Huba

Jokes time:
Zelensky now:
 

"That goes fast"...
Damn, PL and Balts gave half of their arms to Ukraine already, we have nothing left to support Wagnerites now. 😉
There are reports that many internet cameras in Moscow are going down...

Some of humor )
Next Wagners unite with RVC and LFR, seize Moscow, shoot out MoD RF, come to Kremlin, establish military dictatursip. Finally, it turns out that Prigozhyn was killed in Africa as far as in 2018. The bald actor put off a mask - Budanov is under it. He presses a button. Moscow is blowing to bits.

Ok, do we know axctually how many troops Wagnerite still have on and near the frontlines? 20 000 or something?
 
PS. 30-page essay to write and such happenings...sleepless night ahead;)
Kapustin aka Nikitin has a sense of humour...
 

Latest from Girkin:

Edit: time zone difference was probably responsible for claims that Prig's messages were pre-recorded:
 

Jokes time:
Zelensky now:
 

Jokes time:
Zelensky now:
 

Oh wow! I just hope it isn't some deliberate PsyOp aimed at provoking UA to reckless attack (very unlikely IMO). 
 

Rybar reporting that Rosgvardiya is mobilizing (units not already mobilized / kinetically demobilized in Ukraine presumably).  If if they just go through a pantomime of a coup attempt, the damage to Russian state image will be huge.  World must immediately tap strategic popcorn reserves.

I just hope that the message was delivered loud and clear not to mess with the nuke plant.
In spectacular Russian fashion, this is chaos and all must be held accountable.

It's all coming together.
NATO reinforcements flowing into Europe for BALTOPS and Air Defender 23 as deterrence in case things get crazy in Moscow during the counteroffensive. Things actually going crazy in Russia during the counteroffensive. The offensive itself switching into high-gear.

Interesring fact. UKR troops in first time since 2019 have retaken territory, which was under DPR control since 2014. This is between UKR-held Krasnohorivka and DPR-held Staromykhailivka
Reportedly UKR soldiers hitn that penetration is slightly more, than marked on DeepState map
Brutal violation of Minsk agreements! )))
 

Followed discussions while back and we can’t know for sure what type of material of construction these particular mines are. Most likely PMA-2 rather than the old TM-series models, also the mines will show clear differences in heat signatures in relation to the ground they placed in.
The_Capt pointed out depth being factor and sure is, buried deep enough the heat transfer will not occur although very hot ambient temperatures. Direct sunlight will not be factor. Timing of imaging is then not important (1h after sunset) as soil has poor specific heating capacity, approximately 5x lower than water. Dry soil thus retains heat to lesser extent and cools faster with lower radiation of energy when air temp starts to drop than wet soils. The same is not true for solid plastics even less for metals, containing zero water, their properties depend only on subunits (and color of course but that is for heat transfer not specific heating capacity).
Most common plastics have heating capacities 5-10x that of soil, retaining higher levels of energy per volume unit. They will also radiate heat stronger than soil if surrounding temperature drops quickly. This is no attempt of physics lectures and will leave it at this. Rather input on the phenomenon why thermal imaging may work in practice. But as The_Capt said, can't be isolated by soil as the poor heating capacity will rather function as isolation than enable heating of the mine. So not universal method for all scenarios.

Regardless of reason the fact that it is possible to detect by simple available means such as thermal imaging from drones is significant discovery. Not just for the ongoing conflict but even more so for what comes afterwards. De-mining Eastern Ukraine will be tall task with with any given method. This for me is one of those moments of epiphany when seeing really smart applications of cheap standard equipment. 
Regardless if was on purpose or by chance the discovery is nothing short of ingenious. Ukrainians once again show examples of simple, cheap but very effective methods of making difficult tasks much easier. No silver bullet to the mine problem but rather new tool to add for current and future challenges involving mines. Let’s see if it’s one off or if they can map other regions with more clay or slit also. Very interesting nevertheless.

Looks to me you're not the only one that is pondering about the whereabouts  of those Ukrainian troops.
I am, despite all the explanations and all the Russian defense-tenacity and all the historic comparisons, a tiny bit surprised and perhaps even a little bit disappointed that there isn't more BIG OFFENSIVE news. But ..
WHAT IF..
What if the Ukrainians had their big push planned west of the Khakovka dam and, by sheer luck, through clever intel or stupidity, the Russians blew that just before the Ukrainian attack started?
Wouldn't that force the Ukrainians to redeploy a lot of troops and (partially) re-plan that offensive? And cause a delay that, at least for a part, could explain the absence of the "bigger things" that we probably are all waiting for?
(BTW: I don't know why, but I have a gut-feeling that in a week or two things will really start to move.

I still don't get why UAF hasn't nixxed the rail bridges from Crimea to Kherson and Melitopol so far. Maybe still not the correct timing for max effect? We will see.

Neat clip of AFU HMMWVs or Humvees as most people say in action.

I did a little Google Earth exploring of Crimea, looking for potential chokepoints to RU logistic system:
 
1. There's only one relevant railway in Crimea, which crosses the Kerch bridge and then follows to Dzhankoy, where it splits into lines toward Melitopol and Kherson. Disabling it is IMO the low hanging fruit for the UA. Apart from the Kerch bridge itself, there are numerous bridges and overpasses along it, which when struck would put it out of order for some, and in many cases probably for a very long time. The goal here would be to force Russians to offload all the materiel to trucks as far from the frontlines as possible, instead of driving the trains up to Melitopol or Dzhankoy. Making them switch to trucks in Kerch instead of Dzhankoy adds around 200km to the distance trucks have to travel one-way.

2. There are three road connections between Kherson and Crimea:
2.1 The most direct one leads from Dzhankoy through Chonhar, through the bridges that were attacked today. As far as road transport is concerned this is the one RU would like to use (at least as long as they can use Dzhankoy rail yard) and UA to try to deny to them
2.2 Around through Perekop. No bridges or other chokepoints here, but choosing it adds around 200km to the trip, one way.
2.3 Through Arabat Spit. The shortest connection from Kerch > Semysotka > Henichensk and further to Zaporozhiya front. The spit is super narrow and around 100km long. There wasn't a paved road along most of its length, but Russians reportedly started to build one last year. With rail disabled I guess most of the traffic will go through it soon, as road travel from Kerch by this route is noticeably shorter than through Chonhar. At Henichenks there are 2 subsequent bridges that UA side could attack to mess with RU logistics. Also, in case UA reaches the coast of Azov somewhere, this road would be extremely exposed to drone/ missile strikes.


 

Well hopefully deployed The_Capt will have enough time on the evenings for that book writing.

There are some good news coming from the ammunition department today:
Apparently there's a way to feed 2S7s with US 203mm ammunition:
US is ramping up its 155mm production, Rheinmetall is reportedly even further ahead in this regard. In the thread following the tweet below there's a quote from Reznikov about UA using 110K shells per month, and asking for 250K/ month. It is more than official number for RU production, which Shoigu himself said is 200K per month, and in reality probably a fraction of that. Arsenal(s) of democracy are really starting to work, and IMO going froward UA will be in better and better position ammunition wise.

US Congress just basically gave bi-partisan support for an escalation ladder to WW3…that is some spicy talk.  
Nuclear weapons release makes sense (although these were words we dared not speak in the previous 17 months).  Destruction of a nuclear power plant = Article 5 is a pretty serious round to be loading in the chamber. 
I drifted off when everyone was talking about 6.8mm and woke up to this?!
Where in the hell is @billbindc!

I did a little Google Earth exploring of Crimea, looking for potential chokepoints to RU logistic system:
 
1. There's only one relevant railway in Crimea, which crosses the Kerch bridge and then follows to Dzhankoy, where it splits into lines toward Melitopol and Kherson. Disabling it is IMO the low hanging fruit for the UA. Apart from the Kerch bridge itself, there are numerous bridges and overpasses along it, which when struck would put it out of order for some, and in many cases probably for a very long time. The goal here would be to force Russians to offload all the materiel to trucks as far from the frontlines as possible, instead of driving the trains up to Melitopol or Dzhankoy. Making them switch to trucks in Kerch instead of Dzhankoy adds around 200km to the distance trucks have to travel one-way.

2. There are three road connections between Kherson and Crimea:
2.1 The most direct one leads from Dzhankoy through Chonhar, through the bridges that were attacked today. As far as road transport is concerned this is the one RU would like to use (at least as long as they can use Dzhankoy rail yard) and UA to try to deny to them
2.2 Around through Perekop. No bridges or other chokepoints here, but choosing it adds around 200km to the trip, one way.
2.3 Through Arabat Spit. The shortest connection from Kerch > Semysotka > Henichensk and further to Zaporozhiya front. The spit is super narrow and around 100km long. There wasn't a paved road along most of its length, but Russians reportedly started to build one last year. With rail disabled I guess most of the traffic will go through it soon, as road travel from Kerch by this route is noticeably shorter than through Chonhar. At Henichenks there are 2 subsequent bridges that UA side could attack to mess with RU logistics. Also, in case UA reaches the coast of Azov somewhere, this road would be extremely exposed to drone/ missile strikes.


 

This actually excellent, even if the AFU lost a bit of ground. Forcing one of the best units the Russians have left to attack in a place where Ukraine can truly mass fires is the way to win this war.

Kostiantyn Mashovets wrote today Russians took from own operative reserves 38th motor-rifle brigade of 35th CAA of Eastern military district and with elements of 45th VDV Spetsnaz brigade launched heavy counter attack on direction Novofedorivka - Novopokrovka along Mala Tokmachka river and from line Luhivske - Novokarlivka toward Bilohirya. In result of these attacks, supportted with artillery and MLRS, Russians could seize SE part of Novopokrovka village (by DeepState map it already long time signed under Russian control, but likely now it was in grey zone) and push UKR troops closer to Bilohirya. At the evening UKR troops managed to stop Russian advance with huge amount of artillery fire. 
Mashovets supposes, that it's a matter with what forces and where Russians conducted these counter-attacks. If near Pyatykhatky we can see different volunteer units ("Shtorm. Osetia" and BARS-32 "named after Sudoplatov" - local Zaporozhian collaborators) along with some regulars, that east from Robotyne, Russians have thrown to counter-attack one of most capable units on this front - elite VDV Spetsnaz (as assault infantry!) and unit of 35th CAA as well as units of 5th СAA, operating on V.Novosilka salient - on Mashovets opinion, troops of Eastarn Military District are more properly trained and motivated. So, likely Russians considered a section east of Robotyne more dangerous, than Pyatykhatky and harried to counter UKR push with own counter-attack, using more capable reserves and this is good sign in "reserves run" 

There are some good news coming from the ammunition department today:
Apparently there's a way to feed 2S7s with US 203mm ammunition:
US is ramping up its 155mm production, Rheinmetall is reportedly even further ahead in this regard. In the thread following the tweet below there's a quote from Reznikov about UA using 110K shells per month, and asking for 250K/ month. It is more than official number for RU production, which Shoigu himself said is 200K per month, and in reality probably a fraction of that. Arsenal(s) of democracy are really starting to work, and IMO going froward UA will be in better and better position ammunition wise.

I did a little Google Earth exploring of Crimea, looking for potential chokepoints to RU logistic system:
 
1. There's only one relevant railway in Crimea, which crosses the Kerch bridge and then follows to Dzhankoy, where it splits into lines toward Melitopol and Kherson. Disabling it is IMO the low hanging fruit for the UA. Apart from the Kerch bridge itself, there are numerous bridges and overpasses along it, which when struck would put it out of order for some, and in many cases probably for a very long time. The goal here would be to force Russians to offload all the materiel to trucks as far from the frontlines as possible, instead of driving the trains up to Melitopol or Dzhankoy. Making them switch to trucks in Kerch instead of Dzhankoy adds around 200km to the distance trucks have to travel one-way.

2. There are three road connections between Kherson and Crimea:
2.1 The most direct one leads from Dzhankoy through Chonhar, through the bridges that were attacked today. As far as road transport is concerned this is the one RU would like to use (at least as long as they can use Dzhankoy rail yard) and UA to try to deny to them
2.2 Around through Perekop. No bridges or other chokepoints here, but choosing it adds around 200km to the trip, one way.
2.3 Through Arabat Spit. The shortest connection from Kerch > Semysotka > Henichensk and further to Zaporozhiya front. The spit is super narrow and around 100km long. There wasn't a paved road along most of its length, but Russians reportedly started to build one last year. With rail disabled I guess most of the traffic will go through it soon, as road travel from Kerch by this route is noticeably shorter than through Chonhar. At Henichenks there are 2 subsequent bridges that UA side could attack to mess with RU logistics. Also, in case UA reaches the coast of Azov somewhere, this road would be extremely exposed to drone/ missile strikes.