Armata soon to be in service.

[Battlefront.com]

By god and how.  Concentration of maintenance assets rarely ends with good service, and slows down fire responsiveness to an appalling degree.

Absolutely. And let's not forget that the US has a very good track record for keeping its forces in peak fighting condition despite prolonged high tempo operations over long distances in short periods of time. That doesn't happen by accident.

The other thing that is ridiculous in that statement is that the has proven it's operational capabilities on more than one occasion. Compare the performance of the US' operational capabilities in the only war the US has ever truly lost (Vietnam) with, say, Russia's performance in Chechnya and even Georgia. The US did not lose Vietnam because of poor organization and logistics, but having the wrong army for the wrong war with the wrong plan.

Let's keep in mind that there is no nation on Earth, and I mean that literally, that has the ability to fight complex and prolonged wars half way around the world and still achieve victory. In WW2 it even fought two such wars simultaneously and was a major factor in the victory of both adversaries. Not to mention every major war the US has fought in it not only maintained operational cohesion within its own forces, but also as the leader of a coalition. The Brits come a close second for WW2 and a more distant 2nd for the other major wars it has fought.

What the US has a problem with is strategies to "win the peace". The military plays into that sometimes in some ways, but mostly it rests on the shoulders of politicians since they are Constitutionally in control of wars, not the military. The US needs to do more work in this area than it does the military side of things.

Steve

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Oddly enough the SBCTs use consolidated maintenance (at the BDE level).  It's widely regarded as a terrible thing and in every.single.AAR I've seen from an SBCT training rotation, the consolidated maintenance setup is something that always comes up as needing improvement.  I've heard various reasons why it was tried (mechanized unit designed by paratroopers, original Stryker mission assumed fairly limited radius of action from BDE HQ), but again without dispute something regarded as a mistake to be mended rather than our eyes opened to the genius of operational level superiority warfare.

 

It might have been changed since I left the schoolhouse even, I sort of stopped caring about Strykers when I went back to an ABCT.

 

Our Squadron mucked with it a bit in Iraq, we retained our maintenance teams, but our Forward Support Company conned our leadership into believing recovery service would be improved by putting all the wreckers under the Squadron level recovery platoon.  It added hours onto getting any vehicle recovered.  Prior to the consolidation, getting a MRAP pulled from a ditch took about 20 minutes to spin up (basically our mechanics kept two mechanics on a sort of on-call status to man the wrecker, and the Squadron's QRF would do security to move the wrecker to the element in need of help).  It took 2-3 hours to get a wrecker after the consolidation.

 

Honestly terrible.  Consolidated mechanics and fires elements make sense if you don't have the professional core of dudes to fill out lower echelons, but it's a way of making do with less, not a superior way of mission accomplishment.  

[Battlefront.com]

Honestly terrible.  Consolidated mechanics and fires elements make sense if you don't have the professional core of dudes to fill out lower echelons, but it's a way of making do with less, not a superior way of mission accomplishment.

Thanks for the first hand anecdotes!

Yup, which is why the Soviets and Russians have this system. When you have a very large military based on short term conscription, there's no much else that can be done. Which is why the centerpiece of Russia's 2008 reforms is the professionalization of the Russian military. Still, even with contract soldiers the Western style system is more expensive and difficult to maintain than the centralized system that the Russians have traditionally relied upon.

Towards the end of WW2 the Soviets extended more services down to lower echelons because they found it improved battlefield performance. The Germans, on the other hand, consolidated their services more and more. However, they did not do this because it was superior... they did it because they had a massive manpower shortage and needed to maximize combat slots at the expense of support slots. The Brits were forced to do some of the same. The US, on the other hand, expanded it's support services even more.

Steve

[ikalugin]

Could you, please, be more specific (and yes I have read works by David Glantz too)? The reason why I ask is because:

- it appears that we have widely different views.

- you appear to be a sane, rational and educated person.

- you do not appear to be military proffesional.

- thus you base your opinion on some form of specialised literature.

- hence to understand where you come from it would help if I read the same literature.

 

The primary reason behind centralisation of maintenance (and logistics) was not the ability of troops to maintain their vehicles (though it did play some part) was concentration of effort. Ie you do not wish to get your logistical assets to sit idely behind economy of force troops, you want them in your active sectors. This is why logistics/maintenance, firepower and other assets were pushed upwards.

 

It has one serious disadvantage - you cannot fight a war without mobilising, as your repair assets are on the Front level and in general are not availiable without mobilisation (with exception of Groups of Forces), this lead to severe problems in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

Edited April 7, 2015 by ikalugin

[John Kettler]

Samoderzhets,

 

Here is another Jim Warford article on the Premium Tank. This is on the T-80 in combat in Chechnya. Nowhere will you find a single dismissive remark or about Russian homeland tanks or their various systems. Rather, this is a straightforward effort to determine the facts, as best they could be determined.

 

akd,

 

Superelevation has been part of gunnery for ages and is not to be considered the same as high elevation angle capability. Superelevation is simply elevating the gun barrel past the LOS in order to offset gravity induced projectile drop. At a functional level, it's no different than "holding high" on a target when using a rifle with simple iron sights at long range.

 

Sublime,

 

The autoloader personnel hazards were real.  http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/coldwar/USSR/soviet_T-64.phpThis is a very tame assessment. The reports we were getting at the SECRET level during the Cold War talked about the autoloader trying to load the crewman. Whatever it grabbed, it attempted to put through the loading cycle. 

 

(Fair Use)

 

Issues The autoloader controversy

The adoption of an autoloader presented many advantages, but came with some controversy, due to the experience with the less refined T-62 autoloader. It was dangerous for the crew if the assembly quality was not optimal (rounds bouncing around, jammed mechanics), leading to serious injuries and hot poisonous gas exhausts inside the cramped turret, not to mention the problems that arose if the autoloader was inoperable for some reasons. The gunner had to manually load the gun in an uncomfortable and dangerous position, and with a very slow rate of fire (less than one per minute), critical in the heat of battle.

 

This is a much later version of a Russian autoloader in action, on a T-80. As you can see, if you happen to get your coverall or part of yourself snagged in this thing, it's going to end very badly.

 

T-64 Wiki

 

"Additionally, the adoption of the autoloader was highly controversial for several reasons:

• Early versions of the autoloader lacked safety features and were dangerous to the tank crews (especially the gunner, who sits nearby): Limbs could be easily caught in the machinery, leading to injuries and deaths. A sleeve unknowingly snagged on one of the autoloader's moving parts could also drag a crewman into the apparatus upon firing. (Perrett 1987:42)"

 

The citation is to Perrett, Bryan (1987). Soviet Armour Since 1945. London: Blandford Press. 

 

Finally, I think the writer's got his material crossed up, but the quote below was the same one I heard while at Hughes. I heard it attributed to a US Army general in Armor. Article it's quoted from is a good, albeit short, read.

(Fair Use)

 

In prototypes of the T-72, the autoloader revealed a distressing tendency to load vital parts of the gunner, who was jammed next to it. One U.S. Army tanker who studied Israeli-captured tanks said, “We believe this is how the Soviet Army Chorus gets its soprano section.”
 

 A very real problem, which the Russians had to work to fix.

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler
 

[ikalugin]

John, you really should re read Soviet Armour Since 1945, as it is not, ehem, entirely acurate.

[Stagler]

Your 'murcia tantrums do that by far more effectively honestly.

Haha, excellent! U mad that glorious rossiya tankists will receive new Abrams beating toy?

[John Kettler]

ikalugin,

 

I read it many years ago. As I recall, it was a small hardback. When there was precious little in English on Russian armor, it was very much better than nothing in terms of open source. Or I may have it confused with his earlier  Fighting Vehicles of the Red Army. In terms of depth and breadth of coverage, Milsom's Soviet Armour 1917-1970 was tremendous, but the book stopped at the T-62, since the T-64 was then entirely unknown in the West.  

 

Meanwhile, here's something probably buried in another thread. This is an article taken, I believe, from the CIA's CLASSIFIED quarterly Studies in Intelligence. MAJ GEN Paul Gorman of the US Army wrote this chilling assessment circa 1985 of the armor/antiarmor situation, Russian tank design practices and weapon characteristics, net assessment of how US armor stacked up, capability for capability with the equivalent Russian AFVs. Much of the gunnery stuff later wound up in US FMs, but the overall article was SECRET/ORCON/NOCONTRACT/NOFORN. In my entire 11+ years as a professional military analyst I never saw this document.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND SOVIET ARMOR

 

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001066239.pdf

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

The primary reason behind centralisation of maintenance (and logistics) was not the ability of troops to maintain their vehicles (though it did play some part) was concentration of effort. Ie you do not wish to get your logistical assets to sit idely behind economy of force troops, you want them in your active sectors. This is why logistics/maintenance, firepower and other assets were pushed upwards.

 

But again, if I have A TRP 1-1 CAV screening the flank of the Brigade, the mechanics sufficient to support the day to day stuff are already part of the formation.  If one of the vehicles goes down hard it can then be pushed higher until the vehicle receives the level of repairs it needs.  Fires is a little different but given the advances in joint type fires, it's less important that all batteries exist under one formation, controlled by higher, as much as the assets may be flexed to where they are needed.  This flexiability is essential on the modern battlefield, and especially essential once you try to leverage technology over quantity, which at least nominally is what the Russians are trying to do with this modernization thing (and really have to do if they're serious about Armata and associated equipment).

 

 

 

Haha, excellent! U mad that glorious rossiya tankists will receive new Abrams beating toy?   

 

Nah brah.  I just think you're whiny and immature, and the 'murican thing, combined with basically flapping around the American bias flag any time something that reasonably was inferior to US equipment performed inferior basically validated that position.

 

And needless to say you're well on your way to showing I did not jump to conclusions, so carry on!

[ikalugin]

The idea is not to push individual vehicles upwards when they break down, but for the formation to operate with a given level of reliability untill it goes out of action and goes for repairs/replenishment in it's entirety. This is true for all of the subunit-units-formations, they had a set lifetime (in wartime) and depth of expected operations.

 

As to the firepower - derailment discussion was about Soviet doctrine.

 

On topic (as politics were explicitely stated to be on topic):

http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150407/1057146596.html

Duma says that the GPVs were not cut (overall defense relevant budget had a 5 percent cut), but some programs were delayed.

Edited April 7, 2015 by ikalugin

[dan/california]

The other major element of the Soviet doctrine was to use units until they were used up.  They planned that a battalion which carried out a major attack would simply be combat ineffective when it was pulled out,  and wouldn't be combat effective again until it had been completely refitted and the the replacements trained up and integrated.  The casualty levels in Black Sea imply this was not badly thought out.

[ikalugin]

The other major element of the Soviet doctrine was to use units until they were used up.  They planned that a battalion which carried out a major attack would simply be combat ineffective when it was pulled out,  and wouldn't be combat effective again until it had been completely refitted and the the replacements trained up and integrated.  The casualty levels in Black Sea imply this was not badly thought out.

This sort of more applicable to units, ie regiments, rather that sub units (which battalions were).

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

The idea is not to push individual vehicles upwards when they break down, but for the formation to operate with a given level of reliability untill it goes out of action and goes for repairs/replenishment in it's entirety. This is true for all of the subunit-units-formations, they had a set lifetime (in wartime) and depth of expected operations.

 

 

Which relies on a slower operational tempo, and an enemy that is largely unable to mass elsewhere.  When it was just going to be dogpile on Fulda then it makes some sense, but a long march to Kiev or something would likely be a nightmare in terms of recovery and maintenance.

 

Which is something that's always boggled my mind a bit, one of the great killers of Soviet tanks in World War Two was vehicles breaking down and being unable to be recovered.  Even if maintenance was still withheld at higher levels, recovery should certainly be much more available.

[ikalugin]

No, it allows higher operational tempo (within the operation), as you could allow higher rates of losses (you just replace expended regiments/divisions/armies/fronts with fresh ones).

 

I did mention depth, didn't I? Even if I disregard the fact that Soviets had very little need to march on Kiev, it is a front level operation, which will imply full logistic assets including tank repair plants.

 

Recovery is done lower (than repairs), still if you look at the historic loss rates in lets say 1944 operations, you would see that tanks were turned over (ie knocked out, repaired) multiple times (7-12 times if I remeber it right) during the operation, within operational level commands (ie Tank Armies).

If you look at the Cold War era structures - you would see where maintenance, basic repairs and evac services were at. And what sort of logistics assets Soviet Battalions-Regiments-Divisions had compared to Front and Army.

Edited April 7, 2015 by ikalugin

[kaburke61]

 

Nah brah......

 

Perfectly put. I have been buying these games, and on the forums for years and years (back to CM1- and yes, I mostly just lurk), and I've never seen so much nationalistic whining. This whole Armata thread shows how insecure certain people are. Don't confuse them with actual facts, and God forbid, if a 'Murican piece of equipment is superior, it's just flat out ignorance/bias of the game developers.

[Battlefront.com]

Could you, please, be more specific (and yes I have read works by David Glantz too)? The reason why I ask is because:

- it appears that we have widely different views.

- you appear to be a sane, rational and educated person.

- you do not appear to be military proffesional.

- thus you base your opinion on some form of specialised literature.

- hence to understand where you come from it would help if I read the same literature.

Unfortunately, this is like asking me how I came to the conclusion that the Earth is round. I've been studying Soviet doctrine, mostly WW2, quite seriously for at least 25 years with a very fundamental understanding for another 5 years before that. I have thousands of Dollars of books (including a 1st edition of Great Patriotic War that's worth quite a bit) that I've read over the years, plus countless articles online from credible sources (i.e. I do not count Blogs and rantings from individuals, but published articles). And no, I am not a military professional, but my profession is translating the study of militaries into simulations. Some of which I am sure you have heard of

Perhaps it would be better for you to state a specific point that you are in disagreement with because I still have no idea what your point is. That makes responding very difficult. It's the same reason I haven't asked you for a reading list to explain your wildly stated position that the US doesn't have a cohesive operational strategy. Instead, I challenged your point instead. You haven't responded to it yet.

 

The primary reason behind centralisation of maintenance (and logistics) was not the ability of troops to maintain their vehicles (though it did play some part) was concentration of effort. Ie you do not wish to get your logistical assets to sit idely behind economy of force troops, you want them in your active sectors. This is why logistics/maintenance, firepower and other assets were pushed upwards.

Panzersaurkrautwerfer is doing a fine job responding to this so I will not duplicate his efforts.

 

It has one serious disadvantage - you cannot fight a war without mobilising, as your repair assets are on the Front level and in general are not availiable without mobilisation (with exception of Groups of Forces), this lead to severe problems in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

This definitely is a serious disadvantage. But it isn't the only one.

As Dan pointed out there's a major difference between Soviet and Western mentality about what a unit is. To the West a unit is something that is to be maintained in the field and only withdrawn in the event of a catastrophic event or long term cumulative exposure to intense combat. The Soviet doctrine put minimal effort on keeping a unit combat capable and instead withdraw the whole unit when it suffered significant casualties or equipment loss. The unit would then be rebuilt in the rear and cycled back in.

Both approaches are valid. Let me say that again... there is NOTHING wrong with the Soviet methodology. However, both require very different levels of support at the front. The Western model requires a highly agile, flexible system that works very efficiently at a very low level. The Soviet model does not. Instead it focuses on concentrated services that work on a much larger scale.

An analogy is a consumer department store. The Western and Soviet type department stores carry roughly the same products. They are exposed to roughly the same number of shoppers with roughly the same purchasing habits. The Western model seeks to make sure that every single shelf is well stocked with every single product on a daily basis. Replacement stocks are coming in constantly as needed. In this way no customer goes home without what he wants or needs. That is the goal, but of course it doesn't always work out that way.

In the Soviet type department store shelves are maintained by a small number of people with access to a limited number of replacement goods. As long as customer demand is slow and predictable, the shelves maintain sufficient product. However, when there is a sudden rush of demand on one particular shelf the shelf can be depleted beyond what the staff and stock can replace. At this point the shelf is roped off to denny access to it and more items are brought in at one time from the central warehouse. Customers are inconvenienced and possibly harmed by this approach, but it requires less staff, management, and logistics support.

As I said, there are pros and cons of each system, but both the West and the Soviets correctly incorporated these things into their overall conduct of war. Therefore they were, as I have repeatedly stated, internally consistent. It is why they worked. The German model was that of the West and it broke down at the end of the war because the logistics and supplies were insufficient for their needs. Therefore, the German model began to look a lot more like the Soviet model but without the change in German operational strategy. Therefore, it was internally inconsistent and eventually collapsed for that and other reasons.

The primary problem with Russian operational strategy up to 2008 is that it still followed the Soviet model. However, the Soviet model requires a large number of forces (mobilization if you will) for it to function. At a minimum it requires 1 unit rebuilding and 1 unit ready for combat for ever 1 unit heavily engaged in combat. When the unit exposed to combat (and/or high operational tempo) wears out it moves to the rear, the one ready for combat replaces it, and the one being rebuilt is getting ready for the next unit withdrawal.

The Russians realized that they simply do not have the numbers to support this system any longer. Even the Georgian War underscored this and it was both a short war and one against a numerically inferior force that wasn't fighting very well. So the 2008 reforms have largely sought to mimic the Western system because, although more expensive per soldier and difficult to manage, it is more sustainable.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Haha, excellent! U mad that glorious rossiya tankists will receive new Abrams beating toy?

No, we simply understand that it doesn't exist so it's not possible to say either way. Further, those of us who have "heard this song before" are skeptical that it is going to win a Grammy this time. I don't care what the TV commercials said about Slim Whitman selling more albums than the Beatles and Elvis combined... I don't believe it

So what you are seeing is reasonable levels of skepticism based on facts vs. your irrational nationalism. Which is why we do not see eye to eye.

Steve

[Stagler]

Obvious troll was obvious, cmon guys. Jeez.

[jspec]

.....

 

 

Nah brah.  I just think you're whiny and immature, and the 'murican thing, combined with basically flapping around the American bias flag any time something that reasonably was inferior to US equipment performed inferior basically validated that position.

 

And needless to say you're well on your way to showing I did not jump to conclusions, so carry on!

 

 

+1

 

 I gotta say I'm begining to wish the moderation here was a little more 'active'.  This guys posts have been consistently arrogant, condescending, and most of all insulting - what value is he adding to any of the discussions?

 

 There are plenty of posters here who can disagree, even argue without basically calling the other person an idiot. Is it an attempt at humor or something? It doesn't come off that way.

[ikalugin]

Ok, so you present your authority rather than sources.

 

Regarding the operational art - I did not refer to present day, but rather to the Soviet era (as otherwise comparison between US and USSR is meaningless). I think the argument was lost somewhere between the walls of posts, I guess that discussion has a place elsewhere, as here it is OT. Would it be more convenient to conduct it in private (for example by the means of skype?).

 

Your lengthy analogy is wrong - soviets do not restock the shelves (formations), they replace the fully stocked shelves themselves.

Such an approach (replacement by formation) allows higher and not slower rates of operations (ie contrary to what your analogy suggests) within the operation (a limited period of time), because units could be expended at continued high rates during the operations.

 

This (high rate expenditure) does not lead to drops in seamlessness of operations, as whole units-formations are replaced in a contninued fashion, as determined by military science (ie lifetime of those units is known well in advance). It also allows one to improve integrity of units, as they come and go to the battlefield in uniform fashion.

 

It also decreases over all losses, as tempos of operations increase.

 

p.s. can you access any materials in languages other than English?

Edited April 7, 2015 by ikalugin

[Stagler]

No, we simply understand that it doesn't exist so it's not possible to say either way. Further, those of us who have "heard this song before" are skeptical that it is going to win a Grammy this time. I don't care what the TV commercials said about Slim Whitman selling more albums than the Beatles and Elvis combined... I don't believe it

So what you are seeing is reasonable levels of skepticism based on facts vs. your irrational nationalism. Which is why we do not see eye to eye.

Steve

 

To be fair, the actual facts aren't on the open source internet, so everyone is arguing sceptically really.

[Battlefront.com]

Ok, so you present your authority rather than sources.

No, not at all. I have presented a point of view and you question it without specifying what you believe wrong with it. I have asked several times now... what specifically do you view is incorrect in my position? Without that it is difficult to provide sources.

Plus, you have provided no sources so I don't know why only one of us should.

 

Regarding the operational art - I did not refer to present day, but rather to the Soviet era (as otherwise comparison between US and USSR is meaningless). I think the argument was lost somewhere between the walls of posts, I guess that discussion has a place elsewhere, as here it is OT. Would it be more convenient to conduct it in private (for example by the means of skype?).

I do not carry on debates privately. I operate here, in public, only.

 

Your lengthy analogy is wrong - soviets do not restock the shelves (formations), they replace the fully stocked shelves themselves.

I admit that my analogy did not state that the Soviet model required physical removal of the whole shelf and a replacement of a fully stocked shelf delivered as a shelf. That is basically a physical impossibility for stores as we know them. Instead I approximated what that would be like in a real world store environment. Specifically, closing the shelf off to customers and restocking it in full at one time, then making it available to customers again. It is close enough.

The Soviet model did allow for small amounts of replacement and repair without withdrawing the whole unit from the line. This was sufficient for light losses only or as a "bandaid" for a critical unit that was too far forward to be withdrawn.

 

Such an approach (replacement by formation) allows higher and not slower rates of operations (ie contrary to what your analogy suggests) within the operation (a limited period of time), because units could be expended at continued high rates during the operations.

It only offers a higher rate of operational readiness if two things exist:

1. the operations develop according to plan with very little operational variation

2. there are sufficient reserves to keep up operational tempo through replacement

As with all things Soviet, tactical and even operational flexibility is sacrificed.

 

This (high rate expenditure) does not lead to drops in seamlessness of operations, as whole units-formations are replaced in a contninued fashion, as determined by military science (ie lifetime of those units is known well in advance). It also allows one to improve integrity of units, as they come and go to the battlefield in uniform fashion.

Not true. The Soviet method was to fight a unit almost until extinction. The senior staff would likely still be intact, but the line units were very often worn down by several orders of magnitude. When the unit was pulled back the fighting capabilities, at the tactical level, would be little different than a freshly raised unit. This suited the Soviet system very well since there was very little emphasis on tactical capabilities but operational.

And this is why Russia is moving away from the Soviet system. In modern warfare if you can not win tactical battles on a regular basis, you can not win operationally. The Soviet solution in the past was to "throw bodies" at the problem. This is no longer possible for Russia because the Russian population won't accept those sorts of losses for anything other than a direct attack on Russia itself, but it also can't do this any more because Russia is severely outnumbered in terms of population and economic output.

 

It also decreases over all losses, as tempos of operations increase.

The Germans were still enjoying relatively favorable loss ratios all the way up until the end of the war. I do not know how you can possibly think that the Soviet system had no role to play in that.

 

p.s. can you access any materials in languages other than English?

 

No, unfortunately my reading comprehension of German is minimal and Russian zero. I must rely upon translations and interpretations. Fortunately, the topics are of great interest to the English speaking market and so there's no shortage of materials to draw upon.

 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

+1

 

 I gotta say I'm begining to wish the moderation here was a little more 'active'.  This guys posts have been consistently arrogant, condescending, and most of all insulting - what value is he adding to any of the discussions?

 

 There are plenty of posters here who can disagree, even argue without basically calling the other person an idiot. Is it an attempt at humor or something? It doesn't come off that way.

It is often good to allow such people to post because they tend to do more damage to their own position than they do others. Provided it's only one or two people who don't get things too far off track, I have found it smart to let them continue posting. When things go off the track too much I do reign things in.

 

To be fair, the actual facts aren't on the open source internet, so everyone is arguing sceptically really.

Except for you As far as I can tell you are convinced that Armata is going to happen, that it is going to be an "Abrams killer", it will be fielded in large enough numbers to make a difference, and the West won't do anything to counter it. That's optimism, not skepticism.

Steve

[antaress73]

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-IkPoDQ7r0Jo/VSP7CPDFf5I/AAAAAAAABpA/FiHe9IYR2hg/s1600/amKGBox.jpg

[A Canadian Cat]

That's optimism

 

That's not the word I was thinking of