Hull-down spotting disadvantage

[altipueri]

There is an Arracourt scenario in The Operational Art of War.

It's my favourite. Why? It's the shortest.

What's my favourite opera? La Boheme. Why? It's the shortest.

When I hear the word culture I reach for my revolver.

[Jock Tamson]

I'm going to largely cut this down to I agree that more/better information display can be a good thing, but I doubt it will ever be to the degree you feel it should. This is the difference between your own feelings on what is a "want" and what is a "need". As with any personal opinion, and this definitely is, there's going to be a large area where agreement isn't possible in all instances all the time. Plus, we can't afford to go tunnel vision on any one aspect of the game. Not a path we can afford (literally) to go down. Which means improvements in game feedback will be, like everything else in the game, a series of incremental improvements.

What was in CMx1 isn't really relevant so I don't want to continue spending time on that. There is almost nothing about spotting in CMx2 that is similar to the way CMx1 spotted. The most important reason is that CMx1's "absolute" spotting system made nuances mostly pointless because an individual unit rarely had to spot on its own. CMx2's "relative" spotting system, on the other hand, means that individual spotting characteristics matter a ton. Therefore, the generalized and superficial treatment of spotting inherent in CMx1 does not exist in CMx2.

The specific properties for spotting go way beyond mere optics. Vision blocks, for example, are not technically optics but they are factored in. Individual optics systems are also explicitly taken into consideration in terms of magnification and field of view. Beyond that would be the clarity of view, which is a modifier to a specific part of a larger part of a bigger capability to spot. I have absolutely no idea what the modifier might be, or whether it is different based on nation. In fact, in all these years of development of CMx2 I've never thought to ask as it's never come up. And even if I did tell you, I can promise you there's no way you could use that information in a meaningful way.

Best of my knowledge there is no nitty gritty presumption that a specific piece of a specific part of a specific vehicle behaves explicitly different depending on crew quality. Given how arbitrary such decisions would be, since there is no such historical reference to guide us, I think it would be a mistake to do that. The exception made for CMx1 was, in effect, "gamey".

I doubt there are many like you amongst the entire customer base. And I weep for those of you who do play this way Because you will never, ever be armed with enough information to make choices like this in a way that is much better than the average gamer. That's because there is NO one right thing to choose and there is NO one certain outcome. It's all circumstantial and there's no possible way all circumstances can be accounted for.

I understand that people who feel the need to control things to this degree take comfort in exercising as much control as they are afforded... but I don't think it makes much practical difference. The battle will still be won based on tactical prowess, and as history shows stats don't predict outcome. Which is why the various Dupuy attempts failed to work.

If you win more than you lose it's because you're a good player. It's not because you've correctly sussed out the minor possible benefits of one particular type of vehicle vs. another.

Steve

Steve, the nature of PBEM H2H encourages this sort of absorption in the minutiae though doesn't it ? You may have a full day before your first turn is due, and you may only be purchasing 5 or 6 AFVs. In these circumstances I can completely understand the desire to have the detail available - what else is there to do ?

[Jock Tamson]

If having your tanks in hull-down positions entails that those tanks will require, on average, a longer time in order to spot an enemy tank, that has quite important tactical consequences. Let me go over a happening in a "CW First Clash" game I had at The Blitz with Barre (hats off to him, by the way).

That scenario depicts a meeting engagement between a Polish and a Waffen SS recon battlegroups, where the terrain consists of a quite deep forested valley dominated by rolling hills on each side. Each force has the opportunity to deploy their armour on the high-ground, overwatching parts of the valley as well as the higher-ground on the other side. The German side (this is an subjective appraisal) offered much better opportunities to deploy armour in hull-down position.

I was playing the German side and I kept my heavy armour in reserve - relatively speaking, as these were Mk IV's - while the faster, thin skinned German AFV's raced along the main routes in search of the enemy forces. My opponent met the light AFVs with a couple Cromwells, which did indeed have a field day. My opponent had those Cromwells sitting on the open, as he wasn't very afraid.

I immediately ordered three of my Pz IV's to advance along a covered route towards hull-down positions slightly to the flank of the enemy Cromwells. They got there and for when the 'contact' icon solidified into an actual tank, the Cromwells - sitting on the open - had already started firing on the hull-down Pz IV's.

That was a difference of perhaps 20 or 30 seconds, not much yet crucial, since by the time my crews were firing their first shots - and getting their shots too short or too long, as expected - the Cromwells' crews had already taken those 'off range' shots, and their next shots knocked two Mk IV's in quick succession with turret penetrations (both crews bailed out).

I wasn't aware at the time of how important could be that difference - as in allowing the enemy enough time to get a good firing solution before my troops did. In hindsight, if I had been aware of this asymmetry in spotting - which makes perfect sense now, as the Cromwells by being on the open, had more chances to spot than my Mk IV's, by having more "Eyeball Mk I sensors" available - I wouldn't have gambled on taking out the Cromwells (and putting the Mk IV's in hull-down positions, where they're surprisingly yet historically-correct vulnerable).

There is something else going on here other than the spotting asymmetry. The AFVs had contact with the Cromwells but the Mk IVs didn't. So when you move them into their flanking positions they are spotting without any prior knowledge of the existence of the Cromwells or their positions. It can be very easy to forget this as the player with the God's Eye View. In these sorts of circumstances I might try and get one unit in the troop to spot them before moving the others up, or even dismount one crew for recon. Also, given what we know about cumulative crew spotting, maybe try and get HD positions from the rear quarters of the targets so that the target loses some of its spotters?

Of course if I was playing "intuitively" as Steve recommends, I might slow move them into HD flanking positions and expect to get the bounce on tanks sitting out in the open... . Intuitively, that should work. The problem is that your tanks don't know that you are sneaking them into a HD position for a purpose. Maybe setting a narrow target arc in these circumstances should load the odds slightly more in favour of the HD units? (for the avoidance of doubt, arcs don't add a spotting advantage, I am suggesting that maybe they should add a "focus" modifier).

[Erwin]

This is a fascinating thread as I never would have thought that there would be situations where being hull-down could generally have more fatal consequences compared to sitting out in the open. This would completely change the way I play. I can't be the only one.

You tankers out there, is this for real?

[Sgt Joch]

I immediately ordered three of my Pz IV's to advance along a covered route towards hull-down positions slightly to the flank of the enemy Cromwells. They got there and for when the 'contact' icon solidified into an actual tank, the Cromwells - sitting on the open - had already started firing on the hull-down Pz IV's.

That was a difference of perhaps 20 or 30 seconds, not much yet crucial, since by the time my crews were firing their first shots - and getting their shots too short or too long, as expected - the Cromwells' crews had already taken those 'off range' shots, and their next shots knocked two Mk IV's in quick succession with turret penetrations (both crews bailed out).

I wasn't aware at the time of how important could be that difference - as in allowing the enemy enough time to get a good firing solution before my troops did. In hindsight, if I had been aware of this asymmetry in spotting - which makes perfect sense now, as the Cromwells by being on the open, had more chances to spot than my Mk IV's, by having more "Eyeball Mk I sensors" available - I wouldn't have gambled on taking out the Cromwells (and putting the Mk IV's in hull-down positions, where they're surprisingly yet historically-correct vulnerable).

Most likely the Cromwells got the jump because they were stationary and your PzIVs were moving. There is also the question of whether your PzIVs were hulldown. There is also a random factor which can have a big impact.

Guys, I would not read too much into this thread or change your tactics. The tests raise some interesting point which we are looking at, but in tests I ran over the weekend, stationary hulldown tanks always spotted tanks moving in the open first, an average of 80 seconds faster.

One important point is to make sure your tank is "hulldown" as far as the game is concerned. To be sure, you have to get it down as low as possible, low enough so that the gun just clears the obstacle.

[Battlefront.com]

There is something else going on here other than the spotting asymmetry.

I'm sure of that and I'm sure it's more than one thing. As I've said several times now, and it should be repeated, it's a very bad idea to draw too many conclusions about how this behavior works in the average game. There are so many variables in play in a given battlefield game condition that it's pretty much impossible for any one thing to be consistently the sole cause of a particular situation.

BletchleyGeek's example is also from memory and that's never a good thing to use for this sort of discussion. It's anecdotal and unverifiable. It's been my experience that players miss something basic that another set of eyes would pick up on right away. It's hard enough to deliberately set up a test that isolates a single CM factor, it's neigh impossible to do that from an actual game played.

No slight on BletchleyGeek here at all, because we all look for reasons why something bad happened to us in a game. And since we are all Human, we tend to favor reasons that don't involve us making mistakes

This is a fascinating thread as I never would have thought that there would be situations where being hull-down could generally have more fatal consequences compared to sitting out in the open.

That's because it's completely not true You're misreading this thread if you think that. First of all, nobody has done a test that even remotely tests that hypothesis of harm, therefore the opinion you've formed is based on imagination. Second, actual game behaviors are a complex interplay of many variables. It could be that the average conditions aren't impacted by the variable much, if at all.

Which is to say that this whole discussion could be about conditions which may affect 1 in 100 engagements for all we know. For sure it doesn't affect 100 in 100 engagements in a negative way. I can say that with absolute confidence.

You tankers out there, is this for real?

It's not even "real" in the game

Guys, I would not read too much into this thread or change your tactics.

Quite! Especially because being behind something like a berm or a wall still provides protection, even if you're not getting the sort of spotting bonus you expect. Of the two factors, having protection is the more important of the two.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Oh, and another thing. We've made no changes to this part of the code since probably 2008 or 2009. Certainly not since CMBN and CMFI were released. If the problem was as horrid as some think it is, how do you explain it taking thousands of alert players upwards of 5 years to even raise the question?

The only conclusions I can come to is either the problem isn't very big or you guys aren't very observant. Since I've been interacting with you for almost 15 years, I absolutely don't consider you guys unobservant. Therefore... the problem, as it plays out in actual gameplay, can't be all that important a factor.

Steve

[Dadekster]

Ime while operating a Sheridan what Sgt Joch said is pretty much spot on. If you are stationary and paying attention something that moves tends to catch your eye pretty quickly especially if it silhouettes itself. Now being hull down and stationary and something else moving to you is a HUGE advantage. That's like shooting fish in a barrel. I cannot emphasize how hard it is to spot when a track is moving fast across uneven terrain. Also when you crest a hill it takes a second for the eye to take it all in so to say. This stuff starts to add up and experience starts to make a difference as well.

IF there is anything that could improve on via the interface it would be something akin to being able to drag a LOS tool to a spot and it telling you the % of hull down the unit is at relative to the spot you are sighting. Moving it around would give you an idea of how hull down you are to the terrain in front of you.

I also had a question which ties into this scenario above. If you stop short of this crest, dismount the TC and he crawls up to the crest and gets eyeballs on these Cromwells when he gets back to his track/platoon will this pay off in shortening up the spotting/acquisition time for the rest of the platoon or do we still need to handle this manual via an arc? Just curious as I naturally want to let the TacAI handle this if I can. I don't like meddling if I don't need to and I like the 'men' to handle things on their own.

[Vanir Ausf B]

One important point is to make sure your tank is "hulldown" as far as the game is concerned. To be sure, you have to get it down as low as possible, low enough so that the gun just clears the obstacle.

Actually, it's not clear if that is a good idea. Being completely hull down may be preferable to being completely exposed if the cover benefit outweighs the spotting penalty. But that has not been established to be true, to my knowledge. What my testing suggests is that there is a sweet spot that maximizes cover while incurring no spotting penalty, which is when the tank is mostly but not completely hull down. I would recommend people only get low enough to where the top of the hull barely clears the obstacle.

[Battlefront.com]

Ime while operating a Sheridan what Sgt Joch said is pretty much spot on.

Yup, and the game models that explicitly. BletchleyGeek's example, therefore, likely had nothing to do with the topic of this thread. Instead it's an example of misunderstanding a pretty fundamental battlefield condition. And that is:

A unit in motion is easier to be spotted, harder to spot something else. Be it a foot unit or a vehicle, the principle is exactly the same.

This is true even for advanced vehicles like the Abrams. While for sure it can spot better on the move than a WW2 vehicle, it's still as easily spotted while moving as a similar sized WW2 vehicle.

IF there is anything that could improve on via the interface it would be something akin to being able to drag a LOS tool to a spot and it telling you the % of hull down the unit is at relative to the spot you are sighting. Moving it around would give you an idea of how hull down you are to the terrain in front of you.

That's the sort of thing we deliberately don't want to do. The player already has way too much information at his disposal vs. a real life commander or individual tanker. In real life it is very difficult to find good hull down positions where you want them overlooking what you want them to. Allowing the player to use the LOS tool anywhere on the map would eliminate that completely.

I also had a question which ties into this scenario above. If you stop short of this crest, dismount the TC and he crawls up to the crest and gets eyeballs on these Cromwells when he gets back to his track/platoon will this pay off in shortening up the spotting/acquisition time for the rest of the platoon or do we still need to handle this manual via an arc? Just curious as I naturally want to let the TacAI handle this if I can. I don't like meddling if I don't need to and I like the 'men' to handle things on their own.

I've never tried it, but the spotting info is stored by the crew and not the vehicle. In theory if you move the crew back fast enough to get to the radio it should be able to transmit the information around the net. Speed is important because once the crew is out of visual contact it will start to "lose" spotting information.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Actually, it's not clear if that is a good idea. Being completely hull down may be preferable to being completely exposed if the cover benefit outweighs the spotting penalty. But that has not been established to be true, to my knowledge. What my testing suggests is that there is a sweet spot that maximizes cover while incurring no spotting penalty, which is when the tank is mostly but not completely hull down. I would recommend people only get low enough to where the top of the hull barely clears the obstacle.

Yup, our internal testing is showing the same thing. It's because the "window of opportunity" to be Hull Down is likely too narrow for Very Tall tanks (of which the Panther is one). And that means in one circumstance you can gain protection and not lose situational awareness vs. another where you only get a tiny bit more protection but at the price of significant situational awareness loss.

This is something Charles is looking into tweaking. The other issue, which is the reduction in situational awareness, is a separate issue that's also being looked at.

Steve

[futon river crossing]

The AT Guns thread to do with some Battlefront love too, you know

[Vanir Ausf B]

I have done some very limited testing of spotting moving vs stationary tanks and I can echo Sgt Joch's comments to the effect that movement seems to trump all other factors in importance. But what I don't know for sure is to what extent speed makes a difference. My testing suggested that speed makes no difference in how easily a moving tank is spotted, but may make some difference in how much the moving tank's spotting is degraded.

[Battlefront.com]

Outgoing spotting is absolutely negatively affected by speed. Faster you go, the worse you spot. That's true for all units.

It is also easier to spot a fast moving unit than a slower moving unit. However, circumstances can conspire to make the chances effectively the same. For example, a fast moving tank and a slow moving tank in the open with lots of eyeballs on the area at decent ranges will likely have them spotted at the same time. A slow moving tank in moderate cover should be harder to spot than a slow moving tank in the open. At long ranges with some cover I expect a slow moving tank would be harder to spot than a fast moving one.

Again, these principles are not specific to vehicles, though of course the details are specific to the units themselves.

Steve

[Sgt Joch]

Actually, it's not clear if that is a good idea. Being completely hull down may be preferable to being completely exposed if the cover benefit outweighs the spotting penalty. But that has not been established to be true, to my knowledge. What my testing suggests is that there is a sweet spot that maximizes cover while incurring no spotting penalty, which is when the tank is mostly but not completely hull down. I would recommend people only get low enough to where the top of the hull barely clears the obstacle.

The problem is that the exact spot where a tank is considered to be hull down is "fuzzy" and varies from tank to tank. It is hard to give a general rule of thumb.

My limited testing seems to suggest that the benefits of being hulldown outweigh the spotting penalty, hence my suggestion to make sure you really are hulldown.

Of course, YMMV.

[Vanir Ausf B]

The problem is that the exact spot where a tank is considered to be hull down is "fuzzy" and varies from tank to tank. It is hard to give a general rule of thumb.

The rule of thumb is that if the outgoing target line is grey the tank is completely hull down. If is it blue then it is not. This should be true of any tank in which the driver and bow gunner see forward through roof-mounted periscopes.

[Sgt Joch]

The rule of thumb is that if the outgoing target line is grey the tank is completely hull down. If is it blue then it is not. This should be true of any tank in which the driver and bow gunner see forward through roof-mounted periscopes.

so you don't need my help then do you?

[Vanir Ausf B]

To find partial hull down positions? Noooo. Why on earth would I

But if you would like to, say, test the spotting time of the Jagdpanther vs the Sherman 76 at 1200 meters that would save me about 6 hours

[kensal]

I don't agree. We're talking about crew training levels, not overall force wide capabilities. The Germans maintained very high standards for crews pretty much through to the end of the war. I doubt very much that the crews in Arracourt would be considered "Green" and absolutely they were not "Conscript". The factors that caused numerous operational and tactical defeats are vastly more complex than that anyway.

Plus, the units getting Jagdpanthers were generally seasoned units with seasoned crews that switched out other vehicles for the Jagdpanthers. For the most part they were not manned by entire crews straight out of bootcamp.

I am not sure that I agree with this. The panzer brigades were manned by a mixture of seasoned troops but also many who were not. Perhaps more crucially though the formations had virtually no time to train together and I personally don't think that all the crews for the armoured elements for these formations would necessarily be deserving of regular or better status.

A similar point can be made about 12SS in Normandy, which undoubtedly had very high commitment but lacked training. The handling of its tanks in the early part of Normandy did not suggest that they were very well trained. I don't think a green status would be unreasonable given that green is indicative, AFAIK, of not having been in battle before

[A Canadian Cat]

...What my testing suggests is that there is a sweet spot that maximizes cover while incurring no spotting penalty, which is when the tank is mostly but not completely hull down. I would recommend people only get low enough to where the top of the hull barely clears the obstacle.

I would hesitate to change our tactics very far away from what works in real life. Because:

It's because the "window of opportunity" to be Hull Down is likely too narrow for Very Tall tanks...This is something Charles is looking into tweaking. The other issue, which is the reduction in situational awareness, is a separate issue that's also being looked at.

Things are going to be tweaked and then you will be better off doing the RL right thing again.

Frankly as stated this problem is on a fairly narrow circumstance. Most of the encounters we have in game are not effected by this. Doing the Right Thing is the best policy. So, don't go teaching your self any bad habits

[Battlefront.com]

I am not sure that I agree with this. The panzer brigades were manned by a mixture of seasoned troops but also many who were not. Perhaps more crucially though the formations had virtually no time to train together and I personally don't think that all the crews for the armoured elements for these formations would necessarily be deserving of regular or better status.

A similar point can be made about 12SS in Normandy, which undoubtedly had very high commitment but lacked training. The handling of its tanks in the early part of Normandy did not suggest that they were very well trained. I don't think a green status would be unreasonable given that green is indicative, AFAIK, of not having been in battle before

Again, there's a difference between individual crew training and formation training. The game only simulates individual crew capabilities. You, the player, are providing 100% of the formation based experience. The two things should never be confused.

I have some personal experience related to the difference. Many years ago we were in negotiations with the US Army's TRADOC AT missile systems group. As they put it, their crews had the best training and simulators (very fun too ). They could be relied upon to effectively engage anything they got into their view. However, the training of NCOs and officers necessary to get the crews in to those positions was not very good. Mostly because military budget cuts had dramatically curtailed large scale training maneuvers. Battalion staffs did exercises on computers and map tables, crews did training in simulators and classrooms. They weren't out in the field together with combined arms groups in the real world. There's a big difference between an elevation line on a map and a viable firing position in reality.

Anyway, my point here is that Panzer Brigades largely suffered from adequately trained crews led by inadequately trained officers. Mostly because there was no established doctrine about how to use these units to their best advantages while at the same time avoiding their weaknesses. If they had a few more months to train in realistic conditions I'm sure they would have performed a lot better than they did even if crew quality didn't change one iota. They would have performed even better still if they weren't tossed into combat by senior officers who hadn't a clue what to do with them.

Steve

[Vanir Ausf B]

I would hesitate to change our tactics very far away from what works in real life.

The distance between partial and fully hull down positions is almost never very far.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Anyway, my point here is that Panzer Brigades largely suffered from adequately trained crews led by inadequately trained officers. Mostly because there was no established doctrine about how to use these units to their best advantages while at the same time avoiding their weaknesses. If they had a few more months to train in realistic conditions I'm sure they would have performed a lot better than they did even if crew quality didn't change one iota. They would have performed even better still if they weren't tossed into combat by senior officers who hadn't a clue what to do with them.

IIRC there were structural problems with the Brigades. They were all teeth and no tail, meaning they lacked much of the support personnel found in the divisions such as maintenance. Also, IIRC they lacked dedicated reconnaissance units. Consequently the Panthers blundered into one ambush after another.

[Battlefront.com]

IIRC there were structural problems with the Brigades. They were all teeth and no tail, meaning they lacked much of the support personnel found in the divisions such as maintenance. Also, IIRC they lacked dedicated reconnaissance units. Consequently the Panthers blundered into one ambush after another.

Yes, that was a primary deficiency. The other one is that the infantry relied far too heavily on their vehicles for support. In conditions where the vehicles couldn't maneuver (no roads, bad roads, air threat, etc.) the infantry didn't have sufficient independence to stand up to enemy infantry.

From what I know the Panzer Brigades were given their own sectors of the front, like a KG from a Panzer or PzGren Division. The difference is that the latter two formations had a lot more combined arms and dismounted fighting capabilities vs. the Panzer Brigades. Other independent units, such as Tiger, PzJäger, Stug, etc. would be assigned to sectors that had infantry in them OR would be given more limited roles like smashing a break through. The Panzer Brigades, as far as I know, weren't used like that.

Again, I don't want to say that there was NO way the Panzer Brigades could have been used effectively if conditions had been different. All I can say is that conditions were not different and they got chewed to pieces as a result.

The Soviets had similar problems with several of their formations. In particular Tank Brigades/Regiments. The thinking was they would race ahead and by the time they got bogged down the infantry would arrive to solidify the gains. There's more than a few examples where the Soviets lost hundreds AFVs before the infantry got into place.

Steve

[BletchleyGeek]

There is something else going on here other than the spotting asymmetry. The AFVs had contact with the Cromwells but the Mk IVs didn't. So when you move them into their flanking positions they are spotting without any prior knowledge of the existence of the Cromwells or their positions. It can be very easy to forget this as the player with the God's Eye View. In these sorts of circumstances I might try and get one unit in the troop to spot them before moving the others up, or even dismount one crew for recon. Also, given what we know about cumulative crew spotting, maybe try and get HD positions from the rear quarters of the targets so that the target loses some of its spotters?

Yes, the dismounting and doing recon sounded good, but here the idea was to jump on the Cromwells while they were "busy" slaughtering those beautiful Pz II Lynx and other fancy German recon vehicles. So time was a factor here, but perhaps not so much as I thought while playing this particular situation.

Of course if I was playing "intuitively" as Steve recommends, I might slow move them into HD flanking positions and expect to get the bounce on tanks sitting out in the open... . Intuitively, that should work. The problem is that your tanks don't know that you are sneaking them into a HD position for a purpose. Maybe setting a narrow target arc in these circumstances should load the odds slightly more in favour of the HD units? (for the avoidance of doubt, arcs don't add a spotting advantage, I am suggesting that maybe they should add a "focus" modifier).

Actually, pnzrldr pointed that out on his post on Bil's blog and I'm trying to get used to do that. Indeed, there's no spotting bonus per se, other than that of having the crew "probing" a narrower frontage.

Most likely the Cromwells got the jump because they were stationary and your PzIVs were moving. There is also the question of whether your PzIVs were hulldown. There is also a random factor which can have a big impact.

They were hull down, if you check the map, the location of the Pz IV's was right behind the little crest dominating the bridge in the middle of the map (on the German side of the map). By the way, it's one of the most interesting maps I've ever played in CM (Thanks GeorgeMC!).

On the other hand, it's true that since the Cromwells were stationary, there was indeed the possibility their location was given away by the sound of the engines - thus attracting the attention of the Cromwell crews earlier than I would have liked to.

Guys, I would not read too much into this thread or change your tactics. The tests raise some interesting point which we are looking at, but in tests I ran over the weekend, stationary hulldown tanks always spotted tanks moving in the open first, an average of 80 seconds faster.

What you have said, really. Deploying armor in hull down is indeed a viable and effective tactic. The question was that this variability in spotting kind of offered a better explanation than anything else for that particular episode.

BletchleyGeek's example is also from memory and that's never a good thing to use for this sort of discussion. It's anecdotal and unverifiable. It's been my experience that players miss something basic that another set of eyes would pick up on right away. It's hard enough to deliberately set up a test that isolates a single CM factor, it's neigh impossible to do that from an actual game played.

No slight on BletchleyGeek here at all, because we all look for reasons why something bad happened to us in a game. And since we are all Human, we tend to favor reasons that don't involve us making mistakes

Well, maybe Barre can confirm my memories. Which as you say, are faulty by definition

Hey, I will admit readily that I made a mistake. I didn't make that comment to cast doubt on the model you have in the engine (i.e. "Ye Gods didn't smile upon Me that day"). But rather, as an example of how tactically important is this spotting variability.

And also, a little reminder that tactical principles - such as deploying tanks in hull-down position - aren't just trump cards you pull out your sleeve (ahem, deck) to stomp your opponent. Things are more complex in CMx2, and that complexity, even if it bites your rear, it's what makes this engine interesting.

This is not Conflict of Heroes