ukrainian group destroyed the Nord Stream pipeline. He likes the theory that the U.S. did it much more.

Edited March 15, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[Haiduk]

24 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Putin does not seem to be a fan of the idea that some Pro-Ukrainian group destroyed the Nord Stream pipeline.

Even this was Ukrainian action, Russia never will recognize it because this would be deadly strike at national prestige (and prestige of Putin as strong leader) in eyes of Russians %) 

Edited March 15, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Good example why infantry in the trenches not always has an opportunity to repell tank attack even if they have RPG. UKR tank of 54th mech.brigade shot by shot destroys Russian position almost at point blank somewhere on Lysychansk direction.

Each shell explosion rises huge amount of smoke and dust  - RPG shooter can even doesn't spot the tank. Except this soldiers of both armies told that direct tank fire is most terrible thing at the war. I suppose, such often impacts of 125 mm shells can force each to hide in far corner of blindage. Also explosions can just stun or shell-shock soldiers in the trench, so they can be in deep suppression to get out from trench with RPG

 

Edited March 15, 2023 by Haiduk

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Good example why infantry in the trenches not always has an opportunity to repell tank attack even if they have RPG. UKR tank of 54th mech.brigade shot by shot destroys Russian position almost at point blank somewhere on Lysychansk direction.

Each shell explosion rises huge amount of smoke and dust  - RPG shooter can even doesn't spot the tank. Except this soldiers of both armies told that direct tank fire is most terrible thing at the war. I suppose, such often impacts of 125 mm shells can force each to hide in far corner of blindage. Also explosions can just stun or shell-shock soldiers in the trench, so they can be in deep suppression to get out from trench with RPG

 

Got yer snow-eating-fog right here, Ivan!

For the first few seconds I was gaping at the TC fighting out of an open hatch, but soon realised it was the AAMG.

2. Splash one bogey....

3. #KillAllTheTrucks

4. Relic. 

5. Drone films drone striking a footbridge.... 

 

Edited March 15, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Haiduk]

Mud

 

[Bulletpoint]

17 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Sorry if video was posted here before, but may be worth to check it:

 

Is this really Ukrainians attacking a Russian trench?

Any info about where and when was it recorded?

It's mostly the Russians who have been assaulting Ukrainian trenches throughout the winter, and it looks like this trench has been heavily but very inaccurately bombarded, like the Russians like to do.

Maybe a local UKR counterattack to retake their old positions? Or a video with the roles switched around.

Edited March 15, 2023 by Bulletpoint

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Good example why infantry in the trenches not always has an opportunity to repell tank attack even if they have RPG. UKR tank of 54th mech.brigade shot by shot destroys Russian position almost at point blank somewhere on Lysychansk direction.

Each shell explosion rises huge amount of smoke and dust  - RPG shooter can even doesn't spot the tank. Except this soldiers of both armies told that direct tank fire is most terrible thing at the war. I suppose, such often impacts of 125 mm shells can force each to hide in far corner of blindage. Also explosions can just stun or shell-shock soldiers in the trench, so they can be in deep suppression to get out from trench with RPG

 

I saw that video last night and decided not to post it after watching it closely several times.  There is no way to verify that the trench closeup was what the tank was shooting at.  There was also no attempt to watch the shell impacts, only the tank operating.  I am of the opinion the tank was getting in some practice and someone from the unit creatively made it into an attack video.

[edit - ninja'd by our Danish representative )

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Follow up to my comment about how the attack on the drone can be spun to support US isolationists and pro-Russian lobbies...

I was listening to the BBC today and they had a Russia academic and former advisor to Putin on the air.  He stated very clearly, as in VERY CLEARLY, that the whole world knows that Ukraine isn't a country, that the Kyiv regime is a puppet of the US, and that the US drone was actively seeking information in order to kill Russians.  The anchor, thankfully, called BS on all of this and focused on the neutrality of the airspace.

The guy acknowledged this, then quickly went on to say that it didn't matter because Russia has a right to defend itself.  When pressed about if the actions of the pilots was aggressive and irresponsible, he admitted that it wasn't really a good idea for them to have taken down the drone (he said clearly that it was deliberate, BTW), but because the US is insistent on killing Russians then what do you expect Russia to do?

When asked what should be done about the situation, he said that both sides should descalate starting with the US withdrawing its aggressive military posture supporting the deaths of Russian soldiers.

So there it is, the sort of talking points aimed squarely at elements in the US and elsewhere that are too confused to understand what is really going on.  I expect to see the hard right and hard left in the US blathersphere repeating this sort of nonsense.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

BTW, I should have given more background to the 1st hand reporting from Bakhmut that I posted above.  The journalist has covered 4 wars (including Russo-Georgia), has gone to the front many times (he was in Bakhmut in January as well), spent 5 years as an OSCE observer in the Donbas, and was a military intelligence officer before all of this.  He lives in Kyiv.  In short, he's no think tank tourist.

On top of that, while Kofman and so many others were saying that Russia was to be feared before the war, this guy and I had spent years talking about how f'd Russia would be if it full on invaded.  In fact, the reason I didn't appear in this thread for a couple of days after the war started was because he and I were in close contact, even as he had to keep going to air raid shelters.

I say all of this because the picture being painted by Kofman and others is quite different, so it is important for you guys to see the credibility of the source.

Steve

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Some info fresh (i.e. Monday and Tuesday) from just west of Bakhmut and to the north.  About 4km away with units that were either rotating out or rotating in.  This is from a journalist I know who can be trusted with this sort of stuff because he's a CMer from the start.  There's a lot of info so I'm just going to cut and paste some of the stuff relevant to the discussions we've been having:

 

In all of our discussions about Bakhmut, casualty ratios, relative force capabilities, etc. that his first hand experiences are reasonably inline with what the more positive thinking we've expressed here.  I don't see the sort of pessimism and doom that Kofman et all got from their trip only a few days earlier.  I'll ask our friend about this and get back to you.

 

Steve

So on Bakhmut, we are hearing an entire spectrum from "it is a deathtrap for the UA!!  It will collapse at any moment, run away!", to "It sucks because we are not supported and untrained, arty is running out of ammo", to "It is ok and we are making it work", to "It is an RA graveyard, and we are crushing them, we have a lot of arty ammo".

This tracks with these sorts of situations in the past.  The truth is likely down the middle and the extreme POVs are happening but are somewhat on extreme ends of the experience (maybe).

One thing we can say is that Bakhmut is holding, well past mainstream news media prepping for its fall.  Ukrainian and military leadership appear united and in line on the battle.  The RA is smashing up against this fight and moving slowly, the steady stream of video (which is skewed in the west) demonstrates that the battle is costly to the RA - how costly remains to be fully seen.  My instinct, and history tells us that it is likely skewing towards "high".

The biggest factor in attrition of combat power as a whole is the force generation competition.  We are seeing older and older RA equipment and more reports of poorly trained troops.  The UA has reports of poor training and support but also a video streams of newer (and western) equipment rolling into this fight.  Add to the this the steady increase in UA asks for offensive equipment and it is clear that this whole thing is not close to being done yet.

What I am looking for in particular is culminating points. The RA might actually be past theirs, which would have been last summer and this entire thing is a zombie operation for domestic audience consumption - there is a whole lotta "righteous sacrifice" narratives floating around the RA info sphere right now.  The UA has not hit theirs yet, that point going to be key for how this war ends.  Likely culminating point scenarios for the UA:

- This spring in the event of an operational offensive that fails.  Based on Bakhmut, I would say the ability to "freeze" this conflict is in Ukraine's hands right now and this would be on the table if this is as far as the UA can go for this war.

- This summer with a successful operational offensive but no tank left in the gas for finishing off Crimea or Donbas

- This fall, or next spring after retaking a pre-2014 region - my money is on Crimea because it makes the most military sense.

- The whole perogy, likely as a result of a total RA/Russian state collapse and then we got a whole new set of regional security problems to deal with. 

Once culmination happens (and we are talking strategic here), this war could drag on but it will be more likely more in line with the 2014-2022 period of a nasty open sore while both sides try to reconstitute for another round in a few years.  The question of how that reconstitution race would pan out is interesting.