China vs Taiwan please?

[Lethaface]

2 hours ago, alison said:

I live in Taiwan. The vast majority of the population here does not live in the mountains. I can't imagine the PLA would care to spend a lot of resources trying to control what geographically might be the largest portion of the country but demographically and politically is not especially significant. I don't know much about military operations, so perhaps there is some strategic value in controlling a position on top of a mountain in the middle of nowhere, but I suspect any invading force would have their hands full just trying to cross the plains where all the people live.

I think there are two parallel discussions on this thread, and they're not the same thing.

On one hand, it would be cool to have a Combat Mission style game where we could play both Chinese and Taiwanese units duking it out in close quarters on a watery map, something like around the Erren river or Taoyuan airport, for example. Quadcopters. UGVs. Factories. Rice paddies. We all know that's a game that would exist more for fun than serious simming, but there's plenty of people on both sides of the strait who would love to play it.

The other topic is what a real-world invasion - or at least military-backed pressure - would look like. And that is likely to be continued economic punishment, diplomatic isolation, political manipulation, spreading of disinformation, cyberwarfare and ultimately a naval blockade and targeted missile strikes to try encourage a critical mass of the Taiwanese population to support a government capitulation. Not really something that can easily be wargamed in the traditional sense, although it could be interesting to see a political sim go there. I suppose Kinmen might be a plausible (and simable!) military target, but I'm not sure the Chinese government would want to risk what that might turn into unless they really feel out of options.

In the real-world scenario, I think the biggest question is just how strongly the US (and Japan) will stand by Taiwan. I have my doubts about the American people's resolve, and I think the Chinese government does too, which is why the PLA continues salami-slicing the median line, building bases all over the South China Sea and flying spy balloons over the continental US. The trouble is for most Taiwanese the status quo is seen as a better situation than increased tensions with China, whereas Americans are playing a different game - they have their own competition with China where Taiwan just exists as an abstract bargaining chip or domestic points-scoring exercise - so it's difficult to get a sense of just how serious the US government is about the country's defense.

Interesting to read from your POV, thanks.

Edit to add: at the moment the Taiwanese (semi conductor) industry is very important for global economics. As long as that is true and would be hampered by Chinese efforts, there are significant geopolitical interests ensuring Taiwan can continue operating. If the economic situation changes, so will the geopolitical interests and the resolve on the side of Taiwan. At least imo from realpolitik POV.

 

Edited February 7, 2023 by Lethaface

[womble]

35 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Interesting to read from your POV, thanks.

Seconded.

35 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Edit to add: at the moment the Taiwanese (semi conductor) industry is very important for global economics. As long as that is true and would be hampered by Chinese efforts, there are significant geopolitical interests ensuring Taiwan can continue operating. If the economic situation changes, so will the geopolitical interests and the resolve on the side of Taiwan. At least imo from realpolitik POV.

 

I think the importance of Taiwan goes beyond semiconductors, at least if the Ukraine situation pans out anything like the "rules based world order" hopes it will. If Russia somehow manages to persuade the world that we really are back in the time of literally shelling any port you fancy has done you a disservice, then such idealistic politics will, of course, be dead in the water.

But as and when the world is finally shown the error of Russia's ways, Taiwan becomes the next poster-child for "not taking what you want by main force," if PRC thinks its might is enough.

[Lethaface]

2 hours ago, womble said:

I think the importance of Taiwan goes beyond semiconductors, at least if the Ukraine situation pans out anything like the "rules based world order" hopes it will. If Russia somehow manages to persuade the world that we really are back in the time of literally shelling any port you fancy has done you a disservice, then such idealistic politics will, of course, be dead in the water.

But as and when the world is finally shown the error of Russia's ways, Taiwan becomes the next poster-child for "not taking what you want by main force," if PRC thinks its might is enough.

Fair point, I like to agree and there's probably quite some truth in there. But fact of the matter is that 'our' concern is selective and while being free and democratic helps for being a poster-child, there's no guarantees whatsoever.
It's not like there are no examples of countries not really caring about the UN variant of international law and getting away with it. Russia however has pushed the envelope too far, I guess the recent meme of 'flick around and find out' does a good job of describing this progressive boundaries ;-).

It's more that would I have been Taiwan I'd prioritize not finding out how exactly the interests in Taiwan status quo are hedged between economics and norms/values. There's always a connection between those as well. 

[Erwin]

Have always thought that the Taiwan situation, just like Ukraine, are battles in a much wider war with much larger implications.  As with Vietnam we have too many people obsessed with winning all the battles militarily, but failing to see what the enemy's actual objectives are, so that we risk losing the war.

The "war" has been quietly going on for a couple of decades or more.  The goal of the "war" is to determine which power bloc will have the mantle of controlling the world by having the world's reserve currency.  China and ME nations, Iran plus more and more countries that are not happy with US hegemony are banding together to threaten the dominance of the USD. 

The danger we in the west are facing is the same that Great Britain did between the 1920's and 1950's when the pound was replaced by the USD and the British empire essentially imploded.  Half a century later one can observe that GB is well on the way to becoming a 2nd world nation.  At least it's hard to see much difference between life for the average person in London and (say) Buenos Aires.

For example, if one looks at the Ukraine situation another way, Russia's persistence is demonstrating weakness in the west and more and with Chinese support more countries are quietly cheering Russia on.  The west is in as much danger of running low on weaponry as is Russia.  Our lackluster reaction to Chinese spy balloons being sent to many places in the world sends a bad message. 

 

[Centurian52]

On 8/17/2022 at 5:33 AM, Lethaface said:

China doesn't need to invade Taiwan, just blockade it. Obviously such actions will have significant consequences for China as well.

A blockade would be the most sensible option assuming no US intervention. It would have the highest certainty of success, for the fewest casualties. Taiwan would have no answer to it.

But that assumes no US intervention. The downside of a blockade is that, out of all of the options for subduing Taiwan, it would take the longest to achieve results. If you aren't worried about US intervention then that doesn't matter. But if you are worried about the possibility of US intervention then a blockade gives the US the maximum possible amount of time to respond.

I think these considerations mean that a blockade would be the best possible option in an environment in which there is no possibility of a US intervention, and the worst possible option in an environment in which there is a high probability of US intervention.

An invasion is by far the most dangerous option, with a high chance of failure and a guarantee of massive casualties. But has the potential of achieving results in the shortest amount of time. In an environment with no possibility of US intervention it would be the worst possible option. In an environment with a high probability of US intervention then the need to take Taiwan quickly, before the US arrives in overwhelming force, might make it the only realistic option.

[LongLeftFlank]

I've never lived in Taiwan but have enjoyed half a dozen visits to the Taipei metro area and once, to Kaohsiung.  Thoroughly enjoyed both business and leisure time there, which I definitely CANNOT say about the Mainland.

ROC Taiwan is a distinct Chinese society, though the Japanese and KMT legacy does show.  I believe that if mainland society were more like theirs, China truly would be a superpower by now. Japan x 12.

...But China is 1-2 generations away (and sadly, perhaps one more ruinous war) from that status still, thanks largely to the Wilhelmine CPC oligarchy in Beijing, for whom the existence of Chinese societies that do not bend the knee to the Emperor is an intolerable affront, calling their Mandate of Heaven into question.

IMHO. But this is OT for wargaming.

[alison]

I've lived in both China and Taiwan, and aside from a common official language (which diverges more and more each year), I don't think they are really comparable.

From my perspective, there were a lot of things I liked better about living in China, especially when it came to food, urban planning and the unpretentious culture of the so-called 低端人口 "low-end population". But there's no denying that the political system is very hard to cope with as someone who grew up in a democratic country, especially as Xi keeps turning the screws tighter and tighter. The people who grow up in China don't have the same frame of reference, so even when they can admit to flaws in the system, they don't find them as objectionable as those of us who had the luxury of coming of age elsewhere. And, of course, unless they are especially wealthy, they don't have the option to escape to a democratic country anyway, so that shapes the way they look at things. Something someone told me there that stuck with me is that the government is like the weather - it's not something you can change, it's just something that happens to you, and if it blows up your house, or your business, well, 沒辦法 there's nothing you can do. Just deal with it and move on.

To get back on topic, this is why I think the Chinese government does not care especially much about the human cost of an invasion, which people overseas sometimes point to as a reason why an invasion would never go ahead. I believe that the government has a strong enough control over the media that they can manage public opinion, at least to enough of a degree that losing a hundred thousand or even a few hundred thousand soldiers wouldn't trigger major unrest. But I do think they would have to eventually win. Losing would really burst the bubble of infallibility that the party likes to maintain around itself. And I don't think they can frame it like the Russian government could frame the Ukraine invasion, making out like it was only ever a limited operation to stamp out a problematic element in certain regions. With Taiwan you either get the whole island, or you get nothing (with all respect to the people in Kinmen, Matsu islands etc - this is how I believe China will see it). So if they do go for an all-out invasion, they are going to want to have utterly overwhelming firepower... which is why I tend to favor the view of the wonks who predict a late 2020s invasion at the earliest.

In the mean time, the salami-slicing will continue, and I don't anticipate any of the countries having their EEZ violated or PLA bases built on sand bars objectively closer to their coastline than China's will do anything about it. Nobody can afford to lose their largest (or second-largest) trade partner.

[NamEndedAllen]

Re China physical incursions, the USA deciding “No mas”:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/f-22-shoots-down-new-object-flying-high-over-alaskan-waters

"As an Alaskan, I am so angry. I want to use other words. But I’m not going to," Lisa Murkowsk, a Republican Senator from Alaska, told reporters following a classified briefing on that incident yesterday. "It seems to me the clear message to China is: ‘We got free range in Alaska.'"

[cesmonkey]

GOP committee chair eyeing ‘creative wargaming’ to evaluate possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3855902-gop-committee-chair-eyeing-creative-wargaming-to-evaluate-possible-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan/

Quote

“We’re exploring options where we could do creative wargaming that integrates financial and economic warfare into purely kinetic warfare to tease out the importance of Taiwan,” Gallagher said in a statement provided by his office

Quote

“Even when we’re doing formal hearings we’re going to try and make them more interesting.”

 

[Erwin]

1 hour ago, cesmonkey said:

“We’re exploring options where we could do creative wargaming that integrates financial and economic warfare into purely kinetic warfare to tease out the importance of Taiwan,” Gallagher said in a statement provided by his office

Yes, these days a nation must use this approach.  Purely kinetic comparisons can mean winning all the battles and losing the war (eg: Vietnam).

[Centurian52]

I have put a little bit of effort into trying to work out what a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would look like. I expect we would see very high force to space ratios (in contrast to Ukraine, which has low force to space ratios). The other side of the high force to space ratio coin is a lack of strategic depth. So very bitter struggles with lots of troops committed to defending every inch of ground. I expect we would see contested landings. The initial waves of Chinese troops would be supported only by light tanks, which the Cold War era Taiwanese tanks might be roughly a match for (unless Abrams have started to arrive by then, in which case the Taiwanese tanks might actually stand a chance against the Chinese MBTs that would come later). For the fighting over Kinmen I would expect to see a massive Chinese artillery advantage, which I would expect to be inverted on the main island (land based artillery is probably not the easiest or fastest thing to unload from a ship). The Chinese disadvantage in land based artillery on the main island would be offset to some degree by naval support, but I don't know enough about modern naval warfare to comment on that. I expect Chinese air superiority, at least in the initial phase of the invasion, simply on the grounds that an invasion is a non-starter if they don't have air superiority (if the Americans have established air superiority over Taiwan before the Chinese can invade, then I expect there to be no invasion (or the Chinese invade anyway and just get massacred (as the Russo-Ukrainian war has taught me, just because it's a stupid idea doesn't necessarily mean they won't do it))).

In Combat Mission terms I expect dense, infantry-centric scenarios on beaches, urban terrain, and mudflats, supported by light armored vehicles and air power (and whatever modern ships provide in support of ground operations) on the Chinese side, and old armored vehicles and artillery on the Taiwanese side.

It will definitely be an interesting game. Hopefully it will be depicting entirely hypothetical events that never actually take place.

[Erwin]

Logistics has be to be biggest challenge.  Look at how much supply had to transported to France for Overlord.  If one can disrupt the Chinese resupply, they can have all the tanks on Taiwan they want - just no fuel, ammo or supplies to do anything.

CM2 is not good for simulating the logistical tail of a military force for more than a day or two.  IIRC it's roughly 90% of supply troops to 10% of combat units

[Centurian52]

2 hours ago, Erwin said:

Logistics has be to be biggest challenge.  Look at how much supply had to transported to France for Overlord.  If one can disrupt the Chinese resupply, they can have all the tanks on Taiwan they want - just no fuel, ammo or supplies to do anything.

CM2 is not good for simulating the logistical tail of a military force for more than a day or two.  IIRC it's roughly 90% of supply troops to 10% of combat units

Yes, but there has always been an operational and strategic layer that went unsimulated in Combat Mission. Combat Mission is about fighting battles, not winning wars.

But yeah, as difficult as logistics are under the best of circumstances, amphibious operations make it an order of magnitude more difficult just as they make it an order of magnitude more critical.

[Erwin]

The current US carrier aircraft no longer have the range to keep the carrier safe from Chinese land-based AS missiles.  Huge problem.

The US seems to be relying on its superior submarine tech to thwart a seaborne invasion, or at least the logistics of supply.  But no matter how stealthy, once a sub fires anything, everyone knows where it is.  So, doubtful life expectancy.

[NamEndedAllen]

On 2/7/2023 at 10:35 AM, Lethaface said:

Interesting to read from your POV, thanks.

Edit to add: at the moment the Taiwanese (semi conductor) industry is very important for global economics. As long as that is true and would be hampered by Chinese efforts, there are significant geopolitical interests ensuring Taiwan can continue operating. If the economic situation changes, so will the geopolitical interests and the resolve on the side of Taiwan. At least imo from realpolitik POV.

 

I was curious about the entire trade and economics scale in all this. The economic ties between China and the USA are well known.  I know less about the amount of trade between Taiwan and China. And how important Taiwan’s exports are for China.  As far as I could tell, imports from Taiwan are China’s second largest, behind the entire combined EU, and ahead of the USA. Please correct if wrong. Looked first at importance of China for Taiwan’s exports, and then the importance of Taiwan for China as an overall source for its own imports. The chart was surprising to me. A blockade would hurt China, let alone the destruction of much of Taiwan’s infrastructure. Apologies if this was already well covered..

“Last year, mainland China and Hong Kong accounted for 42% of Taiwan’s exports, while the U.S. had a 15% share, according to official Taiwan data accessed through Wind Information.

In all, Taiwan exported $188.91 billion in goods to mainland China and Hong Kong in 2021. More than half were electronic parts, followed by optical equipment, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance.

As a source of Taiwan’s imports, mainland China and Hong Kong again ranked first with a 22% share. The U.S. only had a 10% share, ranking behind Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia.”

Taiwan's trade with China is far bigger than its trade with the U.S. cnbc.com

China Imports from Taiwan - January 2023 Data - 2014-2022 Historical tradingeconomics.com

China Imports by Country	Last	Previous
European Union	34693700.00	24717800.00	USD THO	Feb/20
Taiwan	19225530.44	17419298.71	USD THO	Dec/22
United States	15911753.06	16476130.54	USD THO	Dec/22
Japan	14715460.09	14153420.64	USD THO	Dec/22
South Korea	14379358.00	15370164.00	USD THO	Dec/22
Australia	11070900.79	11761709.91	USD THO	Dec/22
Malaysia	10210735.40	10212144.54	USD THO	Dec/22
Germany	9088666.45	9003880.69	USD THO	Dec/22
Russia	8996554.28	10544850.94	USD THO	Dec/22
Brazil	8216881.95	8541338.47	USD THO	Dec/22

 

 

Edited February 16, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[Lethaface]

2 hours ago, NamEndedAllen said:

I was curious about the entire trade and economics scale in all this. The economic ties between China and the USA are well known.  I know less about the amount of trade between Taiwan and China. And how important Taiwan’s exports are for China.  As far as I could tell, imports from Taiwan are China’s second largest, behind the entire combined EU, and ahead of the USA. Please correct if wrong. Looked first at importance of China for Taiwan’s exports, and then the importance of Taiwan for China as an overall source for its own imports. The chart was surprising to me. A blockade would hurt China, let alone the destruction of much of Taiwan’s infrastructure. Apologies if this was already well covered..

“Last year, mainland China and Hong Kong accounted for 42% of Taiwan’s exports, while the U.S. had a 15% share, according to official Taiwan data accessed through Wind Information.

In all, Taiwan exported $188.91 billion in goods to mainland China and Hong Kong in 2021. More than half were electronic parts, followed by optical equipment, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance.

As a source of Taiwan’s imports, mainland China and Hong Kong again ranked first with a 22% share. The U.S. only had a 10% share, ranking behind Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia.”

Taiwan's trade with China is far bigger than its trade with the U.S. cnbc.com

China Imports from Taiwan - January 2023 Data - 2014-2022 Historical tradingeconomics.com

China Imports by Country	Last	Previous
European Union	34693700.00	24717800.00	USD THO	Feb/20
Taiwan	19225530.44	17419298.71	USD THO	Dec/22
United States	15911753.06	16476130.54	USD THO	Dec/22
Japan	14715460.09	14153420.64	USD THO	Dec/22
South Korea	14379358.00	15370164.00	USD THO	Dec/22
Australia	11070900.79	11761709.91	USD THO	Dec/22
Malaysia	10210735.40	10212144.54	USD THO	Dec/22
Germany	9088666.45	9003880.69	USD THO	Dec/22
Russia	8996554.28	10544850.94	USD THO	Dec/22
Brazil	8216881.95	8541338.47	USD THO	Dec/22

 

 

Yes China imports a lot of electronics / semi-conductor stuff from Taiwan, as does the rest of the world. Although IIRC China's exports to Taiwan aren't that big. But still ~50% of China's export goes to western aligned nations, if not more. 
Risking all that in a trade war, let alone hot war, is not small change. 

Is China's internal economy strong enough to come out such a conflict, assuming it wins, anything other then a pyrrhic victor? 

[NamEndedAllen]

2 hours ago, Lethaface said:

~50% of China's export goes to western aligned nations, if not more. 

Essentially, almost all of it! So, yeah. China would have to look hard at the solidarity in trade sanctions against Russia. And the loss of its massive  imports from Taiwan. Not saying this is decisive. But in any large power not named Russia, certainly a major brake on adventurism.
(more countries follow, but with smaller snd smaller amounts, into just millions, not billions. 

China Exports By Country	Value	Year
United States	$577.13B	2021
Hong Kong	$349.44B	2021
Japan	$165.82B	2021
South Korea	$148.85B	2021
Vietnam	$137.90B	2021
Germany	$115.18B	2021
Netherlands	$102.43B	2021
India	$97.51B	2021
United Kingdom	$87.03B	2021
Malaysia	$78.70B	2021
Thailand	$69.36B	2021
Russia	$67.55B	2021
Mexico	$67.44B	2021
Australia	$66.38B	2021
Indonesia	$60.65B	2021
Philippines	$57.31B	2021
Singapore	$55.22B	2021
Brazil	$53.61B	2021
Canada	$51.51B	2021
France	$46.39B	2021
United Arab Emirates	$43.82B	2021
Italy	$43.63B	2021
Poland	$36.58B	2021
Spain	$36.13B	2021
Belgium	$30.38B	2021
Saudi Arabia	$30.32B	2021
Turkey	$29.15B	2021

[alison]

A frustrating thing about trying to understand China's situation is that certain statistics are either not public at all, or if they are public they're not trustworthy. One statistic is how many Taiwanese people actually live and work in China. Estimates put it at around a million on the low end, but it could be more. There is a sense that a not insignificant part of China's development since 1990 was driven by Taiwanese entrepreneurs (臺商 or taishang) who leveraged their special status as technically-not-foreigners to bring their business acumen and technical knowledge to the mainland. A good example of how this bound the economies of the two countries together is Foxconn - known in the US as the "Chinese" company that makes iPhones, but actually it's a Taiwanese company with massive factories in China. There is a whole stereotype in China of the evil/corrupt/greedy Taiwanese factory owner, lording it over the local proletariat. (Of course across the strait there is another stereotype  - the evil/corrupt/greedy Chinese landlord, to which working class Taiwanese have to pay their hard-earned wages.)

The point is, China and Taiwan are bound together very deeply in business. Because of the special status of Taiwanese in China (not to mention the shared language), it is an appealing destination for young people who want to get rich - perhaps at the expense of their political ideology. This doesn't just extend to white collar workers, but entertainers too. There is a limit on how wealthy and successful you can become selling to an island of 20 million people. There's more people living in Shanghai alone than the entirety of Taiwan! So folks go there to earn money, and lots of that money comes back into Taiwan, so even people who remain here and are against the idea of political unification understand that if the Chinese government wanted to turn the economic screws they could absolutely devastate the country, in a way that could cause some people to accept an eventual hostile takeover just to be able to regain a basic quality of life.

This is one reason why the pan-Green parties in Taiwan keep trying to do a south- or south-east Asia pivot. I am not sure how successful the strategy has been, but to be fair I don't really keep up with regional economics. The disappointing thing from my perspective was that the US under Obama had a plan to help reinforce the regional economy with TPP, but due to domestic concerns in the US subsequent leaders trashed that treaty and there appears to be little appetite to revive it.

I know we're on a wargaming forum and it's tempting to say America should just build bigger guns and/or send more of them to Taiwan to solve the problem, but the reality is that economics are really entwined with this conflict in a way that they haven't been in any other that I am deeply aware of. This isn't like the Cold War where the first and second worlds operated somewhat independently of one another. China is a frenemy not just to the US, but Taiwan, Japan, Philippines and many other countries in the region. I'm really curious to see how it all will unfold.

[NamEndedAllen]

2 hours ago, alison said:

A frustrating thing about trying to understand China's situation is that certain statistics are either not public at all, or if they are public they're not trustworthy. One statistic is how many Taiwanese people actually live and work in China. Estimates put it at around a million on the low end, but it could be more. There is a sense that a not insignificant part of China's development since 1990 was driven by Taiwanese entrepreneurs (臺商 or taishang) who leveraged their special status as technically-not-foreigners to bring their business acumen and technical knowledge to the mainland. A good example of how this bound the economies of the two countries together is Foxconn - known in the US as the "Chinese" company that makes iPhones, but actually it's a Taiwanese company with massive factories in China. There is a whole stereotype in China of the evil/corrupt/greedy Taiwanese factory owner, lording it over the local proletariat. (Of course across the strait there is another stereotype  - the evil/corrupt/greedy Chinese landlord, to which working class Taiwanese have to pay their hard-earned wages.)

The point is, China and Taiwan are bound together very deeply in business. Because of the special status of Taiwanese in China (not to mention the shared language), it is an appealing destination for young people who want to get rich - perhaps at the expense of their political ideology. This doesn't just extend to white collar workers, but entertainers too. There is a limit on how wealthy and successful you can become selling to an island of 20 million people. There's more people living in Shanghai alone than the entirety of Taiwan! So folks go there to earn money, and lots of that money comes back into Taiwan, so even people who remain here and are against the idea of political unification understand that if the Chinese government wanted to turn the economic screws they could absolutely devastate the country, in a way that could cause some people to accept an eventual hostile takeover just to be able to regain a basic quality of life.

This is one reason why the pan-Green parties in Taiwan keep trying to do a south- or south-east Asia pivot. I am not sure how successful the strategy has been, but to be fair I don't really keep up with regional economics. The disappointing thing from my perspective was that the US under Obama had a plan to help reinforce the regional economy with TPP, but due to domestic concerns in the US subsequent leaders trashed that treaty and there appears to be little appetite to revive it.

I know we're on a wargaming forum and it's tempting to say America should just build bigger guns and/or send more of them to Taiwan to solve the problem, but the reality is that economics are really entwined with this conflict in a way that they haven't been in any other that I am deeply aware of. This isn't like the Cold War where the first and second worlds operated somewhat independently of one another. China is a frenemy not just to the US, but Taiwan, Japan, Philippines and many other countries in the region. I'm really curious to see how it all will unfold.

Really well-expressed, informative post. Thanks. 
One thing to know about the trade between the two, regarding Shanghai:

“According to a 2020 census, about 157,900 people from Taiwan resided in mainland China, a roughly 7% decrease over the preceding decade. The entire island of Taiwan was home to about 23.6 million people in 2020, slightly less than Shanghai’s population of roughly 25 million people at the time.

However, Taiwan’s economy is larger than Shanghai’s, at about $781.58 billion versus $680.31 billion last year, according to official figures.

In 2021, Shanghai’s share of mainland China’s GDP was 3.8%.”

AND  ALSO:

“Taiwan’s business and economic ties with mainland China and Hong Kong have grown so large that the region is by far the island’s largest trading partner.

Many large Taiwanese companies in high-tech industries such the world’s biggest chipmaker — Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., or TSMC. — operate factories in mainland China.

Last year, mainland China and Hong Kong accounted for 42% of Taiwan’s exports, while the U.S. had a 15% share, according to official Taiwan data accessed through Wind Information.”

https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/taiwans-trade-with-china-is-far-bigger-than-its-trade-with-the-us.html

Edited February 17, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[cesmonkey]

◆ WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE
U.S. Amps Up Troop Presence in Taiwan
As tensions with China rise, the U.S. will deploy between 100 and 200 troops in the coming months, up from roughly 30 a year ago, to bolster a training program for the island’s military.2945 mi
 

[cesmonkey]

Taipei, Feb. 22 (CNA) Taiwan's reported plan to send a combined arms battalion to the United States for training in the second half of this year shows the two countries are significantly bolstering military exchanges, military experts said Wednesday.

A joint battalion composed mainly of soldiers from the Army's 333rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade and 542nd Armor Brigade is expected to head to the U.S. in the second half of this year for military exchanges, a source with knowledge of the matter told CNA.

https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202302220024

[alison]

The Economist did a special report on Taiwan in the latest edition, featuring a bunch of "Taiwan 101" style articles: https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023-03-11 As usual with The Economist there is no byline so it's not clear whether some of the bolder statements are coming from the peanut gallery or people who actually have skin in the game. One article laments the allegedly sorry state of the Taiwan military and readiness.

Quote

American officials and retired Taiwanese military leaders worry about Taiwan’s defence strategy. Its generals spend too much of their defence budget on fighter jets, tanks and battleships that may have been useful 30 years ago against a weaker China, but are now vulnerable to Chinese missiles. Taiwan’s government repeats American talking-points about asymmetric warfare, the fighting a small country needs to defend itself against a larger enemy, but its army has yet to commit to it.

I keep thinking back to Perun's recent video on building a military in small countries, which was very entertaining and quite illuminating on the choices countries like Taiwan have to make.

One challenge that Taiwan faces compared to other small countries is that no larger countries want to formally declare a defensive alliance with it, because technically they don't recognize it as an independent country in the first place. As usual - and something that is acknowledged in the Economist articles - the problem always comes back to the fact that Chinese "soft power" (read: economic blackmail) has resulted in the isolation of Taiwan in the global arena. Without full-throated support from the US and other large nations, it leaves the Taiwanese defense strategy in a limbo, where theoretically they still need to fund a full stack military because nobody's coming to help. If there were guarantees from the US it might make more sense to focus on more specific areas of expertise. But the US can't make those guarantees without royally pissing off China, so they don't. See the most recent example of speaker McCarthy agreeing to not visit president Tsai in Taipei so as to avoid raising tensions any further. (Instead they will probably meet when Tsai is in California to speak at the Reagan library.)

From the article on economic topics...

Quote

Taiwanese investment in China has dropped partly because of political risk and COVID-19. But it is also because manufacturing is moving to South-East Asia in pursuit of lower labour costs. That reflects regionalisation of supply chains, not wholesale exit from China. Yet Taiwan faces a unique obstacle to further regional integration: China wants to exclude it, and has the clout to pressure its neighbours. Taiwan has but a handful of free-trade agreements. It hoped its latest FTAs, signed with Singapore and New Zealand in 2013, would pave the way for its eventual entry into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes 15 Asia-Pacific countries. But it has been blocked by China.

...

According to Taiwan’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, the CPTPP members agree that Taiwan meets the required standards. Yet they fear Chinese retaliation if they were to admit the island.

They also show some export numbers there that seem lower than the ones NamEndedAllen posted earlier, although to be fair the numbers might be leaving out Hong Kong, which once upon a time might have counted as not exactly China but nowadays should probably just be considered mainland 2.0.

Overall the articles give a decent outline of the situation and several of them touch on defense and economic issues that I'm sure would interest readers here. I recommend giving them all a read.

Edited March 6, 2023 by alison
typo

[alison]

Brian Hioe on the latest disappearance (or desertion?) of a Taiwanese soldier from Kinmen: https://newbloommag.net/2023/03/13/kinmen-soldier-disappearance/ He uses the story as a jumping off point to discuss some of the broader issues around the state of the Taiwanese military, notably emphasizing how the PRC government uses these events as propaganda to try to influence people's feelings on resistance.

I think people outside of the Chinese speaking world underestimate how powerful this propaganda can be. From my perspective living in Guangdong at the time I saw it change the hearts and minds of an influential portion of the well-heeled Hong Kong and cosmopolitan mainland population a few years back. In Canada the English language media is just now starting to talk about CCP influence operations in foreign politics, but this something the diaspora has known was the case for decades. It's easy for English speakers to dismiss the tedious bureaucratic jargon coming out of Two Meetings or the bombastic statements of wolf warrior diplomats, but they're not the ones having more subtle, low-level propaganda pushed at them through families, friends and colleagues. And in Taiwan the propaganda channels from across the strait run deep.

There's an interesting paragraph toward the end of the article that gets a bit into the complexities around Taiwanese identity, which I am sure the Party would like to leverage too.

Quote

The pan-Blue camp has historically enjoyed greater support from members of the military. Namely, members of the military were among the classes privileged by the KMT in authoritarian times, along with police, teachers, and public servants. This, along with ROC nationalism, are among the reasons that questions have been raised about the potential loyalty of some members of the military in wartime–as well as that, as with Taiwanese politics more broadly, the military historically privileged waishengren in its senior leadership.

For context: "waishengren" is a term used for descendents of the immigrants who arrived in the 1940s and 1950s, escaping the Party takeover of China. It's a smaller ethnic group than the "benshengren", people whose families arrived as settlers hundreds of years ago, but politically and economically it is better connected. In modern day Taiwan as a foreigner I don't see much overt conflict between these groups, and younger or more middle class locals say that it doesn't matter any more, but I get the sense the historical divisions still play a role in certain areas.

[Erwin]

Interesting analysis and info.  Thank you.  

The issue is not just about Taiwan itself, but the way China is trying to control the entire S. China Sea through which over 90% of the world's shipping passes.  (Also, China claiming all rights to fishing and minerals right up to the 12 mile limits of many SE Asian nations.)  All of this due to China lying about the peaceful purposes of the artificial islands it created and claiming "would never be militarized".

Ships can go a longer way round avoiding Chinese dominated areas, but that is like saying that "it is not important who controls the Suez canal" cos ships can always go "the long way round".

[alison]

Some new domestic drones unveiled to the public yesterday: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/learning-ukraine-taiwan-shows-off-its-drones-key-asymmetric-warfare-2023-03-14/

The South China Sea situation is somewhat telling to me in how most countries in the region have chosen to deal with China. That is, to let them take what they want (up to a point), because non-trivial resistance is not worth the economic pain. China is already a regional hegemon in my opinion, and it seems Xi's idea of "national rejuvenation" means extending that influence globally.

It's not just about shipping routes either. There was an article in the Financial Times (paywalled: https://www.ft.com/content/89bc954d-64ed-4d80-bb8f-9f1852ec4eb1) a couple days ago about the ongoing pressure faced by telecoms companies trying to lay undersea cable getting strongarmed into applying to the Chinese government for permits to lay cable through the EEZ. The way it's described by an anonymous industry source comes across as Mafia-like tactics ("last thing you want is to approach Chinese waters and a gun boat comes out and stops you"), which I think is unfortunately indicative of how the Chinese government tends to operate.