How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

8 minutes ago, dan/california said:

There is no reason to strike Russia with the first batch of ATACAMs. Drop the Kherson bridges. Smash the pontoon bridge they will surely try to build. Smash all the rail way infrastructure feeding Kupiansk, in and out. Smash all the ammo dumps they just moved. Then ask Russia if they want to see week two. If they were stupid enough to have submarines at dock in Crimea though I would give those anti missile defenses a little test, though. 

The Russians cut bait on Kyiv when it came down to that or lose. Maybe Putin will have a fatal headache if Ukraine can demonstrate the whole war is lost and every Russian soldier on the west side of the Dnipro might as well be a prisoner.

Dude, you forgot the airfields.    Gotta hit those also.  Then maybe offensive actions can have more success.  Seems arty & air is the big RU advantage stopping UKR advances.

And I kinda don't want to drop the bridges yet.  If Herr Putler is gonna feed more men & gear into the kessel, let him!!  Then drop the bridges.  If they have moved their main supply dumps on the crimea side of the river (due to HIMARS, MLRS) then. once cut, the forces on the Kherson side will run out of resources very quickly.  Kherson-ingrad.  That's the kind of epic, unmitigated disaster that could bring down Putin.

Edited July 18, 2022 by danfrodo
typo

[Huba]

33 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'd prioritize the bridge to Kherson first.  Without that, Russia's got no chance of holding on west of the Dnepr.  However, Ukraine can target it without ATACMS.  For some reason Ukraine is holding back on it.  I just don't understand that.

Next thing on my list would be a major railyard or two in Russia.  They are so dependent upon rail transportation that laying waste to something like this (Belgorod) would likely have significant impact:

50.57861507521112, 36.6535580319228

I'd also keep a significant number at the ready to smash Russian industrial and infrastructure targets if Russia engages in a renewed terror war.  I'd stick to militarily defensible targets, but I'd select ones that are "dual purpose" that will cause hardship for the Russian people.

Oh, and I'd also love to do some WW2 style propaganda.  How about releasing a few million leaflets over Rostov or Kursk that says "Hey, we could have used HE like your leader does on our cities, but we didn't.  Please understand that we reserve the right to change our minds if you don't change Putin's."  That would make me feel all warm and fuzzy inside as I go all gooey at the thought of Psyops stuff

I'd also keep a bunch at the ready to take out any command gatherings.  Hell, I'd devote an entire launcher for that role.  With ATACMS one centralized launcher could hit any command center anywhere on or near Ukrainian terrain.

Smashing Sevastopol or the Kerch Bridge would be on my list, but only after doing some of these things.  Boil the frog concept.  Get Russians used to bad news and they would be more accepting of losing targets in Crimea.  Go with Crimea first and they might reactive more aggressively in response.

Steve

I'm still keeping in mind the notion of not attacking Russia proper here If we put that on the table, the whole game changes completely, even with GMLRS only.

As for the Kherson bridges - my bet is that they will strike them at the same time when counterattack from Zaporozhiya towards Crimea will be launched. RU will have to either abandon all the equipment there and flee, or face encirclement and obliteration. Until that will be achievable( I guess when UA has enough AA capabilities, perhaps even western aircraft) , Kherson is the perfect environment to bleed out Russians without any serious risk. ATACMS campaign will happen before, to whack main RU bases on Crimea, and destroy bridge and port facilities. RU counterattack from Mariupol would be a logistical impossibility with only 1 rail line and crappy roads, all in GMLRS range. 

Edited July 18, 2022 by Huba

[Battlefront.com]

A bunch of pages ago we talked about how this war is unlikely to end through negotiations because Russia can't afford to be seen as "losing it".  It's been a while since we talked about the other possibility, and that is Putin really believes Russia can win.  Even more incredibly, he might think it is WINNING.  This is behind a paywall, so I'll post a few interesting tidbts:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/18/opinion/putin-russia-ukraine-winning.html?campaign_id=249&emc=edit_ruwb_20220718&instance_id=66968&nl=russia-ukraine-war-briefing&regi_id=77867169&segment_id=98864&smid=nytcore-ios-share&te=1&user_id=06eb42ecc9056dd32ea63af0c30707b6

Quote

To call such a litany of difficulties and outright failures a success may be to court the charge of propaganda, hypocrisy or even self-delusion.

But it’s what the Kremlin seems to believe. Over two decades I have closely followed Mr. Putin’s words, behavior and decisions, forming a comprehensive picture of the president’s calculations. Based on public rhetoric, policy moves and informal discussions with insiders, I have been able to work out — as far as is possible — the contours of the Kremlin’s current thinking. What is very clear is that in late May, the Kremlin came to the firm conclusion that it is winning this conflict in the long run. And Mr. Putin, in contrast to the early chaotic months, now has a clear plan.

I highlighted the last bit.  The author's position is that what we're seeing now is not the same dysfunctional scramble to quickly find a way out of an unexpectedly bad situation, but instead the execution of a more thought out strategic plan.  Without reading any further I can say that I totally agree with this assessment.  Whatever is going on now, it is vastly more organized and purposeful than March and even May were.

Quote

It may sound extremely fanciful, and it certainly reveals how divorced from reality — to put it mildly — Mr. Putin is. But it’s important for the West, whose response has wavered between confrontation and acquiescence, to understand the full scope of Mr. Putin’s hopes as it continues to assess its role in defending Ukraine against Russian aggression.

The plan boils down to what we've already assessed here:

1. Take all of Donetsk.  Putin feels this can be done by continuing the grinding offensive.  He does not believe the West will keep up its support for much longer, which makes the win for Russia inevitable.
2. Ukraine's will to fight is inferior to Russia's, therefore sooner rather than later Ukraine will request a peace deal and accept Russia's terms for it.
3. The West will not only tire of supporting Ukraine, but will be so tired of confronting Russia generally that there will be a revamped world order where Russia is on an equal footing.  He seems to be holding out hope that the rightward shift within Europe will produce sycophant governments (e.g. Orban's Hungary taken to another level).

The author reminds us that it is not important if we believe any of this possible, rather it's important that Putin probably does.  The author finishes out with this:

Quote

There is some good news. The very fact that the plan seems realistic to him should, in the short term, prevent any nuclear escalation. But the bad news is that sooner or later, Mr. Putin will face reality. It is in that moment, when his plans are stymied and his disappointment high, that he is likely to be most dangerous. If the West seeks to avoid a catastrophic clash, it needs to truly understand what it’s really dealing with when it comes to Mr. Putin.

Exactly.  There's no greater chance of disaster than if we're in a situation where we are thinking we understand Putin and it turns out we were badly off the mark.

Steve

[Calamine Waffles]

  

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Here about 500 m CEP of Kh-22M/MA generation in comparison with Kh-22 generation: https://military.wikireading.ru/hOIyKWeQCi 

Missiles of second generation little outwardly changed, but with enchanced homing system CEP of Kh-22MA reduced from 1000 m to 500 m, and the speed increased up to 4265 km/h

And here about CEP of Kh-22N/NA: https://topwar.ru/37561-krylataya-raketa-h-22.html

The feature, of missiles, adopted in the mid of 70th became new homing systems. They maintained significantly better accuracy of hit. So, CEP of Kh-22N didn't exceed several dozens meters. 

Kh-22MA/NA, the ones with inertial guidance and TERCOM for increased accuracy against ground targets, only have thermonuclear warheads.

A CEP of dozens of meters is impossible using purely 1970s inertial guidance and requires radar. As already stated before, the radar cannot be used accurately except against targets with very large radar cross-sections (i.e., major warships or bridges). Even nuclear Tomahawk, which was widely respected for its accuracy, only has a CEP of 80 m, and that uses INS and TERCOM that is at least a generation ahead of whatever is on the Kh-22N. The only use for conventional Kh-22 against land targets is for terror bombing against cities. It's completely useless as a precision weapon. If you launch it at a city using the radar guidance it will just lock on to the largest target it "sees", whether that's a shopping mall or an apartment block.

Quote

But the noise immunity of the Kh-22N remained insufficient, since all the equipment operated at single fixed frequencies, and there was no equipment for identifying a target against the background of interference. The resolution of the active seeker was only sufficient to detect a target such as a large ship, bridge, etc.

Edited July 18, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, Huba said:

I'm still keeping in mind the notion of not attacking Russia proper here If we put that on the table, the whole game changes completely, even with GMLRS only.

I am inclined not to hit Russian territory targets either, and that might (probably will be) a precondition to getting ATACMS.  Unless Russia does restart a large scale terror campaign on civilian targets (i.e. beyond the daily warcrimes on select residential areas).  At that point I'm thinking the US might allow Ukraine to hit very specific places like rail, air, and supply centers directly providing support for the terror campaign.

There's a couple of important rail junctions and yards on Ukrainian territory, so those could definitely be struck first.

2 minutes ago, Huba said:

As for the Kherson bridges - my bet is that they will strike them at the same time when counterattack from Zaporozhiya towards Crimea will be launched. RU will have to either abandon all the equipment there and flee, or face encirclement and obliteration. Until that will be achievable( I guess when UA has enough AA capabilities, perhaps even western aircraft) , Kherson is the perfect environment to bleed out Russians without any serious risk. ATACMS campaign will happen before, to whack main RU bases on Crimea, and destroy bridge and port facilities. RU counterattack from Mariupol would be a logistical impossibility with only 1 rail line and crappy roads, all in GMLRS range. 

This doesn't make sense to me.  Knocking out the bridge now would force Russia to do something dramatic without a single Ukrainian soldier having to die to make it happen.  It is exactly what Russia did NOT do when attacking Mariupol.  All Russia had to do was put 1000 soldiers around Azov Steel and wait for a couple of weeks tops. 

Russian occupied areas on the west side of Dnepr aren't as cut off as Mariupol was, but with Russia's already low morale I don't think it would take very long for something to happen that would be beneficial to Ukraine.  If not, they surely will be thinking about it.  So if after a couple of weeks there's not signs of withdrawal then I'd launch a determined broad based assault with the immediate goal of making sure all the Russians there know how vulnerable and cut off they are.  If that doesn't shake them loose, then a concentrated attack somewhere in the middle to bisect the occupied area might push them over the edge.  And if that doesn't get them to withdraw, then they'll likely be immobilized and running low on ammo by that time.  Collapse would be sooner rather than later.

Steve

[dan/california]

12 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Dude, you forgot the airfields.    Gotta hit those also.  Then maybe offensive actions can have more success.  Seems arty & air is the big RU advantage stopping UKR advances.

And I kinda don't want to drop the bridges yet.  If Herr Putler is gonna feed more men & gear into the kessel, let him!!  Then drop the bridges.  If they have moved their main supply dumps on the crimea side of the river (due to HIMARS, MLRS) then. once cut, the forces on the Kherson side will run out of resources very quickly.  Kherson-ingrad.  That's the kind of epic, unmitigated disaster that could bring down Putin.

I would certainly hit every airfield in Ukraine. Unless you do it with the very first missiles and can catch a bunch of planes on the ground, I don't think the risk /reward is worth it for airfields in Russia. 

[danfrodo]

13 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I am inclined not to hit Russian territory targets either, and that might (probably will be) a precondition to getting ATACMS.  Unless Russia does restart a large scale terror campaign on civilian targets (i.e. beyond the daily warcrimes on select residential areas).  At that point I'm thinking the US might allow Ukraine to hit very specific places like rail, air, and supply centers directly providing support for the terror campaign.

There's a couple of important rail junctions and yards on Ukrainian territory, so those could definitely be struck first.

This doesn't make sense to me.  Knocking out the bridge now would force Russia to do something dramatic without a single Ukrainian soldier having to die to make it happen.  It is exactly what Russia did NOT do when attacking Mariupol.  All Russia had to do was put 1000 soldiers around Azov Steel and wait for a couple of weeks tops. 

Russian occupied areas on the west side of Dnepr aren't as cut off as Mariupol was, but with Russia's already low morale I don't think it would take very long for something to happen that would be beneficial to Ukraine.  If not, they surely will be thinking about it.  So if after a couple of weeks there's not signs of withdrawal then I'd launch a determined broad based assault with the immediate goal of making sure all the Russians there know how vulnerable and cut off they are.  If that doesn't shake them loose, then a concentrated attack somewhere in the middle to bisect the occupied area might push them over the edge.  And if that doesn't get them to withdraw, then they'll likely be immobilized and running low on ammo by that time.  Collapse would be sooner rather than later.

Steve

Maybe the Kherson forces would be less cut off than those in Mariupol, but it would be a much greater number of troops needing food and ammo & fuel and would be in hostile territory (partisans, infiltration teams).  So my bet is on collapse pretty quickly if the two routes over the big river are cut.  Local unit collapse, here & there, end of first week.  Full Kherson-ingrad within a month.  So please, Putler, put everything you've got into that kessel.  

[Huba]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I am inclined not to hit Russian territory targets either, and that might (probably will be) a precondition to getting ATACMS.  Unless Russia does restart a large scale terror campaign on civilian targets (i.e. beyond the daily warcrimes on select residential areas).  At that point I'm thinking the US might allow Ukraine to hit very specific places like rail, air, and supply centers directly providing support for the terror campaign.

There's a couple of important rail junctions and yards on Ukrainian territory, so those could definitely be struck first.

This doesn't make sense to me.  Knocking out the bridge now would force Russia to do something dramatic without a single Ukrainian soldier having to die to make it happen.  It is exactly what Russia did NOT do when attacking Mariupol.  All Russia had to do was put 1000 soldiers around Azov Steel and wait for a couple of weeks tops. 

Russian occupied areas on the west side of Dnepr aren't as cut off as Mariupol was, but with Russia's already low morale I don't think it would take very long for something to happen that would be beneficial to Ukraine.  If not, they surely will be thinking about it.  So if after a couple of weeks there's not signs of withdrawal then I'd launch a determined broad based assault with the immediate goal of making sure all the Russians there know how vulnerable and cut off they are.  If that doesn't shake them loose, then a concentrated attack somewhere in the middle to bisect the occupied area might push them over the edge.  And if that doesn't get them to withdraw, then they'll likely be immobilized and running low on ammo by that time.  Collapse would be sooner rather than later.

Steve

What I'm outlining is a rapid collapse of the whole RU positions in the south, without the need for push in the northern Kherson at all. You basically could skip one major operation completely, and for the one you are launching, RU forces would be spread thinner then if they would move out of Kherson previously. Until you can do it, make the russkies think they are doing OKish, and then - sudden death, total collapse. With a chance of actually achieving an encirclement of considerable RU forces. 

But to be honest, this is all a bit too much concjeture to really argue about it at this point. If you called it better, I own you a beer

 

Edited July 18, 2022 by Huba

[dan/california]

18 minutes ago, Huba said:

I'm still keeping in mind the notion of not attacking Russia proper here If we put that on the table, the whole game changes completely, even with GMLRS only.

As for the Kherson bridges - my bet is that they will strike them at the same time when counterattack from Zaporozhiya towards Crimea will be launched. RU will have to either abandon all the equipment there and flee, or face encirclement and obliteration. Until that will be achievable( I guess when UA has enough AA capabilities, perhaps even western aircraft) , Kherson is the perfect environment to bleed out Russians without any serious risk. ATACMS campaign will happen before, to whack main RU bases on Crimea, and destroy bridge and port facilities. RU counterattack from Mariupol would be a logistical impossibility with only 1 rail line and crappy roads, all in GMLRS range. 

 

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I am inclined not to hit Russian territory targets either, and that might (probably will be) a precondition to getting ATACMS.  Unless Russia does restart a large scale terror campaign on civilian targets (i.e. beyond the daily warcrimes on select residential areas).  At that point I'm thinking the US might allow Ukraine to hit very specific places like rail, air, and supply centers directly providing support for the terror campaign.

There's a couple of important rail junctions and yards on Ukrainian territory, so those could definitely be struck first.

This doesn't make sense to me.  Knocking out the bridge now would force Russia to do something dramatic without a single Ukrainian soldier having to die to make it happen.  It is exactly what Russia did NOT do when attacking Mariupol.  All Russia had to do was put 1000 soldiers around Azov Steel and wait for a couple of weeks tops. 

Russian occupied areas on the west side of Dnepr aren't as cut off as Mariupol was, but with Russia's already low morale I don't think it would take very long for something to happen that would be beneficial to Ukraine.  If not, they surely will be thinking about it.  So if after a couple of weeks there's not signs of withdrawal then I'd launch a determined broad based assault with the immediate goal of making sure all the Russians there know how vulnerable and cut off they are.  If that doesn't shake them loose, then a concentrated attack somewhere in the middle to bisect the occupied area might push them over the edge.  And if that doesn't get them to withdraw, then they'll likely be immobilized and running low on ammo by that time.  Collapse would be sooner rather than later.

Steve

I am 100% with team Steve here. Dropping the bridges, and basically holding every Russian soldier on the west side hostage, or close to it immediately, and completely, changes the narrative for very low cost, and very low risk.  It is true that a successful simultaneous attack on Melitipol is more or less a war winner, but don't let the best be the enemy of the good.

For extra fun we can have an enjoyable week or two of counting the daily total of Russian helicopters shot down as they try to get supplies in and people out. Maybe the Russians will even get desperate enough to try and get some small ships in. That just becomes another huge propaganda opportunity when they get sunk.  I think a lot of the troops in and around Kherson are DPR/LPR a few thousand prisoners from those unhappy so called Republics would take the starch out of them COMPLETELY. All this talk about executing Azov guys from Mariupol would just stop cold. The Ukrainians definitely need to do this sooner rather than later.

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Huba said:

What I'm outlining is a rapid collapse. of the whole RU positions in the south, without the need for push in the Kherson at all. You basically could skip one major operation completely, and for the one you are launching, RU forces would be spread thinner then if the would move out of Kherson previously. Until you can do it, make the russkies think they are doing OKish, and then - sudden death, total collapse. With a chance of actually achieving an encirclement of considerable RU forces. 

But to be honest, this is all a bit too much concjeture to really argue about it at this point. If you called it better, I own you a beer

 

Getting the entire south to collapse with some deep strikes is very unlikely.  The ability to supply from Rostov through Mariupol is probably about as viable, if not better, than going through Kerch and up through Crimea.  If Kerch were destroyed it wouldn't be good for Russia at all, but it wouldn't be the same as taking out the bridge at Kherson.  There are no alternatives for Russia to explore (pontoon bridges are not viable).

As we've discussed before, Russia for sure has the Kherson bridge rigged to detonate.  If Russia withdraws for ANY reason that bridge is going to get blown.  Therefore, why not just destroy it now at a time when Russia is getting enormous benefit from it?

Also, while Russia would HATE to lose the western side of the Dnepr, it could do so without affecting it's stated strategic goals.  Losing the Crimean land bridge, on the other hand, is not something it can do.  Therefore, expect Russia to do far more to keep the southern area east of the Dnepr compared to west of the Dnepr.  That needs to be entered into the calculations.

Steve

[Huba]

38 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Getting the entire south to collapse with some deep strikes is very unlikely.  The ability to supply from Rostov through Mariupol is probably about as viable, if not better, than going through Kerch and up through Crimea.  If Kerch were destroyed it wouldn't be good for Russia at all, but it wouldn't be the same as taking out the bridge at Kherson.  There are no alternatives for Russia to explore (pontoon bridges are not viable).

That is the crucial thing you got wrong IMO. The landbridge is in no way suitable to sustaining much forces logistically.

There is a single rail line that is going very close to UA lines and is attacked constantly. And at least some sections are single track. It is unusable for all means and purposes. Case in point - Melitopol and even Tokmak are supplied from Crimea. 

All the depots around Donetsk are destroyed. They would have to move stuff from Rostov and Taganrog directly. There is one paved road there near the coast that is relatively safe, it's single lane and 300km long from Taganrog to Melitopol. 

And that's it. There are no other ways to deliver anything across the "landbridge" unless you want to go offroad or really close to UA lines. I don't count ports as in ATACMS environment those are rather risky. There's no way for RU to supply all the forces in Kherson, Zaporizhya and on Crimea through the "landbridge". Even a serious force to counterattack on Melitopol would have huge troubles to sustain itself. 

 

Edited July 18, 2022 by Huba

[Harmon Rabb]

More wisdom from that guy who seems obsessed with with the United Kingdom on Russian television.

[Machor]

Let's not take this to the toxic depths of US domestic politics, but focus on the article's argument: Ukraine's strategy, like that of Russia, is also constrained by politics, in this case the dynamics of US domestic politics [I have no idea why acronyms haven't been capitalized.]:

Is America growing weary of the long war in Ukraine?

https://www.economist.com/united-states/2022/07/17/is-america-growing-weary-of-the-long-war-in-ukraine

Quote

 

...

But nearly six months into the fight, with the prospect of a long war to come, even Mr Biden’s closest allies are asking whether America might soon tire of the burden. The president is more unpopular even than Donald Trump was at this point in his presidency. Inflation and high fuel prices are weakening Americans’ spending power. And Republicans are set to make important gains in mid-term elections in November: they are expected to take control of the House of Representatives and possibly also the Senate.

Chris Coons, a Democratic senator and close ally of Mr Biden’s—sometimes called the president’s “shadow secretary of state”—recently wrote a commentary praising nato’s show of unity at its summit in Madrid last month. It added: “I am concerned about the commitment of the American people and its elected leaders to stay the course as the invasion grinds on.” Vladimir Putin, Russia’s leader, “is counting on the West losing focus”, he told The Economist on July 14th.

The aid for Ukraine is intended to last until the end of the fiscal year on September 30th, but nobody is quite sure when the money will run out. Few in Congress think another large package for Ukraine can be passed before the mid-terms, and many say it could remain difficult thereafter. “It will be an uphill battle,” says a Republican Senate staffer. “The sales pitch from the last time is not good enough now, because the war has fundamentally changed and the domestic situation at home is different.”

Given the country’s acute polarisation, it is perhaps no surprise that Republicans should be sceptical of a proxy war conducted by a Democratic administration. Fewer Americans overall are prepared to pay an economic price for supporting Ukraine than were at the onset of war in March. But a recent poll for the University of Maryland finds that the gap between Democrats and Republicans is widening, too. Among Democrats, 78% would accept costlier fuel and 72% would bear more inflation to help Ukraine; among Republicans only 44% and 39% respectively would do so.

...

Mr Trump still holds much of his party in thrall. He denounced the last aid package for Ukraine, saying: “The Democrats are sending another $40bn to Ukraine, yet America’s parents are struggling to even feed their children.” His base could be energised if, in the coming weeks, he announces his intention to run for president again in 2024. Meanwhile, unexpected trouble has come from Victoria Spartz, a Ukrainian-born Republican in the House who had once urged Mr Biden to act more decisively in Ukraine, but has recently taken to accusing some of Mr Zelensky’s aides of corruption.

...

A second factor is the extent to which allies are willing to keep helping Ukraine confront Russia. “How much are our European partners doing? That’s literally the first question I get,” says Mr Coons. For most Americans, he notes, Ukraine is “half a world away”. European countries are closer to Russia’s military threat, and also more vulnerable to the danger of escalation, the loss of Russian energy supplies and the outflow of refugees.

Perhaps the biggest consideration is the third factor: progress on the battlefield. If the Biden administration can show that Ukraine is gaining ground, rather than being bogged down in another “forever war”, support for the country will be easier to rally. But a protracted conflict looks all too likely. Ukraine has had success of late in using American-supplied himars, a guided-missile launcher, to strike at command posts and ammunition dumps behind Russia’s front lines. But Ukrainian forces are still heavily outgunned and on the defensive, if not still retreating.

Mr Biden’s aim in the war is unclear. His administration has stopped talking about helping Ukraine to “win”, and instead speaks of preventing it from being defeated. It is delivering himars in small packages of four launchers at a time. (It claims it needs time to train Ukrainian forces.) But Mr Biden’s main concern is to avoid a direct conflict between nato and a nuclear-armed Russia. America has demanded assurances that the 84km-range gmlrs munitions provided with himars will not be fired at Russian territory; it has so far refused to provide the atacms munition which has a range of about 300km.

To some the war is unwinnable. They say the Biden administration should make haste to find a diplomatic deal. But for Ukraine’s supporters, whether Democratic or Republican, the answer is for Mr Biden to hurry up and win: give Ukraine more military help, do it faster and accept more risk. Mr Edelman has this warning for the Biden team: “If they think stalemate is the answer, or even if they are not intentionally playing for a stalemate, they’re going to lose on the battlefield, and they’re going to lose the battle for public opinion at home.”

 

 

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

The major difference is that RU is missing anything that could even remotely resemble the Stosstruppen... 

The major difference imo is that Russia's 'leadership' doesn't have capability to put into practice anything resembling 'auftragstaktik' successfully. Neither on the political, strategical, operational or tactical level.

 

[billbindc]

5 minutes ago, Machor said:

Let's not take this to the toxic depths of US domestic politics, but focus on the article's argument: Ukraine's strategy, like that of Russia, is also constrained by politics, in this case the dynamics of US domestic politics [I have no idea why acronyms haven't been capitalized.]:

Is America growing weary of the long war in Ukraine?

https://www.economist.com/united-states/2022/07/17/is-america-growing-weary-of-the-long-war-in-ukraine

 

What's weird about the current wave of concern trolling on Ukraine support is that there's little actual political debate about it. It's not really an issue for anyone except the extremes on the margins of either party and not a single serious candidate that I know of is emphasizing the issue significantly in their campaign. I'm sure there's somebody  but it's just not a hot issue. If I had to guess, this is more of an media dynamic. Not much has been happening that is going to generate high clicks and so editors start to look around for another angle on the story. Folks like Ratigan and Zacharia latch onto that to pump their relevance. You can see above where I posted the counter reaction already coming from Fiona Hill and others pushing back. 

[chris talpas]

5 hours ago, Huba said:

Putin went all in already. I thought he will keep the gas flowing till the winter, and threaten to cut it when it's most needed. My take is that he needs this EU pressure on Ukraine sooner than later and want the Germans to feel the pain ASAP. It's going to get interesting... 

 

Hopefully those turbines Canada was returning can be recalled.

 

[Battlefront.com]

23 minutes ago, Huba said:

That is the crucial thing you got wrong IMO. The landbridge is in no way suitable to sustaining much forces logistically.

There is a single rail line that is going very close to UA lines and is attacked constantly. And at least some sections are single track. It is unusable for all means and purposes. Case in point - Melitopol and even Tokmak are supplied from Crimea. 

All the depots around Donetsk are destroyed. They would have to move stuff from Rostov and Taganrog directly. There is one paved road there near the coast that is relatively safe, it's single lane and 300km long from Taganrog to Melitopol. 

And that's it. There are no other ways to deliver anything across the "landbridge" unless you want to go offroad or really close to UA lines. I don't count ports as in ATACMS environment those are rather risky. There's no way for RU to supply all the forces in Kherson, Zaporizhya and on Crimea through the "landbridge". Even a serious force to counterattack on Melitopol would have huge troubles to sustain itself. 

 

Oh, I got all that.  What I'm saying is that knocking out Kerch doesn't automatically mean the entire south becomes an assured retreat situation.  Russia does have other options, even if they suck.  And given the strategic problems for Putin if he loses the land bridge, they will try everything before giving up.  Knocking out the Kherson bridge is nearly 100% guarantee that Russia will lose the western bank of Dnepr within a few weeks. 

Ukraine could destroy the Kherson bridge (or render it useless) right now through one or more means.  It can not likely destroy Kerch bridge at the moment.  To do that it needs a new capability which, so far, it is not slated to get.

Also keep in mind that knocking out Kerch won't likely get back Mariupol or the area around it.  That is something Russia can keep supplied from Rostov.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, billbindc said:

What's weird about the current wave of concern trolling on Ukraine support is that there's little actual political debate about it. It's not really an issue for anyone except the extremes on the margins of either party and not a single serious candidate that I know of is emphasizing the issue significantly in their campaign. I'm sure there's somebody  but it's just not a hot issue. If I had to guess, this is more of an media dynamic. Not much has been happening that is going to generate high clicks and so editors start to look around for another angle on the story. Folks like Ratigan and Zacharia latch onto that to pump their relevance. You can see above where I posted the counter reaction already coming from Fiona Hill and others pushing back. 

Yeah, I personally think this is coming about now because it hasn't been a topic in the news for the last month or two.  Seems to cycle around just after there's a military setback for Ukraine, which the popular media still thinks withdrawing from Luhansk is.

Steve

[Bearstronaut]

31 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

More wisdom from that guy who seems obsessed with with the United Kingdom on Russian television.

LMAO does that guy truly think that the UK wanted Tsarist Russia to undergo revolution in 1917? That is some truly moronic thinking.

[Beleg85]

40 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

The major difference imo is that Russia's 'leadership' doesn't have capability to put into practice anything resembling 'auftragstaktik' successfully. Neither on the political, strategical, operational or tactical level.

Completelly off-topic, but I came on very interesting discussion about reality of Mission Command. This scholar argue that whole concept is post-factum rationalization of certain trends in the army that were not fully clear even when in full motion.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XaUUV3Udu2s

 

Also, article from Ponomarenko about posibility of future offensive in Kherson. Nothing new but worth reitoreiting (plus, I simply like the guy and his articles):

https://kyivindependent.com/national/what-would-a-ukrainian-counter-offensive-in-kherson-look-like

Edited July 18, 2022 by Beleg85

[chris talpas]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

As we've discussed before, Russia for sure has the Kherson bridge rigged to detonate.  If Russia withdraws for ANY reason that bridge is going to get blown.  Therefore, why not just destroy it now at a time when Russia is getting enormous benefit from it?

Steve

With it already rigged for demolition, would that make it easier to destroy by setting off sympathetic detonations?

[Beleg85]

16 minutes ago, chris talpas said:

With it already rigged for demolition, would that make it easier to destroy by setting off sympathetic detonations?

Yep, it's good question.

It is probable that mystery of Ukraine not striking Dneper bridge lies in politics (like in Severdonetsk case). Perhaps by blowing it they are afraid that population in occupied lands south of the river would be more cooperative to Russian referendum ("You see, Zelensky blown bridge and left you.")? Rivers are potentiall mental barriers as well as physical ones... Also Russians could alternatively retaliate in other ways we are not informed, but perhaps US/Ukrainians are. For example forcing everybody south of the river to take Russian passports. Or mining the nuclear plant and taking everybody hostage.

Hard to tell.

Edited July 19, 2022 by Beleg85

[Huba]

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Oh, I got all that.  What I'm saying is that knocking out Kerch doesn't automatically mean the entire south becomes an assured retreat situation.  Russia does have other options, even if they suck.  And given the strategic problems for Putin if he loses the land bridge, they will try everything before giving up.  Knocking out the Kherson bridge is nearly 100% guarantee that Russia will lose the western bank of Dnepr within a few weeks. 

One thing we all agree is that the Kherson bridges have to go, and it will mean RU losing right bank of Dnipro. What I'm saying is that UA does not need to involve it's strategic reserves to achieve RU defeat there - and given that defeat is unavoidable, with all it's messiness, impact on morale, wasted efforts to salvage the situation etc, perhaps striking elsewhere at the same time might be beneficial, assuming UA has the strength to do so. And if it does, Melitopol seems to create the synergy effect more than anything else. It is a lot of ifs of course.

OTOH, dealing with Kherson now offers a lot of immediate gains - yet UA is not doing it for some reason, even though it seems to have the capability for some time now. They are obviously waiting for something, and it very well might be ability to capitalize on the RU defeat. What else could it  reasonably be?

W we might be wrong  of course and GMLRS is just technically not able to destroy the bridges, it would explain the situation perfectly too...

Edited July 19, 2022 by Huba

[billbindc]

What is the state of supply for Ukrainian citizens on the West bank of the river if the Kherson bridges are blown? I would imagine it is already bad and would be a lot worse if there are weeks between that event and a successful Ukrainian offensive. There are political considerations to be met here that go beyond the immediate military benefit.

[billbindc]

To give you a sense of the actual politics in the US vs the media take du jour, the related House vote for Finland and Sweden joining NATO: