How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[poesel]

6 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Iranian drones stopped being used because of the frost, not because of their shortage, - Assistant Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces Yevhenii Silkin

PVC is only rated down to 0°, and that is the kind of cheap material you would use in suicide drones - if your target area is a warm climate.

If they did not specify that, then I guess they will also have problems with the motor. A small air-cooled combustion engine has essential parts that don't like to be frozen.

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Agree to disagree.  Though I could be convinced he was a useful idiot to start with.

Sorry, I don't find Greenwald credible so I'm not going to bother.  Lost interest in him when he pushed the pro-Putin, Ukrainian Nazi line during 2014. (damn, AKD ninja'd me!)

Some background on why Greenwald doesn't float my boat:

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-tale-of-ukraine-crimea_b_5060692

Steve

US officials have stated off the record that that they don't believe he was an agent. Rather, a disaffected narcissist who didn't feel he was appreciated. You know, like Glenn Greenwald. But at this point, Snowden is a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian intelligence. His lawyers are entirely tied to the SVR and he acts within a precisely laid down set of rules to extend his propaganda value to Vladimir Putin. 

[poesel]

When Putin falls, Lukashenko will switch sides as fast as lightning. He will try to broker a deal for him and his cronies for a get-out-of-jail card for giving over Belarus peacefully to the opposition.

Luka is a very, very good politician. Someone of lesser skill would have been ousted long ago. So I guess he will try everything to avoid sinking together with his regime.

For that purpose, he needs to stay out of anything 'unforgivable' by the West. Which means that Belarus will not attack Ukraine because that would tie him to Putin forever.

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, billbindc said:

US officials have stated off the record that that they don't believe he was an agent. Rather, a disaffected narcissist who didn't feel he was appreciated. You know, like Glenn Greenwald. But at this point, Snowden is a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian intelligence. His lawyers are entirely tied to the SVR and he acts within a precisely laid down set of rules to extend his propaganda value to Vladimir Putin. 

The end result is what's important, of course, but it seems unlikely that NSA's internal security was so lax that youngster like Snowden could have walked away with 1+ million documents from multiple isolated information cells without some help.  Also, he never supported his claims that he tried everything he could to handle the situation legally, which is suspicious as a pure attention seeker would likely have wanted to keep his ass out of jail ("Whistleblower" status would have done that).  It also defies imagination that the release of documents themselves was necessary to shed light on what the NSA was doing, so there was a deliberate intent to cause harm.  Add to this is the claim, which Snowden doesn't deny, that a large number of the documents he stole had nothing to do with the surveillance programs he objected to.  Lastly, he did absolutely nothing to "blow the whistle" on what Russian and China were doing to their own people at home and abroad, which someone who claims to be all about freedom from surveillance would likely have done.

US intel officials have a reason to say "he wasn't an agent" because Snowden can be written off as a unique one-off that they somehow missed.  On the other hand, if he was an agent this implies there could be others now or in the future.  Much better to go with the former than the latter.  Especially if being quoted "off the record".

Nope, I for one don't buy that this was just an attention seeker.  It might have started out like that, but I think he was handled by the Russians long before he wound up there.  Whether he knew he was being used or not is the question I don't feel has been answered.  Snowden could, of course, clear that up if he and his SVR masters wanted it cleared up.

Steve

[billbindc]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The end result is what's important, of course, but it seems unlikely that NSA's internal security was so lax that youngster like Snowden could have walked away with 1+ million documents from multiple isolated information cells without some help.  Also, he never supported his claims that he tried everything he could to handle the situation legally, which is suspicious as a pure attention seeker would likely have wanted to keep his *** out of jail ("Whistleblower" status would have done that).  It also defies imagination that the release of documents themselves was necessary to shed light on what the NSA was doing, so there was a deliberate intent to cause harm.  Add to this is the claim, which Snowden doesn't deny, that a large number of the documents he stole had nothing to do with the surveillance programs he objected to.  Lastly, he did absolutely nothing to "blow the whistle" on what Russian and China were doing to their own people at home and abroad, which someone who claims to be all about freedom from surveillance would likely have done.

US intel officials have a reason to say "he wasn't an agent" because Snowden can be written off as a unique one-off that they somehow missed.  On the other hand, if he was an agent this implies there could be others now or in the future.  Much better to go with the former than the latter.  Especially if being quoted "off the record".

Nope, I for one don't buy that this was just an attention seeker.  It might have started out like that, but I think he was handled by the Russians long before he wound up there.  Whether he knew he was being used or not is the question I don't feel has been answered.  Snowden could, of course, clear that up if he and his SVR masters wanted it cleared up.

Steve

I would put it this way: it’s possible (and in this case likely) that someone inside an organization like the NSA would act like an enemy agent because they had become one in their own head without connection to the opposition. Where and at what point those connections first happened is something we aren’t going to find out unless some sort of regime opposed to Putin takes power in Moscow but…the position Snowden was in would certainly have been of far more use to Moscow if he stayed in it. That he left and the way he left are pretty convincing evidence to me that he imagined that he would somehow martyr or heroize himself without paying the full consequences. He also burned pretty much any leverage he might have had in the process with the now-masters in Moscow.

[dan/california]

 

[danfrodo]

The new Perun video, about winter war requirements, makes it very clear that the most vital item going forward is to add winter battle packs for CMCW & CMBS. 

[Battlefront.com]

32 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I would put it this way: it’s possible (and in this case likely) that someone inside an organization like the NSA would act like an enemy agent because they had become one in their own head without connection to the opposition. Where and at what point those connections first happened is something we aren’t going to find out unless some sort of regime opposed to Putin takes power in Moscow but…the position Snowden was in would certainly have been of far more use to Moscow if he stayed in it. That he left and the way he left are pretty convincing evidence to me that he imagined that he would somehow martyr or heroize himself without paying the full consequences. He also burned pretty much any leverage he might have had in the process with the now-masters in Moscow.

Oh, I agree with that.  I think Snowden believes the sunshines out of his backside and he completely overplayed his hand, no matter what the surrounding scenario might be.  Which is one reason I don't think he's smart enough to have pulled this all off on his own.  Unfortunately, we're unlikely to know the truth because Snowden isn't likely to provide it and the Russians aren't likely to fess up even under new management.

Steve

[JonS]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Lastly, he did absolutely nothing to "blow the whistle" on what Russian and China were doing to their own people at home and abroad, which someone who claims to be all about freedom from surveillance would likely have done.

Tu quoque?

Moaning that Snowden didn't *also* blow the whistle on Russia and China is disingenuous. At best. It's like moaning that the doctor who successfully performed heart surgery on you didn't also fix your brain cancer. And rid you dog of fleas. And whatever other stick you have near at hand to attempt to beat them with.

Also, let's posit an alternate world where Snowden did have access to stuff the Russians and/or Chinese were up to, and released it. Does that make him a good guy in alternate-Steve's eyes? I somehow doubt it.

We get it. You don't like him. We also get that you will create whatever internal narrative you need to justify that.

Edited December 4, 2022 by JonS

[Battlefront.com]

36 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

What's the point of having mobile artillery if just sits in one spot expending dozens of rounds?  Shows how much of Russia's early artillery success was due more to Ukraine's limited counter battery capabilities than Russia's capabilities.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, JonS said:

Tu quoque?

Moaning that Snowden didn't *also* blow the whistle on Russia and China is disingenuous. At best. It's like moaning that the doctor who successfully performed heart surgery on you didn't also fix your brain cancer. And rid you dog of fleas. And whatever other stick you have near at hand to attempt to beat them with.

Also, let's posit an alternate world where Snowden did have access to stuff the Russians and/or Chinese were up to, and released it. Does that make him a good guy in alternate-Steve's eyes? I somehow doubt it.

Nope, it doesn't.  It still makes him a traitor, but it would at least make his moral crusade seem at least somewhat genuine.

2 minutes ago, JonS said:

We get it. You don't like him. We also get that you will create whatever internal narrative you need to justify that.

Er, what the heck?  I don't need to invent anything to justify my dislike of him.  He had options to expose NSA's illegal activities, but he didn't exercise them.  Whatever good he did exposing the NSA's activities were undone by that.  Whether he was a Russian tool from the start or only after doesn't change my opinion that he's a traitor to his country.

I also think the NSA should have had everybody taken out into their parking lot and publicly spanked for having such crap security.  I don't know how much taxpayer money goes into the NSA, but I think we should get a refund.

Steve

[billbindc]

This is going to get interesting: 

 

[dan/california]

25 minutes ago, billbindc said:

This is going to get interesting: 

 

I have assumed these were coming for months now, but it is a shame the first announcement wasn't Russia's strategic bomber fleet going up in flames, followed by their AWACS equivalents. I wonder if Nato leaned on them to make a public announcement and give the Russians one last chance to talk sense, step one of which would be abandoning every square inch of Ukraine at speed. And I suspect Ukraine engineered theirs to work in the cold.

Edit: it would also be hilarious if that range were understated just a bit.

Edit 2: Everybody who thinks they have a military needs a counter for these things, and rather soon.

 

 

Edited December 5, 2022 by dan/california

[LongLeftFlank]

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Time is on the Ukrainian side, not Russia’s side.  Ukraine is the one who is getting force generation advantage - training, equipment and support.  The longer this goes on, and the last 9 months demonstrates it quite well, the UA gets stronger while the RA gets weaker.  

The UA now has experienced formation commanders and has had time to build a western C4ISR enterprise.  They have integrated western hardware into that and driven the might RA back dramatically.

The RA has wasted the modern military it had and has no force generation advantage here.  Large dumb mass is suicide under these conditions and the RA keeps proving it on a daily basis.  The only way any of this changes is if western support falters or fails.

It was 200 Ukrainian ranger battalions I was referring to erupting out of the forests, not a Russian replay of its (as it turned out, mythical) 'Siberian army' of 1941.

Based on @Zeleban's report above, the Russians have now learned enough to (try to) keep a watchful eye on UA formation movements. So yes, achieving strategic surprise is going to be a little trickier.

But I continue to respectfully challenge your central contention:  (absent the West pulling the plug) the UA gets stronger while the RA gets weaker.  

Or at least, I seek corroboration.
 

I think the Russian army will ultimately get pushed out of northern Luhansk. There is really nothing worth holding there now that the supply routes are effectively cut. 

The land bridge (Melitopol - Mariupol) is the 'prize' that matters for Putin, by default.  Will that be a harder or an easier nut to crack in the spring?

I always read your posts very carefully, and many thanks. But I don't see the answer as self-evident. 

...Fine, I can't prove that 2 million cheap Chinese flying butterfly bombs (or what have you)  will show up to -- if not turn the tide -- render a UA offensive too bloody, and ultimately deliver for Russia the 'frozen' cease fire line they are now reduced to seeking. Steve has been dismissive on this point, but my direct experience with China is that they'll make and export anything that people will pay cash for, legality and morality be damned. (And with the collapse of their real estate bubble plus their Covid crisis they could use another export boom.)

Western military thinkers since 1815 have been prone to favour the relentless Big Buildup, followed by the Big Push.  God is on the side of the big battalions. That is posited on the overwhelming global superiority of the Western national/allied industrial base, which has been the case since about 1580.

To what extent is this still the case in 2023?

Edited December 5, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

16 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

It was 200 Ukrainian ranger battalions I was referring to erupting out of the forests, not a Russian replay of its (as it turned out, mythical) 'Siberian army' of 1941.

Based on @Zeleban's report above, the Russians have now learned enough to (try to) keep a watchful eye on UA formation movements. So yes, achieving strategic surprise is going to be a little trickier.

But I continue to respectfully challenge your central contention:  (absent the West pulling the plug) the UA gets stronger while the RA gets weaker.  

Or at least, I seek corroboration.
 

I think the Russian army will ultimately get pushed out of northern Luhansk. There is really nothing worth holding there now that the supply routes are effectively cut. 

The land bridge (Melitopol - Mariupol) is the 'prize' that matters for Putin, by default.  Will that be a harder or an easier nut to crack in the spring?

I always read your posts very carefully, and many thanks. But I don't see the answer as self-evident. 

...Fine, I can't prove that 2 million cheap Chinese flying butterfly bombs (or what have you)  will show up to -- if not turn the tide -- render a UA offensive too bloody, and ultimately deliver for Russia the 'frozen' cease fire line they are now reduced to seeking. Steve has been dismissive on this point, but my direct experience with China is that they'll make and export anything that people will pay cash for, legality and morality be damned. (And with the collapse of their real estate bubble plus their Covid crisis they could use another export boom.)

Western military thinkers since 1815 have been prone to favour the relentless Big Buildup, followed by the Big Push.  God is on the side of the big battalions. That is posited on the overwhelming global superiority of the Western national/allied industrial base, which has been the case since about 1580.

To what extent is this still the case in 2023?

Hopefully there will not be a little test some time soon in the Taiwan Strait. BTW Taiwan REALLY needs to worry about these new model buzz bombs. 

If Ukraine thinks they can push as soon as the ground is hard I am 100% certain they will. But most of the land bridge is about as wide open as wide open gets. 

outside of Melitopol.

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Yasne,+Zaporizhia+Oblast,+Ukraine,+72342/@47.0277055,35.6478743,3a,75y,90t/data=!3m8!1e2!3m6!1sAF1QipOHwbUMJmmk87kg6ordMKFQsds7celf2TkbOie3!2e10!3e12!6shttps:%2F%2Flh5.googleusercontent.com%2Fp%2FAF1QipOHwbUMJmmk87kg6ordMKFQsds7celf2TkbOie3%3Dw203-h152-k-no!7i4032!8i3024!4m13!1m7!3m6!1s0x40c2b1e224ede523:0xa1e1e16ff3a2914a!2sMelitopol',+Zaporizhia+Oblast,+Ukraine,+72300!3b1!8m2!3d46.8550216!4d35.3586996!3m4!1s0x40dd50083d378c2b:0xcc4f4fc9e91a1e6c!8m2!3d47.0277218!4d35.6478882

was hoping the picture would show in the thread, sorry

 

[LongLeftFlank]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Total mobilization is not something that can be sustained for very long.  It's an act of desperation used only when all other options have been cut off.  Even Nazi Germany held off until 1943 (or 1944 depending on definition) because it recognized the dangers of total mobilization.  It is the same reason Russia is so reluctant to scale up its war effort even after all of its humiliating defeats.  It seems the Kremlin's calculation is that it will do more harm than good.  The prevailing opinion here is that the Kremlin is probably right.

Steve

It's a valid point about the 1944 Speer war economy quickly becoming autophagic (devouring itself). But there are degrees of popular mobilisation that fall well short of that. 

What's bothering me is that I am seeing almost nothing in this line. A few workshops that fix up damaged AFVs, distributed so as not to attract missile hits.  Crowdsourcing (local as well as foreign) of support vehicles. OPSEC + Western press collusion can't explain that away.

Not seeing a War Production Board, no Lord Beaverbrook, no Bevan.  I'm sure committees exist, but does their writ run beyond a few major cities?  Vitaliy Kim is a great leader (or great at PR anyway).  Where are his counterparts all over the country?

Also, I keep an eye toward postwar Ukrainian society. While the 'Ukronazi' meme is tosh, there is indeed a quite strong nationalist movement there. Just as you would expect given some 500 years of colonisation, capped off by the horrific period 1914 - 1950.

In short, with a few exceptions (e.g. Kira Rudin) the Ukrainians don't think like nice comfortable Western liberals, nor even Poles. They just haven't had that luxury (you see @kraze, I do hear you).

...So what I would also like to see is signs of a 'We're All In This Together' mass movement in Ukraine society that is manifested someplace more tangible than the Twitterverse.

Otherwise, do the scarred professional veterans of the 93rd Mech and the airborne brigades come home to a society that pays them lip service but didn't truly share their sacrifices, other than some lights out and consumer crap shortages?  Where the plum postwar jobs go to 'draft dodgers' or the politically connected?  Post WWII Britain and USA grappled with these social problems successfully.  Post WWI Europe, not so well.

How will things go in Ukraine?  Will war hero generals begin running for Zelensky's chair? (hint: generals typically make crappy and corrupt civilian leaders. Bismarcks are hard to find)

Edited December 5, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

5 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Hopefully there will not be a little test some time soon in the Taiwan Strait. BTW Taiwan REALLY needs to worry about these new model buzz bombs. 

If Ukraine thinks they can push as soon as the ground is hard I am 100% certain they will. But most of the land bridge is about as wide open as wide open gets. 

outside of Melitopol.

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Yasne,+Zaporizhia+Oblast,+Ukraine,+72342/@47.0277055,35.6478743,3a,75y,90t/data=!3m8!1e2!3m6!1sAF1QipOHwbUMJmmk87kg6ordMKFQsds7celf2TkbOie3!2e10!3e12!6shttps:%2F%2Flh5.googleusercontent.com%2Fp%2FAF1QipOHwbUMJmmk87kg6ordMKFQsds7celf2TkbOie3%3Dw203-h152-k-no!7i4032!8i3024!4m13!1m7!3m6!1s0x40c2b1e224ede523:0xa1e1e16ff3a2914a!2sMelitopol',+Zaporizhia+Oblast,+Ukraine,+72300!3b1!8m2!3d46.8550216!4d35.3586996!3m4!1s0x40dd50083d378c2b:0xcc4f4fc9e91a1e6c!8m2!3d47.0277218!4d35.6478882

was hoping the picture would show in the thread, sorry

 

We should take this over to the CMSF2 Taiwan thread, but umm, where are they going to launch these swarms from?  Ships?

[chrisl]

2 hours ago, billbindc said:

This is going to get interesting: 

 

So how's the air defense around Putin's dacha?

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

It was 200 Ukrainian ranger battalions I was referring to erupting out of the forests, not a Russian replay of its (as it turned out, mythical) 'Siberian army' of 1941.

Based on @Zeleban's report above, the Russians have now learned enough to (try to) keep a watchful eye on UA formation movements. So yes, achieving strategic surprise is going to be a little trickier.

But I continue to respectfully challenge your central contention:  (absent the West pulling the plug) the UA gets stronger while the RA gets weaker.  

Or at least, I seek corroboration.
 

I think the Russian army will ultimately get pushed out of northern Luhansk. There is really nothing worth holding there now that the supply routes are effectively cut. 

The land bridge (Melitopol - Mariupol) is the 'prize' that matters for Putin, by default.  Will that be a harder or an easier nut to crack in the spring?

I always read your posts very carefully, and many thanks. But I don't see the answer as self-evident. 

...Fine, I can't prove that 2 million cheap Chinese flying butterfly bombs (or what have you)  will show up to -- if not turn the tide -- render a UA offensive too bloody, and ultimately deliver for Russia the 'frozen' cease fire line they are now reduced to seeking. Steve has been dismissive on this point, but my direct experience with China is that they'll make and export anything that people will pay cash for, legality and morality be damned. (And with the collapse of their real estate bubble plus their Covid crisis they could use another export boom.)

Western military thinkers since 1815 have been prone to favour the relentless Big Buildup, followed by the Big Push.  God is on the side of the big battalions. That is posited on the overwhelming global superiority of the Western national/allied industrial base, which has been the case since about 1580.

To what extent is this still the case in 2023?

Ah, well apologies for the misread - thought we were talking about the RA pulling out a magic rabbit re: “250 independent Bns”

RA getting worse, UA getting better.  Well most of the evidence is on the battlefield.  The RA began this war able to push (at least) 5 operational axis of advance, albeit clumsily with what looked like a somewhat modern coherent force.  They had issues, lord did they have issues, but they advanced rapidly before stalling and dying in pretty large numbers.

The RA then collapsed on its main effort - Kyiv.  It does not take deep military theory to know that is pretty bad. Qualitatively the RA was probably at it height in the opening of this war and it has been pretty much downhill since.  We saw evidence of this all spring and into summer, to name a few-

Reports of ad hoc units, poorly supported.

Leadership casualties and failures.

Logistical contraction due to UA precision long range fires.  Signs of logistical failure everywhere (e.g. abandoned equipment)

Older Soviet equipment and munitions seen moving to the front

Reports of poorly trained soldiers being used as cannon fodder, especially LNR/DPR.  

Appearance of more mercenary outfits.

Plenty reports of RA friendly fire incidents.  This plus baffling RA targeting, as reported in the RUSI document.

Zombie operations that made no sense - likely driven by political micromanagement.

The continual failure of the Russian airforce, while sustaining higher end platforms we know they cannot replace.

Reports of mobilized soldiers receiving very little training and substandard equipment.

Reports of RA cannibalization of equipment - particularly strategic strike.

This, plus dramatic battlefield losses - failure to make any breakout in the Donbas, even while concentrations that rival WW1; operational collapse at Kharkiv, and withdrawal at Kherson.  None of this points to a military that is qualitatively getting better.  Their mass advantage has not and is not translating onto the battlefield because the UA, armed with western ISR and fires, has crippled the RA operational system to project protect ( - good one), sustain and C2 that mass into an effective weapon.  These are issues they cannot fix in the time frame of this conflict, and they sure are going to have a very hard time of it under crippling economic pressure. Stuff like building a competitive ISR architecture takes years.  Training troops to fight in this new environment also takes time.  Finally, the RA’s biggest sin is a failure to learn at speed of this conflict. They are still playing the old game, which after 9 months clearly does not work for them, and they cannot develop the capability to play it better, let alone better than the UA.

The UA on the other hand went from a scrambling very dispersed hybrid defensive, where we were pretty sure they would have to fold it into an insurgency.  Instead we got something else entirely.  We have watched the UA’s ability to extend the projection of lethal power from its own cities and frontline to the back of the Crimea and beyond.  Then the UA followed up by demonstrating ability to project, protect, sustain and C2 not only a corrosive defence but then take back initiative and carry out two simultaneously successful operational offensives 500kms apart.  From integration of western equipment and data, to clearly producing troops able to fight and win. This is  it a force getting worse.

Now China may sell Russia a bunch of kit but they are not going to be able to sell them a force generation system able to push out higher quality troops.  They are not going to sell them C4ISR able to compete.  And they are not going to sell them a better logistical system.  

The West is doing all that and more for then UA…and they are pretty much giving it away for free.  So the RA is not competing with Ukraine on this - they are competing with us. 

I think the issue is one of how we measure strength.  This war has indicated that the metrics of mass - XXX units/formations is no longer enough.  It is how well one can connect that mass that appears to be the measure of true strength.  On can argue it really always was but the “connection metrics” have changed, the bar is much higher.  The Big Push has to be the Big Integrated Push or it is dead on arrival.  And the “connection” is not just Command and Control, it has many more dimensions - awareness, understanding, self-synchronization, learning.  In the end I think the UA is demonstrating the power of cognitive superiority supported by precision, and massed precision beats everything.

The RA tried the “big push”, twice - opening invasion and Donbas.  If they had a million poorly trained, supported and disconnected troops who ran headlong at the UA lines -deaf, dumb and blind; it would be a massacre of historic proportions.  The UA can see the build up in real time.  They can target the logistics of that build up.  They can pull back and let the Big Push run out of gas.  And then roll em back.  Followed by a very rapid collapse of the entire thing…just like they did the first time.

Edit.  Saw this after I posted - https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/u-s-intel-chief-thinking-optimistically-for-ukraine-forces-1.6180237

Edited December 5, 2022 by The_Capt

[dan/california]

56 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

We should take this over to the CMSF2 Taiwan thread, but umm, where are they going to launch these swarms from?  Ships?

Well the 1000 km range that seems to be the new standard for an improved Shaheed something...something would reach from well into Hunan Province, or well north of Shanghai. 

[dan/california]

https://www.firstpost.com/world/taiwan-to-develop-100-plus-radar-killing-suicide-drones-by-2025-11662241.html

Taiwan's version is WELL underway , but they probably can't just staurate China with them in quite the same way.

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Ah, well apologies for the misread - thought we were talking about the RA pulling out a magic rabbit re: “250 independent Bns”

RA getting worse, UA getting better.  Well most of the evidence is on the battlefield.  The RA began this war able to push (at least) 5 operational axis of advance, albeit clumsily with what looked like a somewhat modern coherent force.  They had issues, lord did they have issues, but they advanced rapidly before stalling and dying in pretty large numbers.

The RA then collapsed on its main effort - Kyiv.  It does not take deep military theory to know that is pretty bad. Qualitatively the RA was probably at it height in the opening of this war and it has been pretty much downhill since.  We saw evidence of this all spring and into summer, to name a few-

Reports of ad hoc units, poorly supported.

Leadership casualties and failures.

Logistical contraction due to UA precision long range fires.  Signs of logistical failure everywhere (e.g. abandoned equipment)

Older Soviet equipment and munitions seen moving to the front

Reports of poorly trained soldiers being used as cannon fodder, especially LNR/DPR.  

Appearance of more mercenary outfits.

Plenty reports of RA friendly fire incidents.  This plus baffling RA targeting, as reported in the RUSI document.

Zombie operations that made no sense - likely driven by political micromanagement.

The continual failure of the Russian airforce, while sustaining higher end platforms we know they cannot replace.

Reports of mobilized soldiers receiving very little training and substandard equipment.

Reports of RA cannibalization of equipment - particularly strategic strike.

This, plus dramatic battlefield losses - failure to make any breakout in the Donbas, even while concentrations that rival WW1; operational collapse at Kharkiv, and withdrawal at Kherson.  None of this points to a military that is qualitatively getting better.  Their mass advantage has not and is not translating onto the battlefield because the UA, armed with western ISR and fires, has crippled the RA operational system to project protect ( - good one), sustain and C2 that mass into an effective weapon.  These are issues they cannot fix in the time frame of this conflict, and they sure are going to have a very hard time of it under crippling economic pressure. Stuff like building a competitive ISR architecture takes years.  Training troops to fight in this new environment also takes time.  Finally, the RA’s biggest sin is a failure to learn at speed of this conflict. They are still playing the old game, which after 9 months clearly does not work for them, and they cannot develop the capability to play it better, let alone better than the UA.

The UA on the other hand went from a scrambling very dispersed hybrid defensive, where we were pretty sure they would have to fold it into an insurgency.  Instead we got something else entirely.  We have watched the UA’s ability to extend the projection of lethal power from its own cities and frontline to the back of the Crimea and beyond.  Then the UA followed up by demonstrating ability to project, protect, sustain and C2 not only a corrosive defence but then take back initiative and carry out two simultaneously successful operational offensives 500kms apart.  From integration of western equipment and data, to clearly producing troops able to fight and win. This is  it a force getting worse.

Now China may sell Russia a bunch of kit but they are not going to be able to sell them a force generation system able to push out higher quality troops.  They are not going to sell them C4ISR able to compete.  And they are not going to sell them a better logistical system.  

The West is doing all that and more for then UA…and they are pretty much giving it away for free.  So the RA is not competing with Ukraine on this - they are competing with us. 

I think the issue is one of how we measure strength.  This war has indicated that the metrics of mass - XXX units/formations is no longer enough.  It is how well one can connect that mass that appears to be the measure of true strength.  On can argue it really always was but the “connection metrics” have changed, the bar is much higher.  The Big Push has to be the Big Integrated Push or it is dead on arrival.  And the “connection” is not just Command and Control, it has many more dimensions - awareness, understanding, self-synchronization, learning.  In the end I think the UA is demonstrating the power of cognitive superiority supported by precision, and massed precision beats everything.

The RA tried the “big push”, twice - opening invasion and Donbas.  If they had a million poorly trained, supported and disconnected troops who ran headlong at the UA lines -deaf, dumb and blind; it would be a massacre of historic proportions.  The UA can see the build up in real time.  They can target the logistics of that build up.  They can pull back and let the Big Push run out of gas.  And then roll em back.  Followed by a very rapid collapse of the entire thing…just like they did the first time.

Edit.  Saw this after I posted - https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/u-s-intel-chief-thinking-optimistically-for-ukraine-forces-1.6180237

Good stuff.  However, I think LLF has a little bit of a point which your answer did not address.  With that in mind, take everything you wrote and add one small scenario to it...

Russia's forces have the potential to be noticeably better if they have 2 months to rest and refit.  For one, they are so bad it's hard not to see how they couldn't improve.  In fact, it seems like Russia has already regained some of its footing in Luhansk.  OK, so let's go with the optimistic scenario for Russia where it's uncommitted mobiks get some training, more equipment is brought online, deficiencies in munitions is improved upon by covert purchases from China, etc.  We can even throw in a major and effective shakeup of the Russian battlefield command to put more competent officers into positions of authority AND unify command AND the Kremlin stops having them do stupid stuff.

Yes, they will still have the Carnival Cruise ship full of baggage they can't solve any time soon, but they already have all of that now so what I just described would still make their forces relatively better than they are today.

If all of this comes to pass, Russia will indeed be in a better position to defend in the winter and, coupled with a more sensible force regeneration policy, perhaps manage to be better prepared for the summer campaign.  It's a lot of ifs, but they aren't all out of the realm of possibility.

Should Ukraine be shuddering?  No, not at all.  Because while all of this is going on Ukraine is continuing to do force generation and regeneration the CORRECT way.  It is getting more capable systems every month and more of the ones they already have.  Ukrainian command is already very good and no doubt will get better throughout the winter.  Etc.  And here's the important point...

While the "what ifs" for Russia are possible, they are not probable.  On the other hand, what I just described for Ukraine is pretty much a sure bet. 

So, which would a betting man want to put money on?  The crap force that has performed horribly so far and MIGHT make minor improvements over the next couple of months?  Or would you rather back the good force that has consistently outfought its enemy extremely well so far and all indications are that it will be even better in a couple of months?

To me, it's a no brainer.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Sheesh... it's like ISW reads our minds   Just after reading and posting to the above discussion, I read the December 4th report and it had this interesting bit to start out with:

Quote

Ukrainian officials have indicated that Ukrainian forces plan to continue offensive operations over the coming winter to capitalize on recent battlefield successes and prevent Russian forces from regaining the battlefield initiative. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group Serhii Cherevatyi stated on December 4 that frozen ground enables heavy wheeled and tracked vehicles to advance and that Ukrainian forces are preparing such vehicles for winter operations.[1] Cherevatyi also stated that low-quality mobilized recruits and Wagner Group personnel recruited from Russian prisoners are unprepared for combat in the winter.[2] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on November 20 that those who suggest the winter will pause hostilities “likely never sunbathed in January on the southern coast of Crimea,” suggesting that Ukrainian forces intend to continue counteroffensive operations over the coming winter that contribute toward the goal of retaking Crimea.[3] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr Havrylov stated on November 18 that Ukrainian forces will continue to fight in the winter because any type of pause will allow Russian forces to reinforce their units and positions.[4] Ukrainian officials’ prior statements on ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in Kherson Oblast are further evidence that these official statements on winter counteroffensive actions are indicators of continuing counteroffensive operations.[5]

Senior US government officials are mistakenly identifying the optimal window of opportunity for Ukraine to conduct more counteroffensives as the spring rather than winter, despite Ukrainian officials’ statements to the contrary. US Director for National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines assessed on December 3 that the pace of the war in Ukraine will slow over the winter so both sides can refit, resupply, and reconstitute, despite evidence that conditions on the ground favor a renewed offensive and despite the demonstrated tendency of Ukrainian forces to initiate new counteroffensive efforts relatively quickly after the previous effort has culminated.[6]

Ukraine’s ability to maintain the military initiative and continue the momentum of its current operational successes depends on Ukrainian forces continuing to conduct successive operations through the winter of 2022-2023. Russia lost the initiative in summer 2022 after its offensive in Donbas culminated.[7] Ukrainian forces gained and have retained the initiative since August 2022 and have been conducting a series of successful successive operations since then: Ukraine liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast in September, Kherson City in November, and is currently setting conditions for more Ukrainian pushes elsewhere this winter.[8] Successive operations are a key part of Ukraine’s campaign design. A series of successive Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts demonstrates the Ukrainian military‘s remarkable operational planning skill and knowledge of the strengths of Soviet operational art. Soviet operational art emphasizes that militaries can only obtain their strategic objectives through the cumulative operational success of successive operations ideally conducted without operational pauses between them.[9] Recent official Ukrainian statements make clear that Ukraine’s campaign design is designed to allow a series of successive operations to deprive Russia of the initiative, defeat the Russian military, and liberate more Ukrainian territory.

Weather conditions in winter 2023 likely will dictate a timeframe in which Ukraine can conduct maneuver warfare and continue its string of operational successes with minimal pauses that would increase the risks of Ukraine losing the initiative. The fall mud season in November hampered maneuver warfare, as ISW previously noted.[10] Both Russia and Ukraine nevertheless continued aggressive offensive and counter-offensive operations throughout this muddy period despite some Western predictions that the mud would suspend operations. As the hard freeze approaches in late December, Ukrainian forces will be again able to exploit the weather conditions. Winter is usually the best season for mechanized warfare in Ukraine whereas spring is the nightmare season for fighting in Ukraine.[11] The thaw swells rivers and streams and turns fields into seas of mud.[12] Ukrainian forces likely are preparing to take advantage of frozen terrain to move more easily than they could in the muddy autumn months.[13]

If Ukraine’s allies and partners do not support Ukrainian forces to conduct large-scale decisive counteroffensive operations this winter—as the DNI’s statements might be construed to suggest – then Ukrainians‘ ability to conduct maneuver warfare will be constrained until likely at least after the spring mud season in March 2023.[14] Such a course of action will likely prematurely culminate Ukraine‘s current momentum and grant shattered Russian forces a valuable three-to-four-month reprieve to reconstitute and prepare to fight on a better footing.

The last bit is what LLF is hinting at, I think.  But I don't think it's a big problem for Ukraine as I don't see them needing outside help to push Russia back during the winter.  Mostly because I don't think Russia is well prepared to meet a determined Ukrainian attack.

Steve

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Good stuff.  However, I think LLF has a little bit of a point which your answer did not address.  With that in mind, take everything you wrote and add one small scenario to it...

Russia's forces have the potential to be noticeably better if they have 2 months to rest and refit.  For one, they are so bad it's hard not to see how they couldn't improve.  In fact, it seems like Russia has already regained some of its footing in Luhansk.  OK, so let's go with the optimistic scenario for Russia where it's uncommitted mobiks get some training, more equipment is brought online, deficiencies in munitions is improved upon by covert purchases from China, etc.  We can even throw in a major and effective shakeup of the Russian battlefield command to put more competent officers into positions of authority AND unify command AND the Kremlin stops having them do stupid stuff.

Yes, they will still have the Carnival Cruise ship full of baggage they can't solve any time soon, but they already have all of that now so what I just described would still make their forces relatively better than they are today.

If all of this comes to pass, Russia will indeed be in a better position to defend in the winter and, coupled with a more sensible force regeneration policy, perhaps manage to be better prepared for the summer campaign.  It's a lot of ifs, but they aren't all out of the realm of possibility.

Should Ukraine be shuddering?  No, not at all.  Because while all of this is going on Ukraine is continuing to do force generation and regeneration the CORRECT way.  It is getting more capable systems every month and more of the ones they already have.  Ukrainian command is already very good and no doubt will get better throughout the winter.  Etc.  And here's the important point...

While the "what ifs" for Russia are possible, they are not probable.  On the other hand, what I just described for Ukraine is pretty much a sure bet. 

So, which would a betting man want to put money on?  The crap force that has performed horribly so far and MIGHT make minor improvements over the next couple of months?  Or would you rather back the good force that has consistently outfought its enemy extremely well so far and all indications are that it will be even better in a couple of months?

To me, it's a no brainer.

Steve

I guess my point is more succinctly expressed as the RA may regain or regenerate tactical capability - I sincerely doubt it will be of a higher quality, but it is theoretically possible.  

What the RA is incapable of is the generation operational capability that is competitive with the UA.  It will also be nowhere near the western support capabilities being provided directly to the UA. It is an unwinnable equation that time makes worse not better.

In reality the RA will likely generate “more poorer” quality tactical capability that will further strain their already stressed operational system effectively making matters worse.

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Sheesh... it's like ISW reads our minds   Just after reading and posting to the above discussion, I read the December 4th report

Absolutely agree on the UA winter offensive.  As we discussed, winter will likely favour the UA and seriously stress the RA - it is likely the better time to strike.  

[Battlefront.com]

Looks like Zelensky didn't need to complain about the $60 price point the EU set as the price cap for Russian oil.  According to the Russians, they aren't going to sell oil at that price to anybody:

https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-ban-oil-sales-under-price-cap-kremlin-says/

If Russia sticks to this pledge, they are going to find their coffers a bit bare pretty soon.  In other news, yesterday? OPEC agreed to maintain current output levels.

Steve