holoween

Youre not looking then.
In international relations intentions cant be known and can change so you have to base decisions on capabilities.
NATO massively outmatches russia in conventional military power so were they to decide to attack russia has little i could do except nuclear excalation. Having buffer states makes it harder for NATO offensive actions since no forward supply depos can be established early.
Now you and i know that NATO has no intentions of ever attacking russia but as pointed out above that could change. Just like NATO was worried about the Warsaw pact because they did have the capability to possibly successfully invade europe even though they might never have wanted to.

IIRC he was specifically describing a delaying action and in that case it could make sense.
But more like
-dismount infantry in a good defensive position and let them start to dig in.
-move tanks and ifvs forward so they can start engaging early forcing the soviets to deploy then fall back
-repeat until you reach the infantries positions for a proper defense
timed well this could allow the attrition of the CRP and FSE of a soviet MRR and set them up attacking with the main body into your prepared defenses without much recon and preparation and then giving you time to withdraw during the night or prepare a counterattack.
I have however never seen this discussed or put in practice outside of the article you mentioned and it would only be really usefull for this specific purpose.
This seems to be the actual employment most of the time

IIRC he was specifically describing a delaying action and in that case it could make sense.
But more like
-dismount infantry in a good defensive position and let them start to dig in.
-move tanks and ifvs forward so they can start engaging early forcing the soviets to deploy then fall back
-repeat until you reach the infantries positions for a proper defense
timed well this could allow the attrition of the CRP and FSE of a soviet MRR and set them up attacking with the main body into your prepared defenses without much recon and preparation and then giving you time to withdraw during the night or prepare a counterattack.
I have however never seen this discussed or put in practice outside of the article you mentioned and it would only be really usefull for this specific purpose.
This seems to be the actual employment most of the time

No because neither the greens nor the FDP have a good enough incentive to switch to the union. Id expect them to simply keep pressuring Scholz with the help of the union in parliament and take the voter boost theyll get from it.

I think youre making an assumption without realizing. You assume its impossible to defend against fires. To go with your comparison to naval war why hasnt the surface fleet been made obsolete even though long range anti ship missile exist and why do they still move as formations rather than far dispersed over the entire ocean? Simply put because their ability to shoot down incoming munitions especially with layered mutually supporting defensive fires.
1
Surprise on the strategic level has been dead since before ww1 yet it continues to happen even if its just because decision makers dont want to see it.
On the operational level it equally should be dead but it continues to not be because while you can track where a formation is you cant know what its intentions are (you can make assumtions but they can be wrong) and that is when youre not being fed wrong informations via decoys etc.
and on the tactical level its not even an argument. Even in afghanistan and iraq ambushes kept happening while almost perfect drone cover was available. And thats against troops that arent trained to expect and equipped to deal with constant themal imaging hangin above looking for them.
3
Id argue the exact opposite. Mass will become far more important. A dispersed infantry unit is easy pickings for weapons like switchblade. Sure you might need one weapon per soldier but thats not too difficult. If youre talking about a platoon of ifvs with aps that can cover each other the effort required to take them out increases massively. Its also easyer to defend this with air defense to reduce an oponents recon asstes effectiveness.
2
Manouver warfare is even more important than before. Because with both sides being able to see where the oponent is roughly the one that is able to move faster can create strength vs weakness engagements or avoid being put into them on the defense.
Again id say the exact opposite is true at least for terrain. Anyone moving in the open better have serious defensive capabilities or they will get quickly eliminated because they will be seen. Get into a city and suddenly not being seen from drones becomes trivial. For forests the drones have to come a whole lot closer and with proper camo it might still be impossible to detect stationary targets.

I dont buy the cant shoot down drones argument.
Autocannons with airburst rounds are quite capable in dealing with small drones. And short/medium range anti air missile are very easily capable of dealing with medium drones. The core of this threat is exactly the same as light ground attack aircraft during the cold war. Yes their weapons are more accurate but for aa they are a far easier target because the weapons carrying ones are big enough to easily spot with radar and unlike manned aircraft are far slower and less manouverable.
 

This is 100% true and the right thing to do...  in 1944 Normandies bocage.
In simple terms this is an infantry centric aproach. The infantry carries the battle supported by artillery and tanks. Its a low casualtie high munitions aproach that takes a lot of time.
If youre the Soviets in an attack through germany or any Nato country counterattacking you dont have that time. By the time you scouted a hill across the enemy has broken through and is rampaging in your backfield destroying your arty and supplies.
The cold war gone hot is a tank war. The tank forms the centerpiece of the battle. All other arms exist to maximise the tanks effect. Your recon is motorized to not slow the tank down. If that means the recon is recon by death then so be it as long as it shows where the enemy is (obviously its preferable to not die but its acceptable in the grand sceme). The Infantry is driving in AFVs to cover the areas tanks arent great in. Clear small villages, patches of forrest, etc. Artillery fire denies positions where ATGMs could be employed to disrupt the attack. Any strong resistance is simply bypassed and only cleared out by followon forces.

Except you cant do a proper berm drill because your tank wont see the target so you have to pop up and down hoping the tank will spot and shoot in time.

Are we talking about the same Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr? Because the Wehrmacht i know was quite enthusiastically giving out panzerfaust and panzerschreck to its units. The Bundeswehr following it did the same with the Carl Gustav and Pzf44 so them not expecting it would require some incredible institutional blindness.
Being a stopgap and not as good as wanted doesnt prevent it from being seen and employed as an IFV and drawing conclusions from its use. The wehrmacht proved quite capable of invading Poland and France with stopgap tanks.
In 1956 te Bundeswehr had barely started to exist, in 1967 it had IFVs in use for 7 years and in 1973 it was on its second generation IFV.
That BMPs werent following the tanks says more about the combined arms coordination than the vehicle used. It actually shows a quite bleak picture for Syrian officers competence and therefore calls taking the lessons lerned by Israel at face value into question.
During the second gulf war the initial Iraqi positions were well prepared but mostly destroyed by artillery. The 2008 and 2014 wars saw russian troops mostly counterattacking units on the offensive.
I find the assertion that fighting into a well-prepared and well-defended position is a flawed metric for judging an IFVs value. They enable highly mobile operations which are far more effective in winning fights. No matter how well prepared and defended your positions are they can be broken as evidenced during WW2.
 
Also some interesting loss statistics from those middle eastern wars:
Second gulf war 1,487 tanks, 1,384 infantry fighting vehicles Employed by US troops resulting in 31 tanks destroyed/disabled and 28 Bradley IFVs destroyed/damaged indicating an equal chance of being knocked out.
For the 1982 Lebanon war For Israel its 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers employed 130 tanks destroyed/damaged and 175 APCs destroyed/damaged.
This suggests that on a large scale tanks arent much more survivable than IFVs.
Primary threat are IEDs, light anti tank weapons, far heavier and less mobile than their immediate laternative, used primarily in very rough ground or cities against oponents that reach at best western light infantry standards.
Biggest difference is that the Namer weighs 60tons and is supposed to also be usable in conventional war.
Also my initial statement was somewhat exagerated so this isnt the hill ill die on.
 
Here is my main problem though and where i wonder why you didnt adress my first post at all.
I pointed out issues i have with your method of reaching your conclusion specifically possible weaknesses in the ruleset you used based on your description of what happened. I dont know the ruleset but when my irl experience clashes with my wargaming experience i first question if my wargaming experience has any possible flaws causing the results. You take the results as is without examining the ruleset for possible issues.
Your conclusion might very well be correct but it contradicts practically all modern armies with all their combined experience so the burden of proof is on your end to show youre right and everyone else is wrong and you present very little hard evidence. What you present is wargaming under one specific ruleset modified by yourself against the same oponent and to validate you use one military not using IFVs where there might be other reasons involved as i pointed out. At least for me that is not enough so id be quite happy if you could actually clarify.
Thank you for the replies so far. Its highly unusual to be able to discuss a book like this with its author so its much apreciated.

Now the Next interesting topic is how you chose to validate your results namely with the one exception among major armies that doesnt use IFVs Israel.
"The only army to have much experience of APC operations in regular war did not adopt IFVs." p.122
Historically its actually exactly the opposite. The army with the most experience using APCs being the wehrmacht with the SdKfz 251 literally starting ww2 with an APC. And as soon as the Bundeswehr formed they went for getting an IFV with the HS 30 8 years ahead of the BMP1.
Out of all major militaries Israel is actually the exception in not having an IFV.
So lets examine what could have lead to this and what they are using instead.
The area Israel has to fight in has generally quite rough terrain and a fairly high number of highly build up areas. This generally puts a higher emphasis on the dismounts. It also decreases the value of the added speed of advance IFVs can give formations. Israel also had a fairly long history of Insurgency fighting where IFVs also tend to not excel (compare Iraq occupation) though htats straying away from the regular war narative.
Interestingly as much as the Arab Israeli wars were studied by Soviets and Nato alike neither abandoned their IFVs. The biggest influence being the development of BMP2. Curiously with 1 fewer dismounts compared to BMP1 so lack of dismounted infantry wasnt the takeaway.
What seems to be far more influential is that Israel maintains an army of a size it can only afford due to extensive military aid and during the cold war the same was true of its oponents. Its main aid contributor was the US which for the time of Israels major wars simply didnt own IFVs and so couldnt sell them but istead sold APCs. At that point Israel also had very limited AFV production capability so the combination of essentially free APCs and production of IFVs eating into the tank numbers its obviously the better choice to not produce IFVs.
To feed into this the heavy APCs build were primarily captured or outdaatet tank chassis repurposed and only with the Namer did they produce them from the ground up resulting in far lower numbers than they would like. These heavy APCs also face primarily Insurgents not a regular army so are in purpose closer to the modern US MRAP.
IFVs have also been used in several regular wars (2nd and 3rd gulf war, 2008 Georgian war and 2014 in Ukraine). So far they all seem to have accounted quite well for themselves seeing as no unser advocated to stop using them.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

Are we talking about the same Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr? Because the Wehrmacht i know was quite enthusiastically giving out panzerfaust and panzerschreck to its units. The Bundeswehr following it did the same with the Carl Gustav and Pzf44 so them not expecting it would require some incredible institutional blindness.
Being a stopgap and not as good as wanted doesnt prevent it from being seen and employed as an IFV and drawing conclusions from its use. The wehrmacht proved quite capable of invading Poland and France with stopgap tanks.
In 1956 te Bundeswehr had barely started to exist, in 1967 it had IFVs in use for 7 years and in 1973 it was on its second generation IFV.
That BMPs werent following the tanks says more about the combined arms coordination than the vehicle used. It actually shows a quite bleak picture for Syrian officers competence and therefore calls taking the lessons lerned by Israel at face value into question.
During the second gulf war the initial Iraqi positions were well prepared but mostly destroyed by artillery. The 2008 and 2014 wars saw russian troops mostly counterattacking units on the offensive.
I find the assertion that fighting into a well-prepared and well-defended position is a flawed metric for judging an IFVs value. They enable highly mobile operations which are far more effective in winning fights. No matter how well prepared and defended your positions are they can be broken as evidenced during WW2.
 
Also some interesting loss statistics from those middle eastern wars:
Second gulf war 1,487 tanks, 1,384 infantry fighting vehicles Employed by US troops resulting in 31 tanks destroyed/disabled and 28 Bradley IFVs destroyed/damaged indicating an equal chance of being knocked out.
For the 1982 Lebanon war For Israel its 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers employed 130 tanks destroyed/damaged and 175 APCs destroyed/damaged.
This suggests that on a large scale tanks arent much more survivable than IFVs.
Primary threat are IEDs, light anti tank weapons, far heavier and less mobile than their immediate laternative, used primarily in very rough ground or cities against oponents that reach at best western light infantry standards.
Biggest difference is that the Namer weighs 60tons and is supposed to also be usable in conventional war.
Also my initial statement was somewhat exagerated so this isnt the hill ill die on.
 
Here is my main problem though and where i wonder why you didnt adress my first post at all.
I pointed out issues i have with your method of reaching your conclusion specifically possible weaknesses in the ruleset you used based on your description of what happened. I dont know the ruleset but when my irl experience clashes with my wargaming experience i first question if my wargaming experience has any possible flaws causing the results. You take the results as is without examining the ruleset for possible issues.
Your conclusion might very well be correct but it contradicts practically all modern armies with all their combined experience so the burden of proof is on your end to show youre right and everyone else is wrong and you present very little hard evidence. What you present is wargaming under one specific ruleset modified by yourself against the same oponent and to validate you use one military not using IFVs where there might be other reasons involved as i pointed out. At least for me that is not enough so id be quite happy if you could actually clarify.
Thank you for the replies so far. Its highly unusual to be able to discuss a book like this with its author so its much apreciated.

Are we talking about the same Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr? Because the Wehrmacht i know was quite enthusiastically giving out panzerfaust and panzerschreck to its units. The Bundeswehr following it did the same with the Carl Gustav and Pzf44 so them not expecting it would require some incredible institutional blindness.
Being a stopgap and not as good as wanted doesnt prevent it from being seen and employed as an IFV and drawing conclusions from its use. The wehrmacht proved quite capable of invading Poland and France with stopgap tanks.
In 1956 te Bundeswehr had barely started to exist, in 1967 it had IFVs in use for 7 years and in 1973 it was on its second generation IFV.
That BMPs werent following the tanks says more about the combined arms coordination than the vehicle used. It actually shows a quite bleak picture for Syrian officers competence and therefore calls taking the lessons lerned by Israel at face value into question.
During the second gulf war the initial Iraqi positions were well prepared but mostly destroyed by artillery. The 2008 and 2014 wars saw russian troops mostly counterattacking units on the offensive.
I find the assertion that fighting into a well-prepared and well-defended position is a flawed metric for judging an IFVs value. They enable highly mobile operations which are far more effective in winning fights. No matter how well prepared and defended your positions are they can be broken as evidenced during WW2.
 
Also some interesting loss statistics from those middle eastern wars:
Second gulf war 1,487 tanks, 1,384 infantry fighting vehicles Employed by US troops resulting in 31 tanks destroyed/disabled and 28 Bradley IFVs destroyed/damaged indicating an equal chance of being knocked out.
For the 1982 Lebanon war For Israel its 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers employed 130 tanks destroyed/damaged and 175 APCs destroyed/damaged.
This suggests that on a large scale tanks arent much more survivable than IFVs.
Primary threat are IEDs, light anti tank weapons, far heavier and less mobile than their immediate laternative, used primarily in very rough ground or cities against oponents that reach at best western light infantry standards.
Biggest difference is that the Namer weighs 60tons and is supposed to also be usable in conventional war.
Also my initial statement was somewhat exagerated so this isnt the hill ill die on.
 
Here is my main problem though and where i wonder why you didnt adress my first post at all.
I pointed out issues i have with your method of reaching your conclusion specifically possible weaknesses in the ruleset you used based on your description of what happened. I dont know the ruleset but when my irl experience clashes with my wargaming experience i first question if my wargaming experience has any possible flaws causing the results. You take the results as is without examining the ruleset for possible issues.
Your conclusion might very well be correct but it contradicts practically all modern armies with all their combined experience so the burden of proof is on your end to show youre right and everyone else is wrong and you present very little hard evidence. What you present is wargaming under one specific ruleset modified by yourself against the same oponent and to validate you use one military not using IFVs where there might be other reasons involved as i pointed out. At least for me that is not enough so id be quite happy if you could actually clarify.
Thank you for the replies so far. Its highly unusual to be able to discuss a book like this with its author so its much apreciated.

Are we talking about the same Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr? Because the Wehrmacht i know was quite enthusiastically giving out panzerfaust and panzerschreck to its units. The Bundeswehr following it did the same with the Carl Gustav and Pzf44 so them not expecting it would require some incredible institutional blindness.
Being a stopgap and not as good as wanted doesnt prevent it from being seen and employed as an IFV and drawing conclusions from its use. The wehrmacht proved quite capable of invading Poland and France with stopgap tanks.
In 1956 te Bundeswehr had barely started to exist, in 1967 it had IFVs in use for 7 years and in 1973 it was on its second generation IFV.
That BMPs werent following the tanks says more about the combined arms coordination than the vehicle used. It actually shows a quite bleak picture for Syrian officers competence and therefore calls taking the lessons lerned by Israel at face value into question.
During the second gulf war the initial Iraqi positions were well prepared but mostly destroyed by artillery. The 2008 and 2014 wars saw russian troops mostly counterattacking units on the offensive.
I find the assertion that fighting into a well-prepared and well-defended position is a flawed metric for judging an IFVs value. They enable highly mobile operations which are far more effective in winning fights. No matter how well prepared and defended your positions are they can be broken as evidenced during WW2.
 
Also some interesting loss statistics from those middle eastern wars:
Second gulf war 1,487 tanks, 1,384 infantry fighting vehicles Employed by US troops resulting in 31 tanks destroyed/disabled and 28 Bradley IFVs destroyed/damaged indicating an equal chance of being knocked out.
For the 1982 Lebanon war For Israel its 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers employed 130 tanks destroyed/damaged and 175 APCs destroyed/damaged.
This suggests that on a large scale tanks arent much more survivable than IFVs.
Primary threat are IEDs, light anti tank weapons, far heavier and less mobile than their immediate laternative, used primarily in very rough ground or cities against oponents that reach at best western light infantry standards.
Biggest difference is that the Namer weighs 60tons and is supposed to also be usable in conventional war.
Also my initial statement was somewhat exagerated so this isnt the hill ill die on.
 
Here is my main problem though and where i wonder why you didnt adress my first post at all.
I pointed out issues i have with your method of reaching your conclusion specifically possible weaknesses in the ruleset you used based on your description of what happened. I dont know the ruleset but when my irl experience clashes with my wargaming experience i first question if my wargaming experience has any possible flaws causing the results. You take the results as is without examining the ruleset for possible issues.
Your conclusion might very well be correct but it contradicts practically all modern armies with all their combined experience so the burden of proof is on your end to show youre right and everyone else is wrong and you present very little hard evidence. What you present is wargaming under one specific ruleset modified by yourself against the same oponent and to validate you use one military not using IFVs where there might be other reasons involved as i pointed out. At least for me that is not enough so id be quite happy if you could actually clarify.
Thank you for the replies so far. Its highly unusual to be able to discuss a book like this with its author so its much apreciated.

Are we talking about the same Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr? Because the Wehrmacht i know was quite enthusiastically giving out panzerfaust and panzerschreck to its units. The Bundeswehr following it did the same with the Carl Gustav and Pzf44 so them not expecting it would require some incredible institutional blindness.
Being a stopgap and not as good as wanted doesnt prevent it from being seen and employed as an IFV and drawing conclusions from its use. The wehrmacht proved quite capable of invading Poland and France with stopgap tanks.
In 1956 te Bundeswehr had barely started to exist, in 1967 it had IFVs in use for 7 years and in 1973 it was on its second generation IFV.
That BMPs werent following the tanks says more about the combined arms coordination than the vehicle used. It actually shows a quite bleak picture for Syrian officers competence and therefore calls taking the lessons lerned by Israel at face value into question.
During the second gulf war the initial Iraqi positions were well prepared but mostly destroyed by artillery. The 2008 and 2014 wars saw russian troops mostly counterattacking units on the offensive.
I find the assertion that fighting into a well-prepared and well-defended position is a flawed metric for judging an IFVs value. They enable highly mobile operations which are far more effective in winning fights. No matter how well prepared and defended your positions are they can be broken as evidenced during WW2.
 
Also some interesting loss statistics from those middle eastern wars:
Second gulf war 1,487 tanks, 1,384 infantry fighting vehicles Employed by US troops resulting in 31 tanks destroyed/disabled and 28 Bradley IFVs destroyed/damaged indicating an equal chance of being knocked out.
For the 1982 Lebanon war For Israel its 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers employed 130 tanks destroyed/damaged and 175 APCs destroyed/damaged.
This suggests that on a large scale tanks arent much more survivable than IFVs.
Primary threat are IEDs, light anti tank weapons, far heavier and less mobile than their immediate laternative, used primarily in very rough ground or cities against oponents that reach at best western light infantry standards.
Biggest difference is that the Namer weighs 60tons and is supposed to also be usable in conventional war.
Also my initial statement was somewhat exagerated so this isnt the hill ill die on.
 
Here is my main problem though and where i wonder why you didnt adress my first post at all.
I pointed out issues i have with your method of reaching your conclusion specifically possible weaknesses in the ruleset you used based on your description of what happened. I dont know the ruleset but when my irl experience clashes with my wargaming experience i first question if my wargaming experience has any possible flaws causing the results. You take the results as is without examining the ruleset for possible issues.
Your conclusion might very well be correct but it contradicts practically all modern armies with all their combined experience so the burden of proof is on your end to show youre right and everyone else is wrong and you present very little hard evidence. What you present is wargaming under one specific ruleset modified by yourself against the same oponent and to validate you use one military not using IFVs where there might be other reasons involved as i pointed out. At least for me that is not enough so id be quite happy if you could actually clarify.
Thank you for the replies so far. Its highly unusual to be able to discuss a book like this with its author so its much apreciated.

I havent noticed Soviet tanks to be particularly blind though somewhat less attentive. However the randomness of CM spotting is far more noticable so id say most issues being brought up is people expecting far more than reasonable.

Are we talking about the same Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr? Because the Wehrmacht i know was quite enthusiastically giving out panzerfaust and panzerschreck to its units. The Bundeswehr following it did the same with the Carl Gustav and Pzf44 so them not expecting it would require some incredible institutional blindness.
Being a stopgap and not as good as wanted doesnt prevent it from being seen and employed as an IFV and drawing conclusions from its use. The wehrmacht proved quite capable of invading Poland and France with stopgap tanks.
In 1956 te Bundeswehr had barely started to exist, in 1967 it had IFVs in use for 7 years and in 1973 it was on its second generation IFV.
That BMPs werent following the tanks says more about the combined arms coordination than the vehicle used. It actually shows a quite bleak picture for Syrian officers competence and therefore calls taking the lessons lerned by Israel at face value into question.
During the second gulf war the initial Iraqi positions were well prepared but mostly destroyed by artillery. The 2008 and 2014 wars saw russian troops mostly counterattacking units on the offensive.
I find the assertion that fighting into a well-prepared and well-defended position is a flawed metric for judging an IFVs value. They enable highly mobile operations which are far more effective in winning fights. No matter how well prepared and defended your positions are they can be broken as evidenced during WW2.
 
Also some interesting loss statistics from those middle eastern wars:
Second gulf war 1,487 tanks, 1,384 infantry fighting vehicles Employed by US troops resulting in 31 tanks destroyed/disabled and 28 Bradley IFVs destroyed/damaged indicating an equal chance of being knocked out.
For the 1982 Lebanon war For Israel its 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers employed 130 tanks destroyed/damaged and 175 APCs destroyed/damaged.
This suggests that on a large scale tanks arent much more survivable than IFVs.
Primary threat are IEDs, light anti tank weapons, far heavier and less mobile than their immediate laternative, used primarily in very rough ground or cities against oponents that reach at best western light infantry standards.
Biggest difference is that the Namer weighs 60tons and is supposed to also be usable in conventional war.
Also my initial statement was somewhat exagerated so this isnt the hill ill die on.
 
Here is my main problem though and where i wonder why you didnt adress my first post at all.
I pointed out issues i have with your method of reaching your conclusion specifically possible weaknesses in the ruleset you used based on your description of what happened. I dont know the ruleset but when my irl experience clashes with my wargaming experience i first question if my wargaming experience has any possible flaws causing the results. You take the results as is without examining the ruleset for possible issues.
Your conclusion might very well be correct but it contradicts practically all modern armies with all their combined experience so the burden of proof is on your end to show youre right and everyone else is wrong and you present very little hard evidence. What you present is wargaming under one specific ruleset modified by yourself against the same oponent and to validate you use one military not using IFVs where there might be other reasons involved as i pointed out. At least for me that is not enough so id be quite happy if you could actually clarify.
Thank you for the replies so far. Its highly unusual to be able to discuss a book like this with its author so its much apreciated.

This is 100% true and the right thing to do...  in 1944 Normandies bocage.
In simple terms this is an infantry centric aproach. The infantry carries the battle supported by artillery and tanks. Its a low casualtie high munitions aproach that takes a lot of time.
If youre the Soviets in an attack through germany or any Nato country counterattacking you dont have that time. By the time you scouted a hill across the enemy has broken through and is rampaging in your backfield destroying your arty and supplies.
The cold war gone hot is a tank war. The tank forms the centerpiece of the battle. All other arms exist to maximise the tanks effect. Your recon is motorized to not slow the tank down. If that means the recon is recon by death then so be it as long as it shows where the enemy is (obviously its preferable to not die but its acceptable in the grand sceme). The Infantry is driving in AFVs to cover the areas tanks arent great in. Clear small villages, patches of forrest, etc. Artillery fire denies positions where ATGMs could be employed to disrupt the attack. Any strong resistance is simply bypassed and only cleared out by followon forces.

Ah, well and of course UH and Rice agree with you...wait a minute can you point to the timestamp in the video where they do?
The Soviet T62s did get pretty mauled due to spotting abilities....just like they did in the Gulf War:
"The lack of high powered optics, thermal sights and ballistic computers of Iraqi tanks compared to their adversaries made the T-62 and other Iraqi armoured fighting vehicles extremely vulnerable and unable to retaliate against Coalition vehicles. The Iraqi 3rd Armored Division alone lost about a hundred T-62 tanks" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-62...wiki no less, how hard is it to look up freakin wiki?)  Oh wait there is more:
"The turret also cannot be traversed with the driver's hatch open. Although the tank commander may override the gunner and traverse the turret, he cannot fire the main gun from his position. He is also unable to override the gunner in the elevation of the main gun, causing target acquisition problems."
"The tank uses the same sights and vision devices as the T-55 except for the gunner, who received a new TSh-2B-41 sight which has x4 or x7 magnification. It is mounted coaxially with an optic rangefinder"
And because I think amateur hour is finally over:
"As might be expected, the authority of the platoon leader is even more restricted. He is not authorized to transmit on the radio except in an extreme emergency or to request support. This communications posture is consistent with his role, which is to lead his platoon in the execution of the company mission. He does not have the responsibility to translate his superiors' mission into a platoon mission. The noncommissioned tank commander monitors and complies with his superiors' commands and follows his platoon leader in the execution of the company mission. Since he is not issued a map, he has limited capability to relay targets of opportunity to fire support units." (https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf)
So when one does game engine design one goes down to the sub-systems of each vehicle in question.  You then assign values to each of those sub-systems based on the available historical data that get incorporated into the design.  So for example for the T62 we could have:
Optics (see the target) - roughly inline with the T55, post WW2 but barely.  Noted historical poor performance in Gulf War.
Targeting (shoot and hit the target) - noted issues between gunner and crew commander, no targeting computer system
Crew Conditions - a brutally cramped and ergonomic nightmare
Command and Control (ability for target hand-off by others) - very limited by doctrine and training.
Ok, let's stack all that up and weigh it against one loud opinion on the forum who has not bother to post a single fact to back up his opinion...hmm.

This is 100% true and the right thing to do...  in 1944 Normandies bocage.
In simple terms this is an infantry centric aproach. The infantry carries the battle supported by artillery and tanks. Its a low casualtie high munitions aproach that takes a lot of time.
If youre the Soviets in an attack through germany or any Nato country counterattacking you dont have that time. By the time you scouted a hill across the enemy has broken through and is rampaging in your backfield destroying your arty and supplies.
The cold war gone hot is a tank war. The tank forms the centerpiece of the battle. All other arms exist to maximise the tanks effect. Your recon is motorized to not slow the tank down. If that means the recon is recon by death then so be it as long as it shows where the enemy is (obviously its preferable to not die but its acceptable in the grand sceme). The Infantry is driving in AFVs to cover the areas tanks arent great in. Clear small villages, patches of forrest, etc. Artillery fire denies positions where ATGMs could be employed to disrupt the attack. Any strong resistance is simply bypassed and only cleared out by followon forces.

Now the Next interesting topic is how you chose to validate your results namely with the one exception among major armies that doesnt use IFVs Israel.
"The only army to have much experience of APC operations in regular war did not adopt IFVs." p.122
Historically its actually exactly the opposite. The army with the most experience using APCs being the wehrmacht with the SdKfz 251 literally starting ww2 with an APC. And as soon as the Bundeswehr formed they went for getting an IFV with the HS 30 8 years ahead of the BMP1.
Out of all major militaries Israel is actually the exception in not having an IFV.
So lets examine what could have lead to this and what they are using instead.
The area Israel has to fight in has generally quite rough terrain and a fairly high number of highly build up areas. This generally puts a higher emphasis on the dismounts. It also decreases the value of the added speed of advance IFVs can give formations. Israel also had a fairly long history of Insurgency fighting where IFVs also tend to not excel (compare Iraq occupation) though htats straying away from the regular war narative.
Interestingly as much as the Arab Israeli wars were studied by Soviets and Nato alike neither abandoned their IFVs. The biggest influence being the development of BMP2. Curiously with 1 fewer dismounts compared to BMP1 so lack of dismounted infantry wasnt the takeaway.
What seems to be far more influential is that Israel maintains an army of a size it can only afford due to extensive military aid and during the cold war the same was true of its oponents. Its main aid contributor was the US which for the time of Israels major wars simply didnt own IFVs and so couldnt sell them but istead sold APCs. At that point Israel also had very limited AFV production capability so the combination of essentially free APCs and production of IFVs eating into the tank numbers its obviously the better choice to not produce IFVs.
To feed into this the heavy APCs build were primarily captured or outdaatet tank chassis repurposed and only with the Namer did they produce them from the ground up resulting in far lower numbers than they would like. These heavy APCs also face primarily Insurgents not a regular army so are in purpose closer to the modern US MRAP.
IFVs have also been used in several regular wars (2nd and 3rd gulf war, 2008 Georgian war and 2014 in Ukraine). So far they all seem to have accounted quite well for themselves seeing as no unser advocated to stop using them.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

I'll contribute to the above by providing some context from Storr's previous works. Storr probably got the idea to go anti-IFV after one of his contributors, William Owen, wrote an article and Storr replied to it. I'm supposed to cite these as:
Owen, William F., “Wrong Technology for the Wrong Tactics: The Infantry Fighting Vehicle”,
Military Operations, Volume 1, Issue No. 3, Winter 2012, pages 17-20. Storr, Jim, “Three Short Pieces”, Military Operations, Volume 1, Issue No. 4, Spring 2013, pages 23-26. In it, an IFV is defined as:
and the BMP-1 is called:
By that standard, the Schutzenpanzer HS30 is not an IFV. An IFV in this context might be defined as an infantry-carrying vehicle that has more weapons capability than can be fitted without massive tradeoffs in infantry complement, protection and/or cost (both procurement and training).
Also, the concern, either in Owen's article or Storr's reply the objection is not with the effectiveness of the on-board weapons, but the vulnerability of the vehicles and the attendant crippling of the formation's mobility due to the loss of infantry carrying capability.
Thus, for example in this context:
I'm going to guess what he meant to say is not that a dismounted 20mm or manpack ATGM launcher is "more resistant" than an IFV turret, or even much less visible as it commits to action, but that when you lose them at least you don't lose an infantry carrier (and consequent mobility) with it. 50% losses in dismounted heavy weapons means a proportionate lowering of firepower. Even 20% losses in IFVs means a disproportionate lowering of mobility unless you just cut off anybody who can't cram onto a surviving vehicle.
Re the point of suppression, if he's doing it in a wargame a significant difference will be how the wargame models this psychological factor. In previous works, Storr is of the opinion that the suppressive effect will be minimal unless it is very close to the target:
Storr, Jim, “The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat”, Rusi Defence Systems, June 2009, pages 44-46. If we assume that Storr believes autocannon fire works in similar fashion and works it into his wargame rules, then such area suppressive fires will be much less effective than in wargames assuming a larger acceptable miss radius for suppressive fire.
I agree, however, that the target priorities seem a clear point of suspicion in the conclusions. Who got to decide what gets shot at first in that wargame? My sense is that weapons on an IFV exploit the "shadow" created by the tanks. Certainly, if the infantry carriers are armed and they are shooting, they will move up in priority, but in theory they will be safe as long as they are not the most interesting choice - the theoretical optimum is that they make themselves as interesting as possible (by putting effective weapons fire on the enemy) without being more interesting than the tanks.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.