ArmouredTopHat

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/05/31/a-lighter-high-tech-abrams-tank-is-taking-shape/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=tw_dfn

Seems the US have scrapped further upgrades to current line M1A2s and are now going for an M1E3 with some interesting adjustments. Lower weight and a mandatory APS system strike out to me in particular. I wonder if they will go with an autoloader as they imply. Would be quite the radical shakeup.

Curious to see what other modifications they go for, as well as considerations for a more drone filled battlefield. 

It was truly infuriating to hear from frustrated Ukrainian artillery officers that the Russians were massing with near complacency across the border knowing that the systems with the range to hit them were not allowed to do so. All they could do was watch. A truly stupid restriction set by America that has cost Ukrainian lives for no good reason. Thankfully its been clarified at least. I imagine it wont be long until we see geolocated GMLRs rockets striking some juicy artillery targets inside Russia in due time. 

As a side note, I hope I am articulating myself reasonably well here. I am still somewhat new here despite having lurked for an ungodly amount of time on the forum. Its certainly lovely to discuss / talk to you all!


 

It was truly infuriating to hear from frustrated Ukrainian artillery officers that the Russians were massing with near complacency across the border knowing that the systems with the range to hit them were not allowed to do so. All they could do was watch. A truly stupid restriction set by America that has cost Ukrainian lives for no good reason. Thankfully its been clarified at least. I imagine it wont be long until we see geolocated GMLRs rockets striking some juicy artillery targets inside Russia in due time. 

Excellent video I must say.

Some of my own thoughts and responses.

Kreminna is probably close to some of of the roughest terrain for tank usage around, not to say they cant be used but yeah, very close quarters so this outcome is not exactly a surprise. To me even with the loss of a tank, they are still performing exactly what their intended role is: to spearhead a push and provide supporting fire to blast the infantry onto target. Outside of major mechanised movements this is the quintessential purpose of a tank in its form. Given the infantry make it into the Russian trenches and succeed in their assault, I view that as a success, especially as the crew of the tank reportedly survive.

If they did not have tanks at all in the assault its fair to argue that more men are liable to become casualties. As a rule of thumb, steel always saves on blood and sweat. You can even hear the Ukrainian soldiers seem pretty happy / confident that they have two tanks supporting them on this assault. Having that level of firepower for a small assault is pretty damn good to have and its clearly good for their morale!

The RU infantry in the meantime clearly have the opposite issue and are focussing their attentions on the tanks, which gives the  UA infantry the opportunity to act out their own mission. Is it not possible the defending Russian infantry might have been a bit more active and able if they were not suffering the significant emotional event of having tank fire directed at near point blank range at them?

The other big observation is, what would you use instead of the tank in this situation? Any other vehicle is going to be lighter and even more vulnerable to anti tank fire. To have nothing in support means your infantry are assaulting a trench position without any vehicular support. That is always an even bloodier outcome in most cases. To me, the issue here if there is one is that the poor bastards are having to use pretty old tanks. One wonders how much better the tanks would fare with thermals made in the last generation at least for instance. Not to mention that this seems more the perfect reason why something like a functioning APS system on a tank is so important. 

At the end of the day, the Ukrainians (and people in general for war really) are using what they have. 

China has its own issues regarding procurement, not to mention corruption problems. While they are not nearly as bad as Russia, they do like to chest beat about advanced technology while compromising more basic capabilities of their military. Also the fact of the matter is they fib a lot just like the Russians do about their actual capabilities. (All bling no basics Perun video is one to watch)

Excellent video I must say.

Some of my own thoughts and responses.

Kreminna is probably close to some of of the roughest terrain for tank usage around, not to say they cant be used but yeah, very close quarters so this outcome is not exactly a surprise. To me even with the loss of a tank, they are still performing exactly what their intended role is: to spearhead a push and provide supporting fire to blast the infantry onto target. Outside of major mechanised movements this is the quintessential purpose of a tank in its form. Given the infantry make it into the Russian trenches and succeed in their assault, I view that as a success, especially as the crew of the tank reportedly survive.

If they did not have tanks at all in the assault its fair to argue that more men are liable to become casualties. As a rule of thumb, steel always saves on blood and sweat. You can even hear the Ukrainian soldiers seem pretty happy / confident that they have two tanks supporting them on this assault. Having that level of firepower for a small assault is pretty damn good to have and its clearly good for their morale!

The RU infantry in the meantime clearly have the opposite issue and are focussing their attentions on the tanks, which gives the  UA infantry the opportunity to act out their own mission. Is it not possible the defending Russian infantry might have been a bit more active and able if they were not suffering the significant emotional event of having tank fire directed at near point blank range at them?

The other big observation is, what would you use instead of the tank in this situation? Any other vehicle is going to be lighter and even more vulnerable to anti tank fire. To have nothing in support means your infantry are assaulting a trench position without any vehicular support. That is always an even bloodier outcome in most cases. To me, the issue here if there is one is that the poor bastards are having to use pretty old tanks. One wonders how much better the tanks would fare with thermals made in the last generation at least for instance. Not to mention that this seems more the perfect reason why something like a functioning APS system on a tank is so important. 

At the end of the day, the Ukrainians (and people in general for war really) are using what they have. 

I think we will see UGVs used in roles that are very unfriendly to people first more than anything, demining seems one of those areas where its a no brainer. Being able to rapidly clear mines without risk to your soldiers seems a very real and in demand need as todays conflict shows. 

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/what-happened-when-russia-tested-its-uran-9-robot-tank-syria-182143

https://www.researcher-app.com/paper/8517551

I also dug into the Uran 9 a bit more and the issues which I feared did crop up quite a bit. (OF course the factory making them claim it was really good!)
Signal issues seem to be frequent (Major concern when they were operating in Syria and not Ukraine with its plethora of interferences / EWAR) Terrain features messed with signals far more than flying drones. Buildings in particular seemed an issue. Control vehicle (Kamaz truck) had to get very close to maintain control (Not ideal in the Ukraine environment) remote control system only had effective range of 300-400 metres in most situations 'lag time' between inputs and actions was noted as a frequent issue even then. loss of control entirely was frequent (This one in particular seems especially not ideal for battlefield use. Lag in gaming is infuriating enough!) suspension issues on the chassis were also reported and limited operation time. problems acquiring and engaging targets at the specified range issues with the gun system. As I maintain, we really are a decade a way from these things becoming more practical. 
 

And we are immune to defence spending boondoggles? Spend some time on the history of the western military industrial complex and the levels of outright thievery happening, going back to the 50s.
China is largely recognized as the global leader in UAS exports, and its internal capability development is in over drive, because we keep pointing at them while making angry gestures.
Based on how fast UAS have come up in a few short years, no credible modern military is going to push the UGV threat/opportunity out to 20 years.  This is not 1914, it is 1918 and everyone just saw what aircraft were capable of.  Some really conservative thinkers are still claiming the aircraft is a fad but western militaries are going to vote with their money.  They already have:
 https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/12/canada-acquiring-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-for-the-canadian-armed-forces.html
If the RCAF and the Government of this nation are finally willing to spend money on a military capability...well whatever we buy is probably at the end of its life cycle.  We are not late adopters, we are last adopters.  We are in an Unmanned Age already by virtue of the fact that Canada just jumped onboard - there is a Perun video for you.
https://www.army.mil/article/273594/army_announces_aviation_investment_rebalance
https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2023/12/a-glimpse-into-the-future-of-warfare/
"We have all seen the prevalence of drones in combat, including in Ukraine and the Red Sea. So we are increasing funding for Australian drone and counter-drone capabilities. To make this happen, we are providing an additional $300 million over the next four years and $1.1 billion over the decade."
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/speeches/2024-04-17/launch-national-defence-strategy-and-integrated-investment-program#:~:text=We have all seen the,%241.1 billion over the decade.
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/new-zealand-army-to-receive-new-unmanned-systems
So what is interesting about all of this is that these are rapid buys.  In many cases not forecasted 10 years ago.  For Canada, we did not even have them on the books in 2017.
This industry is going to go nuts after this war, and UGVs will go right along with it.  This is not a late 90s 2G flip-phone moment, it is a 2009 iPhone moment within defence.
Close out with this one:
"However, a force that is not aware of or equipped to counter UAVs risks ceding the enemy an insurmountable advantage in situational awareness, and suffering from a scale of precision effects that will prove crippling. Armies cannot, therefore, afford to be unprepared."
https://static.rusi.org/mass-precision-strike-final.pdf (and these guys are pretty tough on the subject)
No one is going to go into the next war and not ask "what about unmanned" as a primary consideration.  That sort of heat and light is going to drive UGV development at an accelerated rate.

Given some of the discussion here over the last day or so, I thought I'd flag this unit in case some are unaware of it.
The UK Deep Reconnaissance Strike Brigade. It carried out it's first major exercise last year, and is something that was in development before 02/22. No doubt many of our talking points are being considered within its role which appears an attempt to break away from a COIN mentality and revert to dealing with peer threats.
Everyone is recce, everyone is strike. 
https://www.joint-forces.com/features/68290-scorpion-cyclone-1st-deep-reconnaissance-strike-bct
https://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2022/05/everyone-is-recce-everyone-is-strike.html

P

On UGVs I do actually agree with ArmouredTopHat that we are a while off before they become really useful. Driving a vehicle across bad terrain is hard and it will be a long time before that is automated. If you choose to drive it manually you are very vulnerable to terrain interference and EW, and even if it all goes well it is still harder to control since you dont have the same feedback as when you are in the vehicle. 
In my opinion the shooting part of a ugv can be semi or fully automated in the very near future, but the driving around part is a very hard problem to crack. I have been thinking about including a single driver/operator in my tankette idea for that reason, but I'm honestly not sure about whether having a single person in a fighting vehicle woks from a psychological point on view! Maybe if the tankettes could always see each other it would work.

I think we need to bear in mind something pretty important, in that we are suffering from an acute reporting bias when it comes to FPV usage on tanks, and tank losses overall. (This notion extends to drone footage and use in general really)

For FPV drones, we typically only see successful strikes posted, we dont tend to see the many many many misses, poor angled attacks, EWAR casualties or simply hits that fail to inflict major damage. We have a few videos of tanks shrugging off numerous FPV hits its true but the majority of footage we see is usually pretty spectacular. The point is we tend to get the footage of the 'good stuff' when in reality both sides admit that a large percentage of drones will never reach a target due to the various factors involved. 

Secondly, often we see FPV strikes on vehicles already disabled, typically by mines or other means. FPVs make an excellent 'finisher' method together with drone dropped grenades to deprive knocked out but potentially recoverable vehicles and render them a complete loss. FPV strikes do happen on functioning vehicles too of course, but the point is we probably want some actual hard data when it comes to things like what FPVs mostly strike and what percentage are lost along the way. Honestly a breakdown of what is knocking out tanks would be very interesting. I suspect most are knocked out by more traditional methods such as mines and ATGM / RPG / shoulder launchers.

There is also the issue of 'latency'. FPV drones typically have a 'call in time' for the drone unit to be alerted, drone prepared and launched and then led to its target. All of this takes precious time, enough time for vehicles to potentially make an assault or for a target to escape. This is one thing that more traditional anti tank methods have an advantage with in comparison. Your NLAW operator can fight a tank straight away from his trench, FPV support like any external support is not guaranteed nor is it likely to be timely all the time.

Furthermore, we have clear evidence that adaptions can and will be made against FPV drones. Drone cages have proven effective both against FPV and heavier drones such as lancet, and are a minimal cost modification that do not compromise the effectiveness of tanks. ERA has also proven effective (Ill try and dig up that notable photo of a UA tank that survived a lancet hit which set off a Kontact-1 block on the turret) Obviously future tanks will have to be designed to deal with the changing battlefield dynamic, but its telling that tanks made in the cold war can put up reasonable well with things despite the myriad of threats. The overwhelming consensus regarding heavy Russian tank losses has always been poor tactical use / doctrine instead of something inheritably wrong with the tanks themselves (With some exceptions)

I am not attempting to disparage FPV drones in the slightest, they are and will be a most effective tool and are likely a hallmark of things to come. They have not however, rendered other battlefield options obsolete but merely given a potent supplement to a force that is otherwise outmatched in more traditional aspects such as artillery tubes or vehicle density. The Ukrainians themselves have admitted that artillery is typically more effective at breaking up attacks than mass FPV strikes (presumably due to the host of potential mitigations drones can suffer from) and that they rely on FPV's so much due to the lack of said artillery systems. We have seen numerous supposed ends to tanks before from technological developments (ATGM becoming more prevalent is probably the most notable one to mind) yet like many weapon systems, there is simply adaptation to the threat and continued use because the base value of a tank remains the same.

At the end of the day, nothing beats being able to pull up a stabilised 120/125mm gun rapidly to a position, destroy a target and make off while the majority of threats on the battlefield (shrapnel, small arms and lighter AT systems) are less of a threat to you in turn. I do not see that changing anytime soon. 

*Edit*

Here are just a couple of good examples of such. Tanks can survive a lot more than what people perhaps realise.

As a side note, I hope I am articulating myself reasonably well here. I am still somewhat new here despite having lurked for an ungodly amount of time on the forum. Its certainly lovely to discuss / talk to you all!


 

I think we need to bear in mind something pretty important, in that we are suffering from an acute reporting bias when it comes to FPV usage on tanks, and tank losses overall. (This notion extends to drone footage and use in general really)

For FPV drones, we typically only see successful strikes posted, we dont tend to see the many many many misses, poor angled attacks, EWAR casualties or simply hits that fail to inflict major damage. We have a few videos of tanks shrugging off numerous FPV hits its true but the majority of footage we see is usually pretty spectacular. The point is we tend to get the footage of the 'good stuff' when in reality both sides admit that a large percentage of drones will never reach a target due to the various factors involved. 

Secondly, often we see FPV strikes on vehicles already disabled, typically by mines or other means. FPVs make an excellent 'finisher' method together with drone dropped grenades to deprive knocked out but potentially recoverable vehicles and render them a complete loss. FPV strikes do happen on functioning vehicles too of course, but the point is we probably want some actual hard data when it comes to things like what FPVs mostly strike and what percentage are lost along the way. Honestly a breakdown of what is knocking out tanks would be very interesting. I suspect most are knocked out by more traditional methods such as mines and ATGM / RPG / shoulder launchers.

There is also the issue of 'latency'. FPV drones typically have a 'call in time' for the drone unit to be alerted, drone prepared and launched and then led to its target. All of this takes precious time, enough time for vehicles to potentially make an assault or for a target to escape. This is one thing that more traditional anti tank methods have an advantage with in comparison. Your NLAW operator can fight a tank straight away from his trench, FPV support like any external support is not guaranteed nor is it likely to be timely all the time.

Furthermore, we have clear evidence that adaptions can and will be made against FPV drones. Drone cages have proven effective both against FPV and heavier drones such as lancet, and are a minimal cost modification that do not compromise the effectiveness of tanks. ERA has also proven effective (Ill try and dig up that notable photo of a UA tank that survived a lancet hit which set off a Kontact-1 block on the turret) Obviously future tanks will have to be designed to deal with the changing battlefield dynamic, but its telling that tanks made in the cold war can put up reasonable well with things despite the myriad of threats. The overwhelming consensus regarding heavy Russian tank losses has always been poor tactical use / doctrine instead of something inheritably wrong with the tanks themselves (With some exceptions)

I am not attempting to disparage FPV drones in the slightest, they are and will be a most effective tool and are likely a hallmark of things to come. They have not however, rendered other battlefield options obsolete but merely given a potent supplement to a force that is otherwise outmatched in more traditional aspects such as artillery tubes or vehicle density. The Ukrainians themselves have admitted that artillery is typically more effective at breaking up attacks than mass FPV strikes (presumably due to the host of potential mitigations drones can suffer from) and that they rely on FPV's so much due to the lack of said artillery systems. We have seen numerous supposed ends to tanks before from technological developments (ATGM becoming more prevalent is probably the most notable one to mind) yet like many weapon systems, there is simply adaptation to the threat and continued use because the base value of a tank remains the same.

At the end of the day, nothing beats being able to pull up a stabilised 120/125mm gun rapidly to a position, destroy a target and make off while the majority of threats on the battlefield (shrapnel, small arms and lighter AT systems) are less of a threat to you in turn. I do not see that changing anytime soon. 

*Edit*

Here are just a couple of good examples of such. Tanks can survive a lot more than what people perhaps realise.

As a side note, I hope I am articulating myself reasonably well here. I am still somewhat new here despite having lurked for an ungodly amount of time on the forum. Its certainly lovely to discuss / talk to you all!


 

It was truly infuriating to hear from frustrated Ukrainian artillery officers that the Russians were massing with near complacency across the border knowing that the systems with the range to hit them were not allowed to do so. All they could do was watch. A truly stupid restriction set by America that has cost Ukrainian lives for no good reason. Thankfully its been clarified at least. I imagine it wont be long until we see geolocated GMLRs rockets striking some juicy artillery targets inside Russia in due time. 

This is sort of my point though. Plenty of countries have some degree of interest in a wide variety of drones and UGVs yet it is largely in supplemental roles rather than say replacing current vehicles / concepts in service. No one wants to take a potential risk on something that could very well end as a dead end or something that becomes ruinously expensive/ does not work as intended. (Not suggesting that is a likely outcome, but its something that clearly has to be potentially thought about and its something taxpayers are going to inquire about) 

A lot of countries already have pretty tight spending budgets which means they are less likely to want to splurge into what could be perceived as a risk. UK for instance is still very much struggling with halting the decline of its current armed forces due to constraining budgets. I am sure people are pushing for greater looks into the implications of increased drone warfare, heck I am certain that we will see a growing proliferation of drones on the squad level across NATO in the next few years.

Radical adjustments to established doctrine that see drones replacing vehicles though? That's going to take time, money, political will and some practise to actually get from an idea to reality. Assuming everything works as it should. Maybe data will eventually suggest some clear outcomes that countries will be interested in following, but right now the vibe I get is people / countries are watching intently and seeing what the outcome will be in Ukraine before even setting up anything experimental. 

Excellent video I must say.

Some of my own thoughts and responses.

Kreminna is probably close to some of of the roughest terrain for tank usage around, not to say they cant be used but yeah, very close quarters so this outcome is not exactly a surprise. To me even with the loss of a tank, they are still performing exactly what their intended role is: to spearhead a push and provide supporting fire to blast the infantry onto target. Outside of major mechanised movements this is the quintessential purpose of a tank in its form. Given the infantry make it into the Russian trenches and succeed in their assault, I view that as a success, especially as the crew of the tank reportedly survive.

If they did not have tanks at all in the assault its fair to argue that more men are liable to become casualties. As a rule of thumb, steel always saves on blood and sweat. You can even hear the Ukrainian soldiers seem pretty happy / confident that they have two tanks supporting them on this assault. Having that level of firepower for a small assault is pretty damn good to have and its clearly good for their morale!

The RU infantry in the meantime clearly have the opposite issue and are focussing their attentions on the tanks, which gives the  UA infantry the opportunity to act out their own mission. Is it not possible the defending Russian infantry might have been a bit more active and able if they were not suffering the significant emotional event of having tank fire directed at near point blank range at them?

The other big observation is, what would you use instead of the tank in this situation? Any other vehicle is going to be lighter and even more vulnerable to anti tank fire. To have nothing in support means your infantry are assaulting a trench position without any vehicular support. That is always an even bloodier outcome in most cases. To me, the issue here if there is one is that the poor bastards are having to use pretty old tanks. One wonders how much better the tanks would fare with thermals made in the last generation at least for instance. Not to mention that this seems more the perfect reason why something like a functioning APS system on a tank is so important. 

At the end of the day, the Ukrainians (and people in general for war really) are using what they have. 

I think it would be fair to say that while FPVs have been a major aspect of the UA defence, there is quite a bit more going on that meshes together to explain....whatever the hell the Russians are doing. 

Minefields continue to be a -major- source of frustration on both sides. Simply putting mine rollers on tanks is not enough now, and artillery delivered mining missions (And increasingly drone delivered mines) and causing further havoc as lines of advance believed cleared suddenly become unsafe again. Mines are the reason a of vehicles are disabled / abandoned in the first place, and I even wonder if they might be the single weapon system responsible for the most 'mission kills' of vehicles to date. Drones enhance the lethality mines further as of course you can now harass the living daylights out of demining operations, personnel based or vehicular. Whenever you look at Telegram chats from soldiers on both sides, there is always always some level of complaining / bitching / reference to minefields and the constraints they inflict when they are attacking. I would perhaps say that they are responsible more than anything for the struggle to achieve any significant level of operational penetration. They simply cause so much attrition and blunt momentum so effectively. 

Ukraine was obviously still firing artillery during this as well, they were just limited in having to pick the best out of lots of targets to engage. Plenty of attacks were broken up ultimately with artillery fire. I do recall reading recently from a Russian source about how FPV drones have made mortars more than anything extremely unsafe to use due to their proximity to the front, which might explain why we are seeing quite a bit less use from them outside of crazy improvised shelters. 

We should also not underestimate the Ukrainian defenders, who have clearly made it clear they have the skill and tenacity to defend under the most difficult of conditions. Its the bloody work of those brave souls holding that is half the reason the Russians are having such dismal performance to begin with. They could have all the FPV's in the world but it would not matter if they did not have people willing to rotate into some truly deplorable and dangerous conditions to hold a frontline. 

Lastly, I know we have to be careful with how critical we should be of Russian doctrine and tactics....but we really do have to wonder why they are shooting themselves in the foot so much with regards to the choices they are making. The veritable host of Russian military issues aside from corruption to a lack of a proper NCO system, the Russians have seemingly settled on trying to attrition the Ukrainians to death, which anyone can tell you based on the Verdun experience is typically a very poor idea when you are doing so by attacking. 

The focus right now seems to be small, consistent attacks in personnel and vehicles along various points in the line, the majority of which seem to end pretty poorly. Even successful pushes are tactically minor in scope and almost always at significant cost. The whole idea being seemingly to avoid large scale losses. The problem with this notion is that over time, these constant losses are in fact -more- costly rather than larger, planned operations using larger scale units attacking in strength, and its all simply unsustainable in the long term.

It would seem the Russian situation is truly dismal with its inability to attack in larger than what were once BTG levels of strength (they have seemingly abandoned BTGs entirely) for whatever reason. this was established and noted pretty quickly in 2022 that Russian units had shockingly poor levels of coordination. The requirement for constant attacks / pressure could be a military decision (Just one more push and the Ukrainians will collapse) or a political one, but it is simply not going to work either way, at least it has not so far. So what we see are very limited / narrow attacks that allow Ukraine to direct reserves into, and the Russians just rotate units in as they get utterly mauled. Its a slow bloody grind but its clear that the Russians are paying in truly horrendous losses. I genuinely do not understand why they do this, but we know the Russian military system is not exactly honest when reporting its successes and losses. They really are their own worst enemy. 

To conclude, I think the key tell is that these tactics were not especially successful even before mass FPV usage, which to me indicates this is what the younger people would call a 'skill issue'. FPV's are just to be put it bluntly, another kick to the legs of a struggling Russian military trying to figure itself out of the quagmire they were already knee deep in. They remain dangerous and have many advantages to be concerned about, but I feel their inability to attack properly despite said advantages is a product of their own incompetency as well as the truly heroic efforts of the AFU. 

 

Good discussion started by ArmorTopHat.  I am heavily biased because tanks are god's chosen ones, obviously, but I still think TheCapt is right.  
This is great example of how to disagree and debate on a complex subject.  Well, done to both of you (and Steve also). 

I think it would be fair to say that while FPVs have been a major aspect of the UA defence, there is quite a bit more going on that meshes together to explain....whatever the hell the Russians are doing. 

Minefields continue to be a -major- source of frustration on both sides. Simply putting mine rollers on tanks is not enough now, and artillery delivered mining missions (And increasingly drone delivered mines) and causing further havoc as lines of advance believed cleared suddenly become unsafe again. Mines are the reason a of vehicles are disabled / abandoned in the first place, and I even wonder if they might be the single weapon system responsible for the most 'mission kills' of vehicles to date. Drones enhance the lethality mines further as of course you can now harass the living daylights out of demining operations, personnel based or vehicular. Whenever you look at Telegram chats from soldiers on both sides, there is always always some level of complaining / bitching / reference to minefields and the constraints they inflict when they are attacking. I would perhaps say that they are responsible more than anything for the struggle to achieve any significant level of operational penetration. They simply cause so much attrition and blunt momentum so effectively. 

Ukraine was obviously still firing artillery during this as well, they were just limited in having to pick the best out of lots of targets to engage. Plenty of attacks were broken up ultimately with artillery fire. I do recall reading recently from a Russian source about how FPV drones have made mortars more than anything extremely unsafe to use due to their proximity to the front, which might explain why we are seeing quite a bit less use from them outside of crazy improvised shelters. 

We should also not underestimate the Ukrainian defenders, who have clearly made it clear they have the skill and tenacity to defend under the most difficult of conditions. Its the bloody work of those brave souls holding that is half the reason the Russians are having such dismal performance to begin with. They could have all the FPV's in the world but it would not matter if they did not have people willing to rotate into some truly deplorable and dangerous conditions to hold a frontline. 

Lastly, I know we have to be careful with how critical we should be of Russian doctrine and tactics....but we really do have to wonder why they are shooting themselves in the foot so much with regards to the choices they are making. The veritable host of Russian military issues aside from corruption to a lack of a proper NCO system, the Russians have seemingly settled on trying to attrition the Ukrainians to death, which anyone can tell you based on the Verdun experience is typically a very poor idea when you are doing so by attacking. 

The focus right now seems to be small, consistent attacks in personnel and vehicles along various points in the line, the majority of which seem to end pretty poorly. Even successful pushes are tactically minor in scope and almost always at significant cost. The whole idea being seemingly to avoid large scale losses. The problem with this notion is that over time, these constant losses are in fact -more- costly rather than larger, planned operations using larger scale units attacking in strength, and its all simply unsustainable in the long term.

It would seem the Russian situation is truly dismal with its inability to attack in larger than what were once BTG levels of strength (they have seemingly abandoned BTGs entirely) for whatever reason. this was established and noted pretty quickly in 2022 that Russian units had shockingly poor levels of coordination. The requirement for constant attacks / pressure could be a military decision (Just one more push and the Ukrainians will collapse) or a political one, but it is simply not going to work either way, at least it has not so far. So what we see are very limited / narrow attacks that allow Ukraine to direct reserves into, and the Russians just rotate units in as they get utterly mauled. Its a slow bloody grind but its clear that the Russians are paying in truly horrendous losses. I genuinely do not understand why they do this, but we know the Russian military system is not exactly honest when reporting its successes and losses. They really are their own worst enemy. 

To conclude, I think the key tell is that these tactics were not especially successful even before mass FPV usage, which to me indicates this is what the younger people would call a 'skill issue'. FPV's are just to be put it bluntly, another kick to the legs of a struggling Russian military trying to figure itself out of the quagmire they were already knee deep in. They remain dangerous and have many advantages to be concerned about, but I feel their inability to attack properly despite said advantages is a product of their own incompetency as well as the truly heroic efforts of the AFU. 

 

We do get useful data points with Andrews regular loss identifications. FPV drones feature a lot, though about half of them are disabling knocked out / abandoned vehicles. The majority of tank hits via FPV drone are damaging and not destroying them. (remember this what gets uploaded, presumably there is a greater amount of footage not uploaded due to negligible impacts, misses ect) Ratios vary by day as well. 

Being able to deny recoverable vehicles is -very- tactically useful though, and no doubt exasperates heavy Russian equipment losses. This is obviously an area where FPV / drones shine. Blowing up an IFV or tank with a drone dropped grenade is up there when it comes to value trades. 

As a side note, I hope I am articulating myself reasonably well here. I am still somewhat new here despite having lurked for an ungodly amount of time on the forum. Its certainly lovely to discuss / talk to you all!


 

I entirely agree that -something- is going on. It could very well be a fundamental change in the nature of modern warfare as we know it. It would be foolish to deny that as a potential explanation. I just think the conclusion is premature and the issues / explanations are...extremely complicated. Were talking about everything from technology to doctrine to training to terrain ect being a potential cause of explanation here, or a mix of all of these. 

Ukraine was until very recently asking for tanks near constantly, perhaps they view this year as one largely for defence and they are focussed on dealing with more severe issues at the moment in the shape of ammunition shortages. Time will tell on that one I suppose.

With regards to scale of losses, I think this is primarily a Russian issue to put it simply. Ukraine's vehicle losses are a fraction of the Russians, despite them having a reasonably sizable amount of tanks fielded. I dont think driving mechanised assaults straight into well established killzones covered in mines again and again is particularly helping the Russians in this case. (Using armoured divisions to create a breakthrough instead of relying on the infantry to do so tended to go very poorly even in WW2)

The big thing that I think keeps mechanised warfare relevant is that there could always be another phase in this war where exploitation suddenly becomes possible. I think it might take some time to achieve the conditions for this yet going on either side, so its very much a matter of seeing how things play out. Kharkiv / Sumy showed us that it can happen very quickly, and you dont want to be deprived of armoured / mobile units when it happens. While not as successful, the initial Russian attack also featured some pretty extensive and deep mechanised penetrations, which were let down more by the lack of a proper consolidation and a severe over extension as well as a host of other issues. 

Collapse could very well be caused by Artillery / PGM and whatnot, which would in turn open up the door again for mass mechanised movements again. I feel another eerie sense of comparison when thinking about the First World War. Everyone thought it was going to be a permanent state of trench warfare....until it suddenly wasn't in 1918 and conditions suddenly became more akin to mobile warfare. Big shifts like that can and will happen. 

As a side note, I hope I am articulating myself reasonably well here. I am still somewhat new here despite having lurked for an ungodly amount of time on the forum. Its certainly lovely to discuss / talk to you all!