CAS in CM2

[sburke]

FWIW, AFAICT*, the basic air plan used at Sedan (described by Jason and sburke above) was produced and settled between Guderian and the LW on 30 April 1940 ... that is two weeks before it was implemented. There were last minute alterations on the 12th (mainly the identification and selection of some specific targets), but nothing that materially altered the April plan.

* Frieser, Blitzkreig legend, p.154-155, and especially footnote 37.

To a degree yes. They had wargamed the Meuse crossing, however the selection of the actual crossing site was to be determined later and Guderian actually chose a different site than had been directed by V Kleist forcing some adaptation of the plan. Rothbrust's book contains the XIX corps attack order, the corp artillery organization and the timetable for the crossing as well as the 1st Pz task organization. The artillery plan including Luftwaffe support divided the Sedan sector into zones A1, A11, B1, B11, C1 and C11.

Plan looks as follows

A1, B1 and C1 were N-S areas adjacent to the Meuse

A11, B11 and C11 ran parallel to the Meuse starting in C11 in the south at Mouzon.

The actual timing was:

0800-1200 Harassing fire on B1 and C1

1200-1600 Combined bombing attack on A1, B1 and C1

1600-1730 Shift harassing fires to A11, B11 and C11 and to gun emplacements near Mouzon. Stuka attacks commence on B1 and C1

1730-evening attack targets of opportunity in A11, B11 and C11

Darkness- harass all movement directly north and east of the roads coming from Hirso, Laon, Rethel, Vourziers and Stenay.

Luftwaffe support for Pz Grp Kleist consisted of

420 Me 109

180 Me 110

270 Ju 87

900 He 111 and d0 17 bombers

1,770 aircraft

For XIX corps in the Sedan sector they sent

280 Me 109

90 Me 110

180 Ju 87

360 He 111

910 aircraft

The remaining aircraft went to support Reihardt's XLI corp in the Montherme-Mezlieres sector

140 Me 109

90 Me110

90 Ju 87

540 He 111 and Do 17

860 aircraft

As I recall he also wrote that almost the entire Luftwaffe in the west was dedicated to supporting the attack on Sedan that day. Which means that they couldn't have been doing much in other sectors at the time.

Michael

I assume Frieser meant Pz Grp Kleist, not just specifically Sedan in reference to the Luftwaffe commitment. Pz Grp Kleist had this commitment only for the 13th as the Luftwaffe had to support other commitments on the 14th. This force represented 61% of the Luftwaffe's total air assets according to Rothbrust.

[JasonC]

sburke - yes the concentration was extreme. Meanwhile the other panzer forces that crossed didn't get or need much air support. Rommel got practically none while forcing his crossing, for example. I also note that the scale of air support for a major Allied late war operation was much, much larger - for Goodwood it was 4700 aircraft, for example, and types with much heavier bomb loads than the German types had in 1940. That one had 20 Allied planes in the air for every defending tank on the ground - maybe 15 when you count German reserves. (It failed anyway).

[Pak40]

Interesting bg info, Jason.

"...the size of the map has absolutely nothing to do with accuracy of any type of support."

Yes, I know that Pak. The point is that CM maps are small and LOS is rarely more than 200-300 hundred meters. So, it's hard to target or be further than that from any type of CAS.

Well, some CM maps are small and many have limited view sheds, but if you're using using CAS in these cases then your not really using it how it was intended to be used. Many other maps, especially in the Commonwelth module offer great distances where CAS is more ideal. I think it's up to the wisdom of the commander to decide if/when they are to be used. There were some Market Garden battles where I chose not to use the CAS because I deemed it too dangerous.

Therefore, CAS in CM2 seems rather dangerous to friendlies, and probably shouldn't be used unless the map is very large and the spotter can spot targets 400+ meters away. (As I mentioned, I have repeatedly had friendlies bombed when they were about 300 meters from the attack radius edge.)

I'm not sure if you're saying the CM2 is unrealistic in it's danger or distances with CAS? Or are you merely expressing your surprise that CAS can be 300 meters off? I think CM is fairly spot on - historically FOs didn't call in CAS or even artillery unless they were many hundreds of meters away from the target. I guess my point is that anyone deserves to suffer the consequences if they use CAS in an ahistoric way.

[Erwin]

I have simply been trying to figure out how to use CAS appropriately in the game. But, on these forums there is no such thing as a simple answer to a simple question.

Interesting that you chose to not use it at all if circumstances were poor.

[akd]

You've been given an amazing capability for WWII era in the combination of forward observers and point targets for aircraft. Under what circumstances would you not use that if available?

[Michael Emrys]

But, on these forums there is no such thing as a simple answer to a simple question.

That's because the question is actually not very simple whether the asker knows that or not.

Interesting that you chose to not use it at all if circumstances were poor.

Sensible, I'd say.

Michael

[akd]

This would never happen with a point target in CM. Count your blessings.

[Erwin]

Well, that provides evidence that a 500lb bomb only a few meters way doesn't necessarily do much to well-protected troops, pressure wave included.

[Bulletpoint]

Well, that provides evidence that a 500lb bomb only a few meters way doesn't necessarily do much to well-protected troops, pressure wave included.

Difficult to see from the video how close it actually was. Seems to me the bomb hit the other side of the mountain.. and no 10 metre crater visible as far as I can see.

[Warts 'n' all]

To me, one of the problems with FO and CAS within the game arises from the fact that observers are set up on the ground alongside the rest of our troops. The size of map dictates that they are not behind the line in a church tower, on a hill etc which is where there would often be. So we are left with our observers only being able to spot targets a few hundred yards away. And we just have to hope that the flyboys don't drop anything short.

As the name suggests there were FO's who went forward with the tanks and infantry. Whilst other arty spotters stayed back. But to allow for the latter would mean much larger maps.