Annoying, unbelievable tank spotting

[John Kettler]

Here's some material directly pertinent to the whole tank spotting issue.

No product at link!

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/vehicles/tanks/shermantank.htm

(Fair Use)

"All tanks of this period shared a number of inherent weaknesses. The crewmen inside a tank were half blind. Narrow vision slits and optical instruments with a limited field of view were their eye on the battlefield. Spotting the usually well-concealed enemy machine-guns against which the infantry demanded the tanks' help was not easy, especially when the tank was pitching and rolling as it moved. Enemy anti-tank guns presented similar problems of detection, and for most of the war German anti-tank guns were capable of destroying British (and Canadian) tanks at ranges of many hundreds of yards. British (and Canadian) tanks could not hope to prosper unless those guns were identified and dealt with.'

Not only were tank crewmen half-blind in their steel shells, they were half-deaf too. No man sat more than a few feet from the engine. Its noise quite overwhelmed the reports of firearms and explosions that might otherwise have helped to compensate for limited vision. Slow to detect danger, tanks were also slow to react when they did. Even the lightes tank was a clumsy device. It could not fall flat on the ground, stop, start or change direction in a split second, as a man could. A rut in a track might be enough to protect a man from direct fire; a tank required at least ten feet of depth. From his rut, an infantryman could see and hear what was happening on the battlefield around him with far less hindrance than a tank commander. Although the latter might put his head out of the turret, silhouetted against the sky he presented an irresistible target to enemy snipers. If he eluded that peril and spotted a target, traversing the main gun took precious seconds. Whereas a rifleman or light machine-gunner could have his weapon pointing towards a target almost immediately.

In areas where the tank was weak - sensory perception and agility - the infantryman on the ground was strong. Fire-power and bullet-resistance, faculties in which the tank was strong, were weak links for the infantryman. 2

Visibility

In January 1945, only one tank of the South Alberta Regiment had a commander's cupola with vision blocks.3 Most Canadian Sherman crews in the Second World War were faced with the choice of restricted fields of vision using periscopes, or dangerous exposure to enemy fire through open or partially open hatches. Some maneuvers were particularly difficult - such as backing the Sherman up. Reversing out of trouble was often preferred as the armour of the Sherman was much thicker in the front than in the rear. Other times, tight terrain or other obstacles made reversing the only way to maneuver. As restrictive as vision was forward, it was non-existent in reverse and the driver had no rear view mirror to guide him. When his tank was on an icy dyke at Kapelsche Veer, Lieutenant Ken Little of the SAR found he couldn't turn around.

As his driver's vision to the rear was extremely limited, Ken opened his hatch to guide the man through this tricky manoeuvre and was killed instantly when a German sniper shot him in the head.4"

(Fair Use)

Regards,

John Kettler

[Wodin]

I think it's more or less well known that the vision from WW2 tanks was pretty poor and very poor to the rear, plus very noisy and hot.

[Erwin]

Yes, it is a bit of a weakness of the game that our tanks can spot seemingly with ease - even when in battle, with smoke, in trees at night etc.

[Vark]

Um, the possibility that the tanks are behaving in an unhistorical manner might constitute more than a 'bit of a weakness' to a game that rightly prides its accuracy, in simulating tactical combat.

[A Canadian Cat]

I think it's more or less well known that the vision from WW2 tanks was pretty poor and very poor to the rear, plus very noisy and hot.

Yeah but that description does not match well with the game at all. This is the kind of thing that we need to be able to make sense of the testing that some have been doing. After reading that I would declare my testing shows that the tanks spot much to well to the rear and sides.

So, is there consensus that that passage quoted by John above is a reasonable representation?

[A Canadian Cat]

Not only were tank crewmen half-blind in their steel shells, they were half-deaf too. No man sat more than a few feet from the engine. Its noise quite overwhelmed the reports of firearms and explosions that might otherwise have helped to compensate for limited vision.

Now this I have seen very well represented in the game. I once had a platoon of Royal Tigers sitting behind a hill waiting for their que to attack. On their right flank was a long strip of forest separating their position from the next field. They were waiting for their infantry support to arrive - by truck. While sitting there they had no contacts. For many many turns. When the infantry arrived - in the truck same thing. No contact. Just moments after the infantry dismounted contacts started appearing in the next field. The infantry had heard the enemy attempting to flank my position. It was a brilliant game moment such a shock.

The Platoon commander was able to tell the tank platoon commander that there were tanks attempting to flank his position and they responded appropriately. Sadly for the enemy they were attacking without infantry support and did not hear my guys coming. The slaughter was dramatic.

Wonderful game moment and brilliantly designed game mechanics.

[Erwin]

If that were the norm, there wouldn't be the concerns that are continuously listed here. For every good experience s above, there are too many bad/inaccurate ones.

It's like the claims that wearing a seatbelt is dangerous 'cos of a few people trapped in burning cars etc.

[A Canadian Cat]

If that were the norm, there wouldn't be the concerns that are continuously listed here. For every good experience s above, there are too many bad/inaccurate ones.

It's like the claims that wearing a seatbelt is dangerous 'cos of a few people trapped in burning cars etc.

Oh, I was not using my example of tank crews not hearing to say things are good with spotting. I was saying it seems that tank crews hearing does seem to be taken into account.

[Oddball_E8]

If that were the norm, there wouldn't be the concerns that are continuously listed here. For every good experience s above, there are too many bad/inaccurate ones.

It's like the claims that wearing a seatbelt is dangerous 'cos of a few people trapped in burning cars etc.

Actually I feel that it is the other way around.

And mainly because the "bad" experiences stand out so much more.

I cannot count the times my tanks have been unable to spot things right infront of them, never mind behind them.

But every now and then I get this "miracle spotting" and i always chalk it up to being the random time when my tank commander randomly looks in the right direction at the right time.

But because people tend to remember the "bad" moments more than the "good" moments, they can easily use them as examples and make it seem like there is an overwhelming number of times when this happens.

But they never count the times it doesn't happen.

[A Canadian Cat]

OK I regret bring up my example about tank crews being unable to hear. It was not testing it was just one example.

Lets get back to some data. If you look at my post #66 http://www.battlefront.com/community/showpost.php?p=1466736&postcount=66

You can see that Tanks spot a two man infantry coming up from their 7-8 o'clock before the infantry fired on them 52% of the time. Wow. That seems high compared to the description of tank visibility in the above.

We still have a problem though: is that description accurate? If so is 52% spotting in line with the description or not?

[John Kettler]

Here is a direct example of what can be seen (and shot at) from a buttoned tank. It's taken directly from a thorough WW II analysis by the Germans of the early T-34/76 and forms part of Infantry Versus Soviet Tanks, an article written by former Panzerjaeger in the East, Kurt Fischer. Hope this is cool with Moon!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/105589859/1971-AFV-G2-Volume-3-No-4

Regards,

John Kettler

[Wodin]

Well looks like it has been addressed abit in the upcoming MG and following patch.

[A Canadian Cat]

Well looks like it has been addressed abit in the upcoming MG and following patch.

What did I miss? I do not remember reading anything about that. Any reference please.

[A Canadian Cat]

It's taken directly from a thorough WW II analysis by the Germans of the early T-34/76

That is totally cool.

One thing I noticed is the time spent finding out how close to the tank you need to be to no longer be seen. Tweaking spotting to account for in close blind spots might go along way to mitigating the lack of gun depression limits. If the tank cannot see the enemy in close then they cannot fire at them. In other words eliminate the issues of tanks shooting enemy infantry in close by making it impossible to spot them - instead of attacking the whole issue of the AI reacting to things it can see but not target because of gun elevation limits. That would be helpful for when your infantry do get a chance to assault they actually would be safe Xm behind the tank where they cannot be seen. Whereas now the tank will shoot them through its own engine because they are able to see in close.

Just a suggestions - I am sure there are things I cannot foresee that might make it more difficult than I expect. Not to mention the difficulty of getting data like that for all AFVs.

[A Canadian Cat]

Ok I wrote those last two posts before reading http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=111569 especially #4 and #6 which are relevant to the above.

[Blazing 88's]

True, and mostly seems to be a good guy. But he still can't spell 'weird' correctly.

Michael

I thought of mentioning this, as several years ago he corrected a spelling error (typo) I made in one of my posts. Then I thought to myself... nah it's just a message board.