CMBN: Dien Bien Phu!

[sburke]

All the nonsense about the left being more popular was and is nonsense. They took power at the barrel of Russian 100mm cannon, not elections. They proceeded to kill several hundred thousand people and send millions fleeing the country. And that is pretty much how every communist government in the century seized power, starting with the Russian civil war - by military force.

They actually did win the elections of January 1946. The French in return backed the guy who had ruled the gov't under Japanese occupation. You can say as often as you'd like that the left wasn't more popular, but by Eisenhower's own statements, if the US had abided by the Geneva accords our guy would have been lucky to get 20% of the vote. We were the ones who refused to recognize any elections and made it an issue that could only be resolved by the gun. That doesn't excuse the actions of the Vietnamese communists, but let's not try and wrap ourselves in something that just didn't exist. We didn't give a damn what the Vietnamese wanted, we supported a gov't so corrupt we had to back a coup against it.

Our own gov't has never shown any reticence about establishing gov't through military force so let's not rattle the old flag of democracy and human rights as if we have some corner on moral authority. Try counting up the number of dead in the war the US waged to control the Phillipines.

[John Kettler]

LongLeftFlank,

Am going to take a flyer here, but if I'm wrong, you'll still find it topical. If I'm right, you may be thrilled.

This site is Vietnam map central.

http://www.rjsmith.com/topo_map.html

At which, there's a 1:50,000 crisp, clear DBP topo map. I wondered how this guy got away with copyrighting a public domain map, but what he's done is added content. Each of the arrows is linked to a file describing what was there, its map coordinates and, sometimes, the significance of the position in terms of the battle. If you don't yet have a good, clear map, this may well make your day.

http://www.rjsmith.com/Dien_Bien_Phu_Cropped.html

You probably have all the books in the DBP Scenario Designer's Notes here, but the glossary would seem useful. Having only the most minuscule knowledge of French military acronyms, I found it educational.

[PDF]

scenario designer's notes for dien bien phu - Scenario Design Center

hist-sdc.com/images/spotlights/sb_dbp/DBP_Notes.pdf

Analysis of the French Defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Thesis, Bloomer, Major, CSC 1991

It's just what the title says, and the author pulls no punches, mercilessly dissecting how what each side did or didn't do there accorded with or violated core military principles. I think this provides an excellent, quickly stated context in which the DBP situation came to be, key decisions were made and events played out.

http://web.mst.edu/~rogersda/umrcourses/ge342/Miltary%20Geo%20Presentations/Bill%20Louie/DBP/The%20French%20Defeat.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

LongLeftFlank,

Here is a historiographic discussion of whether or not the Chinese dictated Viet Minh war plans, as they seem to think, or the Viet Minh, in their view, let the Chinese think so, treating it as yet more advice. At this stage of the discussion, no one seems to really know, but the discussion of sources, biases, cultural overlays, distortions of history regarding China and Vietnam as far back as circa 1400 C.E. and many other topics, make for a stimulating and provocative reading experience. Here's a snippet of what's there.

http://www.lib.washington.edu/SouthEastAsia/vsg/elist_2000/milaid.htm

(Fair Use)

From: "Stephen O'Harrow" <soh@hawaii.edu>

To: "Vietnam Studies Group" <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Subject: Re: More on Chinese military aid, 1950-54

Hello,

For what it's worth: The VM unit which gets a lion's share of the credit for the reduction of the French positions leading up to the final assault, apart from the trenchers and sappers (who appear to have been with various units), was the 351st Artillery. Now Vietnamese sources seem to call it a regiment and the French have referred to it as a division (perhaps because it gave them so much grief that they didn't want to admit it was only a regiment). Just like other famous VPA units (the 308th or "August 30th" unit), the name "351" refers to the date of its founding (in March of 1951), not to the fact that the Viet Minh had 350 previous artillery units. In point of fact, they had zero heavy artillery units before that time. When they did establish the 351st, the VM needed some technical expertise and turned to a former officer in the French artillery who had escaped from the Japanese after the fall of Lang Son in March, 1945; his nom-de-guerre was Vu van Viet. This gentleman had been the DRV number 2 at the Nguyen Hue military academy before the evacuation of Hanoi in December, 1945, and thus was already in the maquis in another capacity. The head of the new unit was a political appointee, but according to the doctrine of "Red & Expert," the VM needed their own senior technician and were not content just to take a Chinese advisor, so it is of interest that Vu van Viet was an accomplished linguist and that he spoke Chinese.

But why wait until 1951 to start an artillery branch? Could it have been that the VM were not capturing French artillery pieces in quantity (either because they did not encounter them left in the field or because the VM really had no use for large cannon up to that time, even if they could get their hands on them) and it was only after the winter of 1950 and the arrival of Mao's troops on the entire length of the Sino-Vietnamese border that any significant quantity of (U.S.-made 75 mm and 105 mm pieces first given to the KMT) cannon became available to the Vietnamese. Looking at the time interval, March, 1951, would have been a logical time to get going on the setting up of a Viet Minh artillery capability if the Chinese were playing a major role in future strategy. The Viet Minh would have been fools not to have taken advantage of this opportunity. At the same time, they would have wanted to keep their hands on key points of decision making, if only for future reference. Thus they appointed a trusted man as their very own technical chief, athwart the possibly Chinese-dominated axis of technical aid.

The discussion continues in Part II here. There may be more.

http://www.lib.washington.edu/SouthEastAsia/vsg/elist_2000/milaid_2.htm

M24s at DBP; detailed discussion of their organization, unit commander, additional ammo loads, operating buttoned up almost constantly, combat use, damage sustained and operational causes. Seems to have some great game chrome.

http://www.network54.com/Forum/47209/message/1267522703/Les+Bisons+at+DBP

(Fair Use)

"Hi Graeme

Ive had a trawl through my library and can tell you some more. Bear in mind that Ive not devoted huge study to the tanks at DBP specifically although they do feature in the histories of the battle as well as in histories of the use of armour in French Indo-China.

Simon Dunstan had the best coverage I have seen of the use of the bison in Vietnam Tracks, an excellent book published in 1982. They operated as three platoons of three, with an additional tank (Conti) for Capt. Hervouët, the commander. A platoon commanded by Lt. Prèaud (Auerstaedt) was detached to Isabelle in the south with the remainder being based in the main position. They were used for patrolling and offensive support tasks but when not on operations, were held in sandbagged revetments with accommodation for the crews and supplies. They saw their first action on 1st February to the north west of Gabrielle and were involved in the counterattack on that position after its capture in the early days of the Viet Minh assault.

From then onwards, they were used in counterattacks although constant artillery fire caused casualties among both crews and vehicles and required crews to operate constantly closed down, Douaumont and Ratisbonne being badly damaged by artillery. Several replacement crewmen were air-dropped (despite a lack of jump training and the somewhat hot drop zone) during the battle although Capt Hervouët continued to command despite having both arms in plaster casts for much of the battle.

High ammunition consumption (typically 60-100 rounds in an engagement) coupled with the 48-round capacity of the M24 required extra ammunition to be carried on the trackguards and engine deck or internally, which was obviously not ideal.

By the end of the battle on 7th May, three tanks were out of action due to problems with the overworked recoil system but there are reports that two sergeants manned one tank (Bazeilles, which remains at the location today) on Eliane 2 and its machine guns were the last weapons heard to be firing in the position.

Simon gives a description of the fates of each tank, of which the highlights are:

Conti Mine damaged on 5th April at Huguette 6, used as pillbox south of airstrip

Mulhouse Hit by rocket on turret on 31st March but continued to fight at Eliane 2

Bazeilles Hit by rocket on 31st March at Eliane 2, burnt out and abandoned

Douaumont Hit by 105mm in right hull front on 29th April. Used as pillbox at Huguette 3

Smolensk Took two 57mm RR hits on 31st March on Eliane 2. Later gearbox failed

Posen Rocket hit on turret on 24th March on road to Isabelle but remained serviceable

Ettlingen Six 57mm RR hits on 31st March at Eliane 2. Rocket hits on 5th April and on turret on 15th April but operational to the end

Auerstaedt IC-94266 Operational throughout

Neumach Rocket hit on turret at nearby village on 31st March but remained operational

Ratisbonne Two 105mm hits at Isabelle on 29th April but remained operational

They were initially uncamouflaged (I assume US No. 9 OD) but earth yellow stripes were painted on at least some tanks during the battle. A photo from Lt. Prèaud of Auerstaedt so camouflaged is included and the same vehicle is depicted in a colour plate in Simons Osprey Vanguard 42 Armour of the Vietnam wars, although it is shown with a three-colour scheme of OD, red ochre and yellow. The only markings seem to have been the name in white and the registration number (Auerstaedts is given above) on the lower part of the turret rear. They appear to have had the metal tracks although some in Indo-China had the rubber block variety.

I have the Squadron/Signal Armor in Vietnam and the Concord books on the subject but there is nothing of note in them on DBP (Concord ignores the French period entirely), although for general reading on the battle with some M24 content, I can very highly recommend Martin Windrows The last valley and the classic by Bernard Fall, Hell in a very small place. I understand that there is another new account recently published but I've not got hold of one yet.

The best photo coverage I have seen is on the Chars Francais site that Ronan suggested, although I do have some other shots of the vehicles as they are today."

And here is the photo set to which he refers. Regrettably, the pictures have no captions, but the tank names are often quite evident.

http://www.chars-francais.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=90&Itemid=41

M24 Smolensk Image 91 In tank revetment; of particular interest is the camouflage job referred to above.

M24 Ney Image 86

M24 Image 39 Turret rear markings and extensive OVM

M24 Image 68 Unknown tank but better camouflage depiction; possible refueling

M24 Image 30 Fuzzy color pic of camouflage

M24 Image 80 Douaumont, much the worse for wear; camouflage evident

M24 Image 58 High resolution color pic of tank as monument; shows camouflage still

M24 Image 87 Posen, full left side view; great camouflage detail

Observations

If you can manage it, the French tankers wore standard soldier helmets, not tanker headgear. All the combat pics I found showed this to be the case.

Regards,

John Kettler

[LongLeftFlank]

*Sigh*

John, once again, there is nothing really new here, that map included... I linked to the original earlier. Eventually, I suppose that if you post enough verbiage, on the monkeys-on-typewriters principle, you'll end up replicating Martin Windrow's book in its totality in this thread. I already have over a hundred pages of detailed notes. Unlike you though, I don't feel a compunction to copy-paste them all here.

You have clearly appointed yourself my (web) research assistant, but how many ways do I have to say it: your "help" is not particularly welcome, as it is so voluminous and so scattershot. Together with all the political polemicizing by others, this continuing mess of links and commentary is making this thread unreadable.

I will likely start a new thread on my DBP scenario design, and if you continue to deluge it, I will complain to the moderators. Or simply not waste my time posting here at all.

[Sublime]

JasonC, you.re one of the smartest and most knowledgable people I recall seeing post on these forums. And Im sure you have more historical knowledge than me, but that doesnt mean you know everything, or are always right. I dont know why you've decided to paint me as a VC sympathizer and apologist. I had family who served in Vietnam, and one who was KIA around 68/69 in My Tho.

However, you.re actually wrong. The left was especially popular during the First Indochina war, and the US and West purposefully did not let the 1956 elections be held as the Geneva Accords stated they were because by the US's own admission they would have elected Ho Chi Minh in a landslide. Its open knowledge the DRV and VC received a lot of Soviet and Chinese aid. However it also should be noted that for example in the first Indochina war the Chinese aid never exceeded 20% of the total supplies and was less than 1/9th of what we were giving to the French. I have statistics for the 2nd Indochina war, but not in front of me and I have class in a couple of hours. I'd be happy to produce those and my sources for them if you want to question them.

Also, Im well aware of the history of the Vietnam war. I know all about the defeat of the 72 offensive, and how we left the ARVN hgh and dry. That being said though, in our limited invasion of Cambodia in 71 we provided air support and helo support to the ARVN who were basically slaughtered in a gigantic mess.

I wasnt there, and nothing in real life and history is black and white, but most US veterans of Vietnam Ive personally spoken to, or read opinions of thought the ARVN sucked and didnt want to even fight the war for their own country.

LLF sorry, I didnt mean to derail the thread, I didnt think the conversation had gotten *too political*. But still, I apologize, you know I like you.

[LongLeftFlank]

No problem Sublime, unlike old farts like me, Burke, Jason and JK, you have your life ahead of you. I am thrilled that someone in the new generation is still interested in these events and is willing to seek the truth, as opposed to falling blindly for 20/20 hindsight revisionist/ grievance claptrap, dumbed down milChannel pap, or worse, conspiracy theories.

[sburke]

No problem Sublime, unlike old farts like me, Burke, Jason and JK, you have your life ahead of you. I am thrilled that someone in the new generation is still interested in these events and is willing to seek the truth, as opposed to falling blindly for 20/20 hindsight revisionist/ grievance claptrap, dumbed down milChannel pap, or worse, conspiracy theories.

who you calling an old fart? Damned hippy! Get off my lawn, you are screwing up the grass mod!

[John Kettler]

LongLeftFlank,

I would've thought the material on tanks, ammo loads, direct links to their pics so you could see the actual tanks named and so on would've been useful. Guess not. Someone else gave you a BEP breakdown, so I, not unreasonably, expected something similar would be welcome for the tanks. I spent considerable time going through the pics and explaining why each one was of significance to what you're doing. Several things which looked interesting I made a point of asking about, rather than presenting them. As for links, I presented very few and explained their topic coverage, so you could decide quickly whether or not you had any interest. On balance, my view was that this was a considerable improvement over what I've provided before. Obviously, you disagree. Strongly. Your words are more measured, but the vibe underlying them is unmistakable.

Pax.

Regards,

John Kettler

[richardsharpe]

Any news on this mod?

[Sublime]

Unfortunately I saw LLF mention in another post he's taking a break from CM so who knows? =(

[Malaspina]

Looking forward to this. Courage LongLeftFlank! (Love your PTO work)

[LongLeftFlank]

Desole, mon brave, but all my CM other than the odd compulsive Forum visit has been suspended for work reasons.

In any case, my last few playtests convinced me that CMing DBP is futile until BFC takes a serious new look at infantry concealment and cover values, especially entrenchments. Mortars and MGs just sit and rapidly shoot defenders out of their holes right now, even at night. No need for the dac cong to storm the wire... Fix or sumfink, s.v.p.

[John Kettler]

LongLeftFlank,

This may not ever see your eyes, but I came across a book you may not have on DBP and thought of you. Hamilton Book is practically giving away (~$5) The Angel of Dien Bien Phu, the story of a French flight nurse who was the only French woman there.

Regards,

John Kettler