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Armata soon to be in service.


Lee_Vincent

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It is often good to allow such people to post because they tend to do more damage to their own position than they do others. Provided it's only one or two people who don't get things too far off track, I have found it smart to let them continue posting. When things go off the track too much I do reign things in.

 

....

 

Okay, fair enough.

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It is often good to allow such people to post because they tend to do more damage to their own position than they do others. Provided it's only one or two people who don't get things too far off track, I have found it smart to let them continue posting. When things go off the track too much I do reign things in.

Except for you :) As far as I can tell you are convinced that Armata is going to happen, that it is going to be an "Abrams killer", it will be fielded in large enough numbers to make a difference, and the West won't do anything to counter it. That's optimism, not skepticism.

Steve

The Abrams killer thing was a joke btw. A blatantly obvious attempt to wind up people that succeeded.

But yes I am convinced about the first part. Signs point toward many hats getting eaten in May.

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Steve, before you read any further, please do consider splitting the OT from this thread into some sort of specialised thread. I, myself, am not very comfortable with filling this thead with Op Art stuff :(

 

 

I did specify, else, what did you discuss below in your post? What I seek at the moment is not sources to back up specific claims, but rather the core materials that formed your view on the matter, so I could access those if I have not done so already.

As those materials (which I did not access at some point in the past) are (most likely) in English it would be quicker for me to access them, rather for you to access previously uknown to you materials from my side as they would be (most likely) in languages other than English.

The point of excericise is to gain some common ground in such matters as terminology for example.

 

Ok, however it would be more convenient if this debate (regarding Soviet era operational art and related matters) is kept sepate of Armata discussion.

 

To an extend you are correct, however the lower level operations (where such replacement occurs the most) will develop in accordance to calculated plan (within a margin of error), as they are dependent on higher level of operations. Sufficient reserves, again, are pre planned from the higher level of operations. Thus such mechanism would work properly, should the user party have:

- have proper scientific theory (backed up with experiments and historic experience) to calculate such things.

- good high level (operational, operational-strategic) planning/command.

- adequate means to execute those plans.

 

The point is that instead of throwing green soldiers into the depleted units in the field, where there would be no time to co train and integrate such soldiers into their units, you create cohesive, integrated units. Between the operations due to lower over all levels of casualties (due to faster operational tempo) you would have a greater pool of experienced troops (especially command wise) to form the replacement units from.

 

The reason why Soviet classical model is not applicable to Russia is not because of -throwing bodies at the problem- (WW2 stereotypes?), but because Russia no longer plans to fight a pre emptive conventional, high intensity, medium term wars on multiple fronts.

It is reflected in our doctrine - by lowering the nuclear release threshhold (which does not remove the requirement for a conventional defence ofcourse, as we still need that nuclear release level above the tripwire).

 

And now we go into the subject of losses on the Eastern Front. I would really, really try to avoid it in Armata thread.

 

Which translations from Russian and German are you fammiliar with?

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Except for you :) As far as I can tell you are convinced that Armata is going to happen, that it is going to be an "Abrams killer", it will be fielded in large enough numbers to make a difference, and the West won't do anything to counter it. That's optimism, not skepticism.

 

What is the threshhold for inclusion into the game?

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The Abrams killer thing was a joke btw. A blatantly obvious attempt to wind up people that succeeded.

No, I think most people understood that it was a joke. However, your other posts do seem to indicate that you aren't joking.

But yes I am convinced about the first part. Signs point toward many hats getting eaten in May.

Parading something is not the same as it going into production. So no hats should be eaten in May because it's not relevant.

Personally, I don't have an opinion about Armata going into production, therefore on that point I am not a skeptic. It's all the other points that I am skeptical of.

Steve

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Steve, before you read any further, please do consider splitting the OT from this thread into some sort of specialised thread. I, myself, am not very comfortable with filling this thead with Op Art stuff :(

It is a good suggestion, however the Armata discussion seems to be at an end because there's not much left to say that hasn't already been said. So maybe we can bring our operational discussion back to the relevance of Armata?

 

 

I did specify, else, what did you discuss below in your post? What I seek at the moment is not sources to back up specific claims, but rather the core materials that formed your view on the matter, so I could access those if I have not done so already.

But which part? This is a huge topic and I can't think of any one book or article that led to my conclusions. As I said, I first started serious study of the Eastern Front more than 25 years ago. It's not easy to pin that down to one or two sources. However, I did think of one:

"Analytical Survey of Personnel Replacement Systems in Modern War (1982" by The Dupuy Institute. It is a 204 page comparison of the German and Soviet replacement systems in WW2. It also draws comparisons between the American system because the report was written for the US Army. I do not know where you can get a copy of it. I bought mine 20+ years ago and it is photo copy of the original typed report. Here is some information on it:

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub1tnda.htm

Another book that I found excellent was Brian Fugate's "Operation Barbarossa". It focused on the pre-war Soviet planning and how it had to adapt to reality after the German invasion. I found this in Russian:

http://militera.lib.ru/h/fugate/index.html

I can not emphasize enough that I think the Soviet system was very good for the time and purpose of WW2 and I believe it would have worked well up until the 1970s in a war with NATO. In fact, I have been known to say it was better than the Third Reich's system. Mostly because it was practical minded and internally consistent, with Stalin (after 1942) showing far more brains than Hitler in that he mostly did not micromanage the military like Hitler did.

 

Ok, however it would be more convenient if this debate (regarding Soviet era operational art and related matters) is kept sepate of Armata discussion.

Agreed :D

 

To an extend you are correct, however the lower level operations (where such replacement occurs the most) will develop in accordance to calculated plan (within a margin of error), as they are dependent on higher level of operations. Sufficient reserves, again, are pre planned from the higher level of operations. Thus such mechanism would work properly, should the user party have:

- have proper scientific theory (backed up with experiments and historic experience) to calculate such things.

- good high level (operational, operational-strategic) planning/command.

- adequate means to execute those plans.

Agreed. The difference between Operation Bagration and the earlier Operation Mars is that Mars was deficient in all three areas, Bagration was not.

 

The point is that instead of throwing green soldiers into the depleted units in the field, where there would be no time to co train and integrate such soldiers into their units, you create cohesive, integrated units. Between the operations due to lower over all levels of casualties (due to faster operational tempo) you would have a greater pool of experienced troops (especially command wise) to form the replacement units from.

The German system "solved" this problem with replacement/training Battalions for each division (one company per line battalion). For example, a line company that was in lower tempo fights might lose a few men at a time. Replacements could be fed in a few men at a time and their negative impact would be minimal and the firepower of the unit maintained. They would have time to integrate. Often those replacements were soldiers from the same unit who had recovered from light to medium wounds, so they were already to some degree integrated.

If the company suffered larger amounts of casualties then it was pulled from the line and reorganized using (if possible) whole units from the replacement formation. For example, 30 casualties would warrant receiving a platoon of replacements. The company could decide how to integrate them. But the whole time the company would remain near the front and not pulled out of combat entirely. It would then rotate into the line to relieve another company in due course. This system broke down at the end of the war because the replacements could not keep up with losses and the German method of geographic replacement pools for specific regiments no longer was practical.

The US system was considered worse. Individual soldiers were fed in without benefit of orientation. This led to a higher than necessary loss of green soldiers. This kept operational tempo only because there was an ample supply of replacements. It was not seen as sustainable, so by the end of the war the American system was more-or-less operating like the German system. The differences were that the Americans had a non-geographic based replacement system (more flexible)and it was not suffering casualties faster than the system could handle.

 

The reason why Soviet classical model is not applicable to Russia is not because of -throwing bodies at the problem- (WW2 stereotypes?), but because Russia no longer plans to fight a pre emptive conventional, high intensity, medium term wars on multiple fronts.

It is reflected in our doctrine - by lowering the nuclear release threshhold (which does not remove the requirement for a conventional defence ofcourse, as we still need that nuclear release level above the tripwire).

By Western standards the Soviet "throwing bodies at the problem" is not a stereotype. It is a factual reality. However, over the course of the war the Soviets became less desperate and more experienced. They also started to have serious manpower shortages. Therefore, this thinking evolved into doctrine that was less wasteful of men and material. Still very wasteful by Western standards, but very different in 1944/45 compared to 1941/42. But as you say, that's a bit too far off topic.

For sure the Russian strategy has changed from preparing to fight a global land war to something more practical, such as fighting in neighboring republics or internally. It is a sensible approach given that Russia has no practical need for a global land war strategy, nor could it come up with one that would have any chance of success.

So the Russian military is scaling its combat forces along new lines to be ready to fight the wars it views as more likely. The old Soviet doctrine simply doesn't work for these types of wars, but the Russian military (until 2008) was still structured as it was in the Soviet days.

Russia realized it had to do three things:

1. modernize its equipment. Having tanks that can be knocked out regularly before they even see the enemy is not going to win a ground engagement at any scale, medium or otherwise.

2. modernize its command and control. Detailed inflexible plans no longer work in today's highly lethal fast moving battlefield. Adaptability and speed were two things the Soviet system utterly lacked, so both the command concept and the communications methodologies had to change. This is one of the big lessons that came out of the Georgian War.

3. higher state of readiness. If a war is only going to last a few weeks or months, then you better have all the forces necessary to win that war on hand because there will not be time to rotate and refit units as per the old Soviet doctrine. This is the "fight with what you have" concept.

One of the common elements necessary for #2 and #3 is professional soldiers. Without them you can't do either very well. Which is why, sensibly, Russia has put so much effort and money into attracting and retaining contract soldiers. I think it has had very good success in this portion of the reforms, though it still has a significant amount of work ahead.

Armata helps solve the first problem. However, the reforms needed for #2 and #3 require more than just a very good tank. If Russia can not afford warehouses full of replacements, then it will have to change how it supports them in a high tempo war situation. Meaning, it's support services will likely look more like those in the West than those of the Soviet Union. It is inevitable.

 

Which translations from Russian and German are you fammiliar with?

I'd have to dig around, but I do have some translations for US Army research. And of course people like Glanz use Russian source materials throughout his works. In fact, the best thing to do is take Russian and German sources and reevaluate them independently.

Steve

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No, I think most people understood that it was a joke. However, your other posts do seem to indicate that you aren't joking.

Parading something is not the same as it going into production. So no hats should be eaten in May because it's not relevant.

Personally, I don't have an opinion about Armata going into production, therefore on that point I am not a skeptic. It's all the other points that I am skeptical of.

Steve

 

About the hats, I do believe some people are unsure about it making the parade even.

 

 

 

 

It was up on Military Photos a while ago that Antaress, nice find though.

Edited by Stagler
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About the hats, I do believe some people are unsure about it making the parade even.

That is true. It certainly seems that Russia would like to have the Armata part of it, but maybe it won't be practical. I personally have no opinion and really don't think it's very important either way. Even if it is in the parade, it might not be a truly functional vehicle and therefore could still have a year left in development.

Plus, just because it is in the parade doesn't mean it's going to go into full scale production. Remember what I said about the US Sgt. York? 50 production vehicles that were theoretically ready for frontline service, but they were rejected and the program killed. So a dozen or two dozen or even three dozen vehicles doesn't mean it's a sure thing.

Steve

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Again this thing is just sort of clipping along, so small shots:

 

Re: Concentration of assets

 

The whole Soviet system works very well when you have a nearly endless supply of men and material, and strategic intiative.  It breaks down if you lack any of those items.  Swapping out units in contact is one of those military operations that ranks up there with rocket surgery in terms of complexity, and to built a system that doesn't just anticipate a need to do so, but requires it to be done when one unit degrades to a point (because you chose not to maintain it enough) to have to be sent to the rear on a regular basis is just silly in the extreme.  No matter how good of a relief in place you conduct, the best you can hope for is a modest loss in momentum.  If you're facing a more agile army he's going to exploit this slack to do a whole host of bad mojo.  Having units that broadly remain in motion for longer because they're maintained as they break vs get fixed once they're broke better retains the initiative.  Same goes for fires, the ability to mass is great, but given the ranges involved and a good communications network, it is much less critical to have a lot of fires that are highly managed, and by far more useful to have potentially mutually supporting, but generally aligned against lower echelons as responsive fires are critical to mobile military warfare.

 

The Soviet system worked when it did, because it did not have to worry about the sort of resource crunch the Russians do.  I wouldn't see fit to call it a "good" system nearly as much as one that well identified how to be functional given the people and equipment available.  But it simply is not practical in a post-Soviet world.

 

Re: Aratatata

 

I think hat consumption will be low.  The dubious of Armata crew, myself included have always assumed "something" would be at the march.  The more extreme opinions were an entirely plywood float over a UAZ sort, while the less extreme was prototypes of marginal functionality, made able to conduct the road march, but they still cannot shoot or go in reverse without catching fire (like the T-50 apparently).  The plywoodian option is looking less likely, but the functional Armata is looking about as likely as the "it goes forward and turns right.  Left turns completed by total revolution with right turn" level of operation.

 

In terms of skepticism, there's really three separate realms of doubt for the Armata:

 

1.  The performance of the vehicle itself.  As discussed at length with the unmanned turret conversations, there's some pretty reasonable doubt to if an unmanned turret is a good idea, and doubtless as more details will come out, there will be more questions to if it really is that good with only so much thermal resolution/weight to power/the coffee maker is prone to fire.  

 

2. The performance of Russian high tech projects.  Separate from the vehicle itself, Russia has had a not so good record with "new" equipment.   Improvements to old stuff?  Not so bad!  But the T-50 gives a good example of how derailed Russian programs with ambitious goals can get.  The question for me at least is if the Armata will be the T-64, stumbling out of the box but after some work, a good tank, or a T-35, a host of immature technology strapped to a marginal design choice.

 

3. Performance of the Russian economy.  While it wanders into politics, the reason why Russia has not done major upgrades to any of its various vehicle fleets has always been chalked up to poor economic situation and lack of funding.  The economic situation has not gotten better, and by many estimates it is actually quite poor.  The plans Russia has stated for modernization and new vehicles are very ambitious for countries with much stronger economies and much better future prospects.  This does not rule the plans out, but it does raise questions about making ends meet, and the long term practicality of such plans.

 

None of these have really been addressed too well from the Armata club for Armatas.  None of them preclude "something" happening with the Armata being an okay tank, and being fielded in numbers, but all of them cast a lot of doubt on the Armata procurement going to the scale that has been claimed.  

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ikalugin,

 

The evidence from Russian combat memoirs doesn't support your repair model. There is an ATO-34 commander's account called Episodes. Russian Tanker Memoir over on the RKKA/narod  dot ru site. Unfortunately, my AV software is treating it as being virus infected, but the infected site data base may be old. In any event, it's quite clear from the account that totally against my expectations, the Russians did very aggressive field repairs of their tanks. When his tank hit a mine right at the enemy defenses and got badly torn up running gear, the technical section came out as the attack ground forward and replaced andentire road wheel and suspension assembly and, working with the crew, repaired the shattered track. This was done as evening fell and working into the night with light blocking shields up. I don't recall whether it was the same incident, but the technical section also welded over a series of ATG holes into his tank. It's easy enough to read of the combat regulation requiring the crew to remain with the tank and entirely normal to find the crew repairing track and dealing with other stuff, but I never expected to read of major in situ repair. Am reasonably certain he talked about a similar exercise to replace a tank cannon. There was no resort had to major workshops at Division and Front. From what I can tell, the Technical Section came from Regiment, and he commanded a ATO-34 Company. 

Reinforcing what the memoirs say is p. 67 of MOBILE GROUPS: PRELUDE TO OMG, by Richard Armstrong, Parameters XVI, No. 2. Parameters is the Journal of the US Army War College. The article is very heavily Russian sourced. The summary statement is this: "The basic method was to repair equipment directly in the forward unit areas."

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

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Even though GPV and post GPV repair approaches differ, tank repair factory is not always something stationary far in the rear, in GPW times (especially in the late years, where Soviet air and artillery superiority was clear), it was quite possible to forward deploy those assets, even though they were still centraly managed.

 

At the same time - you should remember that mobile groupings had a high degree of autonomy, so they had their own logistics/repair assets.

Edited by ikalugin
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Patch 1.0.69

 

Fixed Bug where Armata's turret is weaker than expected at key points along the frontal arc

 

Patch 1.0.7

 

Undid former bug where Armata's turret is weaker than expected at key points along the frontal arc due to recent information

 

Patch 1.0.71

 

Modified bug where Armata's turret was weaker than expected at key points along the frontal arc by covering it with a canvas tarp

 

Patch 1.0.72 

 

Fixed bug where Armata was ingame

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Not really.  On the other hand if something is coming through the frontal slope with enough velocity to kill the gunner, let alone the commander it isn't going to leave enough of the FCS to make the tank especially combat worthy.  It'd also have to pass through the thickest armor on the tank so it's...a bit of a stretch right now for most anti-tank systems.

 

OK, that sounds reasonable.

 

Nope.  I'd rather have that crew going back to pick up a "float" tank from the Brigade's reserve of such vehicles, or working with the BN maintenance guys to drop in a new gun tubes.  Longer they're on the battlefield, longer I have to wait for a fully capable tank.  And I'd much rather have a fully capable tank than a well armored 30 mm carrier.

 

Even so, it'd take time for evac crew to arrive, and then travel back to safety. And such time would increase depending how hot is it on the battlefield, and what type of operation is going on (offensive or defensive). Under no circumstances 30mm can be considered a bad thing to have here IMO.

 

The short version is the mechanics themselves are not anywhere near the tanks, and usually exist at BDE levels.  The response is much slower, and while western type mechanics are less concentrated, there's much larger numbers of them, and it allows for better triage of repairs (crew handles minor fixes, company team handles replacement of larger parts and some battle damage repairs, BN covers major end system repairs and more significant battle damage repair, BDE handles tanks that are very broken and more practically arranges for replacement of tank and dispatch of broken tank to depot level facilities).

 

Uhm. Here's what I know. Driver's MOS is actually called "mechanic-driver", and he's the guy who's responsible for maintenance and field repairs of the chassis. And evac/maintenance/repairs units are based on both BN and BDE level (more on latter). But, like I've said, it would be much better if someone with the actual experience or just more knowledge told us.

 

Like I said, we usually roll in fours.  The degree to which we're on alert depends a lot on the threat, if we're in the howling open desert in a Company coil, there might be a driver and man on the turret while the other two crewmen do post operations maintenance.  On the offensive into North Korea, likely only one tank is doing anything but watching for North Korean SOF and stay-behinds.

 

I see.

 

Generally actual repair operations are conducted with the maintenance team located one terrain feature behind the front line when possible though.  The actual rest cycle is usually completed on a by tank basis, someone awake in the driver's hole, someone in the TC's seat scanning for targets, while the other two crewmen rack out for a few hours.  This allows the platoon to still conduct movements while allowing for crew rest.

 

That's a good point to make. I guess the same can be done with either type of vehicle and crew amount of 3+. It's just the percentage (or number) of the crew that gets to sleep is different.

Edited by L0ckAndL0ad
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Nerdwing,

 

To say you have a wicked sense of humor would be to grossly understate your twisted talents. Bravo! My only criticism? Nowhere in there did you address the vital issue of plywoodium as it applies to the T-14 Armata MBT (nothing to do with Peng). For a complete discussion of where the now independently confirmed plywoodium and lesser known cardboardium fit on the spiral to oblivion capped by Governmentium, please see this

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

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Even so, it'd take time for evac crew to arrive, and then travel back to safety. And such time would increase depending how hot is it on the battlefield, and what type of operation is going on (offensive or defensive). Under no circumstances 30mm can be considered a bad thing to have here IMO.

If the 30mm comes with no design tradeoffs, costs, or logistics headaches... sure :D But what are the chances of that happening? Zero. So the ability to have that 30mm AND have it be useful for a small subset of situations needs to be weighed against the negatives that come with it all the time. Panzersaurkrautwerfer's point appears to be that "under no circumstances 30mm can be considered worth the tradeoffs".

 

 

Uhm. Here's what I know. Driver's MOS is actually called "mechanic-driver", and he's the guy who's responsible for maintenance and field repairs of the chassis. And evac/maintenance/repairs units are based on both BN and BDE level (more on latter).

That's the standard for drivers since WW2 days in all nations. The drivers are usually tasked with getting the vehicle to start when it doesn't want to, basic engine maintenance (oil levels and what not), keeping track tension correct, supervising track repair/replacement, changing headlight bulbs... etc. Anything beyond that is in other hands.

I have owned several military vehicles in my time dating from the years 1942-1972. All of them come with either 2 or 3 manuals. The 1st manual is for the driver and it contains basic maintenance instructions. The US manuals are written so that anybody with basic mechanical skills can jump right in and make a difference. Anything beyond that goes to the 2nd manual and that is reserved for the dedicated maintenance units with things like welders, hydraulic presses, lathes, a wider range of hand tools, engine hoists, tons of spare parts, etc. It is also written in a way that someone with good mechanical skills and the right tools can affect repairs. The 3rd manual is a parts inventory manual which is how requests are made from the shop to the supply chain.

 

So basically... the driver has a very narrow range of fairly simple tasks that he is responsible for. They are the sorts of things that crop up all the time and can, generally, be fixed by someone with minimal training. Everything else is handled by dedicated shops, which are most likely themselves subdivided because of the tool sets and facilities. Since the driver only gets the 1st manual, anything that is not present in that manual is generally not within his ability to fix. If only because he won't know what part number to request for a specific repair.

 

That's a good point to make. I guess the same can be done with either type of vehicle and crew amount of 3+. It's just the percentage (or number) of the crew that gets to sleep is different.

Yes. And the difference between 3 and 5 men is pretty significant. A Russian tank can have 2 men sleeping at any one time, the Abrams 4 men. That theoretically means a Russian tank goes into combat with 2/3rds of its crew under slept, the Abrams 1/5th. Not an insignificant difference.

Steve

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Nah. You can fit two additional dudes in if the gun is not in operation but other than that its four or four crewmen.

Re:30 mm

If a tank has no main gun and cannot drive itself to the maintenance collection point then a 30 mm doesn't really change the equation.

Re: driver mechanics

Thats pretty much standard for all tankers. There's usually a workload for each crewman, driver tends to do the engine and suspension stuff, gunner does the weapons systems, loader the breach, coms and helping the driver. Tank commander helps out when he is around. Milage varies though based on the commander workload.

Re: sleeping

Popular spaces are:

Rear turret deck. The army sleeping bag and its waterproof outer shell work well enough to make this practical.

Engine deck. Best with gun elevated and traversed to rear. Then you throw a tarp over it for super comfy tent.

Sleeping inside, the drivers position is awesome so long as you are not actually needing to drive soon. Racked out face into the gunners primary sight works too if it's been a 36 hour day. Loaders can usually do the fetal position on the floor with enough padding or the before mentioned 36 hour day.

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Re: Concentration of assets

 

The way I was taught to think about this (and 'this' here means all the log stuff, not just maint and recov, so it also includes med spt, for example) is to treat it as a spectrum, with freedom of operation at one end, and freedom of maneauvre at the other.

 

If you want to maximise freedom of maneauvre, then take all the log stuff away from the commander and provide it on push or pull from a centrally controlled pool. That way the commander only has F-Ech toys to worry about, and can really concentrate on the fight. But it does mean that he'll culminate fairly quickly.

 

On the other hand, if you want to maximise a commander's freedom to roam and 'operate' within an AO, then decentralise the B-Ech and higher stuff down to him so that he has all the support and maint he needs for the duration of the task. But the downside is that the commander now has a whole bunch of claggage that he'll have to move, protect, and organise, and which probably has mobility which is a lot lower than his F-Ech toys (i.e., wheels vs. tracks, 2WD vs 4WD)

 

As usual, there's no right answer*, it depends on the context which is better. For example, you might centralise log and maint, but decentralise med. Or two companys might have their FoM maximised, while the third has it's FoO enhanced. Or whatever. Western spt assets tend to be organised in a way which means they pool nicely, but are 'bricked' - or built-up - in their TOE in a way that allows easy decentralisation.

 

* There are, however, wrong answers ;):D

Edited by JonS
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I thought the Abrams had 4 crew.

Heh... yeah, 4. I'm working with Shermans and Panthers at the moment so brain got confused :)

The point is still that there's 1 more man in an Abrams to perform various functions that the smaller crew of an Armata also has to perform. Even if the automated systems work as they are supposed to, that difference still matters in practical terms.

Steve

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Sleeping inside, the drivers position is awesome so long as you are not actually needing to drive soon.

I used the driving pod simulator at Ft. Knox (or is it now at Benning?) and I can easily see that being super comfy for sleeping. However, I also sat in a Swedish S-Tank and the Abrams has NOTHING on that one in terms of crew comfort. Cripes, it was better than a leather recliner in a Man Cave :)

 

 

If you want to maximise freedom of maneauvre, then take all the log stuff away from the commander and provide it on push or pull from a centrally controlled pool. That way the commander only has F-Ech toys to worry about, and can really concentrate on the fight. But it does mean that he'll culminate fairly quickly.

 

On the other hand, if you want to maximise a commander's freedom to roam and 'operate' within an AO, then decentralise the B-Ech and higher stuff down to him so that he has all the support and maint he needs for the duration of the task. But the downside is that the commander now has a whole bunch of claggage that he'll have to move, protect, and organise, and which probably has mobility which is a lot lower than his F-Ech toys (i.e., wheels vs. tracks, 2WD vs 4WD)

Good point. However, the alternative is to have fairly independent (delegated) responsibility for the logistics end of thing so the commander doesn't have to worry about it, yet it's right there whenever he needs it. A Battalion XO in Afghanistan said that in an intense firefight one time a Javelin was used and the next thing he knows there's the supply SGT "appearing out of nowhere" to hand him another one almost as soon as the first one was fired.

But again, this sort of thing takes a lot of money and concentrated effort. If a military is unable to muster the resources to make that work, then best not to try. Because a system that is prone to failure on paper is absolutely going to fail in the field. Which is why I do admire the Soviet system in many ways. It was designed to work given the Soviet's limitations.

 

* There are, however, wrong answers ;):D

Indeed :) The Soviets going into 1941 were organized more-or-less along Western lines. It didn't work out so well!

Steve

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About the engine on Armata - it appears to be the regular 1500 hp, with reserves for increasing the power output up to 2200 hp or so. Given the expected mass of the Tnk and IFV versions (50-55t) this should provide better specific power than other modern tanks. The engine itself:

f_My5icC5ibG9nc3BvdC5jb20vLWhxd0pMVmoxYm

As interesting as doctrinal discussion is, I feel this engine was glossed over without proper comment. It is a very interesting configuration, x12 if I'm not mistaken. A quick google search of X engines reveals very few have been made, mostly prototypes for WW2 era aircraft. Is this engine based on some existing engine or this a unique design? It is extremely compact for its power, or so it appears. A mechanic I know explained these X engines tend to provide more power but have shorter lifespans than a flat or V engine. Also odd is the choice of three cylinders to a bank, apparently odd numbers like that are harder on the crankshaft.  Irregardless the most interesting deviation in tank engines since the turbine engine. (Also turbine engine 4 lyfe)

Edited by danzig5
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^^^

 

Yeah, that's why I mentioned it about 6 pages ago! ;)

 

The engine tech is pretty important and seems to be a bit of a leap. (Of faith, perhaps...) If it is a "plug and play" version, then go for it.

 

It'll be interesting to see how well it does in service.

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