Armata soon to be in service.

[ikalugin]

Yep, but if I claimed the US Army had ninja battle robots, but you don't get to see them because OPSEC, you'd have reasons to be incredulous.  As more than a few posters have stated the ability of Russia to crank out Armatas, and the capabilities of the vehicle itself are somewhat in doubt.

 

There are:

- immages of the Armata.

- videos of Armata moving around.

- official order for maintaining 24 Armata vehicles (12 IFVs and 12 tnks) in the parade unit (which by the way is already being executed - you could see that from official goverment procurement system website).

 

Still, one could pretend that those vehicles do not exist until they march on that Red Square on 9th of May.

Edited April 6, 2015 by ikalugin

[Stagler]

What capabilities are in doubt? Its an mbt, it's going to do the same as most other mbts. The only significant step change that everyone on here has a face on about is the unmanned turret. It has a better sabotted projectile capability (which there is even less data about) but other than that I don't see its performance being that different from other Russian mbt besides crew survivability.

Don't insult my intelligence matey, nobody is talking ninja robots here.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

But we know nothing about what they're actually capable of, there's strong doubts the Russians could build or maintain them in quantity and there's some pretty serious questions into the actual design.  LOL OPSEC does not make those issues disappear. 

 

 

 

Don't insult my intelligence matey, nobody is talking ninja robots here.

 

 

Your 'murcia tantrums do that by far more effectively honestly.  

Edited April 6, 2015 by panzersaurkrautwerfer

[Thewood1]

I have seen 1-2 very fuzzy pictures of an AFV claimed to be the Armata.  There was almost no definition.  One short video of a tank covered in a tarp that someone claimed was an Armata.  Let's see what shows up in the parade...that wasn't practiced for like every other AFV.

 

Obviously the opsec doesn't mean much for the parade.

[Thewood1]

My main point is the call for the inclusion of Armata in CM at the beginning of the thread.  How would you model it?  If no one one has a clear understanding of what it even is, how do you model it.  All the units in both CMSF and CMBS were based on functional and operation platforms with a pretty reasonable upgrade path to get to 2017.  BFC can't even model the Armata physically.

[ikalugin]

I have seen 1-2 very fuzzy pictures of an AFV claimed to be the Armata.  There was almost no definition.  One short video of a tank covered in a tarp that someone claimed was an Armata.  Let's see what shows up in the parade...that wasn't practiced for like every other AFV.

 

Obviously the opsec doesn't mean much for the parade.

Would it help if I make the photos from parade myself?

 

My main point is the call for the inclusion of Armata in CM at the beginning of the thread.  How would you model it?  If no one one has a clear understanding of what it even is, how do you model it.  All the units in both CMSF and CMBS were based on functional and operation platforms with a pretty reasonable upgrade path to get to 2017.  BFC can't even model the Armata physically.

There are already open 3d modeling efforts going on using availiable open source data.

 

If we are talking about combat capabilities - the gun is fairly well known (information about the round length, muzle energy is fairly availiable), what else? Mobility (general mass category and geometrical size, as well as engine power are known)? Protection (a tricky part, though this would be fairly obvious by the time parade comes)?

[L0ckAndL0ad]

My main point is the call for the inclusion of Armata in CM at the beginning of the thread.  How would you model it?  If no one one has a clear understanding of what it even is, how do you model it.  All the units in both CMSF and CMBS were based on functional and operation platforms with a pretty reasonable upgrade path to get to 2017.  BFC can't even model the Armata physically.

 

I can't call "sane" anyone who'd ask for that. In one-two years if it all comes out good? Certainly.

[Kieme(ITA)]

Let's say that right now, with what we know and see, it is not possible to model the new russian vehicles in the game.

 

At the same time, it's not wrong, in my opinion, to say that it's possible to see these new vehicles in game with a future module, that means in a matter of 1 to 2 years. If and only if more information will be available in the meantime.

Edited April 6, 2015 by Kieme(ITA)

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

Let's say that right now, with what we know and see, it is not possible to model the new russian vehicles in the game.

 

At the same time, it's not wrong, in my opinion, to say that it's possible to see these new vehicles in game with a future module, that means in a matter of 1 to 2 years. If and only if more information will be available in the meantime.

 

This is pretty much already the official word.  If it's 2016 and the first Armata BTG is rumbling along, then cool.  If it's 2016 and it only shows up for parades, then best left out.

[L0ckAndL0ad]

2016 is pretty lame as a target, IMO. Even if they'll enter actual service on May 31st 2017, that would still be within game time frame. However, the next 1-1.5 years would indeed be decisive in terms of what's actually gonna happen in between of now and mid 2017.

[Kieme(ITA)]

I belive the target is due to the time you must consider to model the vehicles from scratch, add them to the game, solve all possible bugs, squeeze them in one of the planned releases for CMBS (I belive they are already decided on paper). The process can take up to a year of time (in between other projects etc.) and for sure the contents of the first module are already set.

So, you have to keep in mind that it will take time.

Finally it's Worth to consider that if the time goes by too much since the release of CMBS they might also be cut simply because thet didn't make it in any released module (expansion), although there's still the way of the vehicle packs (if that is still considered by BFC).

 

I would be optimistic, the main constraint is available informantion (real information, not 3d mockups by fans and tank enthusiasts etc.- what panzersaurkraut would call "digital plywood"), so if you can dig it out in the next months, it's all welcome and adds to the cause.

Edited April 6, 2015 by Kieme(ITA)

[L0ckAndL0ad]

I belive the target is due to the time you must consider to model the vehicles from scratch, add them to the game, solve all possible bugs, squeeze them in one of the planned releases for CMBS (I belive they are already decided on paper). The process can take up to a year of time (in between other projects etc.) and for sure the contents of the first module are already set.

So, you have to keep in mind that it will take time.

Finally it's Worth to consider that if the time goes by too much since the release of CMBS they might also be cut simply because thet didn't make it in any released module (expansion), although there's still the way of the vehicle packs (if that is still considered by BFC).

 

I would be optimistic, the main constraint is available informantion (real information, not 3d mockups by fans and tank enthusiasts etc.- what panzersaurkraut would call "digital plywood"), so if you can dig it out in the next months, it's all welcome and adds to the cause.

 

Only if somebody wants the module to come out before Jun-Aug 2017. But why can't modules come out after that time?

 

Release history of CMSF:

 

Shock Force - July 27th, 2007

Marines - September 26th, 2008

British Forces - July 29th, 2009

NATO - October 21st, 2010

 

More than 3 years in between.

Edited April 6, 2015 by L0ckAndL0ad

[Thewood1]

Because BFC has most likely moved on to different games at that point.

[Kieme(ITA)]

All I said about modules timeframes is pure speculation. Anything can happen. Even that no modules come out (exageration).

Edited April 6, 2015 by Kieme(ITA)

[akd]

Just out of timeframe vehicles would be great for a module, and not just Russian vehicles. JLTV, AMPV, ACV 1.1 (MPC), Scout SV, Warrior upgrade, etc.

Edited April 6, 2015 by akd

[Thewood1]

When those modules came out, CMSF was basically the only game in release on the CM2 engine...except CMA...and that was a weird 3rd party exception.

 

Now there are four active games out.  I would expect that you won't see more than a couple\modules for CMBS as CMFI, CMRT, CMBN, and Bulge will suck up a lot of resources.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

Just out of timeframe vehicles would be great for a module, and not just Russian vehicles. JLTV, AMPV, Scout SV, etc. 

 

I have to differ.  I'd rather better realized "real" vehicles and the like, than CM turning into adverts for General Dynamic's Fall 2018 catalog, or a mouthpiece for Russian claims of industrial might.  What's reasonably expected to show up to the fight in 2017+a few modest reaches (US APS, and Russian employment of export upgrades) is really the optimal setup.  For modules a really well rounded out NATO and uncon lineup is a better use of time.  

[akd]

This would be in addition to our core vehicles / TO&E for modules, not in place of it. Sort of like our "funnies" vehicle pack for CM. Would be fun and draw additional interest. Doesn't even have to reference the storyline, and balance for multiplayer can be handled through rarity or segregated dates.

CM has great appeal as a sandbox, and BF has a good track record taking a reasonable and conservative approach to new equipment. I think they'd be foolish not to take advantage of adding new stuff as information firms up. We are talking about things that are either real now or will be real in the next year or so, not fantasy vehicles.

CMSF was more fun with the "what-if?" addition of BMP-3 and T-90S, even though it was basically a flight of fancy.

Edited April 6, 2015 by akd

[Battlefront.com]

This would be in addition to our core vehicles / TO&E for modules, not in place of it. Sort of like our "funnies" vehicle pack for CM. Would be fun and draw additional interest. Doesn't even have to reference the storyline, and balance for multiplayer can be handled through rarity or segregated dates.

CM has great appeal as a sandbox, and BF has a good track record taking a reasonable and conservative approach to new equipment. I think they'd be foolish not to take advantage of adding new stuff as information firms up. We are talking about things that are either real now or will be real in the next year or so, not fantasy vehicles.

CMSF was more fun with the "what-if?" addition of BMP-3 and T-90S, even though it was basically a flight of fantasy.

Yup! The key difference is between something that is more an "almost what-if" than a "fantasy what-if". If we know enough about Armata, and it's not outright cancelled or apparently suffering a drawn out procurement death, then I think it's a good candidate to include. But if it never progresses beyond the prototype stage, like Black Eagle, then we're not inclined to put it in.

And let's keep that in mind when we talk about the Armata vehicles that exist now. They are prototypes, and there's a mountain of prototype vehicles built over the decades that never went into production. Granted there are quite a few, but two dozen doesn't mean it's a for sure production candidate. The M247 Sergeant York had over 50 built and the only thing they were ever used for was target practice. I don't mean the Sgt. York shooting at stuff, but the Sgt. York being shot at on test fire ranges. I personally saw a couple at Redstone quietly awaiting their fate.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Are you telling us were in the combat loaded T-72 shown subsequently being attacked by Javelin in the video below?

 

No, the test I went to was a couple of months after. However, I was driven around by the 1SGT that shot the Javelin in that video and the test I witnessed. As he said, "I've got the best job in the world. Shhhhh... don't tell anybody"

The series of tests, of which this video was part of, involved various different components. The test I witnessed did have the fuel tanks topped off and the tank running at the time of the hit (IR signature test). However, the munitions inside the tank were simulated. The purpose was to see how penetration/spalling affected the ammo in a scientific way instead of with the first test (which was fully loaded with live ammo) which simply shows the outcome.

In test I witnessed the Javelin failed to hit the top of the tank. Instead, it hit the tracks (i.e. it missed by less than a meter at IIRC 4000m range). Their conclusion was it was a solid mobility kill with a high probability of crew casualties (they did not have dummies inside the tank for this test). They did not think the tank would have suffered a catastrophic explosion.

 

The point I am trying to make is that it appears that you have very little idea as to how Soviets were desighning their tanks and for which reasons. The maintenance part of it is but an example - Soviet tanks were difficult to maintain in the field (doing anything other than changing oil/batteries was no easy task), because they were not intended to be maintained in the field, but rather whole sets of vehicles were intended to be sent to the rear and maintained/repaired there after a set period of time (ie when the unit was expected to sustain sufficient casualties).

I was not arguing about field maintenance vs. operational maintenance, which is why I was confused by your question. There is a difference between building something simple and inexpensive compared with something easily maintained by conscript crew. To me this shows the Soviet Union understood the practical limitations of crew maintenance and/or made decisions more on cost and production rather than maintenance. It doesn't mean the technology in the tanks was sophisticated. As I said, Ferret takes 2 guys 5 hours to change the oil and there's nothing sophisticated about that vehicle. It's simply a bad design from a maintenance standpoint.

 

While the Soviet desighns were indeed relatively simple to produce and well thought out (having military science to back up the concept helped), they were by no means low tech, for example T64B for it's time was fairly revolutionary (integrated fire control system, first of the kind, TGM, ect). The only area in which Western tanks did over come the Soviet ones (and only during late cold war) were the thermals.

An overly simplified and questionable statement, but I was not arguing that every single thing on a Soviet Tank was low tech for the time period. However, the fire control system is a good example of what I have been talking about. It was something that theoretically gave an edge to the T-62, but from what I've read in reality a well trained Western crew could outshoot a T-62. This is akin to the discussion we're having about autoloaders and remote turrets. Again, the track record for Soviet and Russian "pushing the technological envelope" is mixed, at best.

 

 

Pretty much.  The whole small size thing comes with pretty vast trade-offs.  That's always been the case (the Korean tank on tank fighting is a really good illustration of this simply because each engagement was fairly well documented, and nearly all of the knocked out T-34s/UN tanks were recovered or available for analysis).

Quite. And with technologies such as Javelin and the SEP improvements to the Abrams, the physical size of a tank is not as relevant as it once used to be. At least in terms of detection and avoiding being hit. Smaller size, and weight, still has advantages in terms of mobility and cost. However, those things come with tradeoffs.

 

If the allocation of mechanics was better, or more extensive in the Russian army, I'd be less dubious, but right now it's sort of like, you want to do this amazingly complex tank with cutting edge technology....and your mechanics are still at echelons above reality?

Yup.

This is one of the central differences between Soviet/Russian thinking and Western doctrine, going all the way back to WW2. The Western approach is to push everything down to the lowest possible level so as to make the units as autonomous as they can be, then back them up with sophisticated logistics to make sure every single unit has what it needs when it needs it. At least in theory This is a VERY expensive strategy and it also requires a lot of highly trained soldiers to pull it off. Germany failed towards the end of WW2 in large part because it could not maintain the logistics side of things.

The Soviet and old Russian model was the opposite. Because the costs and practical capabilities of implementing a Western style approach were incompatible with reality, specialized services were concentrated at the Regimental, Divisional, and even Corps levels. Since the rest of the military structure was based on this concept, it was internally consistent and functioned well in strained combat situations as long as there was a steady flow of replacements of personnel and equipment. Since that was possible under the Soviet system it was a viable strategy. It is not a viable strategy for Russia and that is why the 2008 reforms have deliberately moved away from this.

 

Steve

[ikalugin]

So I guess employement of composite armours (T64) and integrated FCS (T64B, prior to the M60A3), as well as large calibre smouthbore cannon (T62) got us mixed results, ok. Or employement of proper dual plane stabilisers and NBCR protection system with the T55A (though nuclear war did not happen, such equipment was highly desired feature of 60s and ealry 70s tanks).

 

For the same ammount of assets (logistics and fire power wise) concentrating assets at higher levels of command is simply better - as it provides concentration of effort. The reason behind western dispersion of assets was poor operational level theory and doctrine.

 

As a historian, which works on operational art and military science are you fammiliar with?

Edited April 6, 2015 by ikalugin

[Nerdwing]

I'm most familiar with the Global Defense Initiative's sweeping success to retake Europe from terrorist elements belonging to the Brotherhood of Nod, myself.  

[L0ckAndL0ad]

Just going off how we tended to lose dudes on occasions that the Abrams was penetrated in Iraq.  EFP isn't a bad model for ATGM strikes, and more than a few got hit by later RPG-7 warheads from the rear/sides (pre-ERA), and there were even a fair number of RPG-29 strikes.  Losing more than one guy usually required a massive tank destroying event like a buried aircraft bomb.  That's generally what happened, so I'm inclined to believe it's not an unreasonable result for a short of tank destruction hit.

 

I understand that the chances are better when talking about side/angled penetrations, that's quite obvious. But were there any frontal attack casualties?

 

Even if Abrams had a 30 MM I'd still be pulling it off the line if I lost the main gun.  Even then there's a lot less to go wrong on the tank, and I've seen enough breach issues, or rounds fail to fire that I'm dubious of being unable to get at the gun to troubleshoot it, or work it in a degraded mode (manually operating the breach, firing via the "master blaster" etc).

 

You've said yourself that you had to run mission 22 hours straight. Sometimes you can't just pull stuff off the front line. In this case, having 30mm is better than having just 7.62/12.7.

 

For the Abrams it depends pretty wildly.  A lot of the electronics are plug and play, and each company has a stock of spares with their unit maintenance team (which is generally 1X M88 recovery vehicle, 1X tool truck, 1X FRSH for lack of a better way of describing it, mobile garage, and usually a cargo truck for spare parts).  The sort of stuff you won't have in stock will be complete engines, gun tubes, entire optics assemblies etc, but most of that will be kept at Battalion level.

 

So to that end, I've watched an Abrams go from "pretty much a brick" after a small electrical fire to "ready to rock" in a few hours while sitting in a muddy field with no more assets than the tank crew and the mechanic team.

 

If the allocation of mechanics was better, or more extensive in the Russian army, I'd be less dubious, but right now it's sort of like, you want to do this amazingly complex tank with cutting edge technology....and your mechanics are still at echelons above reality?

 

This is where I'd say that I have pretty much no idea about how this is done in Russian Armed Forces. I've heard some bits and pieces of info about it here and there, but not enough to say how different is it in Russia in this regard. Maybe some other folks who know can shed some light?

 

We usually do not operate in sections by themselves.  They exist mostly for inter-platoon maneuver (so first section covers second section while moving through open terrain) or as attachments (1st section is attached to mechanized infantry platoon 1, while 2nd section is attached to mechanized infantry platoon 2).  We did platoon vs section training because of the size of the training space, and to give a more realistic attacker/defender ratio rather than a common deployment of sections.  Generally if you see one US tank, there's at least another three out there somewhere.

 

This borders with my previous answer in regards of my knowledge, but I'd make a guess that Russian minimal unbreakable armor formation is platoon of 3 tanks, and when not in combat, they can rotate shifts with 2 tanks always being up, while crew of 3rd can either sleep or do repairs/maintenance. Even if one tank will completely fail, platoon would still be operational with two tanks. That's how I would've done it, at least.

[Battlefront.com]

So I guess employement of composite armours (T64) and integrated FCS (T64B, prior to the M60A3), as well as large calibre smouthbore cannon (T62) got us mixed results, ok. Or employement of proper dual plane stabilisers and NBCR protection system with the T55A (though nuclear war did not happen, such equipment was highly desired feature of 60s and ealry 70s tanks).

If you think I'm arguing that all Soviet stuff was junk, you are mistaken. And certainly in the late 1950s and early 1960s the technological differences between Soviet and Western designs wasn't as huge as it became. Mostly because technology itself had not taken a leap forward yet with the age of "solid state" electronics and computers. But I'm still not sure what you are arguing.

 

For the same ammount of assets (logistics and fire power wise) concentrating assets at higher levels of command is simply better - as it provides concentration of effort. The reason behind western dispersion of assets was poor operational level theory and doctrine.

Oooo... I think you'll find many, many people disagree with that. Big time. As in I don't even know where to start saying how wrong this is.

 

As a historian, which works on operational art and military science are you fammiliar with?

Accumulated knowledge over 30 years. For Soviet WW2 doctrine, Glanz comes to mind fairly easily.

And before you get your knickers in a twist, as they say, I believe the Soviet's method of warfare in WW2 was superior to the Third Reich's on many levels. The primary reason is that the Soviet system was internally balanced and based on reality. The German method of war was internally imbalanced and was not based on reality. Not a great comfort for the millions of Soviet citizens that had their lives thrown away, by Western standards, but it worked and worked very well.

Steve

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

I understand that the chances are better when talking about side/angled penetrations, that's quite obvious. But were there any frontal attack casualties?

 

Not really.  On the other hand if something is coming through the frontal slope with enough velocity to kill the gunner, let alone the commander it isn't going to leave enough of the FCS to make the tank especially combat worthy.  It'd also have to pass through the thickest armor on the tank so it's...a bit of a stretch right now for most anti-tank systems.

 

 

 

You've said yourself that you had to run mission 22 hours straight. Sometimes you can't just pull stuff off the front line. In this case, having 30mm is better than having just 7.62/12.7.

 

Nope.  I'd rather have that crew going back to pick up a "float" tank from the Brigade's reserve of such vehicles, or working with the BN maintenance guys to drop in a new gun tubes.  Longer they're on the battlefield, longer I have to wait for a fully capable tank.  And I'd much rather have a fully capable tank than a well armored 30 mm carrier.

 

 

 

This is where I'd say that I have pretty much no idea about how this is done in Russian Armed Forces. I've heard some bits and pieces of info about it here and there, but not enough to say how different is it in Russia in this regard. Maybe some other folks who know can shed some light?

The short version is the mechanics themselves are not anywhere near the tanks, and usually exist at BDE levels.  The response is much slower, and while western type mechanics are less concentrated, there's much larger numbers of them, and it allows for better triage of repairs (crew handles minor fixes, company team handles replacement of larger parts and some battle damage repairs, BN covers major end system repairs and more significant battle damage repair, BDE handles tanks that are very broken and more practically arranges for replacement of tank and dispatch of broken tank to depot level facilities).

 

 

 

This borders with my previous answer in regards of my knowledge, but I'd make a guess that Russian minimal unbreakable armor formation is platoon of 3 tanks, and when not in combat, they can rotate shifts with 2 tanks always being up, while crew of 3rd can either sleep or do repairs/maintenance. Even if one tank will completely fail, platoon would still be operational with two tanks. That's how I would've done it, at least.

Like I said, we usually roll in fours.  The degree to which we're on alert depends a lot on the threat, if we're in the howling open desert in a Company coil, there might be a driver and man on the turret while the other two crewmen do post operations maintenance.  On the offensive into North Korea, likely only one tank is doing anything but watching for North Korean SOF and stay-behinds.  

 

Generally actual repair operations are conducted with the maintenance team located one terrain feature behind the front line when possible though.  The actual rest cycle is usually completed on a by tank basis, someone awake in the driver's hole, someone in the TC's seat scanning for targets, while the other two crewmen rack out for a few hours.  This allows the platoon to still conduct movements while allowing for crew rest.

 

 

 

Oooo... I think you'll find many, many people disagree with that. Big time. As in I don't even know where to start saying how wrong this is.

 

By god and how.  Concentration of maintenance assets rarely ends with good service, and slows down fire responsiveness to an appalling degree.