Centurian52

ISW was reporting as far back as March that Russia was planning large scale information operations that would continue through May. So I'm not surprised.

I'm completely with you there. Refineries are obviously legitimate military targets, and I am struggling to understand why there is any controversy in Ukraine attacking them. I have never understood our prohibition on Ukraine using western weapons to attack targets inside internationally-recognized Russian territory (we don't care about what Russia thinks is Russian territory). But that isn't what Carolus was suggesting.

No. It will not lead to the eventual end of international law. International law might come to an end eventually, but it will not be because we stayed high. If anything, it might come to an end because we went low.
I think you are missing some very basic fundamentals about this war, the relative strength of modern day Russia and the west, how the modern world works in general, and a few realities of warfare.
1. It isn't about going high or low. Russia is making gains in Ukraine right now because there was a gap in western aid, not because the west is sticking to the high road. Now that fresh aid is on the way Russia's window to make significant gains is going to come to a close, even if they keep going low. It will not reopen unless there is another gap in western aid. It has absolutely nothing to do with going high or low. Russia going low is not giving them an advantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is. Us going high is not putting Ukraine at a disadvantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is.
2. The west is massively more powerful than Russia. The US GDP in 2022 was ten times the Russian GDP. The combined members of NATO (including the US) have twenty times the Russian GDP. If you add in our Pacific and Asian allies it comes out to thirty times the Russian GDP. Now, as we have been painfully learning over the last two years, overwhelming economic superiority does not instantly or automatically translate to a superiority in military industrial production. But, as I expect Russia to very painfully learn over the next (I'm throwing out a guess here, based largely on the mediocrity principle, that we're right smack dab in the middle of this thing) two years, it does translate to a greater potential to expand military industrial production. And it translates to greater economic endurance. Russia cannot keep up current levels of spending forever. The west can keep up current levels of aid to Ukraine (or even many times the current levels of aid in monetary terms) pretty much forever. So the west absolutely has the capability to enable Ukraine to win. The only factor is western will to continue supporting Ukraine, and to hopefully expand support for Ukraine. Provided that western will to support Ukraine doesn't break, it is impossible for Russia to win even if they go low and we stay high. Going low or high isn't even a factor.
3. Going high isn't just about principle, it's where our strength comes from. I mean that literally, not in the vague feel-good sense in which the power of love somehow enables the heroes of a story to overcome impossible odds. Our strength (both military and economic) is literally derived from our alliances, our credibility, and the rules based international order. The United States has a massive network of alliances. You may notice that China and Russia, both of which are far more willing to go low, come up a little short on allies.
4. Going low doesn't actually work. This may be a bit difficult to grasp, particularly since we've been inundated with pessimists who think they're realists for so many years. But just because something is dirty or unethical doesn't make it effective. As one example, Russian assassinations on British soil were probably a factor in why the British have been so enthusiastic in providing support for Ukraine (the small amount of material they've provided has more to do with a lack of material to provide than with a lack of will to provide it). As another example, I have been reading about increasing use by the Russians of chemical weapons in Ukraine. These are outlawed in warfare under international law, so is about as clear a case of going low as you could imagine. But there are reasons why it was so much easier to outlaw the use of chemical weapons in warfare than it was to outlaw the use of, for example, cluster munitions. Chief among them is that cluster munitions are extremely effective, while chemical weapons aren't particularly effective. It was easy to outlaw chemical weapons because their cruelty is far out of proportion to their battlefield utility. They're better than nothing, but they're difficult to maintain and generally less effective than an equivalent amount of HE would have been. The fact that Russia has resorted to using chemical weapons is a sign of desperation, not a sign that these are actually effective weapons. So far I believe all of the recent Russian advances have been credited to artillery and local air superiority, not to their use of chemical weapons.

I'm completely with you there. Refineries are obviously legitimate military targets, and I am struggling to understand why there is any controversy in Ukraine attacking them. I have never understood our prohibition on Ukraine using western weapons to attack targets inside internationally-recognized Russian territory (we don't care about what Russia thinks is Russian territory). But that isn't what Carolus was suggesting.

No. It will not lead to the eventual end of international law. International law might come to an end eventually, but it will not be because we stayed high. If anything, it might come to an end because we went low.
I think you are missing some very basic fundamentals about this war, the relative strength of modern day Russia and the west, how the modern world works in general, and a few realities of warfare.
1. It isn't about going high or low. Russia is making gains in Ukraine right now because there was a gap in western aid, not because the west is sticking to the high road. Now that fresh aid is on the way Russia's window to make significant gains is going to come to a close, even if they keep going low. It will not reopen unless there is another gap in western aid. It has absolutely nothing to do with going high or low. Russia going low is not giving them an advantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is. Us going high is not putting Ukraine at a disadvantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is.
2. The west is massively more powerful than Russia. The US GDP in 2022 was ten times the Russian GDP. The combined members of NATO (including the US) have twenty times the Russian GDP. If you add in our Pacific and Asian allies it comes out to thirty times the Russian GDP. Now, as we have been painfully learning over the last two years, overwhelming economic superiority does not instantly or automatically translate to a superiority in military industrial production. But, as I expect Russia to very painfully learn over the next (I'm throwing out a guess here, based largely on the mediocrity principle, that we're right smack dab in the middle of this thing) two years, it does translate to a greater potential to expand military industrial production. And it translates to greater economic endurance. Russia cannot keep up current levels of spending forever. The west can keep up current levels of aid to Ukraine (or even many times the current levels of aid in monetary terms) pretty much forever. So the west absolutely has the capability to enable Ukraine to win. The only factor is western will to continue supporting Ukraine, and to hopefully expand support for Ukraine. Provided that western will to support Ukraine doesn't break, it is impossible for Russia to win even if they go low and we stay high. Going low or high isn't even a factor.
3. Going high isn't just about principle, it's where our strength comes from. I mean that literally, not in the vague feel-good sense in which the power of love somehow enables the heroes of a story to overcome impossible odds. Our strength (both military and economic) is literally derived from our alliances, our credibility, and the rules based international order. The United States has a massive network of alliances. You may notice that China and Russia, both of which are far more willing to go low, come up a little short on allies.
4. Going low doesn't actually work. This may be a bit difficult to grasp, particularly since we've been inundated with pessimists who think they're realists for so many years. But just because something is dirty or unethical doesn't make it effective. As one example, Russian assassinations on British soil were probably a factor in why the British have been so enthusiastic in providing support for Ukraine (the small amount of material they've provided has more to do with a lack of material to provide than with a lack of will to provide it). As another example, I have been reading about increasing use by the Russians of chemical weapons in Ukraine. These are outlawed in warfare under international law, so is about as clear a case of going low as you could imagine. But there are reasons why it was so much easier to outlaw the use of chemical weapons in warfare than it was to outlaw the use of, for example, cluster munitions. Chief among them is that cluster munitions are extremely effective, while chemical weapons aren't particularly effective. It was easy to outlaw chemical weapons because their cruelty is far out of proportion to their battlefield utility. They're better than nothing, but they're difficult to maintain and generally less effective than an equivalent amount of HE would have been. The fact that Russia has resorted to using chemical weapons is a sign of desperation, not a sign that these are actually effective weapons. So far I believe all of the recent Russian advances have been credited to artillery and local air superiority, not to their use of chemical weapons.

Even if this approach didn't backfire, which it almost certainly would, we would be winning by defeating the whole point of winning. I think most people here, myself included, want Ukraine to win for Ukraine's sake. But from the West's perspective the whole point of supporting Ukraine is to uphold international law. You can't uphold international law by breaking international law. We would be "winning" by maximizing the defeat of our own political objectives, giving us an outcome even worse for us than if we had lost.

I'm completely with you there. Refineries are obviously legitimate military targets, and I am struggling to understand why there is any controversy in Ukraine attacking them. I have never understood our prohibition on Ukraine using western weapons to attack targets inside internationally-recognized Russian territory (we don't care about what Russia thinks is Russian territory). But that isn't what Carolus was suggesting.

Even if this approach didn't backfire, which it almost certainly would, we would be winning by defeating the whole point of winning. I think most people here, myself included, want Ukraine to win for Ukraine's sake. But from the West's perspective the whole point of supporting Ukraine is to uphold international law. You can't uphold international law by breaking international law. We would be "winning" by maximizing the defeat of our own political objectives, giving us an outcome even worse for us than if we had lost.

I'm completely with you there. Refineries are obviously legitimate military targets, and I am struggling to understand why there is any controversy in Ukraine attacking them. I have never understood our prohibition on Ukraine using western weapons to attack targets inside internationally-recognized Russian territory (we don't care about what Russia thinks is Russian territory). But that isn't what Carolus was suggesting.

ISW was reporting as far back as March that Russia was planning large scale information operations that would continue through May. So I'm not surprised.

ISW was reporting as far back as March that Russia was planning large scale information operations that would continue through May. So I'm not surprised.

I'm completely with you there. Refineries are obviously legitimate military targets, and I am struggling to understand why there is any controversy in Ukraine attacking them. I have never understood our prohibition on Ukraine using western weapons to attack targets inside internationally-recognized Russian territory (we don't care about what Russia thinks is Russian territory). But that isn't what Carolus was suggesting.

I'm completely with you there. Refineries are obviously legitimate military targets, and I am struggling to understand why there is any controversy in Ukraine attacking them. I have never understood our prohibition on Ukraine using western weapons to attack targets inside internationally-recognized Russian territory (we don't care about what Russia thinks is Russian territory). But that isn't what Carolus was suggesting.

Even if this approach didn't backfire, which it almost certainly would, we would be winning by defeating the whole point of winning. I think most people here, myself included, want Ukraine to win for Ukraine's sake. But from the West's perspective the whole point of supporting Ukraine is to uphold international law. You can't uphold international law by breaking international law. We would be "winning" by maximizing the defeat of our own political objectives, giving us an outcome even worse for us than if we had lost.

Gonna weigh in here, so what we are dancing around here is political warfare/subversive warfare/active measures/stick-a-new-label-on-it-and-claim-it-was-my-idea.
Is it an option space...sure.  There are actions we could take in the backfield to create strategic friction and disruption, we could even engineer paralysis - it has been done to us.  But this is the last thing from an "easy button."
Subversive warfare campaigns take years to setup - mapping, testing and simply keeping up with internal shifts in an opponents human systems would cripple our current intelligence agencies. We had this back during the Cold War - and we all remember how well CIA follies went in places like Cuba. This is extremely tricky work, even with advent that human terrain mapping is technically "easier" in the information age (it really isn't). 
Assuming you can get enough awareness to even start to play this game, the risks are high.  Human systems are non-linear and potentially explosively auto-catalytic. Subversive warfare has more in common with bomb disposal than anything else - a bunch of barely evolved primates armed with the internet is not a cave one walks into lightly.
And then there is the target.  Free democracies are incredibly messy, but we are resilient as hell compared to rigid autocratic societies.  Dictators have single points of failure that when tripped can get out of hand really fast.  We have talked a lot about a coherent theory of Russian failure.  For subversive warfare - like somehow convincing and supporting Georgia with active SOF and CIA - we could see things get out of hand and out of control very quickly.  No politician is going to sign off on - "Well we are not sure but it might result in Russia falling apart. You know...for Ukraine."  Much more likely given our woeful inexperience it will blow up publicly in our faces.  We cannot take a big "sh#t on the floor at the UN", it is the bloody house we built.
Finally, these sorts of actions are more about strategic shaping for negotiation advantage, not really winning a proxy war.  No single harassing ship sinking is going to force Russia to the table - however, it may very well drive support into Putin's arms and allow him to actually mobilize.  Covert and clandestine in the modern age is a lot harder.  Most times Russia "gets away with it" is not because we can't figure it out, it is because we cannot be bothered.  If Putin wants an oligarch to prove the laws of gravity in another country, do we really care?  Diddling our democracy is finally getting eyebrows raised but no one yet thinks it has been much more than an accelerant, not a cause.  No right wing nut jobs stormed the Hill because Russia or China told them to.  Those powers likely made plays to help it along but this is not a evil masterplan...we are doing most of this to ourselves.
So what?  Well I am sure these options are on the whiteboard. And we very likely have some backfield muttering around potentially friendly power elites that we might be able to woo.  We have provided Ukraine with intel and support to make things happen, but it is all in a nicely controlled box.  We simply are not at the point where we are either able to, or want to "set Russia ablaze."  Nor am I sure we want to escalate to that point anytime soon.
    

As we are expanding back to 1976 for BOAR, I can say that the Sheridan is definitely on the wish list of new vehicles.  And our wish list is looking good.
Oh and thanks for the kind words on Lions ‘79….

My trick has always been (available forces permitting) to bring in multiple teams so that I have one team in each of the surrounding action squares in the hope that one of them is the correct action square. That usually works out eventually, but it isn't a very efficient use of manpower. Your trick is probably better overall.
You're running the same mod I am which alters the bases to be more intuitive (I don't remember which mod this is, it might be part of the arrow bases mod, but I have so many that it's hard to keep track). I've been using it for so long that it's easy to forget that isn't what the vanilla bases look like. People who aren't running any mods won't be seeing a + for wounded and skull for dead. They'll just see a light red circle for wounded, and a dark red circle for dead IIRC.

Indeed. My trick to getting to those hard to reach guys is to move a team next to them and then give that team a slow move to another square such that the move path goes right over top of the casualty. I'l make that order a long as needed to line things up. Then I pause in the adjacent square for 45s (if my guys are already in the next square) or shorter depending on how long I figure it will take to get there.
Then next turn I cancel the move order. Usually that is either perfect or near enough that my guys can help out the casualty.
When I do this I position the camera low and right with the aid team that way next turn I don't forget to cancel the move order. Yeah done that a few times makes buddy aid exhausting and super long - nut just for me :-).

CMBN BP1 on the Battlefront website is currently $10. CMRT BP1 is also $10. I don't speak for Battlefront, but my guess is that it will probably be $10.

CMBN BP1 on the Battlefront website is currently $10. CMRT BP1 is also $10. I don't speak for Battlefront, but my guess is that it will probably be $10.

That's a good observation. You would expect the casualty rate to jump up and down with major battles, lulls, and mass surrenders, rather than be completely smooth over time. Which means that either this video has greatly simplified things, or there is some reason why our expectations don't quite align with reality in this case. Either of those is possible, but I think the burden of proof rests on anyone who wants to assert the latter.

That's a good observation. You would expect the casualty rate to jump up and down with major battles, lulls, and mass surrenders, rather than be completely smooth over time. Which means that either this video has greatly simplified things, or there is some reason why our expectations don't quite align with reality in this case. Either of those is possible, but I think the burden of proof rests on anyone who wants to assert the latter.

The long wait is over! BP2 has a real date!
Time to get into mindset, I'm re-reading Joseph Balkoski's Utah Beach.
https://www.matrixgames.com/news/combat-mission-battle-for-normandy-battle-pack-2-out-on-d-day

https://www.matrixgames.com/game/combat-mission-battle-for-normandy-battle-pack-2

Don't forget that a VERY significant part of casualties came from prisoners, which are obviously much more numerous on the losing side (here, the defending one).
The case of the battle for Cherbourg is significant. According to the wiki page of the battle, the US forces lost 22 000 men in this battle, against 38 000 for the German. Of the German tally, 30 000 were captured. Which means that, if you remove the prisoners from the casualties, the US attackers suffered MUCH more losses than the German defenders (22k to 7 or 8k, that's 3 to 1), even though the battle was fought under total air superiority and at naval gun range for the most part.
By the way, however spectacular and technically well done, I find the video poorly convincing from this point of view (casualties seem to be spread out smoothly  over time with no major increase during major battles or after significant surrenders).

There was an attempt at an Arracourt campaign/scenario pack, it kind of fizzled out.

You can follow the conversation here:
HTH