dbsapp

I suspect the same, it seems like they changed something and the balance in game was distorted, but nobody cares. CMFR seems much, much more reasonable to me than original CMRT. So what was your general plan, what did you do exactly?

I did something resembling what you are saying, but still I wasn't satisfied. For me this kind of missions remind a trap: first they look like an interesting scenario, but then after many rage quits you understand that it was a trolling. It's like a sophisticated riddle you was trying to solve for days just to realise that it was flawed frome the start and never had a beautiful solution.

So how did you make it with Bunkers Burning mission? I remember I completed it going through left side under smoke screen. It was absolutely artificial solution since I knew where the main threats were coming from and I reloaded multiple times because my tanks were bogged and immobilized or destroyed. I tried to find different paths to victory, which would be more "natural", but they didn't work. Basically you command Soviet infantry that is green or regular against veteran Germans in bunkers with machineguns, hidden flak, stug, minefield, barbed wire, mines and rough terrain where your tanks are certainly bogged.

A agree with both - German campaign definitely doesn't look like "Germans are on the ropes". It's more like 1941 German juggernaut against weak Soviet defense. But I still enjoy CMFR because the scenarios are well designed and entertaining. Computer games are not historical learning experience for sure, they are just a games, with more or less "realism", but it's never absolute.

Destroyed more than 50 Soviet tanks in single battle in 8th mission of Broken Shield campaign. How realistic is that from historical and realism standpoint? Looks like it reverse of what actually happened on Balaton lake in that timeframe.

To give Strykers the first role was one of a few options to make not an easy win fest for American campaign. So it deliberately underpowered. I made about 80% of it, it's quite nice, but it feels unbalanced and unpolished in some missions.

Battlefront can ask for permission from the government of Afghanistan now.

This one is very good. Done it twice. It has 6 missions. 4th (named Road to Hell) is really difficult, but you have to win in order to proceed to 5th. And if you lose (!) the 5th you will get 6th.

It's a good tip, thank you.

Sounds good

Never encountered this type of missions in CMFR. But they have it in original CMRT - bunkers burning scenario for example.

Well, every tool is good in the right conditions, so it's quite reasonable to employ Khrizantema from the cover and from the distance in defensive position. The thing is it's optics and it's reaction time for whatever reason are so bad that even in those circumstances - which are pretty rare by game's standards - Khrizantema is almost useless.

If you don't want to get into overly difficult campaign then don't touch "Striker Brigade" from the battle pack. Russian campaigns a pretty decent. I like both of them, especially the additional one (Heroes of Dneproderzhinsk), the original (Crossing the Dnieper) is slightly easier. Heroes of Dneproderzhinsk have concealed and alternative missions. Ukrainian campaign is ok as well, but it's like mini (only 4 missions). I didn't finish US campaign yet, but it's also nice.

On the new playthrough I found what I think is an optimal way to accomplish this mission. First, I sent all my forces, including snipers, to the opposite side of the forest and stroke there. The German forces there consist of several men only, so it's much easier to penetrate their defense. Second, I occupied the houses, so when Germans started withdrawal they were blocked by my units hidden in the ruins. I was impressed how many German forces actually was there! Thirdly, I employed the new squad from reinforcements to strike Germans in the back. I got Major Victory (some unnecessary casualties were made by mistake because I didn't use reloads). Frankly, its very hard - if even possible - to strike Germans in the face in this mission. Snipers are killed faster than they can kill anybody in the buildings. If you run from the bushes directly to the houses its a meatgrinder.

I try to love this game but it doesn't seem to be mutual feeling...

Very nice little scenario, as good as everything in Fire and Rubble. Tried it yesterday, I got major or tactical victory, but I'm not satisfied with my results (my casualties are too high and one or two Germans remained in one of the houses). There were 2 issues I struggled with during playthrough. First, partisans are very low on ammo. In the middle of the heated battle my guns became empty. Second, and this one isn't confined to this particular scenario, my troops don't fire, though they have LOS, see the enemy and if I order them to fire manually they do, but if I don't they do nothing. To make them fire by themselves I need to bring them really close to the enemy (and they have long range weapons like bolt rifles).

Yes, they are. It's a real shame that they have such bias in the game.

Sounds interesting, I'll give it a try next time. You mean you measure line of fire FROM the the target to get the best place from where you can hit it, right?

Found some interesting thoughts on Yugoslavia\ Greece and Barbarossa: Firstly, as a teaser, it is worth pointing out that Hitler himself did quite explicitly blame Mussolini's failures in Africa and the Balkans for undermining his invasion of the USSR, in his famous recorded conversation with Marshal Mannerheim of Finland in May 1942. He made mention of the permanent loss of three key divisions (to Africa), and the disruption and diversion of his airforce and panzer forces, which the Balkan and Mediterranean operations entailed, while they should have been preparing for 'Barbarossa'. He doesn't explicitly say, however, that there was a consequent delay in launching 'Barbarossa', only that he had expected the operation to begin in the spring of 1941, and that the Balkan distraction had been "very unfortunate". Hitler also took great pains to point out to Mannerheim the fact that the German war machine was a "good weather" force, and that this had caused him to delay his campaign in the West over the winter of 1939-40, despite his desperate desire to move quickly on that front. He also spoke of the difficulties caused by excessive rain for his mobile striking forces, and also their acknowledged unpreparedness for winter combat. So while we can see from his own words that Hitler was very good at finding excuses for the German failure to conclude the war in the USSR in 1941, your question was, what do historians think? Historian Martin van Creveld wrote a book on this exact subject back in 1973, 'Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue', which I believe was quite influential in establishing the claim among historians that there was no significant delay to the start of 'Barbarossa' as a consequence of the Balkan Campaigns. In researching this book van Creveld meticulously followed the preparation and positioning of the German military forces in the lead-up to the invasion of the USSR, and found that the scheduling of the re-equipping and training of forces would not have allowed them to be ready for the offensive much earlier than the historical starting point, regardless of the Balkan Campaigns. He shows that units redeploying from the Balkan Campaigns were in fact in position and ready for a start to operations even before the original 16th May 1941 deadline. Many of the forces used in the Balkans were earmarked for reserve, and so were not even required to be in position until very late in the process, and the transportation timetables were very flexible, and had been designed to operate in synchronicity with the Balkan operations. The real cause of delay, according to van Creveld, was the result of shortages of equipment for key divisions, especially motorized and panzer forces which were to be re-equipped with captured French equipment. Some of these units were still moving forward in late May and early June 1941, and some were moved forward before their equipment had even arrived, with the hope that their equipment would be scrounged from various locations and meet them at their destination. He concludes that this problem alone would have prevented a start to operations in the East before late June 1941, and it had nothing to do with the Balkan Campaign or the weather. However, the story does not end there... On 17th March 1941, as British forces were disembarking in Greece in response to German moves into Bulgaria, Hitler made the decision to change the objective of Operation 'Marita', from a limited occupation of northern Greece, into a complete occupation of Greece to expel British forces from the continent. This had the effect of significantly extending the scope of the operation, requiring the use of larger numbers of German forces, for a longer period of time. This threw the synchronization between Operations 'Marita' and 'Barbarossa' into chaos. Forces of 12th Army, required for duty in Greece, which had been earmarked for operations with Army Group South in 'Barbarossa', would simply not be available for the beginning of 'Barbarossa'. This did not cause a delay in the starting date of 'Barbarossa', but it did cause a significant alteration to the operational plan for 'Barbarossa'. The existing plan for Operation 'Barbarossa', called for Army Group South to attack into the USSR along two major axes; from Rumania, with 1st Panzergruppe, and 12th Army in support; forming an encircling pincer with an attack from 6th Army and 17th Army from Poland. The loss of supporting divisions from 12th Army due to the expanding scope of the Greek operation, led Hitler to doubt the ability of the southern pincer from Rumania to safely cross the Pruth River, and as a consequence he cancelled the attack from Rumania, and directed that 1st Panzergruppe would support the northern attack from Poland instead, creating a single-axis attack for Army Group South, without the ability to create large pincer encirclements. This had significant ramifications for the Germans. In the historical event, the single-axis attack from Army Group South from Poland was hindered and delayed by terrain and stubborn Soviet resistance, which resulted in Army Group South lagging behind as the German Army advanced into the USSR, and exposed the right flank of Army Group Centre. It was this exposed southern flank which so worried Hitler that he diverted Guderian's 2nd Panzergruppe to Kiev from Army Group Centre during the critical month of September, when German forces should have been resting, resupplying, and building up their logistics for the next stage of the campaign. We can only speculate how things might have been different if 1st Panzergruppe had been sent racing across the southern steppes of the Ukraine, instead of winding through the Carpathian valleys, perhaps encircling Kiev from the south and finding itself, rested, replenished and poised in perfect position to continue the advance to Moscow or Rostov at the beginning of September, along with a similarly refreshed Army Group Centre. So while there was no overall delay to the start of Operation 'Barbarossa' due to the Balkan Campaign, there were potentially far-reaching ramifications due to the diversion of key units from the planned attack. Given the effect this had, we can also perhaps revisit Hitler's criticism of Mussolini to Mannerheim in 1942, and see it as perhaps not as entirely self-serving as might have been assumed.

Comrades Lemeshev and Schetinin will be awarded with the order of Red Banner. I really like how all those people in CM games have names. It makes it more personal. Reminds me of good old "Theatre of War" where you could distribute experience and give medals to every guy after a mission.

I remeber this mission. Those two panthers were a real pain.

The hilarious thing was that initially Germans hoped that Japan WOULDN'T invade USSR and engage US unstead. Reich planners thought it would distract America from interfering in European war. Few month later everything changed and Ribbentrop begun to press Japanese for help, but they already had their own war to fight. The loose cooperation between Germany and Japan was one of the major factors of their defeat. Japan didn't give a notice to its ally on the preparations to Pearl harbor, and Germans gave Tokyo only a vague hint about Barbarossa.