How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, womble said:

 

Speculative theorycraft answer, but serious, even if it makes me slightly queasy to type:

1. The Russians send a fire team to die.
2. The death of the fireteam exposes one or more UKR positions, which might be manned by a fireteam.
3. Indirect fires reduce the locations of the UKR fire team(s) to rubble graves for pulverised UKR troopers.

Depending on the ratio of "death by recon" elements to "fire positions located" over time, it's possible that this form of warfare, if the RU economy of force is well-controlled and they can put enough HE on the targets revealed by their recon, it's not inconceivable  that the RU commanders are getting somewhere close to unity in the casualty ratios just in that form of warfare. So, in the best-case-for-Russia where Wagner have enough drone-observers to real-time the guns assigned to that assault phase onto the revealed targets, maybe 1:1 is more credible.

This would mean every single death by recon attempt winds up with at least as many Ukrainian casualties.  I don't buy that.  Plus, it would mean that all other exchanges of fire are decidedly advantageous to Russia, for example all those Excalibur and HIMARS strikes hit nothing more than what Russia's unguided artillery can strike.

Nope, too much other evidence out there to suggest 1:1 is possible.  Closer to 1:1 than 1:5?  Absolutely believe that is true starting very recently.

Steve

[JonS]

31 minutes ago, womble said:

 

Speculative theorycraft answer, but serious, even if it makes me slightly queasy to type:

1. The Russians send a fire team to die.
2. The death of the fireteam exposes one or more UKR positions, which might be manned by a fireteam.
3. Indirect fires reduce the locations of the UKR fire team(s) to rubble graves for pulverised UKR troopers.

Depending on the ratio of "death by recon" elements to "fire positions located" over time, it's possible that this form of warfare, if the RU economy of force is well-controlled and they can put enough HE on the targets revealed by their recon, it's not inconceivable  that the RU commanders are getting somewhere close to unity in the casualty ratios just in that form of warfare. So, in the best-case-for-Russia where Wagner have enough drone-observers to real-time the guns assigned to that assault phase onto the revealed targets, maybe 1:1 is more credible.

That's a very slow process, though, that barely scales. They could get 1:1 with that method, which yay for them I guess, but the absolute number of cas would be so low as to be barely noticeable I would think.

I also suspect that UKR would actually welcome RUS adopting that approach as a low tempo relief, and - action/reaction - it'd be fairly straightforward to develop counters to it. Like, oh, only one element firing then displacing. You wouldn't even need to permanently abandon any of the positions - just clear out for 15-60 mins, then quietly reoccupy.

Or, for something completely different, only use indirect fires to engage the recon-by-death dudes, meaning your own front line guys don't suffer any cas (although level of alertness required is exhausting and manpower-intensive to sustain) which would in turn plausibly lead to an artillery duels, and I suspect the UKR forces would again welcome that development.

Edited March 13, 2023 by JonS

[Haiduk]

13 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

It appears Kyianyn is very well known, but it seems wise to ignore him as a fraud. 

It's only recently some our socialneteor active soldiers from Bakhmut raised this theme, that Kyianyn is not who he claims to be. In this time which everybody greedily catches any news about Bakhmut it's too easy to hype and get 1000 followers. I've seen claims that "Kyianyn" is already shifting accents to western audience and making probes about donations, so be aware!

 

Edited March 13, 2023 by Haiduk

[JonS]

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Plus, it would mean that all other exchanges of fire are decidedly advantageous to Russia, for example all those Excalibur and HIMARS strikes hit nothing more than what Russia's unguided artillery can strike.

There is an interesting point hidden here: aside from the time window being looked at (Dec vs Jan vs Feb vs Mar, for example) over what geographic area is 1:1 being assessed? Within 100m of downtown Bakhmut would give you one answer, within 1km a different answer, and out to a 10km radius would be a different answer again.

To put that a slightly different way, 2 Platoon, of C Company IV Battalion could actually be experiencing 1:1 for a variety of reasons - terrain factors, log issues, leadership, quality of opposition, etc. However C Company as a whole would likely be suffering a different exchange ratio, and their battalion commander might consider himself barely engaged, while the Brigade commander is sleeping well at night because nothing interesting or alarming is going on.

In other other words; context matters, yo, and most of the discussion around exchange ratios are sorely lacking context.

Edited March 13, 2023 by JonS

[Butschi]

2 hours ago, Lethaface said:

I personally find the casualty ratio a less interesting subject, mainly because we just don't know the casualties and we haven't known about them. The delta between two unknowns is probably something like unknown². The bean-counting machine don't like computing that one though ;-). 
Maybe Ukraine casualties have always been 'high' or higher than some had assumed, I mean what is even 'high'?

Your statement is really the only contribution to the discussion about casualty ratios that makes sense to me. I've said it earlier, this is like reporting the result of a soccer match as "don't know against probably something like 2". and saying: "Oh what a decisive win!" or "What an embarassing defeat!". We get the Russian number of casualties from Ukraine who have a lot of good reasons to either exaggerate or report to small numbers, depending on circumstance and addressee. We know even less about Ukrainian casualties, or do we? For similar reasons.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Hmm.  Maybe this is a problem of you not being a native English speaker because it seems what you mean to say is a "long and interesting post"

This times 100.  For Ukraine to be suffering 1:1 losses it would mean that Ukraine's defenders are poor quality and Russia's attackers are significantly better *or* the Russians have some sort of overmatch capability at play.  Why?  Because that's the only way to explain how Ukraine could be giving up so little ground and yet be taking as many casualties as the attacker.

Further, the whole Ukraine culture of complaint has been on display since the start of the war.  Remember all the complaints about logistics and supplies of AT weaponry at the beginning of the war?  And they say that when they are out in the middle of nowhere with a pile of Javelins sitting behind them.  Or about how stupid their senior commanders are and yet somehow smart enough to defeat the "2nd biggest army in the world".

Anyway, it is the job of the frontline soldier to complain.  It's in their DNA.  Ukrainians certainly are no different.  But we also see them saying "it's all f'd up here, but we're doing fine despite that".  Maybe part of it is to build up their own myth of superiority in that they are able to defeat not only the Russians but their own side's defects. 

Whatever the case is, it gets back to what The_Capt and I said way back when the Kofman et all trip was concluded.  If all they did was visit the front, then their conclusions aren't likely reliable.  It takes talking with senior leadership to round out the picture, and senior leadership is not talking to pretty much anybody.

That said...

It's pretty clear we're seeing now is a much tougher fight and no opportunities for Ukraine to slaughter large numbers of Russians without breaking a sweat.  So I think it's pretty safe to presume that the favorable casualty rates of the past few months are reduced.  Which is why I said in my previous post that at this point I think it is safer to start with the 1:1 estimate and modify upward then to go with the 1:5 or 1:7 estimates and reduce from there.

Steve

Again, which "1" are we talking about?  One thing that I have not seen from anyone is an actual assessment of combat power attrition at Bakhmut.  Combat power attrition is basically how fast each sides operational systems are eroding in comparison to how well they can sustain and backfill losses.  

So this means the "ratio" is far more than just infantry in the grinder.  Guns, logistics, ISR, C2, engineering, specialists etc.  The US Army defines combat power through - Leadership, Firepower, Information, Mobility, Survivability. (https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf), so the real question is what is the attritional ratio within those components?  Followed by, what were their start states? How are they sustained?  And what trajectory are they on now as a result of this battle? And remember this is a net and gross equation.

Pulling out the old copy of War By Numbers by Lawrence (and again take with caution) and he outlines how attacking is historically normally more costly than defending...up to a point.  Context is king here, was it an ambush or an attack against a prepared position?  Ignoring the noise, the ratios should be in the neighborhood of 1.5:1 against the Russians as a start point and then move around based on historic figures.  The biggest evidence of significant Russian losses is the simple fact that they have not been successful after trying for nearly 10 months that is a lot of failed attacks and failed attacks tend to skew losses heavily against the attacker. 

Now expand that out to a operational systemic level - and we know it is based on ISR and deep strike capabilities and we start to see what is in play.

[Haiduk]

@sburke

Colonel Denis Gutarov, chief of operative department, HQ of 4th "Kantemirovskaya" tank division. Was killed on 1st of Oct in Kherson oblast (yes, some combined unit of 4th TD was moved there), when his command vehicle was hit on march by UKR airstrike.

Major Sergey Gudovskikh, unknown naval infantry (?) unit, was killed on 23rd of Feb 2023. It's seen a starnge part of writing on moutning ribbon - Tu-154. This guy was burried in Yeysk, the town on Azov sea. It has airfield, when two Tu-154 are based, belonged to Navy. It's knowingly UKR has struck Yeysk airfield on 28th of Feb. Many questions...  

 

Edited March 13, 2023 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

Longer and slightly more graphic video of the two wandering Wagnerites that were engaged, one of which died and the other taken as POW:

https://censor.net/ua/video_news/3405303/biyitsi_54yi_ombr_imeni_getmana_ivana_mazepy_znyschuyut_odnogo_vagnerivtsya_a_inshogo_berut_v_polon

Steve

[Fenris]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Bunch of stuff:

2.  CASEVAC is something we talk about often.  Here is a video with narrative in English:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/11pq928/our_medic_rescued_the_life_of_this_ukrainan/

 

Steve

This makes me glad.  I saw the full clip without sound last night, the injured guy was in a bad way and very pale so I didn't watch it to the end, I thought he wasn't going to make it which made me sad.

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

16 minutes ago, JonS said:

There is an interesting point hidden here: aside from the time window being looked at (Dec vs Jan vs Feb vs Mar, for example) over what geographic area is 1:1 being assessed? Within 100m of downtown Bakhmut would give you one answer, within 1km a different answer, and out to a 10km radius would be a different answer again.

To put that a slightly different way, 2 Platoon, of C Company IV Battalion could actually be experiencing 1:1 for a variety of reasons - terrain factors, log issues, leadership, quality of opposition, etc. However C Company as a whole would likely be suffering a different exchange ratio, and their battalion commander might consider himself barely engaged, while the Brigade commander is sleeping well at night because nothing interesting or alarming is going on.

In other other words; context matters, yo, and most of the discussion around exchange ratios are sorely lacking context.

Yup, absolutely.  Not only is depth important, but also breadth.  Is the north side of the north pincer getting as much attention from bean counters as the center of the whole thing?  I doubt it.  And as is often the case, the terrain and units fighting in various parts of a larger battle differ greatly.

So I'm with Leatherface and Butschi that this is all tempest in a teapot stuff.  We really don't know.  However, the reason we're having this discussion, and the reason I think it's important, is others think they DO know.  Namely Kofman and his crew that visited the front.  They are presenting their findings as if it's an open and shut case.  Similar to how they presented their case when the war started and numerous times after.  It's important for us to not take what they say at face value, yet it's equally important to not be dismissive by saying "those guys got it wrong before, so without any analysis of my own I've concluded they are wrong now".

Steve

[Haiduk]

Spring in Ukrainian fields is hard not only for vehicles %)

 

 

[Haiduk]

FPV attack from 24th assault battalion "Aydar" of 53rd mech.brigade

 

[JonS]

13 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

this is all tempest in a teapot stuff

On the other hand, though, perception is reality. Exchange ratios are essentially unknowable at any real level of detail or accuracy. About the best you can do is get a sense of how things are going based on what you can see leavened with your experience. It's not that knowing the ratio to 3 decimal places is unimportant, but you just don't have access to the data required to create reliable, numerical, information.

However if the UKR forces perceive that the exchange ratio is getting away from them, which appears to be what Kofman et al are relaying to audiences outside Ukraine, then that really is a real problem and not just a tempest in a teapot.

Edited March 13, 2023 by JonS

[akd]

Tentative report, but Russia may have just de-space powered:

 

 

[danfrodo]

2 minutes ago, akd said:

Tentative report, but Russia may have just de-space powered:

 

 

Now that is some blockbuster news!  Normally Putin would just send in the troops, except they are previously engaged. Wikipedia says Kazak military is ~100k total, w ~20k in the army.  Not much but hopefully enough to ward off whatever Putin tries.  That would be hilarious -- RU beaten by Kazakstan.  The other 'stans might be emboldened by this. 

[JonS]

lol - do they have anyone upstairs at the moment? This might get a bit awkward for them ...

[Harmon Rabb]

ICC to issue first arrest warrants linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

[Haiduk]

LostArmor talks: As is Wagners has thrown to the battle for Bakhmut additional reserves, likely of their "core" troops. Also Russian regulars have thrown there. As if Russian command seriously concerned with opportunity of UKR counter-offensive and as if their recon spotted concentrations of UKR troops, preparing to attack in Chasiv Yar - Kostiantynivka area (SW from Bakhmut)

Looks like both sides conduct intensive PsyOps battle ("MoD doesn't supply Wagners" from Russian side and rumors about preparing to counter-attack from UKR side) and false hits tactic (two attack attempts on the north). 

Russians now activated again on SW direction, trying to breakthrough to Chasiv Yar and intesivlely shelling with heavy MLRS Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kurakhove. Probably they reeally think they hit probable dislocations of UKR reserves

Kostiantynivka now

 

Edited March 13, 2023 by Haiduk

[Bil Hardenberger]

6 hours ago, akd said:

Mounted assault on a Russian trench line:

 

A lot to unpack in that video. Very nice Battle Drill display.

[chrisl]

10 minutes ago, JonS said:

lol - do they have anyone upstairs at the moment? This might get a bit awkward for them ...

Looks like maybe 5 Russians. Probably nobody on station cares. They can’t see the borders from space, and it’s more likely that both crews unite against the ground people than fight with each other.

[Haiduk]

Burning Russian tank on knife-range. And DShKM-TK - upgraded HMG, "main caliber" of position warfare of 2018-2021 still in service

 

Edited March 13, 2023 by Haiduk

[JonS]

2 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Looks like maybe 5 Russians. Probably nobody on station cares. They can’t see the borders from space, and it’s more likely that both crews unite against the ground people than fight with each other.

Yeah, I was more thinking about them being able to get back home, but I guess gravity works regardless of whether the meter has been fed. Keeping the ISS fully functionally probably just got a bit harder though.

[Bil Hardenberger]

25 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Burning Russian tank on knife-range. And DShKM-TK - upgraded HMG, "main caliber" of position warfare of 2018-2021 still in service

 

The guy manning that DShK has played his Vlad the Loader card!

[Sojourner]

1 hour ago, akd said:

Tentative report, but Russia may have just de-space powered:

 

 

If true they missed one. A MILCOM/SIGINT satellite just launched this morning.

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2023/03/proton-olymp-k-2/

Also, four crew returned from ISS Saturday - 2 American, 1 Japanese, 1 Russian.

Most likely, what was confiscated was non-flight assets.

Edited March 13, 2023 by Sojourner

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, akd said:

Tentative report, but Russia may have just de-space powered:

 

 

They could sell it to the Chinese. That would be fun!