How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

Several accounts of people from Kherson or Kherson oblast meant about yesterday night strike on Chervonyi Mayak village (lays on Dnipro bank between Mylove and Beryslav), where Russian troops where deployed, expecting for own queue to cross the Dnipro along the dam or by ferries in Nova Kahovka. As if there were two strikes with several hour delay - one hit building with personnel, next hit reamins of building again and vehicles. I can't find any confirmations, also no info about this from oppose side. Though Operative Commend "South" reported about some "HQ hit in Beryslav district"

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

 

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

 

My money well spent.  F YES.  Thanks for sharing this.  Cold weather gear incl, that's great to know.  500 precision rounds, heh heh, we'll be seeing those hitting RU armor in videos sometime this winter I am sure.

[Zeleban]

Mashovets...

 

By and large, the departure of an enemy grouping of troops from the right-bank bridgehead on the Dnieper is for the Russians, for the most part, an organizational issue rather than a military one. After all, it is obvious that, unlike the events in the Kharkiv region, it does not occur as a result of a breakthrough and defeat of the enemy defense system, but as a result of the adoption of an appropriate management decision by his command. In this regard, however, it is worth noting that in the event of a failure in “organizational issues”, the military consequences of this for the Russians will not be long in coming ...

The fact that the Russians this time, by the way, for the first time in this war, decided to demonstrate publicly the process of “making a difficult decision”, under television cameras, was the result of taking into account the lessons of their past retreat near Kyiv, Chernigov and Sumy, when this fact was perceived in information space as a rout.

It was in order to avoid this that Shoigu and the Russian general, nicknamed Armageddon, were forced to play a small scene under the spotlights under the general title "the headquarters makes a" difficult decision ". The reaction to this performance of the leading "operators" of the information and power bloc of the Kremlin, such as Prigozhin, Kadyrov and the "official" Kremlin propagandists, on its meaning, only confirms this.

At the same time, they “forgot” very carefully, and in the future they are unlikely to be able to answer a completely logical question that arises, in this case, from an ordinary Russian “vatnik”: what led to the need for such a decision? Why, all of a sudden, was it necessary to “leave part of Russian territory” to be torn to pieces by the Binderofites and Ukronazis?

Let's return from the issues of information support by the Kremlin of its next "difficult decision", to issues of a purely military nature. In this regard, I would like to draw your attention, dear readers, to several important nuances that are directly related to the hypothetical (that's right, hypothetical) withdrawal of Russian troops from the Kherson-Berislav bridgehead.

It is obvious that a phased SUCCESSFUL withdrawal of the main part of the forces of your troops from the position of a direct collision with the enemy is possible ONLY if they are separated from this collision. For, otherwise, you will find yourself in the most uncomfortable position for yourself - the folding of your battle formations and the retreat itself will take place under the massive fire influence of the enemy, and he himself will “be on your shoulders”, continuing to peck you in the tail and mane, because that as soon as it discovers your departure, it will immediately begin to move forward. Such reckless withdrawal usually ends in total defeat. This is understood by both our and their command.

In order to avoid such events, the party that has decided on an “organized and purposeful” withdrawal usually organizes the implementation of a whole range of relevant measures: disruption of communications and careful disguise and conducting an appropriate disinformation campaign in order to hide the time (starting point), direction and the extent of this retreat.

In addition, if for one reason or another you decide to leave, especially in a situation where there is a direct collision with the enemy, one way or another you will have to do one more thing: to conduct rearguard battles. The meaning of this type of hostilities is that you are forced to allocate a certain part of your forces so that they, with stubborn and persistent defense at the forefront, hold back the advance of enemy units, which, having discovered your attempt to retreat with the main forces, will immediately demand your pursuit . Thus, giving the main forces the opportunity to withdraw to a certain distance without the direct influence of the enemy.

[Zeleban]

This is if the content of this term is depicted extremely simply and schematically. For in reality, in modern warfare, all this is implemented much more complicated and difficult: appropriate support lanes are created, the “rolling” method of movement is used, etc., we will not go into tactical details now. I hope you understand the general meaning - conducting a retreat with minimal losses and negative consequences is a VERY DIFFICULT type of maneuver that puts you in a VERY vulnerable position a priori.

 

Now let's try specifically on the situation on the bridgehead to assess the enemy's capabilities to carry out more or less successfully (i.e., with minimal losses) this kind of maneuver of an operational-tactical scale with his forces and understand the content of his corresponding plan (I hope you have no doubt that the Russian generals on this account have a corresponding plan?).

 

At the same time, we must take into account the methodology by which the Russian command usually makes any plans and decisions: they separately evaluate the factors that impede the implementation of the plan and the factors that contribute to its successful implementation, and then establish the level of their interconnectedness and interaction, assessing their own REAL abilities and abilities the enemy (i.e., the Armed Forces of Ukraine) in the implementation of plans and only then come to the final conclusions and form a specific decision, formalizing it with a combat order (that is, they determine who, how, where, at what moment, by what forces, and most importantly - what exactly must do in order to achieve the goals).

 

In this sense, the performance that Putin's Shoyga and the bald asshole with a military criminal background showed us yesterday has a very distant relation to reality.

 

Obviously, the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to influence almost all communications and supply routes of the Russian grouping (including bridge crossings on the Dnieper and crossings there) significantly complicates this maneuver for the enemy.

The presence of large settlements in the immediate tactical rear of the enemy, such as Kherson and a number of other fairly large settlements and towns, makes it easier for the enemy to implement the phased withdrawal methodology (it helps to organize an appropriate system of strong points and defense areas and hold them for the time necessary for the enemy).

The enemy had the opportunity to determine the moment of his departure and, accordingly, to carry out a cycle of preparatory measures IN ADVANCE, including the organization and creation of a new defense system on the left bank of the Dnieper and the withdrawal of the bulk of his long-range weapons (artillery) to new positions more convenient for maneuvering.

The advantage of the enemy in the air also makes it easier for him to conduct a retreat. And the ability to constantly build up its air defense system in this operational direction complicates the use of appropriate weapons for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Topographic features of this area (the presence of the Ingulets River, which essentially “cuts” the Russian group in half, forcing its command to essentially organize a retreat separately for each of the “parts”, the presence of a significant number of irrigation facilities, significant open areas of the terrain, etc. ).

The advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in long-range and high-precision weapons is also reflected in the meaning and content of the HYPOTHETICAL plan for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the right-bank bridgehead.

[Zeleban]

And so on ... These factors can be listed for a long time: this is the number and availability of watercraft on the Dnieper, which the enemy owns, and the reserves of fuel and spare parts that he has at his disposal on the right bank of the Dnieper.

 

But returning to the main reasons pushing the Russian military command to "change the format of its presence on the right-bank bridgehead", it is worth noting that there are only two of them, in particular:

In order to maintain a foothold in the area that existed before yesterday's Shoigo performance, in fact, the Russians had enough and still have enough troops (forces and means). They do not have enough opportunities to PROVIDE them fully for defense.

Well, “winter is coming”, which in all likelihood will only strengthen this situation.

 

In this sense, there are only two solutions:

 

Or reduce the area (respectively, the amount of forces) that you need to keep to acceptable (that is, corresponding to your real capabilities).

Or leave the entire foothold and get rid of the “headache” due to the need to hold it.

 

So far, on the right-bank bridgehead, we are dealing with a reduction in its total area (for the purpose of "optimization"). It is being implemented by a “stage-by-stage” withdrawal of troops in separate sectors and directions ...

[dan/california]

 

[Beleg85]

First info from Russian channels about Ukrainian SF/recon groups from SBU allegedly infiltrating the city.

 

Btw, regarding Kherson- some Ukrainian historian I personally know draw my attention to relatively little known facts from WWII. He fears Russians can try to repeat Soviet operations of remote detonating devices hidden under Kyiv, Kharkiv and many otherl abandoned cities from late September of 1941. Largest in scale took place in Kyiv, where whooping number of 300 buildings were blown up, some of them with Wehrmacht soldiers inside- public buildings, churches and similar places were rigged with well hidden devices, sometimes hidden inside walls or under new ceilings. In the city alone German casualties reportely reached 400.

These events directly sparked first wave of mass executions of Jewish population, notably at Babi Yar. Could this play into mind of Russian generalship, this time Russian-speaking population in the role of Jews persecuted by "Nazis"?I doubt personally, but would not be surprised; one can expect everything from Kremlin these days.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2018/09/30/how-soviet-troops-destroyed-downtown-kyiv-and-killed-kyivans-in-1941/

More about tehcnicalities of these devices (Soviets leaving Viipuri also seem to resort to this tactic):

https://www.standingwellback.com/russian-ww2-radio-controlled-explosive-device/

Edited November 10, 2022 by Beleg85

[Taranis]

T-62 in Kherson area

[dan/california]

I suspect we now know EXACTLY how long it takes to relad, aim, and fire something. Plus flight time for the missile.

[Taranis]

 

[Kinophile]

I doubt it's the biggest strike, just a particularly bigger one than usually shown on social. 

+View from one of the trucks involved :

 

 

 

 

[Beleg85]

Russian propaganda host Norkin having 404 error live. Beautiful example of Russian patriotic mind in the moment of realization. Almost like looking at Rutger Hauer in "Blade Runner"...

 

[dan/california]

5 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I doubt it's the biggest strike, just a particularly bigger one than usually shown on social. 

+View from one of the trucks involved :

Proof they are less scared of counterbattery. The can concentrate like that. I hope there was a very croweded bunch of Russians on the other end.

[Beleg85]

Not sure about Grozny, but worth reading. Presence of Chechesn may be telling, just as we predicted...2-3 months ago.

[danfrodo]

31 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I doubt it's the biggest strike, just a particularly bigger one than usually shown on social. 

+View from one of the trucks involved :

 

 

 

 

Any idea where this is?  Great to hear the crews laughing.  High morale and high hopes.  

I actually hope RU bunched a lot of  artillery assets on the left bank to cover the withdrawal and this is all that arty getting smashed.  Could be ferry strike?  Staging area strike?   

'course, could be some other front.

[The_MonkeyKing]

rumor mill:

 

 

[Beleg85]

Reuters aticle, Reznikov says Russian withdrawal will take at least a week.:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-russian-withdrawal-kherson-take-least-week-kyiv-2022-11-10/

[dan/california]

Good thread!

[Beleg85]

Ok, UA officially entering the city- definitelly faster than Muscovites expected. Russian telegrams are crying like girls. Girkin's beard as true prophet of doom just grew several inches longer.

 

Note...if true (it is propaganda, so beware), that would be not small "problem" for Russians...

 

[danfrodo]

49 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Good thread!

Maybe this whole "russia showing operational competence" thing can be dropped now?  They are doing some of the things one should see in a proper withdrawal, like men actually withdrawing; and they spread some mines.  But they announce it on TV.  They leave lots of what appears to be working gear laying around.  And are they all just fleeing?  UKR moving so fast it kinda looks like the delaying units aren't delaying anyone.  

[Beleg85]

One Ru telegram, something went catastrophic for RU. In optimistic version 5 thousand soldiers may be trapped, in most pessimistic...20 thsousand."It's over".

Gear up your livers for tomorrow, folks.

Edited November 10, 2022 by Beleg85

[The_MonkeyKing]

Grigin in going grimdark

Might be a bloody night coming.

 

[womble]

With the ISR advantages that UKR has, it doesn't seem surprising that they're pasting the withdrawing retreating fleeing massed Russians. Anything leaving Kherson will be fair game, for sure. It's only a matter of how much UKR has in range of any given crossing point as to how badly the target will suffer. I got the impression that the whole stretch of river is in reach of rocket arty, that Saints HIMARS and MLRS have pushed RUS arty out of CB range of UKR arty, so any guns that can bear should be able to fire fairly freely.

But it'll be nice if the news arrives on a weekend, so celebrations don't have to be measured enough to work the next day... for those of us lucky enough to still be able to set weekends apart.

[danfrodo]

52 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Grigin in going grimdark

Might be a bloody night coming.

 

And who says dreams don't come true?   This was my fervent wish in my posts last few days and here it is getting fulfilled.  

Once again we have to ask whether will Putin survive this unbelievably incompetent disaster??  Putin was the one ordering more & more troops into the pocket for months until suddenly deciding to pull them out in what seems to have been an impulse decision.  

Now all I want is for no more Ukrainians to get caught by mines & booby traps as they destroy/capture the mob left in the kessel.