Centurian52

I'm probably not qualified to say much on air defenses. But the Javelin is thoroughly at #1. It just locks on to a heat signature. It doesn't make any decisions about whether or not to lock on to a particular heat signature.
We can pretty much already do what you described for tank FCS (well, not the next iteration part about lining up multiple targets, yet). Modern tank FCS uses automatic target tracking, in which all the gunner has to do is lock on to the target and make the decision to fire. The FCS does all of the rest of the work. So modern tank FCS is also thoroughly at #1. It does all of the work in figuring out how to get the round to the target, while the gunner does all of the work of deciding what is a target and when to kill it. Which is a pretty optimal division of labor honestly. Let the computers do what's easy for computers and let the humans do what's easy for humans.

Incorrect - motor rifle regiments generally got the older kit but not T-72s.  Using 8 Guards Army, which would have been GSFG's first operational echelon in the American zone as the case study ...
20 Guards Motor Rifle Division
Was completely equipped with T-54/55 in 1974. It had a mix of T-54/55, T-62 and T-64 in 1979. In 1985 it had 231 x T-62s and 40 x T-80s. 39 Guards Motor Rifle Division
Was completely equipped with T-54/55 in 1974. In 1979 15 Guards Tank Regiment was T-64 equipped while the three motor rifle regiments were T-62 equipped. In 1985 it had 177 x T-62 on strength and 94 x T-80s. 57 Guards Motor Rifle Division
Was completely equipped with T-54/55 in 1974 51 Guards Tank and 174 Guards Motor Rifle Regiment were equipped with T-64 while 170 and 241 Guards Motor Rifle Regiments were equipped with T-55 in 1979. In 1985 the division had 40 x T-62 and 231 x T-80s. 79 Guards Tank Division
In 1974 every single regiment in the division was equipped with T-62 except 247 Guards Motor Rifle Regiment which was equipped with T-54/55. In 1979 it was completely equipped with the T-62 with the exception of 211 Tank Regiment which had possibly received T-64 that year. In 1985 it was completely T-80 equipped.

Actually technology is getting to a point where a 2 man tank will be perfectly effective. The problem with 2-man tanks in WW2 was that the commander was overworked. He had to command the tank, spot targets, aim and fire the gun, and load the gun. One man was trying to be commander, loader, and gunner. Technology has eliminated most of that workload. Obviously the job of the loader could be automated since the 60s. But automatic target tracking is just about to a point where the job of the gunner can be automated as well. As I've said before, a human still needs to be in the loop because AI is still too stupid to be trusted with target identification and selection. But it can make all the targeting calculations and fire on a target that has been designated by a human.
Part of the job of the commander is already to look for new targets while the gunner is busy engaging the last target. And with modern hunter-killer systems the commander is already expected to slew the turret towards the next target for the gunner to engage, while he then goes back to scanning for new targets. With a modern 2-man tank concept a commander would just be modifying his old job description, so that instead of slewing the turret when he spotted a target, he would mark it for the FCS, which would then automatically engage and destroy it (human makes the targeting decisions, computer makes and executes the targeting calculations). With both the loader and gunner roles being automated, the commander of a modern 2-man tank would be no more overworked than the commander of a WW2 5-man tank.
The only downsides to this approach is that you have one less pair of eyes looking for targets, and you have one less pair of hands to assist in maintenance. The maintenance workload could probably be solved with some organizational changes, since there is no reason you couldn't have additional maintenance personnel in a unit that aren't necessarily tank crew (although perhaps they could be reserve tank crew, in case of casualties, sickness, leave, etc...).

Fair enough. Flying to and hitting the target is well within what modern technology can do. So kamikaze drones probably don't need a "pilot" anymore. I was thinking more in terms of target selection and identification. And in that respect we are still a long way from being able to take the human out of the loop. I think we are going to see three stages of autonomous weapons.
1. The weapon is smart enough to find its own way to the target, but the target still has to be identified and selected by a human. This is where we are today.
2. The weapon is smart enough to identify and select its own targets, but with a high enough error rate that a human needs to be in the loop to explicitly approve the target before the weapon can be allowed to kill it. I think we'll get here over the next decade.
3. The weapon is smart enough to be trusted as a fully autonomous system. We have a ways to go to get here.

Actually technology is getting to a point where a 2 man tank will be perfectly effective. The problem with 2-man tanks in WW2 was that the commander was overworked. He had to command the tank, spot targets, aim and fire the gun, and load the gun. One man was trying to be commander, loader, and gunner. Technology has eliminated most of that workload. Obviously the job of the loader could be automated since the 60s. But automatic target tracking is just about to a point where the job of the gunner can be automated as well. As I've said before, a human still needs to be in the loop because AI is still too stupid to be trusted with target identification and selection. But it can make all the targeting calculations and fire on a target that has been designated by a human.
Part of the job of the commander is already to look for new targets while the gunner is busy engaging the last target. And with modern hunter-killer systems the commander is already expected to slew the turret towards the next target for the gunner to engage, while he then goes back to scanning for new targets. With a modern 2-man tank concept a commander would just be modifying his old job description, so that instead of slewing the turret when he spotted a target, he would mark it for the FCS, which would then automatically engage and destroy it (human makes the targeting decisions, computer makes and executes the targeting calculations). With both the loader and gunner roles being automated, the commander of a modern 2-man tank would be no more overworked than the commander of a WW2 5-man tank.
The only downsides to this approach is that you have one less pair of eyes looking for targets, and you have one less pair of hands to assist in maintenance. The maintenance workload could probably be solved with some organizational changes, since there is no reason you couldn't have additional maintenance personnel in a unit that aren't necessarily tank crew (although perhaps they could be reserve tank crew, in case of casualties, sickness, leave, etc...).

The I would argue the the Javelin is doing quite a bit more than that, given its ability to stay locked on with radically changing view aspects and target maneuvers.
Next generation tank FCS Should enable things like passing the view from the commanders sight, or a remote drone view, to the gunners station. The gunner pre approves all four targets in a specified order, and tells the FCS to fire the instant it can bear on the target. Thus the tank could emerge from essentially complete cover and fire four rounds at four preselected targets, and be reversing back into cover in less than thirty seconds to assess. Of course next level is for the platoon commander to be able to set this up for four tanks at once. So you would be looking at 16 rounds going down range in thirty seconds with no double targeting. It would make a heck of a show when they crested the ridge.

This former Bradley crewman loves it!

It looks like M2 in Ukrainian service will be called „Kitty Cat” (I do not dare to suggest another name, commonly used for both cats and ladyparts). UA are really good with social media and I love witty videos they usually post - but this one is just too much 🤣😂
 

I emphasize again, while I do think warfare is headed in that direction, it is still a long way away. As impressive as chat GPT looks from the outside, AI just isn't there yet.
Fully autonomous weapon systems are next decade's tech (at the earliest), not this decade's.

I was about to say no, we've already got German countryside. But then I remembered, this is different German countryside. What we've got right now is the Fulda Gap. This is the North German Plain. So I wouldn't mind taking a peek at the new ground we'll be fighting over.

I emphasize again, while I do think warfare is headed in that direction, it is still a long way away. As impressive as chat GPT looks from the outside, AI just isn't there yet.
Fully autonomous weapon systems are next decade's tech (at the earliest), not this decade's.

I emphasize again, while I do think warfare is headed in that direction, it is still a long way away. As impressive as chat GPT looks from the outside, AI just isn't there yet.
Fully autonomous weapon systems are next decade's tech (at the earliest), not this decade's.

I emphasize again, while I do think warfare is headed in that direction, it is still a long way away. As impressive as chat GPT looks from the outside, AI just isn't there yet.
Fully autonomous weapon systems are next decade's tech (at the earliest), not this decade's.

Kinda looks like they were trying to pull into low ground, which is the standard old drill - won't do much for NLOS or even a Javelin that gets a lock because it just carries that lock with it at altitude.

Working on it.  No screenshots yet expect for a bunch of maps, you guys want to see shots of German countryside?

I think the talk of the probable limited success is emphasizing that the offensive won't be a knockout blow. The war will still be raging and there will still be Ukrainian territory left to liberate. I think this aligns with my expectations. I expect this offensive to accomplish a lot, but it will almost certainly need to be followed up by another offensive, and possibly another after that, in order to finish driving the Russians out completely. So I'm disappointed to hear that we only seem to be equipping the Ukrainians with this offensive in mind, and aren't building them up with multiple successive offensives in mind. One offensive every six months is not a very efficient way to win a war.

A-10s? As much as I want us to send anything and everything we can to help Ukraine out, I really hope we aren't sending A-10s. Those things will not survive in a modern airspace. I know we're ground warfare nerds here, so it may not be obvious, but the "low and slow" philosophy that the A-10 was designed around is an outdated concept. Maybe a bunch of the things getting wrecked will finally break the spell it seems to have over the public, but it's not worth the loss of good Ukrainian pilots. F-16s will perform much better in ground attack missions, and will actually have a chance of surviving.

I know that it won't happen, but what if Putin went somewhere and was arrested?  My first thought is "OMG Ru possible nuke!  Immediate war!"  Then I thought.... but who w access to the levers of power (FSB, military, other) wants him back??  They'd be way too busy fighting each other for power. 
Hilarious thought I had of Putin calling everyone he knows and no one will post bail.  😆

Is it perhaps please possible to have some screenshot for the upcoming British module?

A-10s? As much as I want us to send anything and everything we can to help Ukraine out, I really hope we aren't sending A-10s. Those things will not survive in a modern airspace. I know we're ground warfare nerds here, so it may not be obvious, but the "low and slow" philosophy that the A-10 was designed around is an outdated concept. Maybe a bunch of the things getting wrecked will finally break the spell it seems to have over the public, but it's not worth the loss of good Ukrainian pilots. F-16s will perform much better in ground attack missions, and will actually have a chance of surviving.

I think the talk of the probable limited success is emphasizing that the offensive won't be a knockout blow. The war will still be raging and there will still be Ukrainian territory left to liberate. I think this aligns with my expectations. I expect this offensive to accomplish a lot, but it will almost certainly need to be followed up by another offensive, and possibly another after that, in order to finish driving the Russians out completely. So I'm disappointed to hear that we only seem to be equipping the Ukrainians with this offensive in mind, and aren't building them up with multiple successive offensives in mind. One offensive every six months is not a very efficient way to win a war.

I think the talk of the probable limited success is emphasizing that the offensive won't be a knockout blow. The war will still be raging and there will still be Ukrainian territory left to liberate. I think this aligns with my expectations. I expect this offensive to accomplish a lot, but it will almost certainly need to be followed up by another offensive, and possibly another after that, in order to finish driving the Russians out completely. So I'm disappointed to hear that we only seem to be equipping the Ukrainians with this offensive in mind, and aren't building them up with multiple successive offensives in mind. One offensive every six months is not a very efficient way to win a war.

While transatlantic partners remain supportive of Ukraine, there are questions about the success of the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive. Many Western leaders doubt how a protracted war could impact the future of transatlantic support of Ukraine. In this context, how will the Ukrainian counteroffensive shape the future trajectory both of the battlefield and transatlantic unity? Michael Kofman joins Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Jim Townsend to discuss this and more.
bullet points of the Mike's comments:
On this subject of the Winter Offensive:
In the fall, Russia barely managed to stabilize its frontlines but faced difficulties in improving its military force. The mobilization process primarily achieved increasing the number of troops rather than enhancing their capabilities. The loss of experienced leadership, high-quality equipment, and lack of ammunition further hindered the force's overall effectiveness. The Russian forces didn't have the ability to transition from static defense to more dynamic offensive operations. They appeared incapable of executing large-scale operations and were forced to divide efforts into four or five separate axes. In none of these sectors were they able to gain a significant advantage over the Ukrainians in terms of firepower, manpower, or equipment.  It's unclear why the Ukrainians hyped up the Russian winter offensive to the degree they did.  Interestingly, the media bought into the Ukrainian narrative, and it took them weeks to recognize the actual situation, even after the offensive had already begun. For weeks, the media reported on a non-existent other larger army that was expected to follow up on the initial offensive. This offensive operation showcased the limitations of Russia's offensive capabilities. On the other hand, it revealed little about their defensive capabilities, which may prove more crucial in the summer.  On the counter-offensive:
The stakes appear to be so high because there doesn't seem to be a Plan B for this operation or any contingencies for its aftermath(from the Western coalition). Most of the Western investment appears to have been made with this specific operation in mind, and there is no indication of a significant follow-up build-up. There may be further developments to address this in the summer, but the extent of these efforts remains to be seen. The appropriate way to view this operation is as a window of opportunity for Ukraine. There is significant support provided to Ukraine for this operation, but this does not provide a sustained advantage for the foreseeable future. It is highly likely that the war will return to a static state after this counteroffensive, regardless of its success. There is no visible strategy or momentum to maintain the advantage for Ukraine after this offensive operation. The potential for a decisive defeat that would drive Russia to the negotiation table is unlikely, and even in the best scenarios, the conflict is likely to continue as a cross-border war with the possibility of future escalations in the far future. Many people make the mistake of equating a long-protracted war to a stalemate. This could not be further from the truth. It is improbable that Russia can sustain this war without a second wave of mobilization, which they are currently planning and also doing everything to avoid, like last year. The losing side decides when the war stops. On the strategic picture:
On the three goals of the US: Strategic defeat for Russia, victory for Ukraine, and escalation management. Strategic defeat for Russia has been achieved and the US is balancing between the last two goals. Mike is confused, as even he doesn't understand his own country's plans for the next phase after the counter-offensive. The counter-offensive probably won't be decisive enough to end this war, which is a fair assumption.  If the West waits for the results of the spring offensive, it may take another six months to launch a new operation. Mike states he doesn't usually criticize the government and appreciates the difficulties of balancing various factors ext. However, now he's making an exception.  Fighting a war with one offensive at a time, separated by six months, is not a great plan, and that is exactly how this war has been going.  You cannot wait for the results of the offensives to decide what you will do next.  Mike hasn't heard any plans about sustaining Ukraine in a long war. No one has explained the big picture, which is important for setting expectations for the Russians. Currently, the Russians could be counting on winning this war in the year 5 or so. Generally speaking, Russia might be able to sustain it for a couple of years. Russia's ability to produce ammunition and pull equipment out of storage will increase over time. However, the extent of this is uncertain and is still not going to equal demand even close.  Then there are unknown factors like China that can change the whole equation. China is likely to adopt a “salami-slicing” the US deterrence policy, providing components and industrial enablers that will have significant effects over time. Regarding economic sustainment, Mike doesn't know much, but the outlook does not generally look good for Russia. However, sustaining the war for a couple of years seems feasible. In summary, Russia can sustain this war for years, but it cannot change its fortunes on the battlefield. In terms of aid, Mike is not focused on any single item, like the F-16, but rather on issues like equipping 9 brigades and providing enough ammunition for offensive operations. Western countries are also starting to accept the fact that this will be a years-long war, but they have not yet specified what this means or how to adapt their approach. For now, they are still operating on a three-month timeline. As for Moscow's perspective on this war: 
Highly depends on who you ask in Moscow, but generally... Mike thinks they understand the disaster it has been, but they also recognize that they have survived a lot so far.  They see a total economic collapse as less likely at this point. Putin's political troubles will likely only begin if the war ends.  Russia is transitioning to a war mobilization approach as a nation.  At this point, Russian leadership must be cognizant that their military will not be able to capture Ukraine They are considering the possibility of additional mobilizations. They have settled on the idea of a long war, believing they can eventually wear Ukraine down over the years. Belief in their nation's latent power and cherry-picking history has often given great power leaders false confidence. What indicators is Mike watching now (the counter-offensive):
A series of operations that will unfold over the coming months. He is not expecting significant territorial changes early on. Territorial changes are often a lagging indicator in war. People tend to focus on territorial changes because they are visible, but the driving forces behind them are more complex.  The initial operations are probably not the main effort(s). Mike will be looking closely at sustainment. In the past, the challenge for Ukraine has not been breaking through but sustaining defensive operations. Pushing through the second and third lines, and handing Russian counterattacks. The best time to gauge the effects of the offensive on the war will be late summer, as it will be challenging to determine the operation's impact on the war before that. We have not seen these two militaries face each other before, making it impossible to accurately predict the outcome. Untested, newly-formed Ukrainian units equipped with recently introduced equipment and new tactics will be engaging with Russian-mobilized, untested troops in defenses that have not yet been put to the test.

A-10s? As much as I want us to send anything and everything we can to help Ukraine out, I really hope we aren't sending A-10s. Those things will not survive in a modern airspace. I know we're ground warfare nerds here, so it may not be obvious, but the "low and slow" philosophy that the A-10 was designed around is an outdated concept. Maybe a bunch of the things getting wrecked will finally break the spell it seems to have over the public, but it's not worth the loss of good Ukrainian pilots. F-16s will perform much better in ground attack missions, and will actually have a chance of surviving.