CMBN: Dien Bien Phu!

[Sublime]

No I meant the French backed themselves into the situation, the Viet Minh perhaps would have settled for way more favorable terms (to the French) if the French hadnt destroyed all their credibility by violating numerous accords and treaties.

In fact the 'French' forces were hardly French throughout the war. Per Roy and Logevall, though tens of thousands of metropolitan French passed through Indochina they were almost universally officers, and assigned to higher HQs, supply, admin. In essence- REMFs. At first African colonial troops were not used, per DeGaulle and fears they'd be sympathetic to the VM and perhaps export the revolutionary ideas home. However by 47 that was out the window because of manpower shortages. The troops were heavily German, African, other colonials, and of course Vietnamese.

It should also be noted that higher HQ, usually had superb intelligence on VM intentions and plans. However, on the ground this wasnt the same, and the French had no effective way of figuring out who was who in whatever village, or what was going on at the tactical level intel wise. So while higher could tell the boots what was going on, the reverse wasn't always true, and even if it was higher wasn't listening.

The manpower shortages were bad enough that truck drivers could only be used solo, no 2 man teams for the trucks whatsoever, even though the driving conditions and danger called for such a setup.

As Logevall puts it, 'French authority only extended to the distance of it's soldier's rifle range on either side of major roads.' (yeah I paraphrased.) Just like later with the US at Hamburger Hill and thousands of other places, the French perhaps could seize a territorial objective, but once they left it was lost. They weren't winning the people...

Also interesting is to read about the 'piano keys' dug on the sides of nearly all the roads throughout Vietnam. VM or even simple villagers sympathetic would dig these pits/trenches along the roads. I guess to facilitate ambushes, and just cause trouble. Of course the French would come along and make the villagers fill them in. Only to have them dug out again at night. And on it goes...

p.s. if something seems off maybe it's also because thats not the paper. Just ideas i was tossing around earlier. Im still writing down random ideas, thoughts, to put it all together hopefully tomorrow or monday.

[LongLeftFlank]

Well this is a large topic and I assume you have other (less interesting) courses. Get your prof to help you form a specific hypothesis statement to test in your (20 page?) paper. Then stick to that. I'm assuming this is not a thesis paper. Overachieving to ace this course but bombing the others is not your best strategy. Roy and Windrow alone took me quite some time to read.

[John Kettler]

Sublime,

I presented this early in the thread, but it seems germane to where you are now in your research. Taken from AIR FORCE magazine, and written by Contributing Editor, Rebecca Grant, this is a detailed, insightful look at airpower and DBP, with particular emphasis on Operation Vulture and what that might've entailed. The bit about using C-119s as napalm bombers reminds me more than a little of Ju-52s, operating as bombers, over Guernica Spain, during the Spanish Civil War.

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2004/August%202004/0804dien.aspx

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sublime]

Thx. Interesting about the C-119s, I'd read about them using them in that role during the Day Battles in '51 around Hanoi (Giap's disastrous offensive against the deLattre line and the first French use of napalm) but I'd thought it was just a method borne of necessity at the time, as the first US exports of aircraft had just started arriving earlier that year. Though I guess it would be an ideal 'bomber' for napalm in that situation..?

[LongLeftFlank]

That's all treated in Windrow.

[Sublime]

which I havent gotten to yet. Windrow's going to end up being read purely for pleasure. most of roy is done, along with the Logevall, which has been quite enough for my purposes of the paper.

Like you said I cant let the other classes slide anyways, though fortunately for me they're all very interesting as well. Just maybe a little less than my war in vietnam class

[LongLeftFlank]

Just be careful with Roy -- like journalist Bernard Fall, he was a well-known writer and not a professional historian. And his book was written at a time when the wounds of Algeria and the "paratrooper putsch" amd the fall of the Fourth Republic were still raw and bleeding.

Windrow describes Roy's style as "ad hominem" (in footnotes), which I agree with. He did get face time with a lot of the principal actors, but some of his interviewees clearly swayed him more than others. As a high school history teacher of mine used to quote: "Before you study history, study the historians." Not that you need to go Chomsky deconstructionist or anything, just saying, beware a writer with a beautiful turn of phrase but a visible agenda.

[Erwin]

"Not that you need to go Chomsky deconstructionist or anything, just saying, beware a writer with a beautiful turn of phrase but a visible agenda."

I love that quote LLF!

[Sublime]

Yeah. You mentioned it before, and you.re quite right. I also keep in mind his book was written in 62/63 as well, and that he was a French military officer.

It is a shame Fall was killed in 67 near Hue, I think it would have been really interesting to see what he would have had to say about how the 2nd Indochina war ended up..

[John Kettler]

Sublime,

Now, that would've been worth reading. I think he wrote wonderfully insightful books. Another one, in that genre, if you will, was a British pub detailing how the counterinsurgency action in Malaya was successfully fought and won. Helps if the opponent has no friendly/intimidated neighbor/s from which to operate.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sublime]

Now I wanna look up exactly what happened that day he got killed.. It's interesting that the Geneva Accords were much more favorable to the new RVN and French than say the Paris accords to RVN and Americans. For example the Paris accords set no timetable for elections, and there was no need for the VC to 'regroup' back to the North like the Viet Minh had too.

Also interesting that the Paris Accords stated that the RVN had two legitimate poltical entities, the RVN forces and the NLF! No wonder Thieu was outraged! I would have been too. Especially when you consider the US was in a much stronger position than the French, even with it's ground forces pulled out (IMO). Though public opinion was probably significantly more against the war than in France in 54. International opinion too. again IMO.

[bruce90]

Sublime,

Helps if the opponent has no friendly/intimidated neighbor/s from which to operate.

Regards,

John Kettler

True but a sympathetic and sensible approach to the civilian population goes a long way too.

[Sublime]

Exactly Bruce. It's very telling that NLF and PLAF soldiers had very clear instructions to not fool around with villagers daughters, help if villagers needed help, pick up after themselves, be respectful etc. In marked contrast to US or French soldiers, and the even worse ARVN and ROK troops. Plus they knew we were supporting the ARVN troops and thats what they'd have to look forward to. Dont get it twisted, Im an American and I dont think the VC were angels by any means, but we really screwed up with our treatment of the civilian populace. Bad.

[John Kettler]

bruce90,

It also helps greatly if the insurgents are a separate and distinct ethnic minority. In this case, it was the Chinese.

Sublime,

The Mao's Red Army in China had similar instructions. I'd observe, though, the VC had absolutely no compunctions about killing anyone (village headmen, teachers, medical workers, religious, administrators, etc.) who in their view threatened their program. Moreover, they mercilessly taxed the villagers for food and other items, and they thought nothing of firing on us from a village, then di diing before the artillery and airstrikes arrived. Smashed, burning villages and the wounded, dying and dead civilians made splendid propaganda. From what I can tell, ARVN troops were generally poorly trained, had low morale and were victimized by corrupt, inept, but politically safe, leaders. There were exceptions, and by late in the war, the ARVN troops could and did give a very good account of themselves. By then, though, the war for hearts and minds had long since been lost. NO verdict on the ROK troops, about whom I know pretty much zero.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sublime]

Oh yes, the VC were very merciless when they wanted to be. No doubt about it. Of course us Americans were too to people we thought were cooperating with the British.

The ARVN troops by and large, even when they gave good combat accounts of themselves were brutal to the civilians and despised. The ROK troops supposedly were tough fighters, but were responsible for nearly all the large massacres of the war of civilians by ground troops. Thats including US and VC troops.

And yeah the VC would often shoot at US troops and run for it, theres accounts of the villagers jeering at them while they ran saying the equivalent of 'hey! where you guys going? why doncha stay for the fun??'

[JasonC]

"By then, though, the war for hearts and minds had long since been lost"

If you change the last word to "won", it would have been closer to the truth.

SVN did not fall to an internal insurgency. The internal insurgency was comprehensively smashed and done with by 1970 at the very latest. There was no intact VC presence in the field in the south after that date. What there was, was entire divisions of NVA regulars just over the border in Laos and Cambodia, regularly raiding into SVN.

And in case everybody just forgot, it took multiple divisions of Russian supplied heavy armor to blitzkrieg SVN. The entire notion that SVN fell to disgruntled farmers is revisionist poppycock - you might as readily say Poland fell to disgruntled German speaking minorities in 1939.

As for low ARVN morale, being abandoned by the free world, ridiculed and despised isn't exactly great for morale, but they were still the last to give up. The morale of the US populace was lower, and the morale of the sainted VC (sic) was lower than both. They gave it up as hopeless 2-3 years earlier, in each case.

[sburke]

"By then, though, the war for hearts and minds had long since been lost"

If you change the last word to "won", it would have been closer to the truth.

SVN did not fall to an internal insurgency. The internal insurgency was comprehensively smashed and done with by 1970 at the very latest. There was no intact VC presence in the field in the south after that date. What there was, was entire divisions of NVA regulars just over the border in Laos and Cambodia, regularly raiding into SVN.

And in case everybody just forgot, it took multiple divisions of Russian supplied heavy armor to blitzkrieg SVN. The entire notion that SVN fell to disgruntled farmers is revisionist poppycock - you might as readily say Poland fell to disgruntled German speaking minorities in 1939.

As for low ARVN morale, being abandoned by the free world, ridiculed and despised isn't exactly great for morale, but they were still the last to give up. The morale of the US populace was lower, and the morale of the sainted VC (sic) was lower than both. They gave it up as hopeless 2-3 years earlier, in each case.

That is certainly one perspective on how the Vietnamese fought the war, but I am gonna respect LLF's wishes this time. If someone cares to open this up in the general forum assuming BF doesn't bounce it for politics fine, but I am gonna try to stay outta this one.

[Sublime]

They gave it up as hopeless 2-3 years earlier, in each case.

Gave it up or were just mostly killed off in Tet? I dont think they gave up. They went for the big all or nothing showdown and got wiped out.

What about the piss poor ARVN morale and performance before being given up by the free world though? I think the fact is that many people were forced into ARVN service and didn't want to be there, same with the VC.

And 'sainted VC' whose deeming the VC as saints?

[John Kettler]

Sublime,

Are you talking about the Tories during the American Revolution? If so, I think you'll find the number of executions minuscule (not to justify them), compared to the VC. This account could hardly be deemed anti Tory and makes fascinating historical reading. It presents much of which I knew almost nothing.

Persecution of the Loyalists (or Tories), Files

http://threerivershms.com/loyalistspersecution.htm

This made my head explode. The numbers are appalling, and I've only glanced through this macabre marvel.

Statistics of Vietnamese Democide, Rummel

http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP6.HTM

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sublime]

Well, Im sure the statistics are nowhere near as comprehensive seeing as how it was 300 years ago as well.

doesnt matter - insert your favorite civil war and you'll see much the same stuff.

[LongLeftFlank]

That is certainly one perspective on how the Vietnamese fought the war, but I am gonna respect LLF's wishes this time. If someone cares to open this up in the general forum assuming BF doesn't bounce it for politics fine, but I am gonna try to stay outta this one.

Appreciated, SBurke, but at this point it's hopeless. I am going to let folks say whatever they like here and then restart a different thread on the scenario design.

FWIW, I agree with JasonC. By 1971 the Viet Cong had shot its bolt. The 5 year US ground war, however costly and frustrating, had depleted the ranks of rural guerrilla fighters -- ambitious "main force" operations and the Tet offensive had accelerated that. Simply put, the Communists were running out of grown men capable of holding rifles and planting mines. ARVN and the security forces (secret police) were getting better and better at identifying and neutralizing (killing, detaining) key cadres. The much ridiculed strategic hamlet program was actually working. ARVN forces were increasingly capable of going anywhere in the country they liked (albeit at some cost) except the underpopulated highland areas.

Again, just in my own opinion, the Republic of Vietnam (South) would have survived a la South Korea had Nixon hung in there with a smaller US ground force for about 2 more years (~1974) -- e.g. keeping 2 Marine divisions in I Corps (Da Nang / DMZ) plus SpecOps and tactical air power (stopping the militarily pointless bombing of the North) and, of course, continued supply and training. For example, Lam Son 719 (the incursion into Laos) would likely have had a very different outcome had a larger expeditionary force of Marines been bolstering the ARVN forces; they could have trapped and severely mauled a couple of NVA divisions.

After a year or two of this (1973), the DRV might well then have been inclined to cave to Chinese pressure and go home, leaving the remnant VC (and the Khmer Rouge) to be bribed into rejoining society or progressively exterminated, forsaken by the weary population. The Hanoi Politburo were certainly not Mao's lapdogs, but if China shut off the supply tap to make nice with America the Russians weren't about to run the blockade into Haiphong just to keep the war going. There would still have been sporadic fighting and terrorism into the 1980s and certainly American/SEATO troops manning a DMZ just as in Korea, but South Vietnam would have survived and Cambodia would have been spared its bizarre holocaust.

Final note: Nothing I have said above makes any kind of judgment on who "shoulda" won, or which parties best represented the hopes, dreams and aspirations of cute Vietnamese children. They were all thugs. But at the end of the day, it is simply indisputable that Commies and Jacobins have a vastly bloodier track record once they actually attain power than any kind of ancien regime.

[LongLeftFlank]

Well, Im sure the statistics are nowhere near as comprehensive seeing as how it was 300 years ago as well. doesnt matter - insert your favorite civil war and you'll see much the same stuff.

No, you will look in vain for widespread "cleansing" of collaborators following the American Revolution, although a number of Tories who found themselves in majority Patriot areas (and probably fled), then lost their property for being on the wrong side. In those days, being deprived of your property was pretty serious, and was quite enough incentive for these folks to move to Canada or the Indies (some of my ancestors among them, btw). The exception of course was the grim fate of those Iroquois tribes who had fought for the British (and had committed some atrocities in doing so).

Recall, the American Revolution was different in that the "revolutionaries" represented a majority of the existing political and economic establishment, as opposed to a previously marginalized group seizing power and displacing (or killing) the former elites in the name of the masses (a la France, Russia, etc.).

In addition, keep in mind that your average Tory lived in an area where the majority of his neighbours shared his opinion. Whole areas of the 13 American colonies remained Tory during the war, whether because their natural economic interests (commerce) lay with Britain or because their leading families retained close links with the mother country or simply stuck to the ancient principle of King and Country, and the common folk followed suit. But once the war ended, it's not like these populations were "cleansed" out by some human wave of Patriots sweeping down from the hills and hollers -- they were simply required to pledge allegiance to the new nation, or else settle their affairs and leave.

[John Kettler]

LongLeftFlank,

Given your remarkable ancestry, it's clear, as they say, you have no dog in this hunt. I agree with your overall characterization of what happened, but I find your analysis of the power blocs, in the American Revolution, as compared to others, most insightful. My only quibble? If people are going to sweep down from the hills, wouldn't the others arriving then come up from the hollers? Of course, this may not be absolutely true in, say, the Smokies!

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

Sublime - ARVN with full US air support defeated the NVA Easter Offensive in 1972 decisively, even though the NVA had at least a division's worth of heavy Russian armor by that point. Without air support and facing several divisions worth of Russian heavy tanks in 1975, they were outclassed. Outside powers simply supported the north longer with major military hardware. All there was to it. All the nonsense about the left being more popular was and is nonsense. They took power at the barrel of Russian 100mm cannon, not elections. They proceeded to kill several hundred thousand people and send millions fleeing the country. And that is pretty much how every communist government in the century seized power, starting with the Russian civil war - by military force.

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

I agree the VC, as a field force, had long since been destroyed. I have read this was a deliberate effort by the North Vietnamese to remove any potential South Vietnamese bloc from participation in the post war government. If no one's left to effectively oppose a move, then things become much simpler for those running North Vietnam.

What I do not concede, though, is that the VC ceased to exist. As I recall, there were VC everywhere when the U.S. was leaving. There were accounts of VC clerical personnel in MACV, VC barbers, VC laundry, VC boot shiners, VC, VC, VC. Then, there was also the tunnel complex of Cu Chi, part of which was directly under a major U.S. base.

I argue that by the time the ARVN got its military act together, the VC had real, if hidden, control of the south. That's what I mean by the war for hearts and minds had been lost. The South Vietnamese government may've thought itself in control, but that was illusory.

LongLeftFlank,

How about those Viet Minh?!

By Dean Acheson

"They were engaged in the most dangerous of all activities – deceiving themselves...France was engaged in a task beyond her strength, indeed, beyond the strength of any external power unless it was acting in support of the dominant local will and purpose."

I'm no great fan of Dean Acheson, but I think what he said was spot on. France was in no position--economically, militarily, logistically, politically and most particularly in national will--to successfully fight and win Dien Bien Phu against the Viet Minh. Of course, the fundamental military location was fatally flawed to begin with. Castles are built on hilltops for a reason!

Any interest in a bunch of great period quotes regarding French agendas, Ho Chi Minh's iron determination, and the deep meaning Dien Bien Phu had for all concerned? Material is part of a heavily documented Hofstra University course pack.

Regards,

John Kettler