Why is it the Brits never had a semi-auto rifle?

[John Kettler]

Streety,

A most interesting story about the Waal crossing and the context thereof. I wonder whether you'd care to say something about an alleged similar tea break when the British could supposedly have seized Caen on D-DaY? As I recall, the Americans were disgusted.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sublime]

Id like to point out I was referencing the book ABTF - not the movie. The movie isn't that bad, but I'm not in the business of referencing Hollywood movies for historical facts. Not that books are necessarily always better. Also, the American and not biggest fan of Monty thing. First of all I should point out I'm not a veteran, and I've never seen combat. Monty saw combat in WW1 as a low grade officer in the Brit Army (Very dangerous job..) And despite his critics, he did win crucial victories in WW2. Were their better generals? IMO yes. (btw, Im only distinguishing being extremely close to the combat as opposed to within half a mile of lotsa angry Germans (like Im sure Monty was during WW2 plenty of times)

Second of all, they don't necessarily go hand in hand, being American and not Monty's biggest fan, they just happen to both be true in my case. I simply cited my nationality as a reason for potential bias. That and living in the Cradle of the Revolution

[Michael Emrys]

You see, the book and the film are prime examples of why the Brits get pissed off by Hollywood. And the notion that the tankers wouldn't push on to their besieged colleagues because they had to have a tea break is also just incredibly insulting (and stereotypically enduring) lie. The lead XXX corps tank commander later went on to become a well known politician (Lord Carrington). With 20-20 hindsight, he later said he wondered if perhaps they should have pushed on, but at the time they had just 4 tanks left available at that moment to advance along a single-lane highway (ditched either-side so no way off it)...

I have a question on that last point. Ryan makes a big deal out of what he alleges the Dutch made a big deal of, namely that pushing straight north from Nijmegen to Arnhem was a bad mistake for the reason that you mention. Once the lead vehicle of any column on that elevated road was stopped, the whole column was blocked as there was no way to drive off of it. The Dutch claim that the correct solution was to turn west immediately on leaving Nijmegen and circle around, approaching the Arnhem bridge from the west. I'd be interested to hear any comments you'd care to make about that.

Michael

[Streety]

Hi again guys,

Oh, I wasn't having a go at you, Sublime, and very sorry if I seemed to be. As a Brit, I'm not Monty's biggest fan either. Yes he was brave in WW1, but no more so than many poor chaps. And he got an unfairly bad press from the Americans, but I put the main blame for the failure of Arnhem on his long-running ego-war with Patton, and so to a certain extent blame Patton's ego too, both here and elsewhere (in the sense of them both always wanting to out-do each other)....

Ah, a lovely cup of tea on the beach before having "a little go" at Caen. An American stereotyping of we Brits but one which we happily play up to. But I think Sburke's previous contribution to this thread has it spot on - Brits brewed a tea whenever they had a break much like the GI's would have a smoke (or a "fag break" as we Brits would say). And boiling water to make tea was a safe way to have a drink on the front line. The failure of not getting into Caen by day 2 was (if memory serves) probably down to one green British officer who sent an armoured column single-file up the road without any support, scouting or flank protection (I forget his name but he lost his job after that) straight into Germanany's greatest tank ace (what were the chances?) which destroyed the whole column almost single-handed. But which idiot put that British officer in charge of such a task and why did other elements not push on more quickly? I think part of the answer is that:

a) Capturing Caen on day 1 or 2 was probably always unrealistic (but note Monty's plan of reaching Paris by day 90 was ultimately attained a few days early, except Eisenhower came over and took control - and all the glory - for himself, just before Paris was entered.

the Brits weren't expecting as much resistence as they got.

c) when the Germans countered in Normandy, 2/3 of their effort (inc 3/4 of their panzer units) went against the Brits (even Ambrose says so, in one brief line of his D-Day book) but such concentration of German resistance probably doesn't account enough for day 1 failures.

But sorry, its been too long since I last looked at the DDay-Caen events, but if I remember your query I'll share my thoughts (for what they're worth) when I do.

I've long considered going back to my research and writing a book on the false impressions given by Hollywood about the war. Of course, you guys here all know better than to get your history from Hollywood, but that's how much of the world gets it's history, and its had an insidious effect to the extent that many US-originated TV documentaries today, and some serious books (including Atkinson and Ambrose) are not entirely free of such bad/incorrect influence. The false notion that the 82nd captured Nijmegan bridge on their own, the false notion from Ambrose (Band of Brothers) that they also rescued all the Brit paras from Arnhem (when in fact 90%, of those who made it back across the river, did so by other means or with other, British, help), are just a very few of a great many examples. This "propaganda" had completely succeeded and reached its zenith when Sarkozy initially only invited Obama to the 65th anniversary of D-Day, saying the Queen hadn't been invited because it was primarily a "French-US" commemoration! Hmm, last time I counted, the BritCom forces very slightly outnumbered the US forces that day (but both around 57,000), but did you know that only 48 French troops took part on D-Day! And even they had been told not to go by deGaulle but decided to ignore him as they were part of a special Anglo-French commando force. I believe it was the Whitehouse that first suggested Sarkozy rethink the format, but too late and that's why the Queen, despite being head og the Commonwealth, stayed in Britain that day. Perhaps I should start a new thread called "Streety's long rant about the war" and you can all help with my therapy - er, I mean "my book idea"....

[Streety]

Oh sorry Michael, forgot your second question. Yes, that road (both before Nijmegan as well as beyond it to Arnhem), like the whole concept (for the amount of effort/forces that were applied to the task) was a mistake. Partly, I think, the road was bad not just because of the ditches and the single-file, but because recently bad weather conditions had made the ground either side too boggy for tanks. Thus, once one or two tanks had skirted the road, the ground was found to become impassible for further vehicles, so they had to stay single file.

But as to turning off after Nijmegan and heading around further west for Arnhem? Probably too indirect. On paper, even the most direct-line approach chosen was barely do-able under ideal circumstances, and a moot point because in the event, even getting to Nijmegan on time turned out to be far too optimistic anyway.

[Vanir Ausf B]

And he got an unfairly bad press from the Americans, but I put the main blame for the failure of Arnhem on his long-running ego-war with Patton, and so to a certain extent blame Patton's ego too, both here and elsewhere (in the sense of them both always wanting to out-do each other)....

I remember reading somewhere that his bad reputation in the US began when he released his memoirs after the war in which he bashed Eisenhower, who was US President at the time.

[PzKpfw 1]

I dont think Ike was after glory etc, what i do know is NO one except Ike could have managed what he did as ASC, even his harshest critics vhave grudgeingly gave him that.

As for Arnhem it was a Cluster flock. Personaly I have learned that ppl are going believe what they want. The real challenge here is getting over national bias. Has anyone here been to the Ryan libary?. I ask this becuse Ryan did not write these books alone he had an Readers Digest staff that did most of the interviews for Arnham & Berlin. Anyway its my understanding the place is a treasure trove & much of its resources have been neglected, even Ryan barely scratched the surface.

A couple of authors have commented that they were astonished on what they found n those archives and didnt understand why no one is useing the material as its a trasure trove on Arhnem & Berlin especialy the huge ammounts of first hand accounts from participateing troops & civilians who lived through it., the material has never been used except by two authors Hamilton & Nordyke in a couple of books to date i'm aware of, & that was on Berlin & the 82nd Airborne. Hamilton used the material to give a day by day, street by street account of the fighting in Berlin.

Regards, John Waters

[Streety]

Hi Vanir,

Oh, Monty's bad rep in the US had its origins during the war - he and the US bigwigs didn't get along. It probably goes back to 1943, if not the winter before, and was certainly well in place by 1944. It started when he was among a few Brit commanders who had a generally low opinion of the US troops (but more particularly their commanders). Back in the early days, in the winter of 1942/43 when the US TORCH forces were very green, this was probably an accurate assessment (Bradly concurred - see Atkinson's "Army at Dawn") but in turn the US commanders thought the Brits like Monty in particular were coming it a bit too high and mighty and didn't take well to being told where they were going wrong. And no doubt Monty etc were undiplomatic, and this initial clash of huge egos set up a rivalry, especially between Monty and Patton, and set the scene for the pattern of bad opinion and bad press of Monty from US quarters. I'd recommend watching the exceptionally good BBC series "D-Day to Berlin" which goes into the ill-feeling between Monty and his US conterparts (and how it affected the war) in some detail.

Although I'm not a huge fan of Monty, Eisenhower deserved a bit of bite-back from Monty - the way Eisenhower shamelessly stole Monty's limelight by taking over Monty's Land Forces command and Normandy game-plan just before Paris, meant that thereafter Monty is chiefly remembered in the US for things like not reaching Caen on day 1 and for failure at Arnhem, and not remembered for reaching Paris ahead of his schedule and war-plan as commander of the Normandy campaign.

Egotistical b*stards, the lot of them....

[LongLeftFlank]

Your last line about says it all. That's your book title right there.

[TrailApe]

Not only did Monty jave his detractors amongst the US, he also made some bad enemies on the Brit side - especially on the RAF side, one of the things that came out of that was an immense amount of neg-repping (to use a modern term) amongst the staff back in England, which cumulated in Churchill going out for a cup ot tea and a natter.

Another item that came out of this infighting was the RAF was that phase map - anybody remember it?

It had about 10 or a dozen gain lines against which Monty actaully stated he was going to achieve. Of course when the fighting became static for a while this was used to hit him about the head, and it also emerged in the Monty bashing years later.

Apparently when all comes to all it was a document that was created by the airplanners, who obviously wanted some decent real estate to put in airfields, however it then became an established 'Monty said this' fact and caused no end of arguments later on.

As rightly stated above, the only gain line Monty had forecasted was the Seine - and he was accurate with his estimate.

Monty was an obnoxious little git, and I wonder how somebody like Bill Slim, who did wonders against the Japanese on a shoestring budget, would have handled commanding Overlord.

[LongLeftFlank]

"Uncle Bill" Slim wasn't quite a gentleman though, having risen from the ranks. Class still meant a lot even in Depression era England (my own Dad, a degreed engineer but the son of a lorry driver emigrated in the Fifties for this reason). Slim was quite good enough to take over the battered "Indian Army" out in the colonies, where white skin plus ability to last 6 months without perishing of fever or dysentery had long been the primary class distinction. He only became a proletarian hero well after the war, and he himself did not embrace that identity.

No, in the existential struggle for England, the supreme commander had to represent how Englishmen saw themselves: confident, rational and calm in the face of, well, everything. The demographic catastrophe of WWI and Marxist class struggle had badly damaged the fondly held notions of England's elite being a bunch of Sir Robert Scotts-- cultured and educated men of judgment, yet willing to stoically endure hardships with their stout yeomanry..... "Waterloo being won on the playing fields of Eton" and all that (just finished Robert Graves book Goodbye to All That, btw, which puts me in this frame of mind). Yet national myths die hard.... there's a reason Prince Harry feels a need to be in harms way in Afghanistan, and not because he intends to run for office.

Interesting point about the RAF liaison though; Tedder was quite close to the Americans, wasn't he? Also, General/FM Alexander got along decently well with Clark and the other Mediterranean front commanders (Although admittedly he was the one nominally in charge there and didn't hog credit... what little there was to claim down there). Could well be wrong about that though.

[TrailApe]

No, in the existential struggle for England, the supreme commander had to represent how Englishmen saw themselves: confident, rational and calm in the face of, well, everything.

Not wrong there my transatlantic cousin.

When in reality we are all as mad as a box of gerbils!

[Streety]

Hey Longleftflank,

I was going to call my book "An Ego Too Far", but you're right: "Egotistical B*stards, the Lot of Them" would be more accurate....

Slim certainly is the most forgotten Field Marshall of WW2. He was also a veteran of WW1. What he did with what he had in Burma in WW2, and the fact that the men (both Brit and Anzac) loved him despite their terrible hardships, possibly puts him above all other BritCom commanders. But yes, coming from fairly humble origins, he wasn't the "right sort" for the posh-lot that ran the levers of power. My guess is he'd have done about the same as Monty in Normandy with the exception of being a lot more liked by the Americans and a little less liked by the rest of the British Top-Brass. Almost completely forgotten after the war back in Britain (but not down under, where he became Governor General of Australia!), there's at least a belated effort to erect a statue to him here in Bristol, his home town.

[Erwin]

To better understand Monty's famous "prickly" personality, it's useful to read up on some bio info.

He rose through the Brit ranks at a time when aristocracy dominated the armed forces. Rather like women (understandably) complain today about "having to be twice as good as men to do the same jobs and get paid less" Monty had to withstand a lot of nasty hazing and be a very tough and resilient person to survive let alone flourish in the Army of that day. He had to not care that other jealous officers were trying to do him down. However, excellence/confidence in these situations often lead to appearing (or actually being) arrogant.

That Patton was US "aristocracy" probably was part of the cause of friction.

[LongLeftFlank]

Well that's the thing -- the English class system has never been purely about Toffs vs Toughs, even though those of us who were raised on English comics in the angst-ridden Seventies (yup, I'm not *that* Transatlantic) have come to believe that. That's a relatively new paradigm, partly an American influence.

The English inherited from their Anglo-Saxon and Celtic tribal forbears the notion that the Leader must also be dux bellorum, willing to lead by example. And no matter how Europeanized (i.e. French) their aristocracy became, it was never entirely allowed to shed that idea and isolate itself entirely from the commoners. You might be born into the nobility, but you also had to earn the right to be there.... at least, that was the ideal. And ideals do matter and persist.

Also, don't overestimate the "aristocratic" opposition faced by Montgomery; he was of quite acceptable enough class and had worked diligently to check the right boxes, as had many of his peers. Bill Slim in contrast -- a sergeant who had risen to flag rank -- was still a rarity.

Monty was genuinely popular with his men as well, because he got results, even before Alamein. Even hardcore skeptic and lampoon-artist Spike Milligan fondly remembers the positive changes that swept through the Army when he took over in 1941. The Army had had its arse handed to it by the Germans, with only the Channel standing between it and total defeat. At the same time, it needed to absorb the hard lessons and put them promptly to work using the US materiel that was starting to flow across the ocean. And the willingness to change isn't just about intellectual capacity -- it's all about attitude. And Attitude was what Monty brought to the table in spades. Don't waste my bloody time telling me what you can't do..... find a way! (oh, guess what? sometimes you'll be badly wrong)

The men didn't expect or need Monty to be a working class hero though, in spite of the sweaters, unless they were hard core Socialists (but in that case, they'd have hated Slim too as a class traitor and tool of the system, until the Comintern told them to believe otherwise). It was enough that nobody doubted that Monty would cheerfully share a dirty mug of tea with his lads and if Germans came across the rise would be the first to pick up a rifle. That was what they expected of their leaders, aristocrats or not.

[LongLeftFlank]

I'm about 1/3 of the way through Slim's autobiography. Don't lionize him too much -- he would not want you to, either. Although you are also right in flagging him as a major exception to the EGOTISTICAL BASTARDS rule. Joe Stilwell is a borderline case.... he shamelessly used the press when it suited him, but never to polish his own "brand" except maybe as a cranky plain-speaking Hoosier.

Slim certainly can't be blamed for the 1942 rout in Burma and did extremely well at Imphal and Kohima against the odds -- but of course it's easier to show pluck and initiative when you're against the wall and the enemy has left you no choice.

Arakan on the other hand was a complete waste of time. And while he certainly proved an able logistician and diplomat (with the Americans he depended on, as well as with nutcases with powerful friends, like Wingate), the 1945 offensive was, face it, six months too late to make any difference to the war, falling on a hollowed out Japanese army whose own logistical incompetence had reduced its soldiers to cannibalism.

[LongLeftFlank]

Hmm, before Kettler wanders in here to Wikipedia me to death again, it appears that Slim was never in fact a sergeant. Nor was Stilwell a Hoosier. OK, on that basis you may disregard everything I've written above as a pack of lies and calumny.

[Streety]

Hiya Longleftflank. No, Slim had humble origins but squeaked in as a 2nd Lt for WW1. But are you getting mixed-up between the 1st and 2nd Arakan Campaigns? The 1st was indeed a disaster, but that was while command of XV-corps had been taken away from Slim and given to General Irwin, only to be handed back to Slim once Irwin had screwed the advance up and Slim had to rescue it as best he could. Irwin lost his job after that and Slim promoted. The 2nd Arakan Campaign, wherein I lost my great uncle (shot and drowned crossing the Irrawaddy) was lead by Slim and not defeated by the Japs. But Slim's finest hour was not just really the advance through Burma in 1945 but the earlier twin battles of Imphal-Kohima, which not only stopped the Japs but stopped the pro-Jap elements of the Indian Nationalists from taking India over to the Japanese side. And don't forget he also won in the East Africa campaign before that.

And don't forget that it wasn't until the fall of Mandalay in March 1945 (a couple of months into the 1945 campaign) that the Burmese National army switched sides to join the allies. Burma wasn't a meaningless campaign and a lot of soldiers and civilians died in the recapture effort.

For all that, I don't know enough about Slim regards his position on the Egotist scale except to think he wasn't as bad as the average b*stard. He certainly suffered from them though. From what I'd understood, at what should have been his crowning moment, Slim's boss, Mountbatten, took over and took the glory for Burma (much in the same way Eisenhower did to Monty just before Paris). Anyone who served under Slim never forgave Mountbatten for it.

As for "Vinegar tits" Stilwell, no, he wasn't all bad but I've read enough to put him above the mid-way point on the E-scale.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Hi Vanir,

Oh, Monty's bad rep in the US had its origins during the war - he and the US bigwigs didn't get along.

Yes, I know he clashed with a lot of people during the war, but I was referring more to the popular perception of him outside of military circles. I don't know the answer but a little googling turns up the fact that he was an honorary citizen of Montgomery, Alabama until his memoirs were published in 1958 at which point it was revoked.

[John Kettler]

LongLeftFlank,

Here's why I think so highly of Slim (Fair Use)

"I tell you, as officers, that you will not eat, sleep, smoke, sit down or lie down until your soldiers have had a chance to do these things. If you do this, they will follow you to the ends of the earth. If you do not, I will break you in front of your regiments."

Mind, while this is excellent from a combat leadership and troop wellbeing perspective, it's NOT necessarily a good thing to blindly carry on with while sleep deprived. I've written on that elsewhere before. Suffice it to say a leader's job is to make decisions, and they're generally not good or fast when sleep deprived, both with potentially fatal consequences to the led.

Regards,

John Kettler

[LongLeftFlank]

Well Streety, if you're gonna write that book, be sure to look closely at the role of the pressmen who fed, and when it suited them, demolished, the reputations of said EBs, often to feed their own particular narratives of the war. Just as they still do today.

PS Respect and peace to your great uncle. Keep talking about this stuff and maybe you will talk me into doing Kohima when I can run CM again. Hmm, I wonder if my mum still has the book on it I read when I was a teen.

[Streety]

Oh, much agree with you about the press - some things never change, do they? And of course "the powers that be" also built and used the likes of Monty and Erwin purely for when it suited them......

[Michael Emrys]

Interesting point about the RAF liaison though; Tedder was quite close to the Americans, wasn't he?

Yes, and quite thoroughly detested Montgomery. He was furious and adamant that Monty should be fired after he tried to hog the credit for defeating the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge. (To be fair, his command of the northern shoulder was sensible. But it fell well short of being the whole show.)

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

When in reality we are all as mad as a box of gerbils!

Just so. Mustn't let the natives catch on though.

Michael

[Erwin]

"And of course "the powers that be" also built and used the likes of Monty and Erwin purely for when it suited them......"

I think you are being a bit unfair to me.

Oh wait... never mind...