How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

Thanks Kraft, and I also just saw this summary today which answers my question in more depth.  61 of 71 missiles intercepted.  6 of the remaining actually hit something.  And looks like RU is now re-purposing anti-ship & AD missiles for ground attack.  I am sure the UKR air forces are going to take advantage of this at some point.

Summary also mentions that RU taking a heavy beating at Andiivka, that's good news.  At the bottom says that Putler is planning nationwide address on Feb 21, the one year anniversary of the invasion.  I wonder how much of the current ground attacks were ordered so that Putler would have something to crow about in his speech.  

 

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/10/2152218/-Ukraine-update-Russia-launched-another-big-offensive-at-Donetsk-and-got-another-big-disaster

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Bearstronaut said:

Get outta here with that neo-tankie crap. NATO was not a threat to Russia. Nobody was itching to drive on Moscow like it was 1941 or 1812. If the Russians had played nice instead of weaponizing their whole "Russkiy mir" concept the Europeans would have been perfectly happy to just sit there and buy cheap fossil fuels pumped in from Siberia. 

Whatever claims Russia had to any anything have been abrogated by their behavior in this war. We should be free to commit warcrimes at at will on neighboring countries is a flat no.

51 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Don't oversell AP landmines here. Having been in minefields and witnessed some of the carnage you describe personally - and a lot of years as a combat engineer, I think I can play the "expert" card here.

AP landmines were always designed to harass and attrit - both physically and psychologically.  The only ones that were approaching lethality level to be decisive are area systems like claymore or bounding mines (especially when in daisy chain...nasty).  So their utility in warfare is not zero but it is also 1) upside down and 2) backwards:

Upside down - like most engineer obstacles you are trading work for time.  A LOT of work up front to buy a few seconds minutes later.  Making those minutes second count is what all arms defence is all about.  AP mine as part of that overall system is a very junior player in the modern age.  The vast majority of AP mines simply are never detonated.  They do support force multiplication but pale in comparison to AT systems.  Main reason is that mechanized made modern warfare - we will see how long that lasts - so kill the vehicle and a modern army is back to WW1.  AP mines were there to make clearance of those AT mines difficult and to kill engineers.  In some conditions they were still used for final defence, but in order to really have an effect you have to employ a very high density.  Go read on the Falklands War accounts of the final attacks on the Two Sisters.  The Brits hit minefields on the assault, took hits and just kept on going.  So as the modern era progressed the amount of effort to put out enough density in AP became entirely secondary to the AT problem.  Back in training, before the Ottawa Convention, we would plan for a lone single strip in a massive AT minefield that was frankly an enormous pain in the a@@ and did basically nothing.  We did employ them for nuisance minefields but these were last on the priority list of engineer works.  AT, AT and AT was always the priority. 

So the value of AP outside of very narrow circumstances really began to drop to the point that when the landmine ban came up, we kind looked at it and went "meh".  We still retain the command detonated point defence systems, like Claymores, so the ability really mess people up is still there.  And boobytraps/anti-handling devices exist in a grey area so if we need to deny critical systems in a withdrawal scenario we still could.  The old AP mines - "toe poopers" - really kind became old-school extra work that we really did not miss.

Backwards - The other problem with the old dumb AP mines was the fact that they killed/injured more people after the war than they did in the war itself.  This drove the costs of these systems way outside the battlefield gains.  Cambodia was really the eye opener, and then the Balkans, Afghanistan etc.  We saw that the post-war impact was like GDP-level harming - the cost of removing these weapons, especially if they records are lost or never made, was orders of magnitude of the weapon system itself.  So from a military strategic perspective these were literally cutting off the nose to spite the face.  They were never going to be decisive on the battlefield, and the post-war costs were enormous as we were seeing large swaths of agriculture, tourism and development areas were totally denied for at least a century unless a nation in post-war recovery could spend millions on clearances that would take years. 

So frankly, AP mines do not make warfare economic sense.  They may feel good but Ukraine sticking its neck out on this one is not worth it.  They will kill a few more Russians, but not enough to balance the blowback or post-war impacts.  The RA has demonstrated a stunning ability to feed people into this thing, so they are simply going to ignore any AP minefields, accept the casualties and move on.

DPICM is fundamentally a very different problem.  The issue here is the "peace community" really functions by fund raising and to do that they need "wins".  The AP Convention was a big win, so they were searching for a high profile follow up - enter Lebanon 2006.  Israel in a bafflingly bad military operation - it basically killed the credibility of their famous design approach - decided to start lobbing old stockpiles DPICM at hybrid forces who were fighting from within communities...what could possibli go wrong?  Well the whole thing blew up in their, and our, faces...literally.  Old stockpiled DPICMs had embarrassing dud rates - although, reality check; those dud rates do not even come close to the numbers of AP mines employed in older conflicts.  More modern DPICM systems are seeing lower dud rates than the HE being tossed around the battlefield today...but if it looks like a landmine and can generate crowd funding like a landmine...

 So the Anti-Cluster munition thing was born.  We in military circles knew that it would really go nowhere because DPICM has far more battlefield utility and in many circumstances it could be decisive.  So they bolted together a convention but there are holes one can drive a truck through and all the major players simply refused to sign off - although the US made some hand over heart promises.  So what?  Well DPICM essentially takes HE and distribute it widely and more efficiently.  When shaped charge rounds are employed the lethality goes up as well - plenty of studies out there, and we read a lot of them for CMCW.  So unlike AP which is a nuisance to an attacking combined arms unit, DPICM can kill it.  For Ukraine, and the US, the employment of DPICM is entirely legal, even if it makes some people queasy.  Neither nation signed the thing in Oslo and can legally employ the weapon systems in accordance with the Geneva CCW.  Modern DPICM have extremely low dud rates as they are built to be self-neutralizing - we are talking 95% and above, far higher than standard HE.  Now as PGM enters the battlefield en masse, my bet is that DPICM will also go the way of AP mines.  If we need to kill 10 attacking vehicles, we fire 10 PGM systems.  DPICM cost/benefit will very likely shift- along with a lot of systems - after this war and into the future.  So the entire thing may become moot, but we are not there yet.

So DPICM will have political costs, but I think they are mitigatable and are outweighed by critical battlefield utility.  AP mines, no; DPICM, yes. 

 

 

The two other things about DPICM is that are worth throwing out there. The U.S. has lot of it sitting in warehouses, when people at the front are screaming for any ammo they can get the arguments for not sending it are in bad faith, or simply detached from reality. The other thing about DPICM is that it is cheap enough to take the "maybe" shots. Their might be two or two hundred Russians in that stand of trees over here, and we don't have a drone available to go look. We can take a very real risk of getting the company recon team killed? Or we pop a couple of rounds of DPICM and see what jumps? I know what the recon teams vote is.

[Beleg85]

Some videos coming from Avdiivka area. Fights were eported there as well; 8 BMP's and 2 tanks in the clip:

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Several weeks ago I expressed surprise that Ukraine hadn't picked someplace else along the huge front to hammer and make Russia draw resources away from Bakhmut.  I am in no position to second guess why Ukraine didn't do this as it worked so well for Kherson.  But now, maybe this is an opportunity to finally give Russia some reason to lose focus? 

If Ukraine really is counter attacking in Vuhledar this could finally give Russia something to worry about.  I don't think Russia has much in the immediate area to plug any gaps blown open in their lines.  It wouldn't take much in the way of Ukrainian advances, even a few hundred KMs, to become problematic.

Steve

Counterattacks are only local and rather targeted at regaining favourable ground; perhaps they think about moving battle into Pavlivka again. So probably a local issue, at leats for now.

There were reports in turn about concentration of muscovite troops in Zaporizhia region, back behind the frontlines. So theoretically they have reinforcements at hand, but perhaps suited to different tasks by highest command. This date - 14th february- is quite interesting. Perhaps initiall goal was to capture Vuhledar as part of shaping operations, and roll Ukrainian defence from there  up to the north by other forces. If so, Ukrainians foiled it.

Edited February 10, 2023 by Beleg85

[Beleg85]

Prigozhin in one interview has typical ideas:

 

[Huba]

Visually confirmed RU losses from yesterday. Oryx via Jakub Janovsky:

That is a lot and sustainable for now only because of vast stock of soviet vehicles that are being refurbished. Certainly not something they can keep up for prolonged periods of time.

[Haiduk]

4 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Interestingly, I have not previously seen evidence of the use of ATGMs with BTR-4

First time it was filmed as far in 2016 near Maryinka, when BTR-4 has destroyed DPR truck. I can recall several episodes, where both 9M113/RK-2 were launched from BTR-4. But indeed BTR-4 very rare carries ATGMs. 

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Whoa, I talked about NATO in context of UA access, not European Union. Which has whole separate range of issues, in which security ones are not at the front (yes, you are right PL gov. does a lot of terrible domestic policies in EU).

Btw. genunity of Zeitenweide is widely and critically discussed in German and European press as far I can tell, so nobody is pointing fingers at anybody here. Even with best intentions, such mental change take a hell lot of time, that's my doubts about stance of some countries. And there are myriad of additional factors here that I (as non-German) probably miss as well. We shouldn't discuss it because somebody is uncomfortable with it or "yours are also slightly to blame in other fields"? C'mon, no reason to quarrel here.

At the end of this year it is quite possible PiS loose elections. And voila, we can go back to pure, 100% legit Germany-bashing again, like Balts do.

But seriously problem of populsim is global and very much everywhere, connected to evolving technology (fast, attention-seeking media are killing  traditional view of political process), societal problems (alienation of humans in XXI cent. megalopolis- already explained in details by Oscar Spengler types), economical models and globalization itself. If some people thinks that we can neatly divide Europe into "3 regions" in which there are "reasonable" and "unreasonable" people, sorry to disturb you-your views are based on XIX cent. stereotypes. Better watch at US, UK, South Americas, Italy and growing similar movements in France, Scandinavia etc. Traditional democracy as system of balancing powers have visible problems everywhere. Perhaps simply entire montesquian division of powers system cannot catch behind fast-evolving, multiconnected world of XXi cent. I hope not, but there are many signs.

 

Todays' hunt of Ukrainian AA. 5 drones and 62 missiles...they seem to shot less every time.

 

You were talking about rifts in the EU/NATO because of UA and how DE would probably go it's own way with FR and IT hiding behind it avec plaisir. And how DE supposedly 'pressuring' US into delivering tanks is a reason for PL to order 500 HIMARS. And that DE is not even a weak ally. I find that discussion worthy too. 
I'm not German either, although one of my great grandmothers came from Konigsberg. I have one memory of her when I was four years old and we got into the door of the place where she lived (I guess) and she started swearing. It made an impression, here is a grandmother who says words I can't say lol. She was already demented I understood later. I don't 'identify' as German though .
Anyway I don't mind discussion at all, but the simple fact that Germany was against Ukraine entering NATO before this war erupted is hardly a reason to distrust Germany's loyalty in defense pacts. Perhaps it 'helps' that the armed forces of my country are literally integrated into the German armed forces. 

Edited February 10, 2023 by Lethaface

[Lethaface]

Back to Ukraine

[Jiggathebauce]

Say, whatever happened to JasonC? Is he still alive? Loved his posts, as a long time lurker

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Some videos coming from Avdiivka area. Fights were eported there as well; 8 BMP's and 2 tanks in the clip:

Counterattacks are only local and rather targeted at regaining favourable ground; perhaps they think about moving battle into Pavlivka again. So probably a local issue, at leats for now.

There were reports in turn about concentration of muscovite troops in Zaporizhia region, back behind the frontlines. So theoretically they have reinforcements at hand, but perhaps suited to different tasks by highest command. This date - 14th february- is quite interesting. Perhaps initiall goal was to capture Vuhledar as part of shaping operations, and roll Ukrainian defence from there  up to the north by other forces. If so, Ukrainians foiled it.

I came across this as well. He also said "U cannot even imagine (even I) the amount of destroyed Russia armour from Krasnogorivka to Kamianka. Approximately like 3 brigades"

If that's correct, there will be more (good) news I would guess.

[Haiduk]

5 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Based on the information of this volunteer, it is not Russia that is engaged in wave attacks on our positions, but rather Ukraine.

You can read her twitter пані Добропілля. She is not "porokhobot" and her words are from the words of medics in Bakmut about level of losses comparable to ATO. She didn't clarify what exacly number she meant (only combat losses or total deaths number with non-combat losses), but if we take into account latest info of ISW about at least 4100 KIA and about 10000 WIA Wagners around Bakhmut (but I forgot for what period), that about 3500 killed UKR soldiers will be approx in the frame 1:1. But I forgot, who wrote about this ratio. Maybe and somebody of soldiers. 

Many soldiers write in one voice - when the time will come and you get to know what price was paid in Bakhmut, you will be fu..ng shocked. Urban and trench warfare with the enemy, having large advantage in personnel and reserves can't be light walk. Multiple videos with drone-bombers and piles of dead orcs can make illusion that this is just like practice range. But sometime and on UKR twitter or TG segment leak enemy videos, which too hard to watch. Like recent video from Krasna Hora, were Wagners surprised full squad of nine UKR soldiers (likely enemy had UKR uniform) in some facility and either shot out them immediately or captured and then executed. If we inflict so much losses to enemy and have much less ratio, than 1:1, that why for last two month situation became so bad that 93rd brigade was returned to fight, not having enough tome to rest and 3rd NG brigade was pulled from Kharkiv direction?

I don't say that "all is lost", but even losses ratio not 1:1, but 1:2 or even 1:3 this is anyway too much

Edited February 10, 2023 by Haiduk

[Zeleban]

 

The first confirmation of the presence in the ammunition of Russian tanks of new 125mm armor-piercing feathered sub-caliber projectiles 3BM60 "Lead-2"

[Erwin]

Not sure what the implications are but western-leaning Moldova's govt just fell.  That could presage a Russian-leaning govt formed in the breakaway region of Transnistria, the thin sliver of land along its border with Ukraine that is run by a pro-Russian administration and where Russian troops are already based:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/moldovas-pro-western-government-collapses-as-fallout-from-ukraine-war-worsens-7eb2e24f?mod=world_lead_story

The other challenge is that the promised western tanks may be delayed:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/europeans-reluctance-to-give-ukraine-tanks-leaves-germany-out-in-the-cold-11675948197?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

"Britain and France, which have the biggest armed forces among European NATO allies, have around 220 tanks each, but it is unclear how many are actually battle-ready, according to GlobalFirepower, an online database. Germany has a similar number of tanks, with government surveys showing that less than half of them can be deployed because the rest are in need of repair. By contrast, Russia started the war with over 12,000 tanks, while Ukraine had nearly 2,000... The U.S. did pledge to supply 31 of its Abrams tanks but U.S. officials now say it might take up to two years before they arrive on the battlefield. "

My take is that this is a political compromise to promise tanks, but cos that could lead to escalation, the tanks will be delayed until (the politicians hope) they are no longer required.

[Zeleban]

2 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

I don't say that "all is lost", but even losses ratio not 1:1, but 1:2 or even 1:3 this is anyway too much

 

No, the loss ratio of 1:1 means that we are losing this war and no NATO help will save us

[Zeleban]

1 minute ago, Erwin said:

Not sure what the implications are but western-leaning Moldova's govt just fell.  That could presage a Russian-leaning govt formed in the breakaway region of Transnistria, the thin sliver of land along its border with Ukraine that is run by a pro-Russian administration and where Russian troops are already based:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/moldovas-pro-western-government-collapses-as-fallout-from-ukraine-war-worsens-7eb2e24f?mod=world_lead_story

The other challenge is that the promised western tanks may be delayed:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/europeans-reluctance-to-give-ukraine-tanks-leaves-germany-out-in-the-cold-11675948197?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

"Britain and France, which have the biggest armed forces among European NATO allies, have around 220 tanks each, but it is unclear how many are actually battle-ready, according to GlobalFirepower, an online database. Germany has a similar number of tanks, with government surveys showing that less than half of them can be deployed because the rest are in need of repair. By contrast, Russia started the war with over 12,000 tanks, while Ukraine had nearly 2,000... The U.S. did pledge to supply 31 of its Abrams tanks but U.S. officials now say it might take up to two years before they arrive on the battlefield. "

My take is that this is a political compromise to promise tanks, but cos that could lead to escalation, the tanks will be delayed until (the politicians hope) they are no longer required.

Perhaps Western countries are aware of the loss ratio. Sending equipment to an obviously losing country does not make any sense. Simple and pragmatic solution

[Harmon Rabb]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Prigozhin in one interview has typical ideas:

 

Here's some more rhetoric in the same vein as what you posted.

I would find these statements laughable. If I did not know how many innocent Ukrainian civilians have been murdered during the course of the last year, because of the actions and rhetoric of these psychopaths.

 

Edited February 10, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

cannot even imagine (even I) the amount of destroyed Russia armour from Krasnogorivka to Kamianka. Approximately like 3 brigades"

Look at this. Colorized cadres of Hiroshima? No. This is small town Maryinka with pre-war population about 9500 people not ofrtwn appears in news like Bakhmut. Russians/DPR for year of fierce clashes could take only eastern half of town and fights for the center are continuing to this day. DPR milbloggers in rage curse Russian command, which has been killing their army in Mariupol and Maryinka and now do the same around Avdiivka

  

 

 

[chrisl]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So the system you describe, like the tank (or heavy mass), appears to be having parts of that system critically impacted by changes on the battlefield.  The big one appears to be SEAD.  Modern SEAD is designed for an integrated AD network, these are pretty large enterprises that have to be penetrated and suppressed.  And then an opponents air power has to be countered both in the air and in depth (eg airfields).

But the issue is that AD is distributing and dispersing, and so is C4ISR.  So the best SEAD systems in the world, like the best tank systems in the world, cannot solve for 2 man teams armed with very long range fire and forget lethal systems using passive targeting sensors.  What we are seeing in Ukraine is massive air denial - which basically equates to both sides denying entry costs into airspace.  And they are both doing it through a lot of dispersed AD.  Now the UA are also plugged into a massive C4ISR architecture that can detect Russian fighter/bombers from take-off in Russia, which gives them time to react and pre-position AD, further complicating the air problem.

In the future cheap highly effective AD technology is going to jump on the unmanned bandwagon.  C4ISR is going to look like a massive cloud that goes from space to sub-surface.  So, like tanks, large centralized air power systems are going to become very vulnerable largely because they are highly visible.  And as you note, not just the front end, but the entire air power system (e.g. refeulers).  This will likely push the older larger manned platforms further back, much like we are seeing in both sides of this conflict.  At that point air platforms are essentially firing munitions from stand-off.  Now these can be precision munitions, but at these ranges they are basically competing with ground based deep precision fires which are much, much cheaper.  

Like mass on the ground, mass in the air will likely need to disaggregate and become more dependent on many-small-unmanned systems where the platform becomes a munition in itself.  Like the tanks, we will likely spend billions trying to figure out how to protect these legacy systems to the point they become so expensive and limited that we simply move on.

Right now, opponents of the western world are taking notes and if you have a spare bit of change invest in air denial technology/industry because it is going to be insane after this war.

That change was already underway in US forces with the retirement of the A-10 and using the F-35 as its replacement.  The thing that the aircraft provide is a platform that can carry a lot of fuel to get more stuff closer to the target point faster - missiles are still limited by the rocket equation. Small UAVs for observing and as munitions are limited in similar ways by the fuel scaling. You can get them closer to the target on a more efficient first stage (the aircraft) that flies high enough to stay out of effective range of the MANPADs, while putting the much lower cost targeting drones at risk down near the ground, with those operated by the FOs.  High altitude aircraft (with or without crews inside) with low altitude or ground (or space) observers will still be able to deliver tactical precision at strategic distances.

[billbindc]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes, and poor Imperial Japan was just nicely minding its own busines, rampaging across China, raping Nanking, cutting down all the trees in Korea, fortifying the entire ex-German Pacific islands mandate. Co-Prosperity Sphere, you know.

...and mean old Roosevelt needlessly provoked them with his metals and oil embargo, like a literal dagger to the throat of an oil poor maritime power I tell you!

I mean, what else could they do? but rampage across the entire Pacific, mass-murdering civilians by the bucketload?

Bring better arguments than drive-by Carlson/Buchanan retweets, mate. Otherwise, The American Conservative is over there.....

Funny thing about that Burns cable everyone cites is that he notes the particularly inflammatory nature of any access to NATO of Georgia and Ukraine. Which then did not happen. And when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, that latter country was no closer to joining NATO than it had been 6 years earlier. What galled Putin was that Ukraine was going towards the EU and refusing to accept Russian hegemony over it’s affairs internal and external. Moreover, the Russian government has clearly said multiple times that this the conflict has always been about restoring the Russkiy Mir. 

Seminole, I would meekly suggest that arguments made on the basis of singular cables are often unsound. They are typically very contextual in time and space. 

[Seminole]

2 hours ago, Bearstronaut said:

Get outta here with that neo-tankie crap.

'Get outta here' with documented historical record?

Is the former ambassador to Russia and current CIA Director a 'neo-tankie'?

2 hours ago, Bearstronaut said:

NATO was not a threat to Russia. Nobody was itching to drive on Moscow like it was 1941 or 1812.

While I wholeheartedly concur 'nobody was itching to drive on Moscow', I don't think you can look at a map and not see how Ukraine in NATO worsens Russia's strategic defense situation.

NATO's original concept as a purely defensive arrangement was buried by the Kosovo and Libyan interventions wherein (some) NATO members decided to partition one nation, and directly aid the overthrow of the government of another.  Neither as defensive moves to protect a member state.

 

[Lethaface]

11 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Look at this. Colorized cadres of Hiroshima? No. This is small town Maryinka with pre-war population about 9500 people not ofrtwn appears in news like Bakhmut. Russians/DPR for year of fierce clashes could take only eastern half of town and fights for the center are continuing to this day. DPR milbloggers in rage curse Russian command, which has been killing their army in Mariupol and Maryinka and now do the same around Avdiivka

  

 

 

Sure looks like Stalingrad / Hiroshima 2023. I guess it is difficult to fathom the level of destruction going on. 

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, chrisl said:

That change was already underway in US forces with the retirement of the A-10 and using the F-35 as its replacement.  The thing that the aircraft provide is a platform that can carry a lot of fuel to get more stuff closer to the target point faster - missiles are still limited by the rocket equation. Small UAVs for observing and as munitions are limited in similar ways by the fuel scaling. You can get them closer to the target on a more efficient first stage (the aircraft) that flies high enough to stay out of effective range of the MANPADs, while putting the much lower cost targeting drones at risk down near the ground, with those operated by the FOs.  High altitude aircraft (with or without crews inside) with low altitude or ground (or space) observers will still be able to deliver tactical precision at strategic distances.

Payload is about the only thing that large manned fighters really still have left; however, there has always been a precision offset to payloads.  We are seeing this in artillery outputs in Ukraine right now.  There is a case to be made for high altitude strategic strike, but it comes with a lot of its own baggage wrt profiles.

"High enough to stay out of effective range of MANPADs"  This is also a problem.  MANPADs used to be 5000ft but they are rapidly increasing in altitude:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starstreak

Starstreak has a service ceiling of 22000 feet, so we are well into medium altitudes.  Now mount a Starstreak on a MALE already at 15000 feet and you can see the problem.  So the trend is small self-loitering munitions/UAS plus precision ranged fires in place of CAS, deep strike precision strike missile systems and long range UAS for deep battle (operational) and very likely manned motherships launching unmanned systems for strategic strike from very long standoff.  

So we are into very high altitude aircraft able to fly well above, with stealth, very fast as still really the future of this part of the game - again, ironically the aircraft that will realistically do the mission in Top Gun II was presented (and crashed by Tom Cruise) in the first 30 mins of the movie.  There is going to be an unmanned airpower race, that has already sparked up and despite what will no doubt be a desperate amount of lobbying by industry who have sunk costs, traditional fighter/bombers are going to be looking at significant pressures to survive as is.

Edit:  Oh yes and speed.  The trade off with unmanned systems is persistence.  I do not need speed if a supporting air platform is already there.

Edited February 10, 2023 by The_Capt

[Jiggathebauce]

Quote

Get outta here' with documented historical record?

 

Is the former ambassador to Russia and current CIA Director a 'neo-tankie'?

 

While I wholeheartedly concur 'nobody was itching to drive on Moscow', I don't think you can look at a map and not see how Ukraine in NATO worsens Russia's strategic defense situation.

 

NATO's original concept as a purely defensive arrangement was buried by the Kosovo and Libyan interventions wherein (some) NATO members decided to partition one nation, and directly aid the overthrow of the government of another.  Neither as defensive moves to protect a member state.

 

 

Toothless argument. Ukraine was not in NATO nor planning to be if it would avoid being invaded, they states it numerous times. and they got invaded anyway. Finland and Sweden actually in process of joining, where are the Russian tanks crossing their border?  They won't. 

Edited February 10, 2023 by Jiggathebauce

[Zeleban]

26 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

3500 killed UKR soldiers will be approx in the frame 1:1.

 

Just thought about these numbers. It turns out that even before the start of the most difficult phase of the battles for Bakhmut, our losses in the dead were already greater than our losses in the dead in Mariupol during 3 months of the hardest fighting. Thus, according to Pani Dobropilla's tweet, the battle for Bakhmut is several times more intense than the battle for Mariupol. I doubt it very much. The battle for Mariupol was a real disaster for Ukraine. Our troops were surrounded in a cauldron and completely cut off from supplies, they had no artillery support. In Bakhmut, can our troops receive supplies, replenishment, artillery support and at the same time suffer twice as heavy losses? I just can't believe it, it doesn't fit in my head.

[billbindc]

10 minutes ago, Seminole said:

'Get outta here' with documented historical record?

Is the former ambassador to Russia and current CIA Director a 'neo-tankie'?

While I wholeheartedly concur 'nobody was itching to drive on Moscow', I don't think you can look at a map and not see how Ukraine in NATO worsens Russia's strategic defense situation.

NATO's original concept as a purely defensive arrangement was buried by the Kosovo and Libyan interventions wherein (some) NATO members decided to partition one nation, and directly aid the overthrow of the government of another.  Neither as defensive moves to protect a member state.

 

I can look at a map and say that Ukraine in NATO doesn't hurt Russia's strategic defense much at all.

Russia has 6500 nuclear weapons. It cannot be invaded. The reason NATO expansion happened is because recently liberated countries in Eastern Europe knew a: Russia would eventually want its hegemony back and b; there was no realistic scenario in which NATO would or could attack Russia. 

Russia's strategic problems have not been at all external. Its problems stem from a political culture that stunted development in favor of resource extraction, that drove its best and brightest overseas and that failed to address issues of mortality, demography and technological lag. In lieu of an actual development vision for Russia that would satisfy the needs of the Russian people, the regime elites utilized ressentiment to redirect their grievances. 

Edited February 10, 2023 by billbindc